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ichardson's avowed intention in his novels was to offer moral 
instruction. Such an intention need not be based on an allegiance to 
any given system of religious belief, but Richardson himself characterized Clarissa as 
a `religious novel', designed to inculcate the doctrines of Christianity, and written in 
response to what he perceived as the increasingly godless temper of his times. 
This study takes as its starting-point Richardson's concern with that 
apparently irreligious temper of his age, and argues that his work offers not only a 
warning against moral laxity, but also an assertion of the validity of those theological 
concepts which were, at the time, facing an unprecedented challenge in the 
contentions of materialist and empiric philosophy. Accordingly, this study seeks to 
examine the nature of Richardson's religious beliefs, expressed both implicitly and 
explicitly in his novels, and to trace the origins of certain key theological concepts, 
integral to his work, which had been given successive codifications over seventeen 
hundred years of Christian thought. To this end, I have drawn on the writings of St. 
Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Calvin, and have sought to demonstrate that the 
concepts to which their thought gave form were reflected in the religious conduct 
books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It may be argued that it was 
through the mediation of such works that Richardson assimilated the Christian 
notions of reason, grace and will in the forms that were unchallenged until the 
Enlightenment. 
Finally, since Richardson intended that the heroine of his religious novel 
should be both a saint and an exemplar to her sex, this study seeks to draw some 
conclusions about the nature of his presentation of sanctity, and to examine some of 
the complexities which may trouble the reader in considering Richardson's portrayal 
of his saintly heroine. 
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A Note on Texts 
The editions of Richardson's works used in this study are as 
follows 
Clarissa, ed. by Angus Ross (]London: Penguin, 1985) 
Clarissa, 4 vols (London: Dent 1962) 
Pamela, ed. by Peter Sabor (London: Penguin, 1980, re]pr. 1985) 
Sir Charles Grandison, ed. by Jocelyn Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
This study is based on the first edition, edited by Angus Ross, but some reference 
is made to the third edition, published in four volumes by Dent. 
6 
Introduction 
larissa, generally acknowledged to be Richardson's masterpiece, has 
enjoyed the most wide-spread attention of his three novels, and has 
been the subject of a vast number of differing interpretations and approaches. In his 
own day, Edward Young approvingly wrote to his correspondent, Mrs Delany, to the 
effect that the novel offered a pattern for female dutý1), while in contrast, a modern 
commentator has seen the work as providing a devastating critique of a socio- 
economic system in which the rights of the individual, especially those of the female 
individual, to some degree of self-determination in the matter of self-disposal were 
subordinated to the demands of family aggrandizement and social expectation. (2) The 
contrast in response represents a radical shift in religious and political notions as to 
how the terms 'rights' and 'duties' are to be interpreted in relation to the individual in 
society. It was not therefore, to be expected that the author, however carefully he 
monitored the reception of his novel, could ever determine, once and for all, any 
definitive interpretation. Accordingly, since Richardson's time, and particularly since 
the revival of interest in his work over the recent past, reinterpretations have 
proliferated to the extent that it would be virtually impossible to arrive at any 
complete consensus of opinion on the novel, except to acknowledge its greatness. 
For one commentator Richardson's novels are remarkable for their exploration of the 
sexual dilemmas of the heroines, (3) while for another the focus of his work is the 
ý4ý tension between absolute and relative moral values. 
Likewise, Clarissa herself may be interpreted as the victim of a patriarchal 
oppression, or of the social and economic conditions of the day, or again, as a proto- 
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feminist heroine claiming the right not to be subjected, as a piece of property, to the 
disposal of others. Her conduct may be explored in relation to the psychology of 
eating disorders as a response to a familial situation which deprives her of any control 
of her own life, (5) or as representative of the pattern of Puritan aspirations to 
sainthood. (6) She may be seen as the creator in her letters of her own deceptive and 
self-deceiving text in response to that of Lovelace, (7) or as a text in herself, written by 
others, or even as a text re-written by herself so as to become a version of the word of 
God. (8 Her creator himself had intended her to be recognized as a saint, and any 
commentator who makes his or her concern Richardson's own perception of his 
heroine must find it a fruitful field of enquiry to consider how far she is a credible 
figure as such, and in relation to which criteria of sanctity. This is one of my aims in 
this study. For Richardson, her death represents the triumph of faith, but the death of 
Clarissa, whatever his intentions, has again been variously interpreted; for one 
commentator, it is a political gesture, a protest against a power system which has 
determined her fate, (9) while for another, it is an act of revenge on both Lovelace and 
on the Harlowes. (lo) 
Such proliferation of interpretations can only testify to the greatness of the 
work and to the creative vitality which sustains such a varied and continuing 
engagement on the part of scholars of such widely differing critical persuasions. If 
there is any consensus about the nature of Richardson's novel, however interpreted, it 
is that moral and religious themes are integral to the work. Such a perception is given 
greater or less emphasis, according to the critical preoccupations of the commentator, 
but since Richardson himself is known to have considered such interests of primary 
concern , 
in his life as in his work, it is not surprising that they have received so much 
critical attention. 
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This present study is specifically concerned with these particular aspects of 
Clarissa and attempts to locate the novel within its theological context. That 
Richardson drew upon the popular devotional literature of his day and on the writings 
of the Puritan divines of the seventeenth century has been widely demonstrated in a 
number of studies. (' 1) However, despite these frequent analyses of Richardson's debt 
to such popular devotional works, hardly any examination - if any at all - has been 
undertaken of the theological concepts underlying both such works and Richardson's 
novels. It is this substratum of the theological concepts which underpin both which is 
the focus of this present study in an attempt to address this deficiency. Since almost 
every commentator has something to say, to a greater or lesser degree, about the 
manner in which Richardson's Christian commitment is reflected in his work, it is 
surprising that so little attention has been given to the concepts which inform that 
work, and that so few attempts have been made to examine his novels within the 
context of the history of theological thought. 
This study is intended to offer some conclusions in this much-neglected area 
of Richardsonian studies by contending that Richardson's novels are underpinned by 
successive codifications of Christian thought, and that a reader has much to gain by 
an examination of those novels in relation to the theological concepts which underlie 
them and which are integral to them. To examine whether Richardson fulfilled his 
intention, expressed in the Postscript to the third edition, `to investigate the highest 
and most important doctrines, not only of morality, but of Christianity'(", PP` by the 
light of works of popular devotion is one thing; it is quite another to test his claim by 
examining it in relation to some of the great classical statements of Christian 
theology. 
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My intention in this study is to explore the effect on Clarissa of the author's 
assimilation of certain key doctrines developed by the Christian Church since its 
inception. Such doctrines as the fall of man, the frailty of a human nature vitiated by 
the effects of original sin, and the necessity of Christ's redemptive sacrifice are as old 
as Christianity itself, while successive theologians from St Paul onwards gradually 
codified into a system such concepts as those of the eternal law, free will and grace, 
and the manner in which both reason and free will interact with the workings of 
Divine Providence. 
In this study of Clarissa, I have taken as my starting-point the assumption that 
Richardson, as an upholder of a conservative religious orthodoxy, was the heir to 
such well-established traditions of thought, and have attempted an examination of his 
treatment of his characters and of their progress towards their ultimate eternal 
destinations, in relation to these Christian concepts. Accordingly, I have drawn on 
successive codifications of these vital concepts in some of the great statements of 
Christian doctrine, from the Epistles of St Paul, to the thought of St Augustine, from 
thence to the work of St Thomas Aquinas as representative of scholastic theology, 
and to that of Calvin, as the exponent, in his turn, of the doctrines of Protestantism 
taken to their logical conclusion. The radical divisions between pre- and post- 
Reformation theology on such matters as the sacraments, church government, and 
transubstantiation make all the more remarkable the consistency between these 
differing traditions on such concepts as the eternal law, the freedom of the will, 
reason and the part played by Divine Providence, both in human affairs and 
in the 
ordering of the universe. The challenge to such concepts, in Richardson's time, came 
not from differing traditions of Christianity, but from the rise of materialist and 
empiricist scientific and philosophical theories. 
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It is not suggested that Richardson was an avid reader of such philosophical 
works, but on the evidence of his letters, he knew enough of their tendencies to be 
alarmed by them as representative of a threat to Christian orthodoxy. Nor am I 
suggesting that he had read such theological works, except the Old and New 
Testaments, as primary sources for his religious thought, but that the doctrines to 
which they give codification are the ultimate sources of that thought and of the 
theological concepts integral to his novel, mediated through religious conduct books. 
I have therefore given some attention to some such popular works as examples of the 
kind of direct influence that they would have exerted on Richardson and on his 
contemporaries, in an attempt to demonstrate the manner in which he and his original 
readers might assimilate such complex theological concepts. 
It is also necessary to bear in mind that Richardson's circle of friends and 
correspondents included a number of clergy and religious thinkers, and it may be 
assumed that such acquaintance, by letters and discussion, could not but have its 
effect on his own religious thought. That circle included such diverse religious 
thinkers as William Law, the mystic and disciple of Jacob Boehme, and the orthodox 
Anglican divine and poet, Edward Young. There are hints of a number of unexpected 
and intriguing contributions to Richardson's presentation of his religious theme. 
Two commentators at least have argued that Clarissa may be read in terms of the 
influence of Boehmist mysticism, or of a combination of Boehme's mystical 
theology and of Gnosticism. (12) Even if the reader would not go so far, it is clear that 
as Clarissa approaches her death, she employs some of the imagery by which 
numerous mystics have expressed their sense of a relationship with the Absolute, and 
both she and her creator are acquainted with at least one work of mediaeval 
mysticism, The Imitation of Christ. 
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Again, it is apparent that the Protestant Richardson is familiar enough with 
Catholicism to present convincingly a whole family of devout aristocratic Catholics 
in the della Porrettas. Moreover, Sir Charles Grandison, who, among his other 
unparallelled excellences is, of course, well-read, knows of Bannes and Cajetan, two 
commentators on Aquinas, and is aware of the tradition of Christian casuistry, one 
strand of Christian thought ancient enough in origin to precede Christianity itself. ý13ý 
Clarissa proves herself an excellent casuist in this tradition when she opposes her 
family's choice of suitor in Mr Solmes. Lovelace clearly knows of the Catholic 
custom of veneration of relics, and mockingly refers to it when he describes the 
response of the women of Mrs Sinclair's household, gazing on the blood he has 
spilled in his self-induced illness (P. 677) He is not in a mocking mood when he would 
enshrine Clarissa's heart; nothing could be more reminiscent of the ancient custom of 
the veneration of the relics of a saint, and nothing could be more disturbing to the 
reader. Finally, in some of the rich symbolism with which Richardson invests his 
heroine, there are echoes of the iconography relating to the virgin saints, and even to 
the Virgin herself 
Such traces, unemphatic as they are, enrich and deepen the complexity of 
Richardson's `religious novel' as he himself described it, and cannot be ignored. 
However, my intention in the main is to explore the wider context of Richardson's 
integration of the key concepts of Christian theology into this work, and to 
demonstrate in doing so, he is the heir to an intellectual tradition rooted in the origins 
of Christianity. Chapter One seeks to place Richardson against the changing 
philosophic background of his time, while the second chapter discusses the Christian 
concepts of reason and grace. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters are concerned with 
the manner in which Christian thought has based its notions as to how life is to be 
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lived in accordance with these concepts. The sixth chapter discusses the notions of 
trial and temptation in relation to the novel. Chapters Seven and Eight look at the 
part played in Clarissa by the specific sins of lust and pride. The two final chapters 
are concerned respectively with the deaths of Richardson's sinner, Lovelace, and of 
his saint, Clarissa. In short, this present study represents an attempt to perceive the 
economy of heaven and hell as Richardson and his like-minded contemporaries might 
have seen it, and the consequent overwhelming conviction of the necessity of living a 
life in accordance with the prescriptions of the Gospel, which led him in 
contemplating what he regarded as the irreligiousness of his age, to engage the 




The Cause of Virtue and Religion 
Religion never was at so low an Ebb as at present: and if my 
Work must be supposed of the Novel Kind, I was willing to try if a 
Religious Novel would do good. (') 
Writing to Lady Bradshaigh, Richardson thus makes a judgement on 
the temper of his times and specifies a purpose in the composition 
of his greatest novel. In his own eyes and in the eyes of those who were similarly 
concerned about the moral and intellectual temper of the period, he had good reason 
for his disquiet. In the Postscript to the third edition, he not only censures the 
promotion of a taste for luxury, which encourages the exclusion of both domestic and 
public virtue, but also remarks that: 
He has lived to see scepticism and infidelity openly avowed, 
and even endeavoured to be propagated in the press: the great 
doctrines of the Gospel brought into question: those of self-denial and 
mortification blotted out of the catalogue of Christian virtues. ('"' r. 553) 
It is only with the benefit of hindsight that the modern reader might conclude 
that what Richardson perceived as an increasing godlessness was the inevitable and 
inexorable development of new ways of thinking consequent on the scientific 
revolution of the previous century and the advent of materialist, empirically-based 
philosophies so closely related to it. 
Be that as it may, from the outset of his career as a novelist, and even before, 
in his handbook for apprentices The Apprentice's Vade Mecum, Richardson seems to 
have considered himself, in some respects, as a teacher, and a teacher with a specific 
field of endeavour, to propagate the doctrines of Christianity. There is considerable 
evidence of his conviction of the responsibilities of authors in general to promote 
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virtue and to avoid the propagation of religious infidelity. In the collection of moral 
sentiments which he published as an adjunct to Clarissa, (2) his comment under the 
heading of `Writers' lays out in some detail such authorial responsibilities. He 
clearly regards their fulfilment as an indispensable part of an author's service to God. 
For his own part, in the Preface to the first edition, he is careful to anticipate any 
possible objections to his own presentation of libertine discourse in the 
correspondence of Lovelace and Belford, and refutes them on the grounds that 
decency of language is always preserved, and that the rakes themselves reflect on 
their own failure to observe their moral obligations. (p. 35) His additions to the text of 
Clarissa in the third edition restate this conviction of authorial responsibility. His 
heroine's remarks on Swift'"' 504) remind the reader that even authors of distinction 
may fail in this respect. Moreover, the fact that a contributory cause of Polly 
Horton's moral decline lies in an unguided choice of reading, underlines the 
seriousness of such a failure on the part of an author, as well as of the parent who 
failed to guide in this, as in other moral matters. (1v, pp. 
543-544) Finally, the reader must 
be reminded that his villain, Lovelace, as he discourses on the candour of familiar 
writing, (11,1.431) is an unscrupulous writer himself, whose correspondence with Belford 
may indeed candidly express his wicked purposes, but who may be relied upon in any 
correspondence with a woman to use writing for the purposes of deceit and 
corruption. 
Two comments from Richardson's letters concerning the composition of 
Pamela indicate how seriously he regarded his responsibility in this respect, since he 
gives primacy to the didactic aspects of his work. He writes to Stephen Duck: 
By all which you'll observe that Instruction is my main End, 
and if I can Entertain at the same time my View will be complete. (3) 
A little later he writes to George Cheyne: 
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The Cause of Virtue and Religion, was what I wish'd 
principally to serve ! (4 
Entertainment is put firmly in its place as a secondary consideration, although 
the moralist Richardson appears aware that he will be more likely to secure his 
avowed main purpose by the deployment of the skills of the artist Richardson. Those 
skills however, are subordinated in his own eyes to what he clearly conceives to be 
the primary purpose of life. In the Preface to the third edition, he claims that the 
primary purpose of his novel is: 
To investigate the highest and most important doctrines not 
only of morality, but of Christianity, by showing them thrown into 
action in the conduct of the worthy characters; while the unworthy, 
who set those doctrines at defiance, are condignly, and, as may be 
said, consequentially punished. ("'a') 
He adds that considerate readers will not respond as if the work were 
designed only to amuse. 
Of his own Christian commitment there can be no doubt. Eaves and Kimpel 
have revealed that Richardson was baptised into the Church of England and that he 
adhered to this faith throughout his life. (5) He told his Dutch translator, Stinstra, that 
his father `designed me for the cloth. I was fond of his choice'. (6) If Richardson was 
not to fulfil this intended vocation, he found another, and his sturdy Protestantism is 
displayed both in the puritan morality of his personal life and in the equally sturdy 
insistence on the validity of their private consciences demonstrated by his hero, Sir 
Charles Grrandison, and by his heroines. The former claims that he `lives to himself, 
while Clarissa considers that to be `self-acquitted' is of greater importance than to 
enjoy the approval of anyone else. 
However, both in his life and in his work, Richardson reveals a remarkable 
tolerance, given the age, of religious beliefs which differ from his own(7), and some 
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of those important doctrines which he incorporates into his work have a theological 
history which precedes the Reformation. 
With reference to this long-standing tradition of Christian thought, Albert R. 
Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, in their discussion of the manner in which the doctrines 
of Christian morality had developed from the system of religion devised by the 
scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century, assert that their analysis adopted such 
crucial notions as natural law, conscience and reason, which had been `inherited in a 
fragmentary way from Scripture, patriotic writings, and Classical philosophy'. They 
add: 
By the end of the thirteenth century the theological and moral 
meanings of these concepts, had, in essence, reached the form they 
retained until the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. (8 
It was this tradition of thought, born of this elegant synthesis, and the 
orthodox interpretation of these important concepts which was under assault at the 
time at which Richardson expressed his disquiet in his letter to Lady Bradshaigh, and 
which he clearly intended to reaffirm in his work, setting out to re-iterate `the great 
lessons of Christianity, in an age like the present' "(9) 
The new systems of thought, 
developed by materialist and empiric philosophies, questioned the validity of such 
doctrines as the immateriality of the soul, or its immortality, along with the existence 
of God Himself If the universe was merely a great machine, there was no need of 
Divine Providence. If the Copernican revolution, as it is often claimed, had removed 
man from the centre of that universe to its periphery, new philosophies offered a 
deterministic account of human psychology which denied the freedom of the will as 
conceived by Christian orthodoxy. Man too, became a kind of mechanism, and the 
whole concept of a Christian morality based on the eternal law of God was rendered 
void. In these respects, philosophy and religious orthodoxy parted company. The 
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work of the influential seventeenth century philosopher, Locke, had suggested the 
way in which such a rupture might develop. His Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding had offered, as P. H. Nidditch declares: 
`A systematic, detailed, reasoned, and wide-ranging 
philosophy of mind and cogitation whose thrust, so far as it is in line 
with the future rather than the past, is empiricist'. (10) 
Locke does not question the existence of God, the role of Providence, or the 
validity of Revelation. He concludes to his own satisfaction that `There is no Truth 
more evident than that something must be from eternity', (11) and goes further, 
claiming that the nature of man's Maker may in some respects be ascertained by the 
use of reason, asserting: 
If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of 
Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that it 
must necessarily be a cogitative Being. For it is as impossible to 
conceive, that ever bare, incogitative Matter should produce a 
thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of itself produce 
Matter. (12) 
Such conclusions could not offend the opinion of Christian orthodoxy of 
whatever persuasion, although Locke's own views might be characterized as 
Protestant but not Calvinist, since Nidditch points out that he `believed that the 
sovereignty of God is compatible with man's freedom and does not entail 
(13) 
predestination'. 
However, Locke offended Christian opinion in some important respects, 
notably his attack on innate ideas, a widely held belief at the time, which was held to 
underpin religion and morality. (14) Perhaps even more alarming to Christian opinion 
was that in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding he offers a suggestion which 
opened up a debate on the nature of the soul, a debate which reverberated throughout 
the following century: 
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We have the ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall 
never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; 
it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, 
without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given 
to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and 
think ... 
(1 
Although Locke declares that he does not desire to `any way lessen the belief 
of the soul's Immateriality', his remarks gave fresh impetus to those currents of 
thought that questioned the Christian belief in the duality of man's nature, or which 
perceived man as a form of mechanism, thus challenging any conception of the 
freedom of the will. (16) 
The interest in such ideas forms a background to Richardson's remark that 
`religion never was at so low an ebb', since much of current intellectual debate so 
clearly challenged the views of orthodox Christianity. Whatever differences might 
exist between Christians of various persuasions, the question of the immateriality of 
the soul was in general accepted, as was its immortality. (17) What was also in 
question in some intellectual circles was the existence of God Himself, or His 
existence in the form in which Christian orthodoxy had always perceived Him, as the 
omnipotent and omnipresent Creator who had not only laid down the blueprint for the 
working of the universe but who also supervised its operations, and who intervened 
directly in the affairs of men. Richardson, whose work demonstrates a belief in a 
personal Providence, strongly objected to deistic doctrines; as a printer, as Sale points 
out, he printed a large number of religious works, many of which opposed deism and 
none of which supported it. (18) He appears to have subscribed to the popular view 
that deism could be equated with atheism. After the death of Bolingbroke, a writer 
whose essays suggested deistic views, and whom, along with Hume, 
he described as 
`mischievous', (19) he wrote in some concern to Thomas Edwards that the controversy 
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excited by the late peer's works would have the effects of perpetuating interest in 
them: 
I am afraid that so many Tracts on them will add to his Profits, 
by carrying into Notice Works that would have probably otherwise 
sunk under the Weight of their dogmatical Abuse and Virulence. I 
imagine that these Works of the quondam Peer, so far as they favour 
the Cause of Infidelity, rather abound with Objections against the 
Christian System, that he thought New, than were really so. He seems 
to have been willing to frame a Religion to his Practices. Poor Man! 
He is not a doubter now! (20) 
Such correspondence shows Richardson very much aware of the threat to 
religion posed by the unorthodox doctrines espoused by some of the thinkers of his 
time. He himself was a religious conservative, and wrote to Young that when Sir 
John Stanley argued in favour of Hartley's view that all men would ultimately be 
saved: 
I told him (which was the truth) that I had but little time to read 
anything that I thought controversial, or shocking to fundamentals. (21) 
To Lady Bradshaigh, who had found Hartley's doctrines comforting, he 
confessed that he could hope that the doctrine was true, but could not dare to decide 
in its favour `so fearful am I of weakening foundations". (22) Such remarks might 
suggest that Richardson the writer would assert all the more strongly in his work the 
conservative views that he regarded as vital to salvation because Richardson the man 
was so aware of the dangerous seductiveness of some of the heterodox opinions then 
current; it may be comforting to think that salvation will finally be extended to all 
men, but such a view denies the orthodox doctrine of rewards and punishments which 
he so strongly advocated. 
Richardson did not doubt the general tenor of Hartley's work to such an 
extent that he declined to print it, but he regarded another 
contemporary writer, Hume, with great dislike `for his attempts to sap the 
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foundations of our common Christianity'. (23) Whether he had read any of Hume's 
writings, or whether he was merely aware, in a general way, of their tenor, he was 
correct in regarding them as opposed to orthodox Christianity, indeed to religion 
itself. While Hume never explicitly admits to atheism, his references to the Deity and 
to religion are couched in terms of an irony which points to disbelief, and in his 
Treatise of Human Nature, and his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he 
demolishes, as A. J. Ayer points out, (24) both the a priori and a posteriori arguments 
for the existence of God. 
It is not surprising therefore that Hume's system challenges the Christian 
conception of Providence in which Richardson so firmly believes. Commenting on 
the belief of certain philosophers that everything exists by God's will, and that 
nothing has any power except that granted by Divine permission, Hume declares, 
with veiled irony, that such a view diminishes the Divine attributes: 
It argues more wisdom to continue at first the fabric of the 
world with such perfect foresight that of itself, and by its proper 
operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the 
great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and 
animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine. 
(25) 
It is clear that Hume gives little credence, if any, to the Christian account of 
the Deity and of the whole theological system which posits the drama of the fall and 
redemption. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he states his views as 
follows: 
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and 
the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning 
particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation 
in 
reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most 
solid foundation is faith and divine revelation. 
(26) 
However, the reader may infer that Hume does not think that this foundation 
is at all solid, since he elsewhere calls revelation into question, together with the 
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miracles which might seem its validation, (27) and his proviso `so far as it is supported 
by experience' is intended to demolish any claims which religion might have to rest 
on the support of reason. Such views, disseminated or shared, demonstrate exactly 
why Richardson might have considered Hume `mischievous'. A man who described 
himself as `fearful ... of weakening 
foundations' might find foundations dangerously 
undermined by such contentions. Both Richardson's work and his life rested upon a 
belief in the existence of a God who oversaw, rewarded or punished, and on the 
immortality of those souls who met His judgements. 
Likewise, Richardson's hero and heroines look to reason as their guide to 
virtue and virtue's rewards. Such a view is well validated in both pre- and post- 
Reformation theology. To the former, reason is a light `the shining loveliness of all 
virtue'(28) and to the latter a lamp which assists men to discern good from evil, 
vitiated as that faculty now is. (29) Hume's account of reason, on the other hand, gives 
it a narrowly defined function which denies that it has any role in the production of 
virtue: 
Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas, and 
the discovery of their relations; and if the same relations have 
different characters, it must evidently follow, that those characters are 
not discover' d merely by reason. (30 
Hume comments that there are those who argue that virtue is merely a 
conformity to reason, relating such conformity to `eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of 
things' - in other words, to the eternal law of 
God - and claiming that these standards 
apply to all rational beings, and that these unchangeable standards of right or wrong 
`impose an obligation'. However, he himself claims that morals, as they have an 
influence on actions and affections, cannot be derived from reason, which is merely 
`the discovery of truth or falsehood. (31) His arguments thus attack both the concept 
of the eternal law and the Christian contention that reason is the 
faculty by which 
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man controls his passions. For the orthodox believer, Hume's discussion of the 
relationship between reason and passion must have been startling, since he turns 
upside-down the notion of that relationship generally accepted by believers, and 
which had a provenance stretching back to the early church. Commenting that both 
philosophers and men in common life, when they discuss the matter, give the 
primacy to reason over passion and claim that men are only virtuous when they live 
in accordance with reason, and that such a preference is based on a belief in its 
`eternity, invariableness, and divine origin', he presents arguments which conclude 
that the basis of this preference is mistaken; the impulses of passion cannot, he 
argues, be retarded but by a contrary impulse, and he locates the origin of such 
impulses in pain or pleasure. He concludes that to discuss the combat of reason and 
the passions at all is to speak unphilosophically, and adds: 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and 
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (32) 
Such a contention must stand opposed to the Christian tradition of thought. 
St. Augustine had referred to the passions as disturbances which befall even the wise 
man. However, he claims, such a man would subject them to reason, and remarks 
that 
The predominant intellect as it were imposes laws on the 
passions, which keep them within strict bounds. (33) 
Similar views are expressed by Aquinas, who declares: 
Reason can command the appetites of sense, both affective and 
aggressive, and control feeling. (34) 
Such contentions are equally valid for Calvin, who warns of the negative 
effects of failing to follow reason: 
Man does not, in accordance with the excellence of his 
immortal nature, rationally choose, and studiously pursue, what is 
truly for his good. He does not admit reason to his counsel, nor exert 
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his intellect; but without reason, without counsel, follows the bent of 
his nature like the lower animals. (35 
It is with such accounts of the relationship between reason and the passions, 
the contention that the former can - with divine assistance - and should, control the 
latter, that Richardson's views concur. His hero, Sir Charles Grandison, and his 
heroines struggle with their passions, and their virtue is established and confirmed by 
the successful outcome of that struggle. No reader could fail to recognize the pain of 
Clarissa's confrontation with her own resentment and anger, and to be convinced of 
the difficulty of achieving control over such powerful passions, nor is it by any 
means certain that Clarissa's emotions are entirely subdued. Richardson appears, 
however, to have intended a complete victory for his heroine in the control of her 
passions. He writes to Lady Bradshaigh enquiring: 
Whether Clarissa in the Command of her Passions in the Prime of her 
Youth, had not a greater Merit, than if she had given way to them, and 
been seduced. (36) 
Richardson here acknowledges, even if his heroine is shown to be reluctant to 
do so, the force of a natural response to so attractive a suitor as Lovelace. Clarissa 
exerts her will in the determination of her conduct in favour of virtue, but those 
dangerous emotions are controlled, not eliminated thereby. Christian theology would 
recognize that one of the effects of the fall had been the loss of a perfect balance 
between reason and the passions. In a post-lapsarian world such perfection of human 
nature is impossible, and the subjection of the emotions in itself is a fragile victory 
and still accompanied by pain. This perhaps is one reason why Sir Charles, whose 
control of his passions leaves not the least degree of ambiguity, does not engage the 
reader, and why Clarissa does. 
Part of the difficulty lies in the vexed question of the freedom of the will, 
another faculty, in the view of Christian theology, which had been damaged by the 
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effects of the fall . 
The degree of freedom retained by this damaged faculty was a 
question which troubled theologians as well as philosophers. Richardson's 
understanding of the status of the will appears to be in accordance with that of those 
thinkers who avoided the extremes of Calvinism and Pelagianism; man has freedom 
to choose to sin or not to sin, but the inherited damage to his nature means that 
Divine assistance is required to bring the will to the correct determination. To this 
end, his heroine seeks God's help in prayer, since many factors may obscure what 
should be the proper object of her will. Richardson intends, however, that Clarissa 
should make an active and positive choice of virtue. In a letter to Edward Young he 
makes exactly this point: 
I mean her to act, and to reason, coolly and deliberately; to 
touch with warmth the subject, but not with passion, that her 
determination may be the result of deliberation. (37) 
This remark does not stray too far from the definition of the activity of the 
will which is given by Thomas Aquinas: 
The will's object is what reason presents to it as good to will, 
and as planned by reason it is already a moral object and can cause 
moral goodness of will. (38) 
However, Christian accounts of the will and its activity were under challenge 
from the contentions of materialist philosophy. Hume proposed an account of the 
will which offered an entirely different interpretation from that of Christianity. No 
longer a God-given faculty, however damaged, which dignifies man, but: 
By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel 
and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new 
motions of our body, or new perception of our mind. (39) 
His discussion argues for a deterministic account of the wi11. (40) We may 
imagine that we `feel a liberty within ourselves', but our actions may be inferred 
from our character and motives. (41) Since he thus undermines the Christian view that 
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virtue resides in acting in accordance with reason, by means of an exercise of the will 
in favour of a choice of good, it follows that he discards the notion of the eternal law 
as a frame of reference for virtuous activity. Hume argues for the existence of a 
moral sentiment as the basis for virtue, rather than reason. In short, his conclusions 
directly challenge the Christian view of the relationship between reason, will and 
virtue: 
I wou'd have anyone give me a reason, why virtue and vice 
may not be involuntary, as well as beauty and deformity ... 
As to 
free-will, we have shewn that it has no place with regard to the 
actions, no more than the qualities of men. It is not a just 
consequence, that what is voluntary is free. Our actions are more 
voluntary than our judgements; but we have not more liberty in the 
one than in the other. (42) 
Jt 
may be inferred that such contentious views were the subject of enough 
discussion, whether expressed by Hume or by other thinkers, to give 
disquiet to the adherents of Christian orthodoxy, but a deterministic account of the 
will was by no means new in Richardson's day, nor was an implicit, but openly 
unacknowledged religious scepticism absent from earlier works of materialist 
philosophy. Like Hume, Hobbes never openly avows atheism, but it is clear for him, 
that religion is, at best, a function of the state, which may be socially useful as long 
as subjects conform in outward practice to whatever is deemed orthodoxy by their 
sovereign. Certainly Hobbes's discussion of the passions includes a veiled disavowal 
of belief, and it is one among many. Defining both religion and superstition, he 
declares: 
Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined 
from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, 
SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we 
imagine, TRUE RELIGION. (43) 
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The hint of atheism lies in the `when' that makes the concept conditional and 
doubtful. As a corollary of his religious scepticism, his discussions of the nature of 
the soul, of eternal life, of the Kingdom of God, and of Revelation challenge the 
views of Christian orthodoxy. (44) Hobbes's notions concerning the nature of the soul 
could only be shocking to Christian orthodoxy of whatever persuasion. He argues 
that the term `substance incorporeal' is an absurdity, `as if a man should say, an 
incorporeal body'. (45) He argues that the soul must have substance, declaring: 
The universe ... the whole mass of things that are, is corporeal, that is to say, body ... and consequently every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is no part of the universe: and 
because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing; and 
consequently nowhere. (46) 
Such an account challenges the Christian doctrines of the immateriality of the 
soul, and of the dual nature of man. Hobbes urges that men should `no longer suffer 
themselves to be abused by this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain 
philosophy of Aristotle' "(47) 
Likewise, Hobbes's system substitutes for the Christian 
notion of the eternal law of God, aspects of which manifest themselves in man as `the 
law we have by nature', his concept of natural law. He tells his readers that in the 
state of nature every man has a right to preserve himself and the right to use every 
means to do so. In this state every man has the right to everything, yet since men 
both fear death and also desire `commodious living', reason suggests `convenient 
articles of peace'. These articles are the laws of nature. However, despite the 
restraint of such laws, which lead men to enter into society for general safety and 
benefit, Hobbes holds that human nature is still immensely competitive; if no law is 
recognized, then each man is still in a state of war with his fellows. As one modern 
commentator has pointed out, Hobbes's account of the law of nature differs from the 
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account of natural law offered by Christian orthodoxy in two respects: it is `man- 
centred', and it is `independent of the will of God'. (48) 
If such views and their implicit atheism did not offer challenge enough to 
Christian convictions, Hobbes's account of human psychology provided fresh matter 
for orthodox indignation. His contention is that animals exhibit two sorts of motion, 
one of which is `vital', concerned with the various physical systems of the body, and 
the other of which is `animal', concerned with voluntary movements `in such manner 
as is first fancied in our minds'. The initiation of such motions is called `endeavour' 
Endeavour towards any object is called desire or appetite, and away from any object 
is called 'aversion'. (49) `Life itself , says Hobbes, `is but motion and can never be 
without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense'. (so) 
On this basis he builds a theory which shocked orthodox opinion. (51) He 
claims that whatsoever is the object of any man's desire he calls good, and for 
whatsoever he has an aversion, he calls evil. It is clear that such an account must 
oppose the Christian view that good and evil must be determined with reference to 
the eternal law of God, as expressive of His will, and discernible by reason. 
Moreover, since Hobbes claims that man can never be without desire, in his account, 
as all commentators agree, human beings are necessarily intensely competitive. As 
Christopher Hill remarks: 
Hobbes's philosophy is a secularized version of the protestant 
ethic: Hobbes's man in the state of nature is Calvin's natural man - 
selfish, dominated by evil passions, a lonely individual ... 
Hobbes has 
rightly been seen as the high priest of competitive individualism. (52) 
In Hobbes's account, if man is driven by his desires and aversions, and is at 
the same time inherently competitive, these factors have a bearing on the exercise of 
his will. Hobbes defines the will as `the last appetite, or aversion, immediately 
adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof. (53) Since he claims that man can 
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never be without desire or aversion, his account of the will is essentially 
deterministic, and concludes that liberty exists only where there is no external 
compulsion or opposition. (54) Man is therefore driven by the irresistible impulses of 
his nature to be selfish, and to seek, endlessly, the fulfilment of his desires in 
competition with his fellows. 
For by necessity of nature every man doth in all his voluntary 
actions intend some good unto himself. (55 
However, the implication is that any man may define what constitutes that 
good, and it may well conflict with the good of another. 
Such views had been adopted in the late seventeenth century by those who 
called themselves libertines, whether they endorsed Hobbes's philosophical system 
as a whole, or used its contentions about human psychology to justify a life of sexual 
freedom as a response to the irresistible demands of human nature. (56) In this latter 
sense, such contentions are a source, whether at first or second hand, for the character 
of Lovelace. He does not adopt atheism as a philosophical position, but his conduct 
in the sphere of morals reflects Hobbes's view of human psychology. In its 
psychological aspect libertinism meant for its professors the primacy of desire, the 
constant need for conquest, and an assertion of the supremacy of the ego. Such men 
as these are to be found as the anti-heroes of Restoration comedy; they recognize no 
laws but the demands of their own appetites, and annexe to themselves the right to 
fulfil those appetites. Such a man is Lovelace. Richardson did not choose to make 
his rakes: 
Either infidels or scoffers; nor yet as think themselves freed 
from the observance of other moral obligations. (57) 
For his own purposes, which require examination later, he had good reason 
for declining to do so, but in other respects, Lovelace is closely related to those men 
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of the Restoration court, and to those literary creations, who profess a libertinism 
based on the contentions of Hobbes. Jocelyn Harris claims(58) that Richardson's 
portrayal of Lovelace was influenced by the character of Don John in Thomas 
Shadwell's play The Libertine (1675). The similarities are apparent. Don John, like 
Lovelace, has followers who emulate his violence, egoism and sexual voracity. 
However, as a character he lacks the subtlety of Lovelace. Whatever the character 
may be in performance, on the page he lacks credibility because of the sheer, 
unrelenting indiscriminateness of his sexual appetite. There are enough echoes 
throughout the play of Hobbes's doctrines to indicate that the author has drawn the 
character of Don John with the philosopher's writings in mind. The most important 
of these occurs when the shipwrecked anti-hero encounters a hermit, and Don John 
and his followers offer an exposition of the libertine version of Hobbes's views, by 
claiming that `all our actions are necessitated', and by enquiring whether `that blind 
faculty the will be free; when it depends upon the understanding? '(59) 
In response to this, the hermit argues for the Christian view that the 
understanding is free, and that `foolish men and sinners act against their 
understandings, which inform 'em better'. A warning from him to abandon their 
`devilish philosophy' and to change the destructive course of their lives meets with 
the response that they are what they are by nature. `If we be bad, 'tis nature's fault 
that made us so'. (60) 
In relation to his own rake, Richardson might almost be playing the hermit's 
part. He chooses not to make Lovelace an atheist, so that his anti-hero may be seen 
to do what the hermit accuses Don John of doing, acting against his understanding, 
despite the warnings he receives. In the Postscript to the third edition, Richardson 
defends his decision not to make Lovelace a philosophical atheist against some 
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objections to the presentation of his villain as a libertine in practice only. He claims 
that Clarissa would have been inexcusable had she even considered his addresses, if 
she had known him to be an unbeliever. He also points out that there are many 
persons whose actions are not consistent with their beliefs, and compares Lovelace to 
those devils in Scripture, who `believe and tremble'. (i' pp. 
559-560) Lovelace, 
Richardson writes to Lady Bradshaigh, is one who: 
Sinning against the Light of Knowledge, and against the most 
awakening Calls and Convictions, was too determined a Libertine to 
be reformed, at least till he arrived at the Age of Incapacity. (61) 
He thus gives to Lovelace's libertinism an aspect which at once deepens the 
complexity of his character and deprives him of the excuse of an intellectual 
subscription to the atheistic doctrines of materialist philosophy to account for his 
conduct. In this respect, he is all the more a sinner since he is neither deprived of 
knowledge of Christianity, nor of belief in its doctrines. His eventual - probable - 
fate is therefore all the more painful. 
However, in many other respects, Lovelace follows his libertine antecedents 
in professing some of the doctrines of Hobbes. The description offered by Stephen 
Orgel of Shadwell's libertine, Don John, might equally apply to Lovelace: 
A narcissist whose avidity for pleasure and domination 
destroys him as well as his conquests. (62) 
Likewise, Don John's reflection on his seductions might easily have been said 
by Lovelace, whose own attitude to his victims is similar, even if the pleasure he 
derives from seduction is intellectual rather than sensual: 
What an excellent thing is a woman before enjoyment, and 
how insipid after it! (63) 
Both men exemplify the persistence of desire which Hobbes identifies as an 
integral part of human nature. One sexual conquest succeeds another, a situation 
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which in Don John's case ceases only with death, and in that of Lovelace when 
Clarissa's response to his assault demonstrates the triumph of her Christian 
convictions over his libertine principles; desire for further conquest fades into futility. 
In a sense, what Lovelace represents as a libertine, the logical corollary of a view that 
reduces man to an animal mechanism, has assaulted what Clarissa represents as a 
Christian, the contention that man is made in the image of God, and is a moral being 
endowed with reason and free will, supported by grace, and has found itself impotent 
to change or defeat it. The new philosophical theories which expressed doubt of the 
very existence of God, and challenged the Christian conception of the nature of man, 
must have seemed to Richardson to represent a similar assault on the doctrines of 
Christianity. In Clarissa herself he demonstrates his conviction that those doctrines 
can neither be changed nor overcome. 
What remains for Lovelace, who has lived by the libertine principles that an 
endless desire requires endless fulfilment, and that the competitiveness of human 
nature seeks domination, is the death that comes from making those principles the 
grounds on which his life is predicated. His physical death after his defeat in this life 
will be followed by his - probable - eternal death in the next. This conclusion 
is an 
ironic confirmation of Hobbes's own contentions: 
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all 
mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death. (64) 
Or again: 
Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than 
he, whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a 
continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the 
attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter ... 
(65) 
The Hobbist Lovelace substitutes such successive goals for the pursuit of the 
one eternal goal of human existence. In this sense, even Clarissa 
is a substitute, 
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although in earthly terms he could have no better object, but having lost her, and 
unable to grasp any conception of the one enduring object, there is nothing left but 
death, in this life and in the next. He himself recognizes the void that confronts him 
at the loss of an object. When Clarissa escapes him, he writes despairingly to 
Belford: 
Wanting her, I want my own soul, at least everything dear to 
it. What a void in my heart! What a chillness in my blood, as if its 
circulation were arrested ! (p. 740) 
Lovelace's remarks read as if they were those of a man who feels the 
approach of death, but in terms of Hobbes's account of psychology, it is as if 
Lovelace has lost the object of desire and can have no other. In Christian terms, 
death awaits him because he has never found his true object. In a curious way, 
Lovelace's remarks also carry an echo of the contentions of that other philosopher 
who also doubted God's existence and the validity of the Christian system. His 
description of himself as a void deprived of the presence of Clarissa to give him 
substance is reminiscent of Hume's notion of identity, that the individual is no more 
than a tenuously connected series of impressions. Hume denies that there may be 
something `simple and continu'd' which the individual may call himself, and adds of 
those who believe otherwise: 
But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may 
venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a 
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each 
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement. (66) 
The reader is reminded of the Protean nature of Lovelace, and if Hume's 
remarks leave out any notion of an immortal soul - and implicitly deny its existence 
- Lovelace's tragedy for his author is that he does have a soul to be lost. However, 
the Lovelace who exemplifies the Hobbist doctrine that men propose to themselves 
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an endless series of goals compromises that soul because of his inability to fix on one 
eternal goal. 
By contrast, throughout her trials, Clarissa's conception of the one true end of 
human existence becomes increasingly more clearly defined. In this respect, she and 
Lovelace stand diametrically opposed, and it is, in fact, her fate, from the beginning 
of the novel, to stand opposed to those who exemplify the Hobbist traits of 
competitiveness and of endless desire, whether those desires reach in the direction of 
social aggrandizement, as in the case of the Harlowes, or sexual conquest, as in the 
case of Lovelace. Both of these objects of desire oppose the Christian notion of 
man's true good. The Harlowes define wealth and material success as their good, and 
regard Clarissa's opposition as undutiful (although in both Christian and Hobbist 
terms, she could be said to oppose her good to theirs), while Lovelace defines his 
good in terms of domination. His desire for conquest is what Hobbes calls `Glory, or 
internal gloriation or triumph of the mind', which Hobbes acknowledges may bear 
both a favourable or unfavourable interpretation. He defines it in the following 
terms: 
That passion which proceedeth from the imagination or 
conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth 
with us ... and this passion, 
by them whom it displeaseth, is called 
pride: by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just valuation of 
himself. (67) 
The subject of pride, in both its positive and negative aspects is one which 
Richardson explores in relation to both Lovelace and Clarissa. If the pride of the 
former depends on his triumph in sexual domination, it appears that he also embraces 
the political tenets of Hobbes in his conviction that `once subdued, always subdued). 
Hobbes's discussion of the right of conquest in war concludes that such a right 
depends on the consent of the vanquished to the conqueror. This is exactly 
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Lovelace's approach in his campaigns of seduction; indeed, he frequently employs 
military metaphors to describe his activities. He prefers seduction to rape, and 
expects the vanquished to yield and to acknowledge his power ever after. Clarissa, 
however, declines to give her consent, either to seduction or to his right of conquest 
after the rape. She cannot acknowledge Lovelace as her conqueror, since her will has 
not consented to what Lovelace at first mistakenly regards as conquest. In Christian 
terms, her freedom and autonomy do not depend on any act of his, whether 
imprisonment, deception, or rape, but only on her conformity to her own conscience. 
In relation to those women whom Lovelace does seduce and subdue, he annexes to 
himself the absolute power of a Hobbist sovereign, and claims the right to try, to 
judge and to punish. When the one woman who refuses to acknowledge that power 
escapes him, he expresses his outrage very much in terms of an absolute monarch 
defied by a rebellious subject. (pP. 736-742 
If Lovelace's campaigns of seduction would seem to be in accordance with 
Hobbes's political theories, his conviction, frequently pointed out, that Clarissa must 
at last reveal a nature essentially sexual is in accordance with the philosopher's 
account of human psychology. Hobbes's contention that men can never be without 
desire has a specific application with regard to sex. This appetite, he claims, is called 
`lust' only when it is condemned, but otherwise `love', `for the passion is one and the 
same indefinite desire of the different sex, as natural as hunger'. (68) This suggests 
that desire, like hunger, always requires satisfaction, and that its fulfilment is as much 
a condition of life as the satisfaction of hunger; both satisfactions are integral to the 
organism. As one modern commentator has put it: 
In sum, his thesis is that it is a fact of nature that we are wired 
up to act according to our desires. (69) 
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Such a contention would offer a basis for Lovelace's conviction that Clarissa 
must at last reveal a nature which seeks the satisfaction of this natural hunger; he will 
prove her woman, not angel. (70) Moreover, in his notions as to how he is to bring 
about this effect, he again proves himself a thorough Hobbist. He often reminds 
Belford of his own - considerable - personal attractions, claiming that these give him 
the advantage over his fellow-rakes in matters of seduction. Belford's plain 
ruggedness, he asserts, renders him far less likely to succeed. Hobbes's account of 
erotic love endorses Lovelace's opinion of such aesthetic qualities as those on which 
he values himself: 
For the most part, they have much better fortune in love, whose hopes 
are built upon something in their person, than those that trust to their 
expressions and service; and they that care less, than they that care 
more. 
(71) 
In this instance, Clarissa too, although she urges on Anna the virtues of the 
not overly attractive Mr. Hickman as being those qualities required to make a woman 
happy in marriage, is, in her unacknowledged response to Lovelace, of the devil's 
party without knowing it. His personal attractions do have their effect on her 
judgement, and do influence her conduct. One aspect of her journey towards the 
sanctity which her creator intends for her, and which Richardson would claim that the 
Creator intends for all who adhere to His law, is the accession to the knowledge of 
her fault in this , and 
in other respects, and to repentance in response. 
Whatever her faults, in the main Clarissa's views and conduct are based 
firmly on the Christian concepts of the eternal law of God, and on the concepts of 
reason, grace and freedom of the will which had been developed into a coherent 
system by successive generations of theologians. Richardson is not writing a work of 
theology, but he is writing a work of fiction to which these concepts are integral, and 
he is asserting their validity in the face of currents of thought which presented them 
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with unprecedented challenges. It would be too reductive to argue that his heroine 
merely embodies, in however attractive a form, those concepts which Richardson 
must have perceived as being under threat, nor may he be said to be writing a form of 
Christian allegory, but his exploration of his fictional world, in particular of the 
relationship between Clarissa and Lovelace, does offer some conclusions as to the 
results, in Christian terms, of affirming or denying the validity of those vital 
concepts. It is by such affirmation that his heroine is to be made a saint, although in 
the presence of such ambiguities in her character which the honesty of Richardson's 
presentation demands, the reader must be led to reflections on the nature of sanctity. 
While it could never be denied that this novel is on any terms a great work of art, 
Richardson himself characterized it as a `religious novel'. It is arguable that it is 
from this character that the work derives its great force and power to engage and 
disturb the heart and mind; it is not in question that it does both. 
Richardson wrote in an age when religious beliefs, and controversy about 
such beliefs, had a primacy of interest which they have now largely lost. From the 
perspective of two and a half centuries, his concern at the irreligiousness of his age 
might seem excessive to a modern reader, but from that same perspective, it is also 
possible to see why, from the point of view of a conventional and traditional moralist, 
there was cause for concern. In the face of the challenges to the age-old doctrines of 
Christianity, he asserts their validity. It is by the criterion of their adherence to those 
doctrines that he believes man will be judged by God, and expects his characters to 
be judged by his readers. Those readers are invited to follow their progress to 
tragedy or triumph and to share Richardson's concern with the ultimate destinations 
of these characters. Finally, the reader is required to apply the lessons implicit in the 
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novel to himself In Richardson's eyes, no requirement could be more urgent or exert 
a greater force. 
38 
2 
The Light of Reason and the Grace of God 
The 
account given in the Old Testament of God's creation of man and 
of the latter's fall from grace is complemented in the New Testament 
by the account of the coming of Christ and of His sacrifice, by which man is 
redeemed from the condemnation to which Adam's sin had exposed not only himself, 
but also each and every one of his descendants. Christianity has traditionally 
accepted that the breach in the relationship between God and man was the result of 
freely-chosen evil on the part of the latter, and could only draw upon itself the 
condemnation of a just God. However, since He is also a merciful God, He did not 
leave man without hope of reconciliation, nor without the assistance which his now- 
fallen nature would require before that hope might be fulfilled. 
Adam's sin had offended against a divinely-established order. In terms of the 
physical universe, this order would govern such operations as the movements of the 
heavenly bodies or the changes of the seasons, but in relation to the moral universe it 
requires intellectual beings to live in accordance with God's will, and for man, it is 
`the law which is written in men's hearts and cannot be erased however sinful they 
are' "(1) 
This aspect of the Divinely-established order governed man as a moral and 
spiritual being in his pre-lapsarian state, and while he observed its laws, he was 
in 
harmony with the will of his Creator. However, since justice is also a manifestation 
of that same law, Adam drew upon himself his condemnation in accordance with the 
immutable and eternal laws of God. 
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These doctrines concerning the breach of God's eternal law, man's fall from 
Grace and the Divine mercy which offered redemption underlie the whole structure 
of Christian theology, and are accepted by believers of differing persuasions. Calvin, 
asserting that man had enjoyed clarity of intellect and the due subordination of his 
affections to his reason in his pre-lapsarian state, claims that in that state man was 
indeed the image of his Maker. However, man having lost that state, he adds: 
It cannot be doubted that when Adam lost his first estate he 
became alienated from God. Wherefore, although we grant that the 
image of God was not utterly effaced and destroyed in him, it was, 
however, so corrupted, that any thing which remains is fearful 
deformity. (2) 
Likewise, the conviction that man's nature had sustained a self-inflicted 
wound which deprived him of his pre-lapsarian innocence and the enjoyment of 
harmony with his Creator finds expression in the writings of an earlier theologian of 
a different tradition. Aquinas writes: 
Inherited sin is a disordered disposition that has resulted from 
dissolution of the harmony of an original integrated state, just as 
sickness results from dissolving the harmony of health. It is a lack of 
that integrated state which shows itself in a disordered condition of 
the soul's parts ... 
So as a result of inherited sin, there is an 
inclination in us to disordered action, not directly, as there would be 
from a personal vice, but indirectly, inasmuch as inherited sin has 
taken away the original integrated state that would have prevented 
disordered movement. (3) 
Protestant theology may differ from Aquinas's assertion that the damage 
sustained by human nature expresses itself in a `disordered disposition', and may 
claim instead that it has resulted in what one modern commentator calls a `drive or 
impulse of the will'(4) but both traditions accept that damage and its disastrous effects 
as an undisputed fact. Not the least of these effects is that man incurred the penalty 
of death. St. Augustine tells us that God did not create man in the condition of the 
angels in being incapable of death even if they sinned; humanity brought this penalty 
40 
on itself (5) Likewise, the loss of what Calvin calls man's `first estate' and Aquinas 
refers to as `an original integrated state' exposed man to the misery of a nature which 
can never be free of temptation `since we are born with an inclination toward evil', ý6ý 
as one of Clarissa's own favourite spiritual authors remarks, while reminding his 
readers that since the fall, human nature has declined, so that left to itself, it always 
inclines to evil. He adds later that reason may know the difference between good and 
evil, but because of man's fallen nature, cannot do what it knows to be good. ý'ý 
Moreover, the loss of that original integrated state, as theologians of all persuasions 
agreed, was also the loss of the finely-tempered balance between reason and the 
passions. Calvin tells us that man originally was provided by God with intellect and 
will, and `in the mind and will there was the highest rectitude, and all the organic 
parts were duly formed to obedience, until man corrupted its good properties and 
destroyed himself. (8) St. Augustine, speaking of that same loss of that happy state, 
refers to the warfare in man in which `the desires of the body oppose the spirit, and 
the spirit fights against the body's desires'. He adds: 
Now this war would never have been if human nature had, by 
free choice, persisted in that right condition in which it was created. 
As it is, however, human nature has refused to keep that peace with 
God in happiness; and so in its unhappiness it is at war with itself (9) 
In the light of such contentions, it appears that no human being can ever be 
held entirely free of such fatal tendencies. The only question at issue is the degree to 
which human nature has been damaged. Calvin and his followers argued for the 
complete corruption of human nature as a result of Adam's sin: 
Original sin, then, may be defined a hereditary corruption and 
depravity of our nature, extending to all the parts of the soul, which 
first makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces in us 
works which in Scripture are termed works of the flesh. 
0 0 
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He argues that all ancient theologians, excepting only St. Augustine, 
`exceeded due bounds in extolling the powers of the human will', and condemns the 
opinion that man was corrupted only in his sensual nature, and that reason remained 
intact or virtually unimpaired. ( 1) Reason itself, he tells us `being partly weakened 
and partly corrupted, a shapeless ruin is all that remains'. (12) Only the elect, 
arbitrarily chosen by God in His inscrutable wisdom, will be redeemed from this 
pitiful state; the remainder of mankind are justly condemned to eternal perdition. 
There was no place in such a system for the Pelagian view, once condemned by St. 
Augustine, that the will of man was essentially good, and that grace is given to man 
on account of his merits. 
Jn 
setting out to produce works which `might tend to promote the cause of 
religion and virtue'(13), and in which he intended for his most exalted 
heroine a `Sort of Happiness (founded on the Xn system) )(14) it appears that 
Richardson could hardly fail to include in his scheme, both implicitly and explicitly, 
themes based on these Christian doctrines, enshrined in seventeen hundred years of 
successive codification. He does not, however, appear to adopt either the Calvinist or 
the Pelagian view of man's nature and position in relation to God. His hero, Sir 
Charles, and his heroines recognize in themselves and in others the frailty that is 
common to fallen nature, and acknowledge the necessity to subdue their passions to 
the primacy of reason, while the less exalted characters demonstrate, by their failure 
to act on such a prescription, the temporal and spiritual penalties to which human 
kind is liable as a result of the fall. No-one, however virtuous and well-intentioned, 
is ever able to claim to be without a tendency towards sin, and such a tendency and 
the constant vigilance necessary to guard against it, involve the individual in 
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unremitting struggle. Thus, no-one can be sure of salvation, except the dying 
Clarissa when she has apparently overcome all earthly desires, but equally, 
Richardson does not seem to deny at least the possibility of salvation for even the 
most hardened of sinners, if they can achieve a sincere repentance even at the 
threshold of death itself In his treatment of those of his characters whom he shows 
consciously and earnestly struggling to achieve their salvation, he would seem to be 
in agreement with the views of William Law, who recognizes that such endeavours 
must inevitably fall short, but must not, on that account, be ever abandoned: 
But fallen men can only do their best, and this is the perfection 
that is required of us; it is only the perfection of our best endeavors, a 
careful labor to be as perfect as we can. ('5 
By following this prescription, both Law and Richardson might agree, no-one 
need despair of salvation. However, those of his characters who disregard it, or 
perversely claim that human nature is such that effort is futile, because of the flaws of 
that nature, compromise any hope of heaven if they persist in such views and fail 
either to repent or to engage in that vital struggle. Lovelace argues that human nature 
cannot resist its tendency to evil and seems to take a perverse pride in claiming that 
this is the case. He meets an anticipated reproach from Belford on account of his 
deceptions of Clarissa and Anna in intercepting their correspondence, and for the 
revenge he intends to inflict on them, with a cynical comment on the human capacity 
for sin: 
If thou sayest that the provocation I have given to one of them 
will justify her freedoms; I answer, so they will to any other person 
but myself. But he that is capable of giving those provocations, and 
has the power to punish those who abuse him for giving them, will 
show his resentment; and the more vindictively, perhaps, as he has 
deserved the freedoms? 
If thou sayest it is, however, wrong to do so, I reply that it is 
nevertheless human nature - and wouldst not have me be a man, 
Jack? (p*859) 
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Not for Lovelace an attempt to struggle, as Richardson clearly demonstrates 
his belief that man should, against the frailty of his nature, or to strive to moderate or 
control the passions of pride and anger. Such a struggle, and Richardson's analysis 
of it, must, however, bring into prominence the vexed question of free will. In his 
own day some systems of materialist philosophy offered a deterministic account of 
this faculty, but Christian theologians themselves differed as to the degree to which 
the will, in man's fallen state, might be considered to be free, and as to how far man 
must be considered responsible for his own salvation. Opinions varied from those of 
Calvinists who argued that man can do nothing of himself, in his totally corrupted 
state, and that the direction of the will to good and its constancy after direction, 
depends entirely on the grace of God, to the view that the human will and grace 
interact in the vital process of achieving salvation. 
St. Augustine asserts that man is the only creature, except for the angels, on 
whom God has bestowed free wi11. (16) Both Adam and the angels exerted their free 
will in favour of evil, and God allowed them to do so, despite His foreknowledge 
both of the sins which they would commit and of the consequences of these sins. ýl'ý 
St. Augustine claims that man's abuse of that freedom has left him unable to exercise 
his will in favour of goodness without Divine assistance: 
For man's nature was created good by God, who is good; but it 
was made changeable by him who is changeless, since it was created 
from nothing. And so the will in that nature can turn away from good 
to do evil - and this through its own free choice; and it can also turn 
from evil to do good - but this can only be with the divine 
assi stance. (18) 
Man's first freedom, he tells us, was the freedom to choose not to sin (19), and 
it follows, as he points out elsewhere, that freely chosen evil must bring its own 
punishment. (20) The doctrine that the human will can only be exerted in favour of 
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goodness with divine assistance was adopted by Christian orthodoxy. Aquinas 
makes the same point in his discussion of the relationship between the will and grace: 
The human soul is subordinate to God as the particular to the 
universal agent. Therefore there cannot be a right movement in the 
soul that is not anticipated by the divine action ... 
knowledge of his 
supernatural end comes to man from God: because man cannot obtain 
such knowledge by his natural reason, since it surpasses his natural 
faculty. Therefore the movement of the will towards our last end 
needs to be anticipated by the Divine assistance. (21) 
It would be possible to interpret the position of Clarissa, Sir Charles and 
Pamela in the light of Calvin's doctrine of election, and to see Richardson's villains - 
Lovelace in particular - as reprobate, but Richardson's presentation of his characters 
does not appear to offer them to the reader in this light. The reader witnesses his 
hero and his heroines in the daily process of willing to be saved, despite the frailty of 
their fallen nature. Their creator's technique of writing to the moment(22) renders this 
process all the more vivid and immediate as his characters are faced with the 
temptations which arise from the attractions of the world, the demands of the flesh, 
and the deceit of the devil, materialism and ambition, disordered desire, pride, anger 
and despair. They make their choices, but not easily and always with an 
acknowledgement of the part played in those choices by the grace of God. Even the 
man of achieved virtue, Sir Charles, must acknowledge his constant struggle against 
pride and ambition, and even Clarissa, Richardson's saint, does not achieve that state 
of sanctity without leaving questions in the reader's mind. If the reader must assume 
that certain characters have earned damnation, in taking pains to show why they have 
done so, Richardson at no point appears to endorse a belief in predestined 
reprobation. His villains demonstrate the effects, both in themselves and on the lives 
of others, of depriving themselves of access to Divine grace, but his presentation of 
them suggests that they have had opportunities of availing themselves of its 
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assistance. Richardson's position in regard to his characters might well be summed 
up in the words of one modern commentator on the religious positions established in 
the preceding century which influenced the theological views in some circles during 
Richardson's own formative period. 
The human faculties, although impaired by the fall, are not 
wholly vitiated; right reason, which is as much a gift of God as faith, 
can enable man to know God and discern the good, although he 
cannot follow the good without the help of grace. Christ stands in 
relationship to man not only as redeemer but also as example of 
perfect faith and obedience for him to imitate. The process of 
salvation involves constant human effort and choice, and it is always 
possible for man to fall from grace through his own fault. (23) 
Richardson's villains demonstrably fall from grace through their own fault; 
those who acknowledge as much and repent, even on their death-beds, as Belton 
does, have a hope of salvation. Lovelace, who acknowledges his own sins and 
glories in them, and who is offered grace time and time again, must be considered as 
almost certainly damned. (24) As for Clarissa, Richardson states his intentions about 
the exercise of her will in a letter to Aaron Hill. 
And yet, I would that she should have some little things to be 
blamed for, tho' for nothing in her Will. (25) 
His heroine is not to be without human frailty and is to be liable to faults, but 
she is not to commit the kind of sins which place her in peril of her soul's loss. His 
description of his heroine's spiritual state would seem to be at variance with Calvin's 
rejection of the scholastic distinction between mortal and venial sin: 
They define venial sin to be, desire unaccompanied with 
deliberate assent, and not remaining long in the heart. But I maintain 
that it cannot even enter the heart unless through a want of those 
things required in the Law. ... 
But every transgression of the Law lays 
us under the curse, and therefore even the slightest desires cannot be 
exempted from the fatal sentence. (26) 
It appears that what Richardson intended his heroine to be innocent of 
committing were those sins which Aquinas characterizes as `fatal', a type of offence 
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which severs the sinner eternally from God Such sins are the result of a deliberate 
act of the will. Aquinas says: 
If a sin so disorders our life as to turn it away from its ultimate 
goal in God, to whom we are joined by charity, then the sin is fatal or 
mortal; in its nature it is irreparable and brings with it an eternal 
penalty. (27) 
He adds a little later that such sins are attributed to reason. (28) In fallen man 
reason may fail so far as to mistake its true goal or to choose another. The reader 
may infer from Richardson's statement of his intentions and from his presentation of 
Clarissa that any such `little things' for which she may be blamed may not be 
attributed to a disorder so severe that it could eternally sever an individual from God. 
His treatment of his heroine shows her as a woman fully cognizant of the doctrine of 
free will, and aware of the part played by a failure of reason in the disorder of sin. 
Reflecting on the possibility of marriage to Lovelace, she writes to Anna of her 
misgivings about such a union: 
But they arise principally from what offers to my own heart, 
respecting, as I may say, its own rectitude, its own judgement of the 
fit and the unfit; as I would without study answer for myself to myself, 
in the first place; to him and to the world, in the second only. 
Principles, that are in my mind; that I found there; implanted, no 
doubt, by the first gracious Planter: which therefore impel me, as I 
may say, to act up to them, that thereby I may to the best of my 
judgement be enabled to comport myself worthily in both states (the 
single and the married), let others act as they will by me. (p. 596 
When Clarissa speaks of her heart, she is clearly not referring to any such 
moral sentiment in which Hume locates the origin of virtue in his rejection of the 
notion that virtue may be related to `eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things 
(29) 
For Clarissa here the heart is the faculty of judgement, and the principles which she 
claims to find there may be related to the law which we have in us by nature. Her 
remarks assert her belief that it lies within the individual, with Divine assistance, 
either to act upon the prescriptions of that law, or to reject it. It is not therefore 
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surprising that Clarissa is shocked and appalled by what she calls `a judicial hardness 
of heart' exhibited by Lovelace, since what is implied by this phrase is a recognition 
that such a state of the soul is characteristic of a constant, consistent and deliberate 
rejection of the prescriptions of that same law. Lovelace has chosen to be what he is, 
against the promptings of any better impulses; he has therefore rejected grace and 
rejected it deliberately. She tells him: 
What sensibilities ... must thou 
have suppressed! What a 
dreadful, what a judicial hardness of heart must thine be; who canst be 
capable of such emotions as sometimes thou hast shown; and of such 
sentiments as sometimes have flowed from thy lips; yet canst have so 
far overcome them all as to be able to act as thou hast acted, and that 
from settled purpose and premeditation; and this, as it is said, 
throughout the whole of thy life, from infancy to this time! (p. 852) 
Her remarks bring into focus the close relationship between the faculty of 
reason, which discerns good and evil, and will, the faculty by which the individual 
implements his choice of one or the other. It is a relationship which Christian 
theology defines as crucially important. 
Our actions are controlled by reason acting in virtue of some 
previous acts of will (compare the way will chooses and uses in virtue 
of some previous act of reason). For control is exercised by issuing 
orders, and order is reason's prerogative ... 
The root subject of 
freedom is will, but the root cause reason: will is free to move in more 
than one direction only because reason can have more than one 
conception of what is good. (30 
Clarissa's assumption that Lovelace's habitual and deliberate choice of sin, 
his misuse of his free will in the past, has led to a state in which his heart is hardened 
and which therefore renders him less likely to choose good in the future, is one which 
Christian theology would support. Aquinas tells us that sin may begin in childhood, 
and that an individual arriving at the age at which he begins to use his reason must be 
held responsible for directing himself towards a rightful goal. `This is the time laid 
down', he tells us `For obeying God's positive command to Turn to me and I will 
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turn to you'. (31) It is a command which Lovelace has ignored. Aquinas offers 
likewise a comment on the dangers of an habitual choice of sin which would seem to 
endorse Clarissa's reproof: 
Sinful actions can directly predispose us to other sins of the 
same kind. But sins non-fatal by nature cannot in this way predispose 
us to sins fatal by nature, though they can lead to sins that the sinner 
can make fatal; for the more disposed he is to sin non-fatally the more 
his desire to sin grows, and eventually he may choose what he has 
become habituated to as his goal in life. Actions non-fatally sinful in 
nature can dispose us indirectly to actions fatally sinful by nature, by 
sapping our resistance to disorder as such, and thus to choosing what 
is fatally sinful by nature. (32) 
Lovelace is not without a recognition himself both of the nature of free will 
and of his own weakened ability to exercise it in favour of virtue. However, he uses 
his weakened spiritual state as an excuse for future failures to choose what he knows 
to be right, while yet acknowledging the wickedness of doing otherwise. 
Contemplating the conquest of Clarissa, he writes to Belford in terms which seem to 
extenuate the crime - the fatal sin - that he intends to commit, while actually 
revealing its full heinousness: 
Oh Jack! what a difficulty a man must be allowed to have, to 
conquer a predominant passion, be it what it will, when the gratifying 
of it is in his power, however wrong he knows it to be to resolve to 
gratify it! Reflect upon this; and then wilt thou be able to account for, 
if not to excuse, a projected crime, which has habit to plead for it in a 
breast as stormy, as uncontrollable! - 
(p. 868) 
This statement opens up the whole question of free will. Lovelace 
acknowledges that he has it within his power to abstain from gratifying his 
predominant passion - rather pride than lust perhaps - but he also recognizes that to 
refrain has been made difficult by the self-indulgence to which he admits. Because 
he has habitually chosen to do wrong, it is now difficult to do what is right. `When 
the will is enchained as the slave of sin', says Calvin, `It cannot make a movement 
towards goodness, far less steadily pursue it -). 
(33) The theological problem lies in 
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determining to what degree the individual can work out his own salvation, whether, 
as Calvin contends, God does all, but only for His elect, or whether man is required 
to co-operate with grace offered to all. Richardson appears to expect his reader to 
perceive Lovelace's state as one in which he must bear, to a great degree, the 
responsibility to co-operate with grace. Evidence for this contention may be drawn 
from Richardson's remark in the Collection: 
God knows what he will forgive; but his forgiveness, however, 
depends, in a great measure, on the offenders themselves. (34) 
Richardson's comment that Lovelace was too `determined a Libertine' to be 
reformed, despite `awakening Calls', suggests that Lovelace both knows what is 
required for salvation and refuses the Divine assistance which is extended to him. (35 
Lovelace's plea that habit and his stormy nature make resistance to sin 
difficult reflects a view that Christian theology would endorse. However, Richardson 
does not mean us to believe that resistance is impossible. The rape of Clarissa is pre- 
meditated, and not the result of a sudden impulse of passion. It would be no less a 
sin if it were, but Lovelace's premeditation suggests a sin coolly and rationally 
determined in the sense of which Aquinas speaks when he refers to fatal sin as 
attributed to reason. `Sensuality', he tells us, `can contribute to fatal sin, but what 
makes the sin fatal is not that contribution, but the contribution reason makes in 
ordering it to a goal' , 
(36) 
Lovelace's tragedy lies in the fact that he does understand that what he does, 
and what he proposes to do, is sinful, and recognizes that his heart has been hardened 
by vicious habits. He recognizes that sin lies in the will, a perception that is 
demonstrated when he discusses the integrity of Clarissa's will. 
Her will is unviolated - at present, however, her will is 
unviolated. The destroying of good habits, and the introducing of 
bad, to the corrupting of the whole heart, is the violation. That her 
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will is not to be corrupted, that her mind is not to be debased, she has 
hitherto unquestionably proved. (p. 916) 
The only true violation would be Clarissa's violation of herself, if her will 
consented to Lovelace's seduction. Lovelace implicitly acknowledges here that if 
Clarissa - admittedly unweakened by any habitual vice - can choose virtue, then 
such a choice is a possibility for all. However, as Clarissa herself pointed out, 
Lovelace from earliest youth has chosen otherwise and has thus made himself 
responsible for his weakened state. Richardson's contemporary, William Law, would 
have regarded Lovelace as choosing his own damnation, since Law asserts that God 
would be merciful to us for our failings and unavoidable weaknesses, but not for sin 
which we lacked the intention to avoid. He claims that if we fail to avoid sin through 
negligence or lack of will, we cannot expect mercy. (37) In the light of such a 
contention, Lovelace's reflections on his own habits of vice in the full knowledge of 
their sinful nature, and on his projected rape of Clarissa must suggest to the reader 
that his progress through life is a progress towards spiritual death. 
If Lovelace can reflect upon the manner in which he has exercised his will, so 
Clarissa's reflections on the subject of her own exercise of the will both exonerate 
her from sin and acknowledge the part played in this exoneration by Divine 
assistance. She writes to Anna after the rape of the shock `the greatest that I could 
receive', and adds that, since she had not been at fault, she hopes `I am already got 
above it'. (P 116 1) The assertion that she is not culpable of any wrong-doing, carries the 
implication that had her self-examination disclosed any violation of her will to virtue, 
she would not so soon be able to `get above' the greatest shock that she could 
receive. She is aware, as is Lovelace, that she is essentially unchanged, in the 
spiritual sense, by her experience. Not only did she not will what befell her, she also 
strove her utmost to avoid any such evil. Both her resistance beforehand and the 
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failure of the experience to corrupt or weaken her will to virtue afterwards, Clarissa 
gratefully attributes to Divine assistance. 
Yet, I bless God, it has not tainted my mind; it has not hurt my 
morals ... 
My will is unviolated. ("1254) 
Clarissa's thankfulness to God carries an implicit recognition of the part that 
grace plays in relation to the will, and stands in marked contrast to Lovelace's failure 
to co-operate with grace to help him correct the habits of sin to which he has given 
room. Such a failure can have only one result: 
What is evil simply speaking is the evil of fault, which 
destroys our relationship to God as our ultimate goal and separates us 
from him. (38) 
The unrepentant sinner is deprived of the experience of the presence of God 
and can only reflect on what he has lost. The pain of such a deprivation is 
compounded by the knowledge that it arises from his own freely-exercised choice. 
These are the pains which Lovelace claims to suffer while still living, but the extent 
of his spiritual blindness is revealed in that in acknowledging his sins against 
Clarissa, he seems unaware that he has also sinned both against God and against 
himself, and has thus created his own hell. Even at this point, however, grace in the 
form of a troubled conscience is extended to him; he could respond to it, but he never 
does so: 
If thou knewest that already I feel the torments of the damned, 
in the remorse that wrings my heart on looking back upon my past 
actions by her, thou wouldst not be the devil thou art to halloo on a 
worrying conscience which, without thy merciless aggravations, is 
altogether intolerable. (p. 1333) 
well-established Christian tradition holds that sin brings its own 
punishment upon the sinner, a contention which Lovelace' s pitiful 
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and spiritually perilous state painfully illustrates. St. Augustine considers that such a 
relationship of cause and effect in this instance is part of a Divine ordinance: 
For this is what you have ordained and so it is with us, that 
every soul that sins brings its own punishment upon itself (39) 
In such a state, or in seeking to avoid it, the individual has the resources of 
reason and grace. St. Augustine makes it plain that God gave man reason in order 
that he should choose good, but that the inherited frailty of fallen nature often hinders 
him from doing so, and so he draws penalties upon himself: 
He has made man a rational animal, consisting of soul and 
body; and when man sins, he does not let him go unpunished, nor 
does he abandon him without pity. (40 
Later, he adds: 
It follows that there is only one Good which will bring 
happiness to a rational or intellectual creature; and that Good is God 
... 
In attaining this Good they find their happiness; in losing it they 
are sunk in misery. 
(41) 
Those of Richardson's characters who understand this may eventually achieve 
that happiness which is proper to rational creatures, whatever difficulties or distresses 
afflict them in this temporal life. Those who do not so understand, or who choose to 
ignore this truth, and seek instead whatever presents itself to them as goods, whether 
sensual indulgence or material gain, are shown to experience the misery of which St. 
Augustine speaks, either in this world, or probably in the next, or in both. Christian 
theology recognises that the term `reason', denoting a faculty peculiar to man, may 
be interpreted in a number of ways. Calvin distinguishes between the intelligence 
needed to conduct life on earth in matters of policy, economy, liberal studies and 
mechanical arts, and that concerned with righteousness. All men have a common 
capacity, in varying degrees, to learn the arts, and Calvin asserts that we should 
recognize this as a gift of God, because it is common. (42) Aquinas, too, finds one 
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application of human reason to relate to social and political aspects of life, and relates 
this application to the virtue of prudence: 
Prudence is for people entrusted with rule and government.... 
But since every man's reason shares in government whenever he 
makes a rational decision, every man shares in prudence. (43) 
In relating such a comment to Richardson's work, however, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that prudence exercised in the individual's government of life may be 
exercised rationally, but against the reason that determines action in accordance with 
the eternal law of God. The Harlowes are prudent in their plans for the 
aggrandizement of their family, but they do not act in accordance with reason. 
Christian theology uses the term `reason' in a highly specialized manner in relation to 
man's spiritual life. In this sense, reason is a faculty of discernment or judgement 
which enables man to seek his final and true end, God Himself. St. Augustine 
acknowledges that man uses his God-given faculty of reason in the service of 
philosophy, the arts and the sciences. (44) but also in the supremely important task of 
attaining salvation. Writing of the development of reason in the mind of the 
individual until that mind is `ready for the perception of truth, and able to love the 
good', he adds: 
This capacity enables the mind to absorb reason, to acquire the 
virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, to equip man 
for the struggle against error and all the evil propensities inherent in 
man's nature, so that he may overcome them because his heart is set 
only on that Supreme and Unchanging Good. Man may indeed fail in 
this; yet, even so, what a great and marvellous good is this capacity 
for such good, a capacity divinely implanted in a rational nature ! (45) 
Richardson's presentation of his characters explores the use of reason, or the 
perversion of it, in two capacities essential to the attainment of that eternal goal, the 
ability to discern good and evil, and the mastery of the passions. However, he 
recognizes that human reason has suffered impairment; of all his major characters, 
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only Sir Charles Grandison is seen to exercise a judgement which rarely, if ever, fails 
in its reference to reason. (46) Richardson's own comment on Sir Charles, however, 
indicates that while his hero is to be taken as an example of what man may achieve, 
human nature is yet to be acknowledged faulty: 
The God of Nature intended not Human Nature for a vile and 
contemptible thing: And many are the instances, in every age, of those 
whom He enables, amidst all the frailties of mortality, to do it honour. 
Still the best performances of human creatures will be imperfect; but, 
such as they are, it is surely both delightful and instructive to dwell 
sometimes on this bright side of things. (47) 
Richardson's conviction of this imperfection is better demonstrated in his 
presentation of his avowed saint, Clarissa, who is by no means faultless in her 
exercise of reason in either of its capacities, and is all the more credible, both as a 
character and as a saint for her failure. Her sanctity will be shown to lie in the 
struggle to transcend fallen nature, even if, in this life, nature must still be fallen, and 
Richardson's treatment of her shows that it is. In this respect, both she and Lovelace 
are in the same condition, but while Clarissa understands that her reason must be 
employed, as St. Augustine points out above, in the struggle to seek the Kingdom of 
Heaven, Lovelace, an intelligent and rational man, fails to understand that not to do 
so is a perversion of reason. St. Augustine acknowledges the lack of steadiness in the 
human capacity to adhere to this truth, but claims that to fail ultimately to do so must 
be accounted `a perversion in this rational nature'. He adds: 
For it is created in such a privileged position that, though it is 
itself changeable, it can yet obtain blessedness by adhering to the 
unchangeable Good, that is, to the Supreme God; and, as we can see, 
it cannot satisfy its need except by attaining that bliss which only God 
can supply. Moreover, any perversion does harm to nature, which 
means that it is contrary to nature. 
(48) 
Richardson's villainous characters do demonstrate such perversity, and he 
recognises that even the virtuous man or woman may act, at times, against their own 
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best spiritual interests. His villains all illustrate in their respective ways choices 
made against reason, and freely made, since the perversion of free will and the 
misuse of reason are inextricably linked. 
Only in the pre-lapsarian state could a perfect relationship between reason and 
will exist, but Richardson's virtuous characters strive, insofar as fallen nature allows, 
to give reason the primacy in determining their choices of action, and in guiding their 
conduct. That they must, at times, inevitably fail does not, and should not, deter 
them from renewed struggle. Even Clarissa may fail in discerning her own motives 
when she agrees to correspond with Lovelace, while those characters with more 
damning failures to their accounts illustrate the effects of choosing the wrong 
conception of what is good and substituting for it material advantage or the 
satisfaction of lust, pride and self love. If reason is the defining quality of man, to 
abjure it and lose the joy of heaven which can only be the reward of an intellectual 
being, is to reduce humanity to the status of a beast. Thomas a Kempis imagines 
Christ speaking to His disciples of those who follow the pleasures of this world and 
abandon the pursuit of virtue, which Christian theology holds must also be the course 
of reason: 
Ah, how short-lived and false, how disorderly and base are all 
these pleasures. Yet so besotted and blind are such persons that, like 
dumb beasts, they bring death to their souls for the trivial enjoyments 
of this corruptible life ! (49) 
Lovelace - all Richardson's sinners - demonstrate this `besottedness' which is 
the perversion of reason. Clarissa recognizes the lack of reason in Lovelace's 
manner of life, in that being aware of the excellence of virtue, he yet chooses to live 
the life of a libertine. She writes to Anna on the subject, showing at once great 
insight into Lovelace's spiritual state and the dangers such a state represents, and an 
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appreciation of the distinction between a failure of reason as a result of that faculty's 
vitiated state, and a perversion of reason by its misuse or by defiance of its guidance: 
Allowing, as he does, the excellency of moral precepts, and 
believing the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, he can live 
as if he despised the one, and defied the other: the probability that the 
taint arising from such free principles may go down into the manners 
of posterity: that I knowing these things, and the importance of them, 
should be more inexcusable than one who knows them not; since an 
is worse, infinitely worse, than an error in error against 183) judgement. ('. 1 3) 
If Clarissa here recognizes a lack of reason in Lovelace's conduct, she also 
acknowledges that there would be an equal lack in her own, if she were to link her 
soul to that of a man whose own soul stands in such danger. Likewise, in her conflict 
with her parents, she understands that the morality governing human relationships 
must be based on reason, since she points out that she has resisted `authorities so 
sacred' - authorities sanctioned and approved by God - because the powers of those 
authorities are `unreasonably exerted'. 
(p. 373) Of all Richardson's characters, Clarissa 
most convincingly demonstrates an increasingly refined comprehension of what it is 
to live in accordance with the eternal law, so that she achieves a state to which 
Christian theology, of whatever tradition, encourages the individual to aspire. To live 
thus is to live according to the highest conception of reason, and to comprehend the 
purpose of a divinely given faculty. William Law makes the point in the following 
words, but those words are based on a well-established Christian tradition: 
You must act according to right judgements of the nature and 
value of things; you must live in the exercise of holy and heavenly 
affections and use all the gifts of God to His praise and glory. '50 
Elsewhere, Law argues that `there is nothing more to be feared than the 
wrong use of our reason'. (51) a contention that points to the tragic results of misuse. 
If Clarissa triumphs because of her increasingly refined understanding of what reason 
requires, Lovelace exemplifies the tragedy of a rejection of reason's prescriptions; his 
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misuse or perversion of reason constitutes a rebellion against the Divine order, in 
which the faculty is designed to render man most like to God, and thus capable of 
loving his fellow-man and enjoying God: 
An image of the uncreated Trinity can be found in creatures 
with reason, who utter a word in their minds, and in whose wills a 
love issues, so representing God in species. In other creatures there is 
no such word-source or word or love. (52) 
In using reason correctly, man fulfils both the requirements of the eternal law 
and of his own nature. Two Christian thinkers of differing persuasions and different 
periods sum up such requirements in statements that would leave the aspiring soul in 
no doubt as to the vital importance of the correct use of this faculty and of the part its 
exercise should play in leading man to his final destination. Aquinas claims that 
`Reason's ultimate standard is the law we have in us by nature', (53) while over four 
hundred years later, Law asserts, `True religion is nothing else but simple nature 
governed by right reason'. (54) 
While 
Christian thinkers of whatever persuasion generally urge 
believers to live according to reason, they equally acknowledge the 
difficulty that reason might experience in governing the passions, since the delicate 
balance between reason and the passions had been disturbed by the fall. The loss of a 
state in which `the lower appetites were completely subject to reason, and all feelings 
presupposed reasoned assessment (55) has left man in a condition in which constant 
endeavours must be made in order to control those passions, now grown unruly. St. 
Augustine argues that uncontrolled passions bring man closer to the state of the 
demons, while the use of reason to control and direct passion, he claims, is the means 
of bringing the believer to his ultimate goal in the vision of God. 
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The true religion bids us abjure all those movements of the 
heart, all those agitations of the mind, all those storms and tempests of 
the soul which in the demons make a raging sea of passion. (56) 
That Richardson accepted the established Christian opinion of the dangerous 
and unruly nature of uncontrolled passions, and of the necessity for the individual to 
exert control by the use of reason and with the help of grace, is amply demonstrated 
in the presentation of his major characters. Of these, the virtuously inclined are 
shown as being in the course of struggling against such `storms and tempests of the 
soul' of which St. Augustine writes, in order to secure their salvation, while those 
characters who do not restrain their impulses of greed, anger, lust and envy offer 
examples of the painful consequences of uncontrolled passion, both in this world, and 
- it may be presumed - in the next. It is made clear to the reader, without 
compromise, that the control of the passions is a necessity for the well-being of 
society as much as for that of the individual. It is made equally clear that the task of 
restraint may be painfully difficult in its execution. Writing of the composition of 
Pamela, he recognizes this difficulty: 
In my Scheme I have generally taken Human Nature as it is, 
for it is to no purpose to suppose it Angelic, or to endeavour to make 
it so. There is a Time of Life, in which the Passions will 
predominate. 
(57) 
However, Richardson's virtuous characters are not seen to regard the 
difficulty of the task as an excuse for neglecting its accomplishment. Clarissa's 
awareness of the dangers of passion uncontrolled by reason is established at the very 
earliest stage of the novel when she expresses her fear that her brother's inability to 
control his passions has largely contributed to the enmity between the Harlowes and 
Lovelace. (p. 49) Later, writing to her Uncle Antony, Clarissa reiterates her concern that 
her brother's lack of control not only compromises his own soul, but also the well- 
being of the whole household. She makes it plain that the Harlowes have encouraged 
59 
him in the gratification of `passions which he is above attempting to control', and 
which he `has been too much indulged in, either for his own good, or the peace of 
anybody related to him. (p. 152) If the family may be seen as a microcosm of society, 
as elsewhere Richardson claims that it is, (58) Clarissa's words suggest that Richardson 
sees that where there is uncontrolled passion, moral and social chaos can follow, and 
often do. Such a view is consistent with the teaching of Christ as to what it is that 
defiles a man, those uncontrolled negative impulses of the heart which damage both 
himself and others: 
But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth 
from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed 
evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, 
blasphemies: These are the things which defile a man. (59) 
Clarissa's criticism of her brother for the frailty of his human nature does not 
mean that she remains unaware of the frailty of her own. In his presentation of his 
heroine and her antagonist, Lovelace, Richardson offers a double portrait of the same 
passions of pride and resentment met in diametrically opposing ways. She is seen 
engaged in the struggle to subdue and transcend these passions; he is seen in the 
process of indulging them. 
That Clarissa consciously engages in such a struggle is demonstrated by the 
evidence of her own analysis of her own heart and conduct. She acknowledges 
herself capable of anger and hatred, but adds that these `are but temporary passions 
with me. One cannot ... 
hate people in danger of death, or who are in distress or 
affliction'. ý'678ý It is clear that Clarissa has learned to subdue such negative passions 
by means of conscious effort from an early age. Her correspondence with 
Mrs Norton, her governess, as she approaches her death would seem to suggest the 
conclusion that the latter, whose letters emphasize both perseverance and resignation 
to the will of God, has been instrumental in assisting Clarissa to such triumphs over 
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herself. On the other hand, we learn that Lovelace was subject to no restraints in his 
early youth, but indulged in every wish. (p. 74) The results of both training and lack of 
it are to be seen during the course of the novel as Clarissa and Lovelace live and die. 
In a letter to the Duchess of Portland, Edward Young, poet and priest, 




is Virtue, and Religion itself? It is little more 
than curbing ye natural tendencys of our perverse Hearts. (60 
Religion, that is, living in accordance with God's eternal law, must stand 
opposed to the impulses of the heart. As the reader witnesses Clarissa's struggle to 
overcome what must be acknowledged as a natural response of anger and resentment 
following the rape, itself an act motivated by Lovelace's own uncontrolled passions 
of pride and revenge, Young's remark would seem to have application. Clarissa's 
reason tells her that the Christian believer must forgive injury, but the impulses of 
fallen nature are those of anger and hatred. The forgiveness she is able to extend to 
Lovelace on her deathbed represents a victory over that nature which has been shown 
to be achieved only with the greatest difficulty by constant effort to give primacy to 
the dictates of the Christian conscience, itself an expression of `the law that is in us 
by nature'. That the reader may suspect an ambiguity in that forgiveness, of which 
Clarissa herself seems unaware, does not make the effort any less remarkable. No 
Christian theologian would question that such efforts to subdue such negative 
passions must be made by those who seek salvation. The words of the Gospel itself 
demand it: 
But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse 
you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which 
despitefully use you, and persecute you. (61) 
61 
To follow such a prescription makes demands on fallen nature that can only 
be fulfilled with the help of grace, but which must be made. However, Richardson, 
while acknowledging that this is the case, does not suggest the complete depravity of 
that nature, and in this respect follows the tradition of Christian thought which does 
not condemn the passions as being entirely negative, but which recognizes that they 
are an essential part of human nature, however disordered by the fall. Such negative 
passions as hatred and resentment must indeed be subdued, but appropriately directed 
by reason, the passions may be positive in the effect. `Passion makes us prone to sin 
only when it is unreasonable', says Aquinas. `Reasonable emotion is virtuous'. (62) 
This remark does not suggest that human nature is incapable entirely, even in its 
fallen state, of virtuous passion; what is required is the correct adjustment of passion 
and reason. The very composite nature of man must give such virtuous passion its 
due and positive place. The words of Young demonstrate that this view was 
acceptable to contemporary Christian thinkers: 
Think not our passions from corruption sprung 
Tho' to corruption now they lend their wings; 
That is their mistress, not their mother. All 
(And justly) reason deem divine: I see, 
I feel a grandeur in the passions too, 
Which speaks their high descent, and glorious end; 
Which speaks them rays of an eternal fire. (63) 
Richardson's hero and heroines are capable of such virtuous passions. Sir 
Charles can declare that `I live to my own heart; and I know (I think I do) that it is 
not a bad one'. 
(64) As one modern commentator has claimed, in the late seventeenth 
and first half of the eighteenth centuries, the heart, in the sense of mind, conscience, 
integrity and inner religious conviction, took on a more positive meaning, as the 
essential element of humanity. 
(65) Clarissa too, employs the term in ways which 
reflect such a contention. She tells Anna that her heart condemns the clandestine 
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correspondence which she has been drawn into with Lovelace. (p. 117) In this sense the 
word `heart' suggests the faculty of judgement. Elsewhere, Clarissa employs it to 
suggest that it is the seat of emotion, when she tells her friend that, in discussing her 
response to Lovelace, `I wrote my heart, at the time'. ' 176 In this instance, Clarissa 
does not appear to know her own heart very well. However, she does recognize that 
passion itself may be both virtuous and positive. She tells Anna: 
Noble minds, emulative of perfection (and yet the passion, 
properly directed, I do not take to be an im-perfection neither), may be 
allowed a little generous envy, I think ! (p. 175) 
The shifting meanings of the term `heart' have their dangers. When Clarissa 
discusses with Anna the attributes of a desirable suitor, she concludes that `the heart 
is what we women should judge by in the choice we make'. (P*181) It is open to 
question whether she here speaks of the man's heart, as the seat of virtuous passions 
which would make him eligible, or of the woman's as the faculty of discernment 
which enables her to choose worthily. 
In the case of herself and of Lovelace she is deceived, since the virtuous 
passions she desires in a suitor rarely animate his heart, and her own has responded 
less as the faculty of judgement than as the seat of an unrecognised passion. If such 
error indicates, as St. Augustine claims that it does, that the total subjection of 
passion to reason cannot be achieved in this life, at least the individual may 
endeavour not to give way to negative passions. The Christian scheme which 
Richardson embraces allows for the cultivation of virtuous passions; Clarissa 
achieves a victory, incomplete as it may be, over the passions which oppose reason, 
and cultivates those impulses of the heart which accord with it. She is rewarded 
accordingly. Lovelace, as it will be seen, ignores those better impulses of the heart, 
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and indulges the passions opposed to the eternal law 
and probably eternally so. 
He is accordingly punished, 
t. Augustine's comments on the subject, mentioned above, stress that 
the state of perfection will be achieved when reason and passion are in 
their correct balance, when the impulses of the flesh oppose neither those of the soul 
seeking God nor the Holy Spirit itself He adds: 
Now we cannot achieve this in our present life, for all our 
wishing. But we can, at least, with God's help, see to it that we do not 
give way to the desires of the flesh which oppose the spirit by 
allowing our spirit to be overcome, and that we are not dragged to the 
perpetration of sin with our own consent. (66) 
Richardson might very well agree with both this comment and with that of 
Milton, that the passions `rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue', (67) 
since in the Collection, he writes, `our passions are given us for excellent purposes 
and may be made subservient to the noblest '. (68) However, he would also claim that 
for the passions to be `rightly tempered', divine assistance is necessary, as St. 
Augustine contends. Christian theologians, apart perhaps from those who embrace a 
thorough-going Pelagianism, have generally acknowledged the necessity of divine 
grace to assist man in the control of negative passion and in the cultivation of virtue. 
St. Paul acknowledges that his conversion from persecutor of the church to its apostle 
was accomplished by the grace of God bestowed upon him (1 Cor. 15.10), and 
elsewhere that grace teaches him his duty to his flock (2 Cor. 1.12). Grace then, both 
reforms and encourages. Theologians have disagreed, however, on the extent to 
which grace, reason and will interact. St. Augustine's position moved from a belief 
in the co-operation of will and grace to belief in the doctrine that the will was 
incapable of movement towards goodness without the grace of God. Calvin takes the 
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same view (69) and asserts that grace is not given equally and promiscuously to all, but 
only to the elect through regeneration. (70) Another tradition acknowledges that man 
needs grace, but holds that it is extended to all. 
When his nature was integrated, man kept every 
commandment of the law in the sense that he did everything 
commanded; but now that his nature is disordered he can't even do 
that unless grace heals him. Neither then nor now could he keep the 
commandments lovingly and charitably without grace; and both then 
and now he needed God's help to activate and initiate his keeping of 
them. (71) 
Richardson does not appear to subscribe to the Calvinist position since even 
his most wicked characters are seen to be offered grace if they will avail themselves 
of it, while his virtuous characters are seen to co-operate with the grace extended to 
them. As he points out in his letter to Lady Bradshaigh, quoted above, Lovelace 
persists in his villainy despite `awakening calls', and even Mrs Sinclair, in her 
prolonged process of dying painfully, is shown to understand the necessity of 
repentance and is urged towards it by Belford, who might be seen in this instance as a 
divine messenger, but rejects the opportunity offered. Likewise, in a paragraph 
added in the third edition to Belford's comments on the difficulty of reformation for a 
rake, he reminds Lovelace that only grace can effect such reform, and asks him if he 
can read the word `grace' without a sneer. (iv, 
pp. 389-390) Richardson's virtuous 
characters show an awareness of the part played by grace in assisting their fallen 
human nature in its progress towards eternal life. They seek grace in times of trial 
and temptation, and give thanks for the gift that enables them to avoid the sins that 
would bring eternal death. What Thomas ä Kempis has to say of grace has relevance 
to Clarissa's own experiences: 
The resolution of good men depends more on the grace of God 
than on their own wisdom, and they put their whole trust in Him in all 
their undertakings. (72) 
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Clarissa initially faces the temptation of relying too much on her own 
strength, and one lesson which she must learn, learned perhaps through grace itself, is 
that to attain eternal life, a goal which man has no natural ability to achieve, (73) the 
grace of God is required. Such grace may be solicited, but according to Thomas a 
Kempis, the believer must await God's judgement of the time at which it is to be 
bestowed, for the Divine wisdom is the best judge of how the soul shall be drawn to 
Him: 
Were grace always granted at once and to be had for the 
asking, the weakness of man could hardly support it. The grace of 
devotion must therefore be awaited with firm hope and humble 
patience. 
(74) 
Clarissa's experiences lead her to reflect upon the Divine dispositions in the 
bestowal of grace. She comes to recognize that the trials which lead her to her early 
death, and to the `happy end' which she confidently expects to be crowned by a 
heavenly reward, have been part of a Divine dispensation of grace. Her final letter to 
her father thanks him for the `virtuous education' she received, which gave her 
access to Divine grace. Likewise her letter to her uncles acknowledges that grace 
may be dispensed in various ways. `Some are drawn by love; others are driven by 
terrors, to their Divine refuge '. (p. 1375) However, she also acknowledges in that same 
letter her fault in the past in not having recognized that the credit she attributed to 
herself for her virtuous inclinations belonged to the gift of grace bestowed on her: 
But perhaps I was too apt to value myself upon the love and 
favour of everyone: the merit of the good I delighted to do, and the 
inclinations which were given me, and which I could not help having, 
I was perhaps too ready to attribute to myself. (i*1375 
If Clarissa recognises that her sufferings have been the means of grace, their 
final effects are a grace in themselves in that she has been drawn to purge her soul of 
those defects of vanity and pride. Her response to those sufferings, a response which 
66 
has enabled her to endure them with patience and humility, may be seen as the effect 
of further grace bestowed on her. In The Imitation of Christ, Christ tells His disciple 
that `they who freely and willingly serve Me, shall receive grace upon grace '. (75) 
This promise would seem to be well-illustrated in Richardson's presentation of his 
heroine, since in her final letter to her brother she tells him: 
God gave me grace to make a right use of my sufferings. I 
early repented. I never loved the man half so much as I hated his 
actions, when I saw what he was capable of I gave up my whole 
heart to a better hope. God blessed my penitence, and my reliance 
upon Him. And now, I presume to say, I AM HAPPY. (P, 1374) 
In her sickness, Clarissa has shown the signs of grace that Christian 
theologians of varied persuasions would recognize. Jeremy Taylor remarks that only 
grace can make sickness tolerable, and only grace can turn it into a source of virtue, 
conferring `ease and felicity". (76) Clarissa's patience and charity on her deathbed 
turn the act of dying, if this comment is taken as valid, into a process which serves to 
demonstrate the operation of grace. Likewise that charity itself, as well as the 
forgiveness she extends to the Harlowes and to Lovelace, would suggest the effects 
of grace noted by Thomas ä Kempis: 
And if heavenly grace and true charity enter in, there will be 
no envy or meanness of heart, nor will self-love retain possession. 
Divine charity overcomes everything, enlarging every power of the 
Soul. 
(") 
This is certainly the state that Richardson intends for his dying saint, although 
the reader may be uncomfortably aware that in giving up `her whole heart to a better 
hope', Clarissa may have unconsciously chosen death. However, the sentiment 
which she voices above expresses a view with which no theologian would disagree, 
that grace is required to prepare the individual for heaven, and that one sign of that 
grace is that the believer looks to heaven for felicity rather than to the things of this 
world. 
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Grace pays attention to things eternal, and is not attached to 
the temporal. The loss of goods fails to move her, or hard words to 
anger her, for she lays up her treasure and joy in Heaven, where none 
of it can be lost. (78 
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3 
Holy Living Iý The Love of God 
Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom. (Job 28.28) 
Jn 
paying attention to `things eternal', all Christian traditions agree, man 
must give primacy to the love and service of God. In the Old Testament, 
such was the first precept of the first tablet of God's commandments, and in the New 
Testament, Christ reiterates this primacy for His new dispensation (Mark 12.29-30). 
Moreover, the commands of the Law define man's relationship to God and to his 
fellow-man, and must be seen to be according to reason, since God Himself is their 
source, and they are an aspect of His ordering of all things. `In Him', says St. 
Augustine, `There is no weakness, no unreason, no injustice'. (') Elsewhere, he tells 
us that love of God and the observance of His law are to be understood as 
establishing the standard of virtue: 
When a man's resolve is to love God, and to love his 
neighbour as himself, not according to man's standard, but according 
to God's, he is undoubtedly said to be a man of good will, because of 
this love. (2) 
Such a view is endorsed by subsequent theologians. Aquinas argues that the 
chief intention of God's law is that man should adhere to God, and that man adheres 
to God most firmly by love; if he adheres by fear, he does so for the sake of avoiding 
the evil that would threaten as a result of omission, but if by love, he adheres for its 
own sake. (3) More simply, Calvin asserts that the doctrine of the law `connects man 
by holiness of life with his God ... and makes 
him cleave to him'. He argues that 
holiness of life is comprehended under the two heads of love of God, and love of our 
neighbour. (4) Moreover, he asserts that what is contained in the two tablets of the law 
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4 are, in a manner, dictated to us by that internal law, which ... 
is in a manner written 
and stamped on every heart'. (5) Such contentions about the relationship between love 
of God, love of man, reason and virtue are likewise to be found in the religious 
conduct books of Richardson's day, and examples may be taken from the works of 
two writers with whom he was acquainted as a printer. Patrick Delany writes that 
`the Precepts of Christianity are perfectly agreeable to our human and reasonable 
nature. And admirably fitted to perfect and exalt it'(6), while William Law offers a 
comprehensive view of the duty of the Christian believer: 
He therefore is the devout man who lives no longer to his own 
will, or the way and spirit of the world, but to the sole will of God, 
who considers God in everything, who serves God in everything, who 
makes all the parts of his common life parts of piety by doing 
everything in the name of God and under such rules as are 
conformable to His glory. '7 
Such statements, offering a gloss on the formulations of the theologians, and 
recognising that the frame of reference for Christian conduct is the law of God, are 
consistent with Richardson's own views. His hero and heroines strive to conduct 
their lives by the observance of `such rules as are conformable to his glory' in despite 
of their human frailty, and his own conviction that such observance must be the rule 
and aim of Christian life is expressed in a letter to Joannes Stinstra, his Dutch 
translator: 
May the Almighty bless you with Health and continued Vigor 
of Mind to prosecute your useful Designs, for his Glory, and the 
Benefit of a World that wants such an Instructor! (8 
Richardson's novels amply demonstrate the value he places on this doctrine 
which lies at the very heart of Christian belief, that man's purpose in life is to love 
and serve God and then his fellow-men. His characters may not always be presented 
as being consciously aware of that all-important, ultimate purpose, as man cannot 
be, (9) but they are presented as being liable to judgement by a Divine Creator in 
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accordance with the manner in which they have responded to its demands. More 
immediately Richardson, their human creator, offers them to the judgement of his 
readers, who are invited to evaluate the degree to which they demonstrate, or fail to 
demonstrate, a love of God, and love of their fellow-men. 
No character in Richardson's novels doubts the existence of God, although 
such belief may lie dormant until fear of death, penitence, or need awakens it. Even 
Lovelace and his rakes do not deny the existence of God as an intellectual 
proposition; they merely ignore that existence and its meaning in relation to the 
welfare of their own souls until such time as one of the above circumstances should 
arise. However, for Richardson's hero and heroines, the service of God and the 
benefit of others are the mainsprings of their existence, whether or not they express 
such convictions about the purpose of human life explicitly. Moreover, they show 
themselves aware that the fulfilment of human existence is not to be sought in this 
world, and that true happiness lies beyond this life; their ultimate goal and reward is 
the Beatific Vision. In this respect their convictions are in accordance with the 
promises of the Gospel and with long-established Christian doctrine. 
But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the 
Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by 
the Spirit of the Lord. ('° 
St. Paul's words on the subject of that fulfilment to come are echoed in 
subsequent codifications of this doctrine. St. Augustine discusses at 
length the 
manner in which the saints are to see God, 
(") while Aquinas argues that the 
enjoyment of the vision of God is the specific kind of fulfilment which 
is appropriate 
to intellectual creatures. 
Man's ultimate happiness consists in his highest activity, 
exercising his mind, and if created minds can't see God then either 
men will never be happy or their happiness must lie elsewhere than 
in 
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God. That is not only opposed to our faith but makes no natural 
sense. 
(12) 
It follows that in this life, happiness must always be incomplete. Calvin too, 
asserts that the fulfilment of happiness may only be enjoyed in heaven, but only for 
God's chosen: 
If our Lord will share his glory, power, and righteousness with 
the elect, nay, will give himself to be enjoyed by them: and what is 
better still, will, in a manner, become one with them, let us remember 
that every kind of happiness is herein included. (13) 
In moving towards this great goal, Richardson's hero and heroines are in no 
doubt as to how it must be achieved. Their daily lives must be given to the service of 
God and man, must be devoted to prayer and praise on the one hand, and to the 
strenuous pursuit of virtue, that is to say, living in accordance with reason, on the 
other. William Law, drawing on the Christian tradition accepted by all persuasions, 
reminds his readers of the relationship between reason and religion, and expresses 
such purposes of life that motivate Richardson's heroine: 
The short of the matter is this, either reason and religion 
prescribe rules and ends to all the ordinary actions of our life, or they 
do not. If they do, then it is as necessary to govern all our actions by 
these rules as it is necessary to worship God. 4) 
Nor is there to be any abdication from such demands if life brings trials and 
suffering. Such eventualities in Richardson's novels are the tests which establish the 
adherence to the law of love and service by which his characters are judged. 
Clarissa's sufferings, first at the hands of the Harlowes, and then at those of 
Lovelace, do not render her exempt from the daily necessity to respond to the 
demands of that law. Richardson's presentation of the manner in which his hero and 
heroines approach the Christian imperatives of a life lived from day to day in the love 
of God and man is very much in accordance with the ancient Christian traditions; 
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mediated through the particular codification given them by the religious conduct 
books. 
William Law's gloss on the commandment to `love the Lord thy God with all 
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind' (Matt. 22.37), requires that 
Christians spend every waking hour consciously devoted to this purpose, and 
whatever their degree or status, that they should actively seek to please God in daily 
activities designed to His service and to that of their neighbour. He acknowledges 
that grace is necessary to reach the standard of regularity of life which he claims 
should be the aim of every Christian, but he points out that it is because the 
individual lacks the sincere intention of pleasing God in all his activities that he falls 
into irregularities that could be avoided by `the ordinary means of grace ". (15) Law's 
stern belief that the individual is saved or damned by his own efforts, assisted by 
those `ordinary means of grace', or failing because of the lack of them, presents a 
stark, inexorable choice; he can avoid sin if he really wishes to do so. If he fails to 
avoid it, through negligence or lack of will, he cannot expect mercy. If Clarissa may 
be judged as being sure of salvation in the light of such prescriptions, Lovelace is just 
as surely damned as a man who is fully aware of the sinfulness of his conduct, but 
either unable, because of long habituation to vice, or unwilling to repent. 
However, merely to avoid sin is not enough. The love of God and man 
demands strenuous and unremitting efforts. While Law recognises the difficulty of 
making such efforts, he nevertheless holds it as the duty of the Christian to do so. Of 
all Richardson's virtuous characters, Sir Charles and Clarissa approach the state of 
strenuous Christian endeavour which Law considers necessary, but Clarissa, unlike 
Sir Charles, is shown in the process of anxious self-examination, and her progress 
towards sanctity is defined by her struggle to overcome pride and resentment. 
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Daily life offers endless opportunities for those of Richardson's characters 
who may be seen as Christian exemplars, to offer service to God and to man, and this 
service is shown to be deliberately chosen and purposeful, a life-long commitment 
with every opportunity accepted and fulfilled. Christian life is not shown to exist in 
the mere bleakness of `thou shalt not', but rather in the determination to use time, 
energy and resources in this service. To do this, Law argues that the Christian should 
propose to himself: 
Such rules as relate to the well-ordering of our time and the 
business of our common life. Such rules as prescribe a certain order 
to all that we are to do, our business, devotion, mortifications, 
readings, retirements, conversation, meals, refreshments, sleep and the 
like. (16) 
Such a demand that the individual should impose rules on himself for the 
conduct of his daily life is underwritten by Calvin's assertion that the Christian 
should look to God in all that he does, and that this is the self-denial which will leave 
no place for pride and ostentation, for avarice, lust, luxury and effeminacy, which are 
all the result of self-love. (17 This prescription at once recommends a positive act of 
worship of God, and ensures the avoidance of sin by discipline of life. Such 
prescriptions as these meet with a committed response from Clarissa, since the reader 
learns that she follows them exactly. Anna Howe's eulogy of her friend, written after 
Clarissa's death, describes the way in which the latter exactly apportioned her time 
between prayer, works of charity, and domestic and social duties. 
Anna gives a detailed account of the manner in which Clarissa passed the day, 
allotting little time to rest or to any activities which could be regarded as merely 
frivolous. From the moment of her early rising (thus fulfilling another of Law's 
prescriptions, that the Christian in health should rise early), Clarissa kept a strict 
account of her time. The rigidity of this scheme may appear excessive to the reader, 
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but when it is considered that the disciplined employment of time rests on the 
underlying notion that idleness is spiritually undesirable, and that virtuous activity 
has the dual purpose suggested by Calvin's comments, referred to above, Clarissa's 
conduct then appears in the light of an aspect of the conscious search for salvation. It 
is significant perhaps, that Lovelace and his crew of rakes have no regular occupation 
but pleasure, and that while he, like Clarissa, is an early riser and fills his day with 
activities, these are the activities of sin. Lacking that self-denial of which Calvin 
speaks, and failing to order his life for the sake of salvation, as Law recommends, sin, 
in the form of inordinate self love, enters in. 
Both Lovelace and Clarissa have opportunities to serve God and man which 
are not given to all. They are both rich and freed from the necessity of daily labour to 
earn a living, and these advantages impose special obligations to which Clarissa 
responds and Lovelace does not: 
If you have time and fortune in your own power, you are 
obliged to be thus reasonable and holy and pious in the use of all your 
time and all your fortune. (18 
Clarissa's careful use of her time, and her judicious expenditure of her fortune 
in alms, may thus be seen to be in accordance with both reason and virtue. 
Lovelace's use of time in intrigue, and resources spent in the concoction of his plots 
is, conversely, opposed to reason, since neither God nor man is served thereby and 
his advantages are employed to evil purposes. Such dereliction of duty finds 
condemnation elsewhere, together with a warning of the painful effects on the sinner 
himself Jeremy Taylor censures those who fail to undertake the responsibilities 
implicitly imposed upon them by high social rank, or by the possession of abilities 
which could be of service in public office: 
Some there are that imploy their time in affairs infinitely 
below the dignity of their person, and being called by God, or by the 
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Republick to help to bear great burdens, and to judge a people, do 
enfeeble their understandings and disable their persons by sordid and 
bruitish businesse. (19) 
Lovelace might not be called upon to `judge a people', but his misuse of his 
very considerable powers of intellect and his energy render him liable to such 
censure. If the remarks of such commentators as Law and Taylor are to be taken 
seriously, such men as Lovelace stand in peril of God's judgement when they shall be 
called upon to account for the use they have made of their time. Taylor recognises 
that men of quality are at particular risk in the matter of the prudent employment of 
their time. He claims that those who have not been educated well enough to use their 
time profitably may be miserable and may fall into base company. (20) Lovelace, 
clearly a man of some learning, has not received the moral and religious education 
required to avoid such an eventuality, and choosing vicious company, makes it all the 
more vicious. On the other hand, the virtuous education for which Clarissa thanks 
her father in her final letter to him, has taught her to avoid such a fatal abuse of time. 
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time is to be used wisely, to the glory of God, to the salvation of the 
individual's soul and to the benefit of his fellow-man, the most important, 
indeed the indispensable, use of that time must be in devotion to prayer, both private 
and public. Although none of Richardson's characters, however virtuous, appear to 
resort to prayer at three hourly intervals, beginning at six o'clock in the morning, as 
William Law urges the Christian to do, his hero and heroines are very regular in the 
matter of private and public prayer. Such prayers are never shown to be a merely 
formal exercise; the prayers offered by Clarissa spring from what Law would have 
called `a state of the heart' and `a lively fervour of the soul'. '21) While Law 
acknowledges that it is creditable for Christians to engage in trade and employments, 
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he asserts that they lose what is most valuable if they do not consider devotion as the 
most important business of life; a just proportion must be kept between the demands 
of this world and the true end of life. 
Miss Howe's eulogy of Clarissa offers ample evidence that her friend 
admirably discharged these duties of daughter, mistress of servants and patroness of 
the poor in a manner which would satisfy the terms of Law's prescriptions as to what 
the Christian owes the world, and Clarissa's own letters give evidence of piety from 
the beginning. She is concerned with the performance of those duties as the 
fulfilment of the demands of religion. Her favourite visitor is her spiritual mentor, 
Dr. Lewen, and the deprivation of attendance at public worship when her family 
confine her to her room is important enough to her to merit a mention in her letters to 
Anna. However, it is as her sufferings increase, especially after the rape, that prayer 
in the form of meditations composed from the psalms and the Book of Job, becomes 
the means by which she at once expresses her desolation, and comes to terms with 
her experiences. As one modern commentator has remarked of the use she makes of 
these extracts: 
A narrative begins to emerge, in which her suffering ceases to 
be arbitrary, and takes on the character of a divinely sanctioned 
(22) trial. 
Such prayers are both personal and private, in which Clarissa wrestles both 
with the dispensation of Divine Providence and with her own response to it, but this 
private communication with God and with herself becomes public when her 
meditations are bequeathed to Mrs. Norton, and shared by her with Clarissa's mother. 
These private prayers become at once a way in which she can convey to others her 
personal religious experience of suffering and redemption, and part of the means by 
which her story is told and presented. Moveover, there is another way in which these 
77 
prayers are double-edged, in that Belford records some of them in his letters to 
Lovelace, and the latter may apply to himself such reflections as: 
There is a shame which bringeth sin ... Cease then, and let me alone, that I may take comfort a little ... Deliver me, oh Lord from the evil man. Preserve me from the violent 
man. (pp. 1201,122 1) 
Clarissa's private prayers in this instance act as one of the `awakening calls' 
of which Richardson speaks in his letter to Lady Bradshaigh, and incidentally offer a 
sharp rebuke to the sinner's conscience. However, prayer has many functions. 
Christianity has always recognised the necessity of intercessory prayer. Christ 
Himself prays that Peter may not fail in faith (Luke 22.32), for the restoration of 
Lazarus (John 11.41-42) and that those who crucify Him might be forgiven (Luke 
22.34). The Christian church followed this example of intercessory prayer from the 
beginning. St. Paul asks the prayers of the brethren for himself (Romans 15.20-32). 
Intercessory prayer thereafter is enshrined in Christian tradition. `So charity 
demands we also pray for others', says Thomas Aquinas. `For sinners to return, and 
for just men to persevere and progress' "(23) 
The religious conduct books popular in Richardson's day echo such 
sentiments. William Law points out the importance of intercessory prayers, which 
earn grace for the one who prays and for the person who is their object. There is no 
more obvious instance of such prayers in Richardson's novels than the prayers which 
Clarissa offers for Lovelace that he might be forgiven for the wrong he has done her. 
However, such prayers may earn grace for her, and are themselves evidence of grace 
in her, but since their efficacy must also depend upon some element of repentance in 
him, it is not easy to gauge their benefit to Lovelace. Law claims that the daily 
exercise of such prayer to benefit others will have an effect on the heart of the one 
who prays; it will become `great and generous', eager to see all men happy in heaven 
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in the future, and concerned to relieve suffering in this world. More particularly, he 
urges the Christian to pray for sinners: 
For a frequent intercession with God, earnestly beseeching him 
to forgive the sins of all mankind, to bless them with his spirit, and 
bring them to everlasting happiness, is the divinest exercise that the 
heart of man can be engaged in. (24) 
Clarissa's prayers for Lovelace are no less a divine exercise because they are 
concerned with the spiritual welfare of one man, and they recognise that he cannot be 
forgiven unless he repents. However, they are also an important element in the 
conquest of herself which she seeks. Such prayer, born of her struggle to overcome 
the resentment natural in a woman who has been so wronged, reflects Law's 
contention that intercessory prayer for others must have its effect on the soul of the 
suppliant. Clarissa might be seen as emulating Christ in praying for the man who 
may be said - indirectly - to bring her to her death, but she is at the same time aware 
of her triumph in doing so: `I do forgive you, she writes. `And may the Almighty 
forgive you too! '. Her letter also reminds him, however, that his treatment of her has 
been the means of her accession to glory. (i. 1426) Prayer is a complex matter and the 
human motives which give rise to it are not always without ambiguities. (25) 
This consideration also arises in the question of Clarissa's attendance at 
public worship. The Harlowes' refusal to allow Clarissa to attend church, fearing 
some gesture from Lovelace, or some attempt at communication, is not without 
justification, since Lovelace's first letter to Belford confirms that he had hoped to 
establish some relationship with the family as a means of access to Clarissa. 
Lovelace's motives for attendance at church are never those of devotion, but rather 
those of seduction. Indeed, Lovelace does not appear to understand the sincerity of 
devotion, since when Clarissa determines to attend church, taking a chair from Mrs. 
Sinclair's house, he comments that she does so `not so much from a spirit of 
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devotion, I have reason to think, as to try whether she can go out without check or 
control, or my attendance' " 
633) However, Lovelace's suspicions are - like those of 
the Harlowes - not entirely unjustified. Clarissa's motives are not those of simple 
devotion. On this occasion her attendance at church also tests, `that I may be sure I 
can go out and come in when I please ". (p. 640) The question of attendance at public 
worship has a place in the battle of wills between Lovelace and Clarissa. 
Anna's eulogy of her friend, tells Belford that `The SEVENTH DAY she 
kept, as it ought to be kept, ('. 1471) acknowledging Clarissa's devotion both to the 
service of God and to works of charity. The approach of death offers Clarissa no 
dispensation from these imperatives. Dying, she drives her failing body out to nearby 
churches to attend prayers, well aware both of the duty imposed on the Christian of 
attendance, and of the spiritual benefits of public worship. To Anna, she explains 
what benefits there are in attending various churches at different hours of the day: 
This method pursued, I doubt not will greatly help, as it has 
already done, to calm my disturbed thoughts, and to bring me to that 
perfect resignation which I aspire after: for I must own, my dear, that 
sometimes still my griefs, and my reflections are too heavy for me; 
and all the aid I can draw from religious duties is hardly sufficient to 
support my staggering reason. (p. 1140 
For the sake of such opportunities of frequent prayer, she tells Anna that she 
prefers not to remove from the town to Anna's own neighbourhood. Her preference 
suggests that she does indeed give primacy to the service of God above all other 
considerations, but the reader may equally suspect that these griefs and painful 
reflections may have already determined for Clarissa, without her conscious 
recognition of any such determination, a future course in which the presence of her 
friend and human comfort could only be dangerous distractions from the search for 
God, or death. Whatever Clarissa's desires truly are, what she believes them to be 
determines her conduct in relation to worship. Just as Lovelace's presence in church 
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and his reasons for his presence leave him in danger of the loss of his soul for 
perverting a place of worship into a place of assignation, so Clarissa's recognition 
that her Christian duty in attending is also the means of self-conquest offers the 
possibility of salvation: 
For according as our desires are, so are our prayers; and as our 
prayers are, so shall be the grace; and as that is, so shall be the 
measure of glory. (26) 
To 
determine the nature of those desires, and whether they are in 
accordance with the dictates of the eternal law, and so need to be 
encouraged, or oppose it, and so require to be controlled and overcome, the Christian 
is recommended to undertake the practice of self-examination. St. Paul had declared 
the value of the practice to the early Church in his exhortation to the Corinthians (2 
Cor. 13.5). 
Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith; prove your 
own selves. Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in 
you, except ye be reprobates? 
If the post-Reformation churches abandoned the practice of sacramental 
confession, for which an examination of the conscience was a preliminary, the 
Protestant emphasis on the direct relationship between the individual and God gave a 
fresh impetus to the desirability of self-examination. As G. A. Starr points out, `The 
conviction that every man is both enabled and obliged to scrutinize his own soul was 
widely shared'. (27) No less an authority than Calvin argues that self-examination 
inclines us to submission and later adds that we should employ the laws contained in 
the two tables so that we may look into ourselves, and see how far our conduct is 
from being in accordance with God's wi11. (28) 
It may be concluded then, that self-scrutiny should lead the individual to a 
knowledge of the state of his soul, to an acknowledgement of sin and thus lead on to 
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an impulse towards repentance and to an appreciation of the graces bestowed by God. 
Moreover, self-examination should be a regular practice. Law argues strongly in 
favour of the Christian setting aside time each evening in which to review the day 
past and examine his behaviour. The reason for undertaking such a practice is based 
on the necessity for repentance, since he claims that the guilt of any sin unrepented 
must otherwise remain. Nor is a general repentance sufficient; the Christian must 
repent of particular sins and of each of them. Only in this way can he solicit pardon 
and God's grace to assist him, so as to avoid falling into such sins on the next and 
subsequent days. (29) 
It is clear that Clarissa is accustomed to the practice of self-examination. Her 
correspondence with Anna is in itself a means of interrogating her own heart, since in 
seeking to be candid with her friend, she must first seek to be honest with herself 
That both Anna and the reader may be conscious that she does not always succeed in 
this endeavour does not diminish the importance of the practice. Both women agree 
that true friendship requires not only honesty, but also the exercise of the charitable 
office of pointing out each other's failings so that these may be acknowledged and 
repented. Clarissa writes: 
I will love you the better for the correction you give me, be as 
severe as you will upon me. Spare me not therefore, my dear friend, 
whenever you think me in the least faulty. (P"135 
However, it hardly needs the impetus of Anna's possible criticism to motivate 
her friend to a stringent self-examination. Trained from her earliest years, as she 
reminds Anna, by Mrs. Norton's inculcation of Christian principles, and assisted by 
the spiritual counsel of Dr. Lewen, Clarissa's habitual practice would seem to be that 
of an earnest and demanding dissection of her own heart. Although she claims at one 
point that her heart is `unexamined', the very terms of her claim argue against such a 
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contention, and suggest that she is well-accustomed to self-scrutiny: She writes to 
Anna: 
Your partial love will be ready to acquit me of capital and 
intentional faults - but oh, my dear! My calamities have humbled me 
enough to make me turn my gaudy eye inward; to make me look into 
myself! - And what have I discovered there? - Why, my dear friend, 
more secret pride and vanity than I could have thought had lain in my 
unexamined heart ! 
(p. 333) 
This is not the language of one unaccustomed to introspection. Just as 
Richardson's celebrated technique of writing to the moment gives an unprecedented 
immediacy to his novels, so his presentation of Clarissa's analyses of her own 
spiritual state strongly impresses the reader with the sense of witnessing a soul 
struggling with itself, and struggling with all the urgency of one who understands that 
upon the outcome of her self-examination her eternal welfare may depend: 
But let me stop: let me reflect! - Are not these suggestions the 
suggestions of the secret pride I have been censuring? Then, already 
so impatient! But this moment so resigned! so much better disposed 
for reflection! Yet 'tis hard, 'tis very hard, to subdue an embittered 
spirit! - in the instant of its trial too! - 
(p. 333) 
Clarissa fears that a failure to subdue her impatience may lead to yet more 
`punishable errors'. If her self-castigation seems excessive to a reader who has 
already learned at this comparatively early stage in the novel to admire the 
earnestness of her moral endeavours, it must be acknowledged that it is by means of 
such searching self-analysis, especially after the rape which gives it fresh impetus, 
that Clarissa advances to sanctity by the acknowledgement of her errors and by the 
force of her repentance. Nor is such strictness in the searching out and 
acknowledgement of sin unprecedented among the saints. St. Augustine refers to the 
sins of his childhood as a `whirlpool of debasement 
(30) while John Bunyan feared the 
hot displeasure of Christ and grievous punishment for `taking delight in all manner 
of vice' in his youth, defining `vice' in this instance as breaking the Sabbath 
by 
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playing games. (31) In the light of such self-condemnation on the part of the saints, 
Clarissa's reflections on her `embittered spirit' are very far from unprecedented, and 
hardly excessively rigorous. 
alvin's claim that self-examination inclines the individual to 
submission, is echoed by Clarissa's association of reflection with 
Christian resignation. Both theologian and the heroine of Richardson's novel in these 
remarks implicitly acknowledge the role of Providence and the duty of the Christian 
to submit to its dispensations. Christianity had always acknowledged the role of 
Providence in overseeing and directing not only the operations of the universe, but 
also of the trivial details of daily life. Christ reminds His disciples of God's care 
even for the fowls of the air (Matt. 6.26), and St. Augustine offers a gloss on this 
assertion when he reiterates the role of Providence: 
He has not abandoned even the inner parts of the smallest and 
lowliest creature, or the bird's feather (to say nothing of the heavens 
and the earth, the angels and mankind) ... 
(32) 
Both scholastic and reformed theology agree that Providence concerns itself 
with singulars as well as universals: Thomas Aquinas asserts: 
For God has immediate knowledge of individuals, as knowing 
them not merely in their causes, but also in themselves ... 
Now it 
would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, He did not desire 
their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is 
the source of all goodness. (33) 
Calvin's account of Providence does not substantially differ: 
The world is governed by God, not only because he maintains 
the order of nature appointed by him, but because he takes a special 
charge of every one of his works. 
(34) 
In Richardson's time, Deism questioned many traditional Christian doctrines, 
and among them that of the role of Providence. The God of the deists might 
have 
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established the laws of the universe, but thereafter the great machine operated 
according to those laws without His intervention in its operations, still less in the 
affairs of men. (35) Richardson, in his letters (36) demonstrates his antipathy to deistic 
doctrines, and in his novels explicitly expresses his belief in the long-established 
orthodox view of the role of Providence. Moreover, he accepted the notion that 
Divine Providence might permit evil or affliction for its own purposes, and that 
submission to its decrees was not only the Christian's duty but a means of salvation. 
In his Postscript to Clarissa he remarks `We find that, (in the dispensations of 
PROVIDENCE) good and evil happen alike to ALL MEN on this side of the 
grave ', 
(p'1496) 
and the reader sees the force of this contention reflected in the 
experiences of his heroine. 
Clarissa is shown to be aware, at a very early stage in the novel, that 
Providence oversees and guides human affairs, and that resignation to its 
dispensations is an indispensable element in the Christian vocation. This is all that is 
required of a Christian, as Clarissa points out to Anna, even before the greatest of her 
trials has come upon her: 
What have we then to do but, as I hinted above, to choose 
right, and pursue it steadily, and leave the issue to Providence? (P*106) 
However, choosing right, or defining what right is, may be problematic, as 
Clarissa later acknowledges. Having been tricked into accepting Lovelace's 
protection, she comes to identify a fault in herself of trusting too much in her own 
competence. Perhaps however, the reader may conclude that while Clarissa has not 
yielded to any `disgraceful impulses' in her course of action, she has failed, and still 
fails, to be aware of that attraction which drove her to allow a connection with 
Lovelace at all: 
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That such a vile character, which ever was my abhorrence, 
should fall to my lot! - But depending on my own strength; having no 
reason to apprehend danger from headlong and disgraceful impulses, I 
too little, perhaps, cast up my eyes to the Supreme Director; in whom, 
mistrusting myself, I ought to have placed my whole confidence! - 
and the more, when I saw myself so persistingly addressed by a man 
of this character. (p'565 
Clarissa's reason and her heart - in this instance not the faculty of 
discernment but of deception - have been at odds; it is clear that the hidden 
inclinations of the one have obscured the judgement of the other. However, if 
Clarissa should have cäst the direction of her future course on Providence, it may be 
that Providence has allowed her error for its own purposes, a view to which Clarissa 
herself eventually accedes. After she has endured estrangement from her family, 
imprisonment by Lovelace, and rape, Lovelace reports to Belford a prayer that 
Clarissa offers, which acknowledges that while the ways of Providence may be 
unsearchable, they are always just, and which equally acknowledges the duty of 
submission: 
Great and good God of Heaven, said she, give me patience to 
support myself under the weight of those afflictions, which thou for 
wise and good ends, though at present impenetrable by me, hast 
permitted. (P-909) 
While accepting that the dispensations of Providence may include affliction, 
and permit man to sin, Christian theology denies that God ever wills sin. This 
doctrine was challenged by Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature, where he argues 
that if God is `the great and efficacious principle', and `the author of all our volitions 
and perceptions', He also becomes `the real cause of all our actions, bad as well as 
good, vicious as well as virtuous'. 
(37) The view of Christian orthodoxy of all 
persuasions concludes that God's Providence does not exclude man's voluntary 
actions: Calvin makes exactly this point: 
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Thus we must hold, that while by means of the wicked God 
performs what he had secretly decreed, they are not excusable as if 
they were obeying his precept, which of set purpose they violate 
according to their lust. (38) 
Likewise, Aquinas in discussing God's will states that `God wills some goods 
more than others, but none more than his own goodness. So he cannot in any way 
will wrongdoing', (39) and elsewhere points out that the dispensations of Divine 
Providence embrace the liberty of the will: 
The last end of every creature is to attain to God's likeness ... It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing 
were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the 
voluntary agent attains to God's likeness in that he acts freely; for we 
have proved that there is free will in God. Therefore Providence does 
not deprive the will of liberty. (40 
Whatever differences in emphasis between pre- and post-Reformation 
theology, the point is established that the sinner is free to sin. Clarissa may recognize 
that God has permitted her afflictions, including the sins that Lovelace has committed 
against her, but it is Lovelace who has willed those acts. Lovelace's claim, therefore, 
that his conduct has been the indirect cause of good may be seen as a distortion of the 
ways of Providence, since he willed evil. God does not will evil so that good may 
result, Aquinas tells us `but good follows from evil indirectly despite the intentions of 
the evildoer, (41) while Calvin remarks that, `in his boundless wisdom [God] well 
knows how to use bad instruments for good purposes'. (42) Thus Lovelace's 
annexation to himself of a kind of Providential power could be seen not only as 
unreasonable, but blasphemous: He writes to Belford: 
Why prithee, now, Jack, I have not been so much to blame as 
thou thinkest: for had it not been for me, who have led her into so 
much distress, she could neither have received nor given the joy that 
will now overwhelm them all. So here arises a great and durable good 
out of temporary evil ! (p. 1235) 
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Lovelace, not God, must be seen as having brought about Clarissa's suffering, 
although Christian thinkers might well agree that he has been permitted to do so for 
God's own purposes. However, it is God, who by means of grace, will bring good 
from that suffering in Clarissa's sanctification, the edification of her friends, and in 
the conversion of Belford, which in turn has its indirect effect on a more hopeful 
future for Tourville and Mowbray, both in this world and the next. St. Augustine's 
opinions on the matter,, (43) which make the point that God can and does bring good 
out of evil, were taken up by successive theologians: 
And Augustine writes that God is powerful enough to bring 
good from bad. If God did not permit bad, many goods would 
disappear 
... 
Nor could we praise the righting of wrongs or the 
endurance of suffering if wickedness did not exist. (44) 
This conviction, expressed above by Aquinas, is one which is shared by 
reformed theology. Calvin too quotes St. Augustine's(45) authority to support his own 
contentions on this same point. Christian theology, therefore, would see in 
Lovelace's assertion that he has indirectly brought about good, the implication that 
God has permitted him to exercise his free will, and has Himself not willed to prevent 
the evil that Lovelace perpetrates, since He will bring good out of it. Lovelace, then, 
is very much in the position of Satan in the Book of Job. God permits the testing of 
his servant, and Satan thereby becomes God's instrument in the final revelation to 
Job of His own glory, in the vindication of Job's own righteousness, and in his 
eventual renewal. 
And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy 
power; only upon himself put not forth thine hand. So Satan went 
forth from the presence of the LORD. (Job 1.12) 
Likewise, the Satan of Paradise Lost, a work with which Richardson was 
familiar, is permitted by God to prosecute his evil on mankind as part of the Divine 
design to let him bring evil upon himself. God's Providence will bring forth `infinite 
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goodness, grace and mercy'(46) on mankind, but Satan needs God's permission to act 
at all: 
So stretched out huge in length the Arch-Fiend lay, 
Chained on the burning lake; nor ever thence 
Had risen, or heaved his head, but that the will 
And high permission of all-ruling Heaven 
Left him at large to his own dark designs 
That with reiterated crimes he might 
Heap on himself damnation, while he sought 
Evil to others, and enraged might see 
How all his malice served but to bring forth 
Infinite goodness, grace, and mercy, shown 
On man by him seduced. (47) 
Just as Milton presents the first man falling before the permitted temptation 
by Satan, so he shows the second Adam triumphantly resisting the same tempter. 
However, the Jesus of Paradise Regained is aware, as Adam is not, that God permits 
this temptation for the hidden purposes of His Providential design. Jesus tells Satan: 
Do as thou find'st 
Permission from above; thou canst not more. (48) 
Satan himself has already recognized his own place in that same design `For 
what he bids I do', (49) he acknowledges. Divine Providence has a place for the 
exercise of the sinner's will, whether that sinner is Satan or Lovelace, but the result, 
ultimately, may well be other than the sinner intends, since, as Calvin says `in this 
way, while acting wickedly, we serve his righteous ordination'. 
(50) Lovelace's pride, 
in annexing to himself a kind of providential power does not take into account the all- 
embracing nature of Divine Providence itself 
Clarissa recognizes what the deistic theorists tended to deny, that God 
concerns Himself with the individual. `God's eye is upon us! ' she tells Lovelace in 
warning after the rape, `His more immediate eye'. 
(p951) However, she is equally 
aware that the intervention of Divine Providence into her own life, however painful 
its allowance for contingency in the exercise of Lovelace's free will may 
have 
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seemed, is to her ultimate benefit. The duty of the Christian is submission, and 
submission is a lesson which Clarissa's experiences enable her to learn. Both pre- 
and post-Reformation theology assert that the ways of Providence may be 
unsearchable but that they are in accordance with reason, although human rationality 
may fail to comprehend that this is the case: The Imitation of Christ urges 
submission to the designs of Providence in words which Clarissa's own experiences 
might seem to illustrate: 
Do not argue why this person is so forsaken while another is 
endowed with great graces; or why one person is so grievously 
afflicted, while another is so richly rewarded. These things are above 
human understanding, and neither reason nor argument are competent 
to explain the judgements of God. (51) 
Equally, Calvin points out that we may not always recognize the reason for 
the dispensations of Providence(52) but concludes that these would be found to be, if 
we could only come to understand those purposes, consistent with reason: 
It is true, indeed, that if with sedate and quiet minds we were 
disposed to learn, the issue would at length make it manifest that the 
counsel of God was in accordance with the highest reason, that his 
purpose was either to train his people to patience, correct their 
depraved affections, tame their wantonness, inure them to self-denial, 
and arouse them from torpor. (53) 
Clarissa's final and dearly-achieved response to her sufferings is at once to 
acknowledge the unsearchable nature of the workings of Divine Providence and her 
own duty of submission. Such submission does not come without a struggle. 
Despite her momentary fear that she may not be able to sustain her lot without 
repining, and may conclude that God's punishment exceeds the seriousness of her 
fault, she comes eventually to place her trust in Divine wisdom, and to accept that her 
experiences have been part of a Providential dispensation: 
The ways of Providence are unsearchable. Various are the 
means made use of by it, to bring poor sinners to a sense of their duty. 
Some are drawn by love; others are driven by terrors, to their Divine 
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refuge. ... and now, 
being led to account for the cause of my 
temporary calamities, find I had a secret pride to be punished for, 
which I had not fathomed: and it was necessary perhaps that some 
sore and terrible misfortunes should befall me in order to mortify my 
pride and my vanity. 
(p. 1375) 
Clarissa's reflections might be seen as a re-statement of the remarks of 
Calvin. Her suffering has led her to accept the validity of a Divine dispensation, 
directed towards her ultimate good by a just and merciful God. If the reader might 
consider that Clarissa, while she did not choose her suffering at the hands of 
Lovelace, has in a sense chosen the early death which she regards as part of a 
Providential dispensation, Richardson clearly intends his heroine's fate to be seen as 
an illustration of the unsearchable ways of Providence. Moreover, the theologian 
might argue that Providence includes in its dispositions allowances for the blindness 
of a frail human nature which does not always understand itself and its own motives 
in the exercise of its will, nor, in its fallen state, recognize that its will may be 
divided. 
The submission which Richardson presents his heroine as being possessed of 
is that which Christian tradition would recognize as both desirable and necessary to 
the hope of salvation, and has been achieved by a struggle to accept suffering 
apparently arbitrarily and certainly undeservedly imposed. Clarissa's final letter to 
Mrs. Norton which the `editor' of Clarissa merely records without transcribing, asks 
that lady to rejoice in her present situation, `exulting in the mercies of a gracious God 
who has conducted me through the greatest trials in safety, and put so happy an end 
to all my temptations and distresses'. 
('. 1406) Both Richardson and Clarissa require 
their readers to understand that it is in the love and service of God that man's 
duty 
lies, and that although that love and service may require suffering, trust 
in Divine 
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to love and serve God is the primary purpose of man's existence, and if 
it is according to reason to do so, it is equally reasonable that such love 
and service should be indispensably and inextricably linked to the love and service 
which should be directed towards fellow-men. St. Augustine remarks that while it is 
easy to be well-disposed towards those who have done us no harm, to do whatever 
good can be done towards those who wish us ill, and would do us ill if they could is 
`a matter of magnificent generosity'') which is endorsed - required - by the Gospel. 
In making such a comment, he implicitly recognizes that according to the rationality 
of the world, to return good for evil makes no sense, but according to the eternal law 
which links God and man in charity, nothing could be more reasonable; the love of 
God must necessarily annexe to itself the love of man. Thomas Aquinas points out: 
But charity has only one goal - the goodness of God - and one 
shared life - eternal happiness - so there is only one type of charity, 
which loves God in the first place and our fellow-men for God's 
sake. (2) 
Likewise, post-Reformation theology makes clear the inextricable 
relationship between love of God and love of fellow-men. Calvin asserts that no man 
`observes charity in all respects unless he seriously fear God', and adds that St. Paul 
`makes the whole perfection of the saints to consist in charity ). (3) Holiness of life, he 
tells us, is comprehended under the two heads of the love of God, and love of our 
neighbour. (4) 
To Richardson's hero and heroines, the duty of charity is all-demanding and 
all-embracing in that it is part of their relationship to God, who cannot be loved and 
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served in isolation, without love and service being extended, in a variety of ways, to 
His creatures. In presenting the charitable conduct of Clarissa, Sir Charles and 
Pamela as resting on the basis of love and service to God, Richardson's 
understanding of the nature of charity is far removed from the contentions of 
philosophers who located the origins of such conduct in social utility or in a 
disguised or extended self love. (') Nor does he appear to find feeling rather than 
reason the origin of charity. ý6ý 
Clarissa does not always find that her feelings are consistent with what she 
regards as her Christian duty, notably in the case of her struggle to subdue her anger 
and resentment towards Lovelace in response to the Gospel injunction to forgive. 
She may frequently refer to the necessity to have a good heart (and fear that Lovelace 
has a bad one) but Richardson makes it clear that even in the most virtuous and well- 
disposed of mortals, the reality of fallen nature may render that organ unreliable as a 
guide to conduct. Goodness of heart requires an education in principles of virtue, 
which Clarissa has received at the hands of Mrs. Norton and of Dr. Lewen. When the 
natural impulses of the heart oppose charity, when Clarissa feels resentment and 
anger towards Lovelace, then the dictates of her Christian conscience, themselves 
founded on the eternal law and endorsed by the Gospel, tell her that salvation 
depends on resistance to those impulses. The Christian is told that to be forgiven, he 
must first forgive. He is not told that it is easy to do so, and Richardson's 
presentation of Clarissa's struggle to forgive Lovelace makes abundantly clear both 
the difficulty of adhering to this law of charity and his own acceptance of the 
necessity of doing so. 
While this aspect of charity is problematic and requires further examination, 
other manifestations of this necessary virtue are not neglected 
by Richardson's 
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heroine. Clarissa responds to the injunction to love her neighbours by offering alms 
to relieve their physical needs. Praises for a positive response to such a requirement 
pre-date Christianity: 
For the poor shall never cease out of your land: therefore I 
command thee, saying, Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy 
brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land. (Deut. 15.11)(') 
The Gospel strongly endorses the practice (Matt. 6.1-4) as does St. Paul (1 
Cor. 16.1-3; 2 Cor. 8-9), so that charity in this form becomes an indispensable 
expression of the Christian response to the injunction to love one's neighbour. 
Moreover, while such acts of charity should be undertaken for the sake of the love of 
God and of fellow-men, they benefit not only the recipient, but the giver. St. 
Augustine makes this very point: 
My God, you have taught me to distinguish between a gift and 
its fruit. The gift is the thing itself, a necessity of life given by one 
man to another. It may be money, food, drink, clothing, shelter, or 
help. But the fruit is the good will, the right will, of the giver. (8) 
Clarissa enjoys the blessings of the poor for her acts of charity, and clearly 
regards the performance of these as both a duty and a source of personal satisfaction. 
She is, however, aware of the spiritual benefits to be gained by dispensing alms, and 
tells Arabella that her money is `out at interest', adding, `And I hope it will bring me 
interest upon interest! . 
(p, 195) Arabella's response to this pious hope is to sneer at her 
sister as one who seeks the blessings of the poor. It is true that such charitable 
activities may well have spiritual dangers, encouraging in the donor a complacency 
or undue self satisfaction. Calvin reminds his readers that alms-giving should not be 
accompanied by pride or disdain, (9) and that the Christian should regard himself as 
the steward of whatever material advantages God has bestowed upon him. His 
remarks echo those of St. Augustine, although they have a slightly different 
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emphasis, while Clarissa's readiness to relieve the poor is equally consistent with the 
prescriptions of both theologians. 
Calvin asserts: 
Let this, then, be our method of showing good-will and 
kindness, considering that, in regard to everything which God has 
bestowed upon us, and by which we can aid our neighbour, we are his 
stewards, and are bound to give account of our stewardship; 
moreover, that the only right mode of administration is that which is 
regulated by love. In this way, we shall not only unite the study of 
our neighbour's advantage with a regard to our own, but make the 
latter subordinate to the former. ('° 
When Clarissa is brought to contemplate a possible marriage with Lovelace, 
her remarks on the manner in which she proposes to devote to charity the tenth of her 
income, some of which would derive from his proposed, and liberal, allowance, deny 
any motives of pride or display in her charitable activities. However, her generosity 
is combined with prudence in that she discriminates in the matter as to who should be 
the recipients of her charity. 
I aim at no glare in what I do of that sort: all I wish for is the 
power of relieving the lame, the blind, the sick, and the industrious 
poor, whom accident has made so, or sudden distress reduced. The 
common or bred beggars I leave to others, and to the public provision. 
They cannot be lower: perhaps they wish not to be higher: and, not 
able to do for everyone, I aim not at works of supererogation. 
(p. 655 
Such prudent discrimination in the dispensation of charity is consistent with 
Calvin's condemnation of indiscriminate alms-giving, and his encouragement of 
church authorities to visit every family regularly to ascertain whether its members 
were idle or drunken. Such a view was based on the value which Calvinism placed 
on industry. (") However, it is also a view which was held by some secular authors, 
suggesting the dissemination of this aspect of the Protestant ethic. 
Mandeville 
comments on the dangers of undiscriminating generosity: 
Charity, where it is too extensive, seldom fails of promoting 
Sloth and Idleness, and is good for little in the Common Wealth 
but to 
breed Drones and destroy Industry. "'^" 
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Richardson may have been familiar with Mandeville since Lovelace echoes 
that writer's comment `That private vices are public benefits %(p. 847) but the writers of 
the religious conduct books popular in his day may well have been his immediate 
source for Clarissa's discrimination in matters of charity, and the most likely 
disseminators of this aspect of the Protestant ethic of industry. Jeremy Taylor 
advises that alms should not be given to `vitious persons' if such charity will 
encourage their idleness and support their sins by being spent in `drunkenness or 
wantonness' "(13) 
Likewise, Patrick Delany, while urging that the Christian should err 
on the side of mercy at the risk of relieving the undeserving, rather than risk 
neglecting the deserving recipient, offers a caution: 
The vagrant beggar is an eternal exception, to all the precepts, 
and dictates of Christian charity. The race of vagrant beggars are the 
vilest race, that ever cursed the earth. Every penny given to the 
vagrant beggar, is so much taken away from honest industry, and 
Christian charity: taken away from Christian Charity, and given away 
to idleness, and lewdness: to vice, and villainy, to abominations and 
corruptions of every kind: in one word, it is so much of our substance 
(14) withheld from God, and dedicated to the devil. 
In the light of such stern warnings, the discrimination which Clarissa displays, 
and the dispositions of her will in favour of `the honest, industrious, labouring poor 
only' or of `honest people of large families' (P. 1419) are surely meant by Richardson to 
be seen as an admirable example of generosity balanced by prudence, of which the 
Christian reader could, and should, approve. If Clarissa required a precedent for her 
choice of charitable objects, she might find it in the advice given by Taylor that the 
best such objects are `poor housekeepers that labour hard and are burdened with 
many children'. (15) Moreover, she does as Taylor urges in dispensing charity at first 
hand, wherever possible, since Anna's account of her tells Belford, and the reader, 
that she personally visited the poor and needy. 
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Although Clarissa points out that encouragement to worthy persons `may set 
the wheels of their industry going, and put them in a sphere of useful action', 
(P'1419) it 
appears that her impetus towards the relief of the poor is intended to be seen as 
driven by religious motives rather than by those of a secular social philanthropy 
intended to render such people more productive as members of society. Clarissa's 
conduct in this aspect of Christian living follows closely the prescriptions of the 
religious conduct books. Likewise those conduct books have much to say about the 
duties of the rich in relation to their poorer brethren; they are assumed to have the 
duty of acting as stewards of the wealth that God has bestowed upon them. William 
Law, argues that Christians need to use their estates and fortunes with `religious 
exactness', because such properties are as much the gifts of God as hands and eyes; 
since the use of estates and fortunes constitutes such a great part of our lives, to use 
them well or badly is to live well or badly. Therefore the waste of estates and 
fortunes is, in a manner, robbery of those who could benefit from them. `We waste 
that which might be made as eyes to the blind', he says, `as a husband to the widow, 
as a father to the orphan' . 
16ý 
To waste property is not only foolish from a worldly point of view, since ruin 
could follow, but sinful, and could not only deprive the poor of relief but also the rich 
sinner of a heavenly reward. Conversely, Law points out that using property to 
dispense alms offers benefits to the donor, not perhaps the gratification of receiving 
the thanks of the poor or the admiration of friends (Clarissa does not go without such 
benefits), but a more lasting reward in heaven. (17) 
While Law might well approve of the manner in which Clarissa uses her 
fortune, he might equally have censured the contrasting use that Lovelace makes of 
his. One of Lovelace's virtues is that he is a generous and just landlord. He is not 
98 
imprudent in the management of his affairs, but he is not shown to have any regular 
interest in charity. More seriously, in the light of the Law's claim that money spent 
badly not only deprives those in need of the benefits it might procure, but also 
corrupts the heart of the one who so uses it, Lovelace stands in danger both of 
censure and of Divine displeasure. It is impossible in the light of these remarks not 
to think of the ways in which Lovelace spends his money, and to what ends. He lays 
out large sums to assist him in the process of seduction and complains ruefully to 
Belford of the cost of hiring the jewels necessary to adorn the supposed Lady Betty 
and Cousin Montague. With an irony that will redound on himself, he adds, `This 
sweet girl will half ruin me'. (p*875) By the use of his money for a purpose which is 
intrinsically evil, he is in a fair way, according to Law, to ruin himself 
The duties of stewardship do not cease with the life of the donor, which 
Clarissa recognizes when she takes steps to ensure, in her will, that she will continue 
to dispense alms through the agency of Mrs. Norton. Jeremy Taylor points out that 
testamentary donors benefit themselves spiritually by giving alms, as well as the 
recipients: 
Let thy charity out-live thee, that thou mayest rejoyce in the 
mansion of rest, because by thy means many living persons are eased 
or advantaged. (18) 
He adds that as little as possible should be entrusted to executors, as far as 
exact dispositions are concerned, so that it will be the testator who exercises the 
charity of stewardship. Clarissa takes care to be exact in her dispositions, so that the 
provisions of her will are both binding and unambiguous. In this respect, she would 
seem to offer a positive response to Taylor's recommendation that the testator should 
ensure that charitable donations should out-last the funeral, and that prudence, not 
vanity, should be exercised in the distribution of alms. 
(19) Moreover, in her case there 
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would be no need to hope, as some testators vainly do, that charitable dispensations 
might go some way, at least, to buy remission for any sins committed. St. Augustine 
had warned that alms-giving cannot bribe God to allow sins to be committed with 
impunity, (20) and similarly Taylor sternly dismisses the idea that testamentary 
donations can constitute a payment for sin. Alms are not `proper instruments of 
redemption, but instances of supplication, and advantages of prayer'. X21 
ichardson's work implicitly acknowledges that the Christian must 
how concern not only for the physical well-being of his fellow-men, 
but also for their spiritual welfare, and that he must not practise against their peace. 
As the expanded version of Anna's eulogy of her friend in the third edition amply 
demonstrates, Clarissa responds to the prescriptions of charity in both aspects. She 
relieves the physical needs of the poor not only by alms, but also by contributing to 
the education of poor children, and by finding work for them. At the same time, she 
provides both moral instruction and good books to the benefit of their souls. »" 
p p. 502- 
503) In doing so, she acts in accordance with at least one strain of Christian thought as 
to what constitutes charity. 
Calvin argues that the Christian must do what he can to promote his 
neighbour's tranquillity, and adds that since God's law provides so carefully for the 
physical safety of fellow-men, far greater care is due to his soul, which is of 
immeasurably greater value in the eyes of God. (22) Clarissa early suspects that this 
interest in the welfare of others is lacking in Lovelace, a suspicion which will prove 
to be justified. When she writes of this concern to Anna, she expresses her 
apprehensions that Lovelace lacks a heart; the word `heart' here takes on a meaning 
expressive of a virtuous and benevolent disposition: 
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But I used then to say, and I still am of opinion, that he wants 
a heart: and if he does, he wants everything. A wrong head may be 
convinced, may have a right turn given it: but who is able to give a heart, if a heart be wanting? Divine grace, working miracle, or next 
to a miracle, can only change a bad heart. Should not one fly the man 
who is but suspected of such a one? (p'' 84) 
Lovelace's lack of a heart indicates also a lack of that charity which wishes 
well to his fellow-men. This makes him dangerous, because that void is filled with 
self-love, and it is a variety of self-love which charity opposes. Its converse, 
according to Law, who uses the word `heart' in the same manner as Clarissa, is that 
charity which makes man like to God: 
There is no principle of the heart that is more acceptable to 
God than a universal fervent love to all mankind, wishing and praying 
for that happiness, because there is no principle of the heart that 
makes us more like God, who is love and goodness itself and created 
all beings for their enjoyment of happiness. (23) 
To act thus, says Law, is to act according to `the highest notion we can form 
of a man', in using finite faculties, as God uses His infinite faculties, for the welfare 
of His creatures, for the good of fellow-men. Lovelace is, then, opposed to this 
`highest notion we can form of a man', since his conduct and all his faculties, so far 
from being directed to the good of others, are generally directed towards their 
corruption, degradation, and likely loss of their eternal welfare. Lovelace's conduct 
may be seen as a failure of love in the sense in which Law uses the word; for Law, 
love is not a matter of natural affection, nor the expression of any sensual passion; it 
is a settled disposition allied to reason and will. In this sense Lovelace may be seen 
to be love-less: 
By love, I don't mean any natural tenderness which is more or 
less in people according to their constitutions, but I mean a larger 
principle of the soul, founded in reason and piety, which makes us 
tender, kind and benevolent to all our fellow creatures as creatures of 
God, and for his sake. (24) 
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The love of which Law speaks is a faculty of the heart in the way in which 
Clarissa uses the term in the letter to Anna quoted above. Love of this kind, not 
dependent on natural feelings so much as `on reason and piety' is that of which St. 
Paul writes in his characterization of charity (1 Cor. 13) and which St. Augustine 
regards as part of `an ordered obedience in faith in subjection to everlasting law 5. (25) 
Such a love can only be based on an appropriate self-love. St. Paul points out that all 
the law is fulfilled in the injunction to `Love thy neighbour as thyself (Gal. 5.14). 
St. Augustine likewise reminds his readers that alms-giving must begin with the self: 
There is a certain sort of almsgiving which a man owes as a 
gift to himself in the first instance, and by which the things within are 
made clean. (26) 
It is because Lovelace does not have such mercy on his own soul and is not 
therefore `made clean' within, that he is shown not only to lack charity towards his 
fellow-men but also to do them positive physical and spiritual harm. When Lovelace 
uses the term `heart' he may well do so in a sense opposite to that of Law's reference 
to the cultivation of principles which are pleasing to God. `All's right as heart can 
wish! ', says Lovelace when he has tricked Clarissa into returning to Mrs. Sinclair's 
house, and prepares his act of rape. (p. 877 To gratify a self-love founded in pride, he 
forgoes a self-love which is founded on reason, and therefore cannot exercise charity 
towards others. Clarissa's pleas for mercy, despite Lovelace's claim that her sighs 
went to his heart, must inevitably be in vain, since for Lovelace, to take pity on both 
himself and on Clarissa would be a folly which he rejects: 
Why then should this enervating pity unsteel my foolish heart? 
- It shall not. All these things will I remember; and think of nothing 
else, in order to keep up a resolution which the women about me will 
have it I shall be still unable to hold. (p. 879) 
Lovelace acts against reason when he acts against charity, both to himself and 
to Clarissa, whereas, as Law points out, the self love which keeps the individual 
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`tender, compassionate and well-affected' to himself is `just and reasonable '. (27) 
Without such self love, he cannot be compassionate to anyone else. The kind of self- 
love which makes Lovelace frequently exalt his own brilliance and his superiority of 
person, intelligence and accomplishments, is the opposite of a just and reasonable 
self-love, and leads to contempt, not love, for his fellow-men. 
t is because Clarissa has enough charity towards herself to consider her 
own eternal welfare that she can forgive Lovelace. A love of fellow-men 
founded on reason and piety rather than on constitutional tenderness will be 
extended, if not always easily extended, to those whose behaviour might naturally 
call forth disgust, anger or abhorrence. Such love will be able to forgive where 
constitutional tenderness might fail. Whatever natural feelings might be the response 
to injury, forgiveness as an act of charity must be chosen, striven for, and freely 
offered; there can be no appeal from this stern prescription, however hard the 
practice. Clarissa's struggle shows that it may only be achieved by means of grace. 
Self-interest alone might dictate forgiveness, since the Gospel enjoins the Christian to 
forgive so as to be forgiven, but Richardson's heroine, while recognizing the 
inexorable nature of this injunction, is enabled to go further and to concern herself 
with the spiritual welfare and ultimate destination of the man who has injured her. 
She understands that Lovelace stands even more in need of God's forgiveness than of 
her own if he is not to be lost, and urges him to repentance. 
It is in his presentation of Clarissa that Richardson offers his most 
comprehensive analysis of the nature of forgiveness and of the struggle that is both 
necessary and inevitable before the Christian soul can forgive fully, and forgive 
solely from the spirit of charity which is founded on the love of God. Clarissa must 
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forgive the man who has abducted and raped her, and the family who have oppressed, 
rejected and cursed her. To be able to forgive such treatment approaches that 
heroism of virtue which is considered to be one of the characteristics of sanctity. 
Such heroism is not to be achieved without a struggle, and Richardson's 
honesty of presentation leaves open to question whether fallen nature, even in the 
saint, may achieve it completely. Without the grace of God, it is hardly to be 
achieved at all. Clarissa is shown to experience all the natural resentment of one who 
knows herself both innocent and wronged. After the rape, and after her second 
escape from Lovelace, she writes to Mrs. Norton, torn between the demands of her 
acknowledged duty to forgive, and an equally insistent natural impulse to appeal for 
vindication and for Divine vengeance on those who have wronged her. 
Yet to God Almighty do I appeal, to avenge my wrongs, and 
vindicate my inno- 
But hushed be my stormy passions! ... 
May those be forgiven 
who hinder my father from forgiving me ! ('. 987) 
Later in the same letter, when resentment once more threatens to overwhelm 
her, she checks herself again. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate that true 
forgiveness is only to be purchased at the expense of an intense and painful effort, 
and that it shows not meekness and passivity but an active and passionate soul. 
When St. Augustine writes of forgiveness, he acknowledges the difficulty it presents 
for fallen nature, and says that to follow the injunction of the Gospel to love your 
enemies is `characteristic of the perfect sons of God', and adds that forgiveness of 
this order is: 
An ideal towards which it is every faithful person's duty to 
hasten, training his human mind to this attitude by prayer to God and 
by reasoning and wrestling with himself (28) 
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Implicit in such a statement is an assertion that forgiveness, difficult though it 
is, is the reasonable response to injury, because it is the response which God wills the 
Christian to make. The charity which Clarissa demonstrates when she wrestles with 
herself to overcome her resentment towards Lovelace can only be based on a love of 
God and assisted by application to Him in order to overcome the disordered 
tendencies of fallen human nature. That only a love for God can be the basis of such 
forgiveness is acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas: 
So great can be our love for a friend that for his sake we love 
those connected with him, even those who hurt and hate us. And this 
is how the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, loved 
for the sake of God, our chief friend. (29) 
If St. Thomas argues for the love of God as the basis of forgiveness, Calvin 
asserts the Christian's need for that same God's support in order to forgive at all. 
`The Lord will give us strength', he says `To observe a law which makes such 
demands on our weakness'. (30) In response to her family's enmity Clarissa learns to 
offer love for the sake of God, and for the sake of her own salvation. She gives 
blessings in response to their curses, even when they deny a last blessing themselves: 
God Almighty bless, preserve, and comfort my dear sorrowing 
and grievously offended father and mother! - And continue in honour, 
favour, and merit, my happy sister! - May God forgive my brother, 
and protect him from the violence of his own temper, as well as from 
the destroyer of his sister's honour! 1197 
The whole history of Clarissa's struggle to forgive, in the context of her 
sufferings, bleakly illustrates that the Gospel injunction makes demands, which are 
both inexorable and heroic, on the believer who aspires to respond to them. That 
Gospel injunction ends with a command to `Be ye therefore perfect, even as your 
Father which is in heaven is perfect'(Matt. 5.48). This command suggests that men 
must endeavour to behave as God behaves, that they should attempt to approach an 
impossible ideal, for the weakness of human nature precludes such perfection. 
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However, the Christian is expected to recognize that the near impossibility of the 
ideal does not invalidate the command to forgive; fulfilment must at least be - 
strenuously - attempted. This is the ideal which Clarissa attempts to reach, and it 
may only be approached by painful stages until she is able, finally, to declare that she 
sincerely forgives Lovelace, and dies `in perfect charity with all the world'. (p. 1413) 
The Clarissa who confronts Lovelace immediately she recovers her mental 
equilibrium after the rape is not yet the Clarissa who dies `in perfect charity with all 
the world', but a young woman who has responded to the wrong that he has done her 
according to merely human notions of justice and lawful vengeance. `The LAW 
shall be all my resource', she tells him. (p*950 This is a Clarissa who can declare with 
scorn, `from my heart I despise thee, thou very poor Lovelace! 
'. (P'9'0) Yet, within a 
few weeks, after still further suffering which befalls her as the indirect result of all 
his crimes against her, the process of learning to forgive has begun. Clarissa's 
feelings are ambivalent, torn between bitterness and a consciousness that forgiveness, 
however hard to achieve, is incumbent on the Christian. She herself recognises this 
ambivalence, but the prolonged struggle towards the perfection of charity which she 
finally claims to have achieved has been initiated. Belford reports that struggle to 
Lovelace, recording Clarissa's words: 
Let him know, sir, only one thing, that, when you heard me in 
the bitterness of my spirit most vehemently exclaim against the 
undeserved usage I have met with from him, that even then, in that 
passionate moment, I was able to say (and never did I see such an 
earnest and affecting exaltation of hands and eyes), Give him, good 
God! repentance and amendment; that I may be the last poor creature 
who shall be ruined by him! - and, in thy own good time, receive to 
thy mercy, the poor wretch who had none on me ! 
(p. 1071) 
Clarissa's remarks, and her prayer, demonstrate the conflict between the 
passions of anger and resentment she recognises in herself, and the co-existence 
in 
her of reason and the charity which forgives. Belford's comment, at this point 
`She 
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had not her Bible before her for nothing', reminds the reader that such forgiveness is 
founded on the law of God. Clarissa herself is aware of the inexorability of that law; 
if she wishes to aspire to the Beatific Vision, she must forgive Lovelace, whatever 
her natural feelings, and whatever the difficulty. 
I am trying to bring my mind into such a frame as to be able to 
pity him (poor perjured wretch! What has he not to answer for! ); and 
that I shall not think myself qualified for the state I am aspiring to, if, 
after a few struggles more, I cannot forgive him too. (pp. 101-11°z) 
Forgiveness cannot be merely an emotional response, since it could not then 
be a settled state, given the instability of human feelings, but must find its origin in 
reason, and in an act of the will. When Clarissa speaks a little later of `endeavouring 
to bring my mind to forgive all the world', 1106) it is her mind, not her emotions, 
which she acknowledges as the agent of forgiveness. Likewise, in rejecting 
Lovelace's offer of marriage, a belated attempt to rectify, in worldly terms, the evil 
he has done her, Clarissa bases both her rejection and her forgiveness on principle, 
rather than on emotion. She declares as much to Anna, asking her to communicate 
her decision to the ladies of Lovelace's family: 
Be pleased to acquaint them that I deceive myself, if my 
resolution on this head (however ungratefully, and even inhumanly, 
he has treated me) be not owing more to principle than passion. Nor 
can I give a stronger proof of the truth of this assurance, than by 
declaring that I can and will forgive him on this one easy condition, 
that he will never molest me more. (p. 1141 
The important words here `can and will' acknowledge that forgiveness lies 
within the scope of reasoned moral choice. The difficulty of making that choice and 
of offering forgiveness freely is demonstrated by Clarissa's imposition of a condition, 
natural enough in the circumstances. However, such conditional forgiveness is not 
yet the perfection of charity. Clarissa's spiritual strength increases as 
her bodily 
strength declines, and her growing resolution towards offering an unconditional 
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forgiveness, as the moment of dissolution approaches, and her desire to reach that 
position in which she can claim to be `in perfect charity with all the world', is an 
index of that strength. In reply to Lovelace's letter asking for forgiveness, she tells 
him that she has been able to go further than forgiveness, and to wish him well. (P-1191) 
Clarissa's concern is for Lovelace's spiritual welfare. Hearing that he is ill, 
she prays that he may meet with God's mercy, although he has himself shown none. 
A little later, she expresses the wish that he may feel remorse for his own sake, 
adding that suffering has taught her to wish for mercy for others, since she knows 
what it is to experience the lack of it. She leaves it to God to ascertain the true state 
of Lovelace's repentance. However, it is impossible for the reader to ascertain 
whether Richardson means Lovelace to be reminded, in Clarissa's mention of her 
suffering, of what she has endured, or whether the author cannot forbear, because of 
the integrity of his presentation, showing Clarissa herself unable, despite her 
struggles and her claims of perfect charity, to subdue her resentment completely. 
Likewise, it is difficult to decide whether Clarissa's triumph in her forgiveness of 
Lovelace is that of self-conquest, or that of gratified pride: 
The man whom once I could have loved, I have been enabled 
to despise: and shall not charity complete my triumph? And shall I 
not enjoy it? - And where would be my triumph if he deserved my 
forgiveness? - Poor man! he has had a loss in losing me! I have the 
pride to think so, because I think I know my own heart. I have had 
none in losing him! 
(P. 1254 
Although Clarissa can honestly acknowledge her own pride, she may be 
somewhat mistaken in claiming to know her own heart; it is not clear whether, 
despite her claim, she does not feel a loss. She might be expected, had she entirely 
conquered both secular love and natural resentment, to be speaking of a love based 
on `reason and piety', rather than of despising Lovelace. Perfect charity is hard to 
achieve; it may be almost impossible for human frailty to be able to condemn the sin 
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without also condemning the sinner Richardson certainly seems to have intended 
that Clarissa should achieve the state of perfect forgiveness, since he writes in a letter 
to Frances Grainger: 
People will find it very difficult to forgive wilful or 
Premeditated Injuries, where they love not, since where they do not 
love they will not be very far from the other extreme or from 
despising at least. She owns very near her Death that she could have 
loved her Destroyer Lovelace. Hence we have no doubt that she 
dying could forgive him and pray for him. (31) 
Elsewhere, he asserts baldly, `And yet forgiveness, even of injuries, is a 
Christian duty'. (32) However, Clarissa declares that she does despise Lovelace, and 
the reader may suspect that this response arises not only from the nature of the act 
perpetrated upon her, but also from the painful check given to the love she now 
disclaims because of that very act. In any case, it would appear that whatever 
Clarissa's claims, and those of Richardson for her, her triumph may not yet be as 
complete as she would wish. 
The ambivalences in Clarissa's heart, and the ambiguities in her expression of 
them, do not seem to be quite resolved by the approach of death. Her last letter to 
Lovelace may be seen as the final state of forgiveness which she achieves. She 
believes, and according to the doctrines enshrined in the words of the Gospel and in 
the profound simplicities of the Lord's Prayer, she is right to believe, that her own 
ultimate destination depends on whether or not she can rise above the grief and 
resentment that Lovelace's conduct has created in her. Forgiveness, therefore, is a 
pre-condition for salvation. Clarissa declares that Lovelace's crimes against her have 
indirectly preserved her from a life of suffering as the wife of such a man, and have 
done her the further service of bringing her to an earlier accession to glory than she 
might otherwise have expected. 
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There is no reason to doubt that Clarissa is presented as having a conscious 
intention to forgive, or to suspect that her declaration of a disinterested desire for 
Lovelace's eternal welfare is to be taken as other than sincere; Christian doctrine 
would endorse her declaration that she could not regard herself as truly penitent if she 
could not return good for evil, and if she could not forgive as she wishes to be 
forgiven. However, her forgiveness carries a certain sting in reminding Lovelace of 
what he has deprived her of in this life while indirectly assisting her to her early 
accession to glory. In pursuing his designs against her, Lovelace may be seen as an 
instance of Divine Providence bringing forth good - Clarissa's sanctification - from 
the evil intentions of a sinner, but he is also a man who can and does experience the 
pain of this well-merited rebuke; Clarissa's letter would have no effect were he 
possessed entirely of the `hardened insensibility' of which she accuses him. 
Moreover, when he refers to the `barbed dart of after-reflection' (p. 1429) which sticks in 
his heart, it is legitimate for the reader to assume that Clarissa's letter has had its 
effect in exacerbating the pain of guilt and remorse, and was intended to do so. It is 
also open to the reader to assume that since saints, too, share a nature which has been 
damaged by the fall, and in which passions cannot always be perfectly subdued to 
reason as in the pre-lapsarian state, Clarissa's legitimate concern, her duty even, to 
warn a sinner of the consequences, for himself and others, of his sin, may be undercut 
by a desire, not recognized by herself, to make that sinner suffer. Duty and desire 
here share a common boundary, and it is impossible to define exactly where it lies. 
Clarissa's expressed concern lest Lovelace put himself beyond the power of 
Divine mercy to forgive, would be regarded as a legitimate concern of 
Christian 
charity. Lovelace's response to her final letter shows him as a man who 
is unable to 
face his guilt and remorse, because of the pain of his reflections. `But no more of 
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these fruitless reflections', he tells Belford. However, to endure such reflections is 
the beginning of penitence, and penitence, sustained and sincere, would save him. St. 
Augustine points out that he who refuses to believe that forgiveness is possible, and 
continues in this state until the day of his death, `is guilty of that unforgivable sin 
against the Holy Spirit in whom Christ grants forgiveness of sins7. 
(33) As a 
Protestant, Lovelace would not have sought forgiveness through the Church, as 
St. Augustine requires the sinner to do, but he does not seek forgiveness at all, 
because of a combination of pride and despair. Clarissa's concern, then, for this 
sinner is appropriate; he stands in danger, as she tells him, of the loss of his soul. 
Such a rebuke as she gives him, whatever ambiguities it holds, may be seen as 
an instance of charity well regarded by Christian tradition. St. Augustine regards 
such rebukes as evidence of compassion in one who has reason to forgive a sinner: 
He who corrects with the rod, or constrains by any sort of 
discipline, him over whom he has authority, while yet forgiving him 
from the heart the sin by which he has been injured or offended, or 
who prays for him to be forgiven, is giving alms not only by the fact 
of forgiving and praying but also by the act of rebuking or of 
inflicting on him some corrective penalty; the reason being that he is 
showing compassion. (34) 
Clarissa in dying has an authority over Lovelace which her victory in the 
battle of wills has given her. Moreover, Christian commentators have pointed out the 
necessity that confronts the dying, in particular, to absolve others. Jeremy Taylor's 
discussion of forgiveness suggests that God makes use of us to offer mercy to 
ourselves and to others. 
Charity is the great chanel through which God passes all his 
mercy upon mankinde. For we receive absolution of our sins in 
proportion to our forgiving our brother: this is the rule of our hopes, 
and the measure of our desire in this world. 
(35 
Clarissa looks forward to death with confidence because of her conviction 
that God has forgiven her fault. She could not, then, feel such conviction, if Taylor's 
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comment has any validity, had she not in her turn learned to forgive, and such 
forgiveness is completed by a concern for the welfare of the sinner who injured her. 
In this way her rebuke can be seen as part of her forgiveness. Her final letter to 
Lovelace does not palliate the sins he has committed. From one point of view, the 
reader may perceive the dwelling on his iniquities as evidence that her forgiveness is 
not complete, and that she still feels an unacknowledged resentment. However, 
another construction could be placed on these reminders of his sinfulness, and her 
reproaches from this point of view can be seen as evidence of the performance of 
Christian duty rather than of a species of self-indulgence. Moreover, this is a duty 
which Clarissa has undertaken before, and reciprocally, with Anna. Clarissa in 
pointing out her friend's faults, expects Anna to offer an equal charitable correction 
of her own. This, she tells her friend, is the basis of their friendship: 
Few friendships are founded on such a basis as ours - which 
is, `freely to give reproof and thankfully to receive it, as occasions 
arise; so that either may have opportunity to clear up mistakes, to 
acknowledge and amend errors, as well in behaviour as in words and 
deeds; and to rectify and confirm each other in the judgement each 
shall form upon persons, things, and circumstances'. (p. 484) 
Seen in the light of this severe but essential element in the relationship 
between Clarissa and Anna, Clarissa's rebukes to Lovelace take on the aspect of a 
form of charity, sanctioned by one strain of Christian thinking at least, in a tradition 
inherited from St. Augustine's view of the matter by scholastic theology: 
There are two ways of correcting wrongdoing: brotherly 
correction treats it as bad for the wrongdoer, and is an act of charity 
towards him as a brother aimed at his recovery; another kind of 
correction treats the wrong as harmful to others and to the general 
good, and is an act of justice, maintaining law and order between 
people. (36) 
Since one of Clarissa's prayers for Lovelace is that he may be prevented 
from 
ruining others as he has ruined her, and since her final letter does not spare to point 
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out the iniquity of his conduct, coupled with fervent prayers for his reformation and 
ultimate salvation, she may be seen to act towards Lovelace (by virtue of the 
`brotherly correction' that she offers), and towards society (by virtue of her concern 
for the harm done to it in the past, and probably to be done in the future) with 
exemplary charity. The fact that such charity, in an imperfect world, has its 
ambiguities, does not make the conscious intentions of the well-wisher any less valid, 
nor the hoped-for effects any less to be desired. 
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- justice 
ustice, both legal and natural, has long been considered a legitimate 
province of philosophy. Plato regards it as one of the four cardinal 
virtues of the ideal state(l) and the individual as just when spirit and appetite are 
properly subordinated to reason. Aristotle discusses the justice which governs 
relationships between man and man, and the individual and the state, including in the 
former category the justice which should inhere in the father of a family and the 
master of slaves. (2) In Richardson's own time, Hume locates the origins of this virtue 
in social utility, and, in the person of Epicurus, concludes that a negative response to 
the enquiry as to whether there are `any marks of a distributive justice in the world' 
must imply that there is `no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods'. (3) 
For the Christian believer, however, of whatever tradition, the concerns of 
justice are inseparable from the righteousness of God, and cannot be separated in 
Christian practice from the love of God and charity towards man. No-one who 
claims to fulfil the injunction to love his neighbour will treat him unjustly; no-one 
who claims to love and serve God will do so. Both pre- and post-Reformation 
theology acknowledge this essential relationship between charity and justice. 
Aquinas firmly links the two virtues as an indispensable expression of the 
relationship which should exist between God and man, and between man and his 
fellows: 
So there are virtues disposing the will towards love of God and 
fellowman: charity, justice and the like. (4) 
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He stresses that justice should govern the relationships between man and man, 
and is to be exercised both in the private and in the public domain. In the one case, 
the Christian is required to recognise the rights, moral, social and material, of his 
individual fellow-man; in the other, he is to recognise the respective rights and duties 
of the governed, and of those who govern them. In both cases, however, justice is 
grounded in God's universal design for order in human affairs, not merely in human 
legal sanctions, although Aquinas acknowledges the necessity of these: 
But strictly speaking true justice is a virtue instilled in us by 
God's grace, and cannot be caused by moral injunctions which govern 
human actions; though the injunctions of human law can generate in 
us an acquired virtue of justice. (5) 
Like Aquinas, Calvin locates the origin of justice in the Divine lawgiver, and 
likewise, links charity and justice together in the service of God and a right 
relationship to man. Writing of the manner in which God divided His Law, which 
contains a complete rule of righteousness, into two parts, he concludes that the first 
place is assigned to the worship of God, and the second to the duties of charity to 
man, and adds: 
The first foundation of righteousness undoubtedly is the 
worship of God ... 
Without the fear of God men do not even observe 
justice and charity among themselves. (6) 
As Aquinas does, Calvin makes a distinction between legal and natural 
justice, and recognizes that these may be opposed. In the social sphere, those who 
have the right to govern a household may fail to act justly if they do not faithfully 
fulfil their duties towards their children and servants. He concludes that everyone, of 
whatever status, must consider what he owes to his neighbour, and must have 
reference to God and to His law, remembering that: 
The law requiring us to promote and defend the interest and 
convenience of our fellow-men, applies equally to our minds and our 
hands. (7) 
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It is clear that there is a strong and unbroken tradition in Christian thought 
which regards the concerns of justice as primarily related to the eternal law of God, 
whether justice is exerted in the natural or the legal sense. God's will, according to 
this tradition, as Calvin points out, is the supreme rule of righteousness. (8 However, 
Calvin equally contends that in man, damaged as he is by his fall, the ability to live 
by that law is subject to failure. Men may condemn evils in general, but deceive 
themselves in particular instances. (9) 
These well-established contentions concerning the nature and exercise of 
justice are reflected in Richardson's novels. The issues which he explores in his 
work are concerned perhaps more with the claims of natural than of legal justice, but 
in his examination of the rights and duties of parents and children, husbands and 
wives, masters and servants, those claims must inevitably be examined with those of 
legally instituted authority in mind. Of all Richardson's characters only Sir Charles, 
that example of achieved virtue, faultlessly discerns an exact adjustment between the 
rights and obligations of the parties who apply to his superior capacity for judgement, 
or on whom he gratuitously bestows it. The issues of justice in Clarissa are less 
clear-cut, and Richardson's treatment of their subtleties and of the delicate 
adjustment between justice and charity reflects the greater complexity of this novel. 
There is no-one who possesses the right of superior judgement in Clarissa to arbitrate 
between Richardson's heroine and her parents, or to whom she, as the prospective 
bride of first Mr. Solmes, and then of Lovelace might apply to be informed 
definitively of the respective rights and duties of spouses. As a daughter, Clarissa 
must acknowledge the rights of her parents, especially of her father, to dispose of her, 
but she is also required to determine the point at which Mr. Harlowe violates the 
claims of natural justice and the laws of God. As a prospective wife, her difficulty is 
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that the injustice of her proposed - successive - husbands, will make the fulfilment of 
her own duties to God and man a near impossibility. 
Both natural and legal justice, in a complex and delicate balance, are required 
to govern the relationships which form the bonds holding human society together. If 
only legal justice is exerted to regulate the respective rights and duties of parents and 
children, husbands and wives, governors and governed, there may often be a 
dissatisfied sense that these relationships are not adjusted in such a way that, 
according to the theologian, `involves doing the specific good owed to one's 
fellowmen and avoiding specific evils harmful to them'. (10) Nowhere does there 
appear to be such imbalance between a legally sanctioned order and the reader's 
sense of natural justice as in some of the parent-child relationships in Richardson's 
novels. In Clarissa the question of justice in such familial relationships is examined 
in great depth by the development of a situation in which a most dutiful daughter 
finds herself in opposition to her parents' wishes. The rights of parents, especially 
those of fathers, over their children are sanctioned and hallowed by Scripture, and 
universally acknowledged by Christian commentators. St. Paul places disobedience 
to parents among serious sins (Rom. 1.30), and Calvin regards those who fail in the 
duty of submission to parents as subject to a curse, even if that curse is long-delayed 
in its fulfilment. (il) 
Richardson himself appears to have had no doubt that parents have a right to 
the obedience of their children, or that such a right takes its origin and force from the 
authority of Scripture. In a letter to Sarah Chapone, he writes: 
The Law of God, is very express in many Places in favour of 
Parental Authority, even sometimes to the Power over Life, in case of 
Refractoriness of Children. (12) 
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This is not to say, however, that Richardson does not recognise that parents 
may sometimes fail to exercise their power wisely, or that they may fail to wield it in 
accordance with a concern for natural justice which should moderate their exercise of 
legal and institutionalized rights. If Calvin promises that a curse will descend on 
children who fail in their duty to their parents, Richardson believes that an equally 
severe punishment is reserved for parents who fail in their duties towards their 
children. In another letter to Sarah Chapone he makes exactly this point: 
One great Design of this Piece, was to inforce the Duty of 
Children to Parents, whether Parents did theirs or not; and to hold out 
a Warning to Parents in the Punishment worse than that of Death, of 
the Harlowe-Parents for their Defects in theirs. (13) 
In his recognition that there are reciprocal duties in the parent-child 
relationship, Richardson is in accord with the notions widely disseminated in his time 
by the religious conduct books. Bishop William Fleetwood starts his consideration of 
the subject by defining the duties of children to parents as love, respect, obedience, 
and succour or support. However, he acknowledges that it is not within the power of 
a child - of any person - to love and hate as he wills, and enjoins 
both parents and 
children to take such measures as are necessary to bring about the probability of a 
natural affection: 
Upon this account, it will depend much upon the parents' 
management, whether the children shall love with that affection of the 
heart, which both the parents and themselves desire they should: 
Therefore, by being commanded to love our parents, we are especially 
commanded to take and keep such courses, as will most probably 
secure and increase our natural affection to our parents, and to avoid 
and decline all things that may in any way diminish it. 
(14) 
The modern reader of Clarissa may conclude that the Harlowes' 
management of their youngest child, despite Clarissa's own insistence 
on the indulgence with which they have hitherto treated her, might 
be unlikely to 
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encourage such natural affection. However, Richardson establishes Clarissa's 
reverence for her parents from the very beginning of the novel when she declares to 
Anna that a child should not `seek to clear her own character, or to justify her actions, 
at the expense of the most revered ones'. (P. 52) Moreover, there appears to be some 
justification for Clarissa's references to parental indulgence. It is clear that she has 
been so generally a favourite as to make James and Arabella jealous, and the 
Harlowes have by no means been harsh to their daughter at this point, since she has 
already been permitted, when the novel opens, to refuse a number of suitors. It 
appears that the power of refusal has been left to her choice. Since Clarissa's 
objection to one such suitor, Mr. Wyerley, is based on her distaste for the disrespect 
with which he refers to sacred matters, in accepting her rejection in this instance the 
Harlowes appear to be not only indulgent, but wise parents, since Fleetwood argues 
that it is important to secure a certain compatibility between prospective spouses. He 
advises parents to be very careful that: 
They urge not their Authority too far in constraining their 
Children to marry, not only where there is no visible Aversion, but 
where there is great Likelihood that there will not be good 
Agreement. (15 
A young woman of sincere, if - at this point - conventional piety would be 
unlikely to find it agreeable to be married to a blasphemer. However, the Harlowes' 
subsequent treatment of their daughter, in which the exercise of their institutionalized 
authority can only be seen by the reader to be in opposition to the claims of natural 
justice, is inconsistent with this earlier apparent concern that their child should not be 
united to any man who might offend her religious or personal susceptibilities. 
This inconsistency is apparently initiated by a virtual abdication of their 
parental authority in favour of their son, James. Since it is James whose greed and 
ambition give impetus to the proposal to marry Clarissa to a suitor whom she finds so 
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repulsive in every respect, and who is indeed a man of sordid character, such 
abdication can in itself be seen as an act of injustice on the part of her parents. 
Christopher Hill, following Professor Habakkuk, has pointed out that social 
conditions in the early eighteenth century and the ambitions of such families as the 
Harlowes could place the eldest son, in whom the hopes of family aggrandizement 
resided, in a unique position of authority. (16) It is clear that James does hope, by the 
accumulation of the family wealth in his own hands, to be both the instrument and 
the beneficiary of the Harlowes' elevation, and that both Clarissa's legacy from her 
grandfather and her opposition to the proposed marriage with Mr. Solmes are 
stumbling-blocks in his progress towards the achievement of his ambitions. 
However, to explain the situation is not to excuse the Harlowe parents in the 
abdication of their duty. If Clarissa is subject to them in obedience, she is also 
entitled to their protection against envy and spite, protection, which in the third 
edition, she explicitly claims, (1 p. 226) and whatever James's other motives for the 
course he takes in proposing Solmes as a suitor, both envy and spite are mingled with 
them in his case, as in that of Arabella, who supports him. If the Harlowe parents are 
culpable in elevating considerations of material success over those of ensuring that 
their daughter is settled in marriage with a man whose character she can respect, they 
compound that culpability by failing to protect her from falling victim to the least 
admirable qualities of her brother and sister. Clarissa is herself aware of this reversal 
of the established and natural order in the Harlowe household. She writes to Anna of 
her brother, to whom her elders, `whose will ought to be his', now defer: 
Well may he expect to be treated with this deference by every 
other person, when my papa himself, generally so absolute, constantly 
pays it to him. () 54) 
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Clarissa acknowledges that there is no established age at which a `good child 
shall conclude herself absolved from the duty she owes to a parent', but equally, 
there is no age laid down at which parents may lay aside the care they have for 
children. (17 The reader may infer that in the case of the Harlowe family, this ideal of 
reciprocity has broken down. 
Richardson might have expected his original readers to be aware of this 
breakdown in reciprocal relations, since the conduct literature of the time discusses 
such situations, and they might be expected to be topics of widespread interest. 
Patrick Delany declared that as long as children continued as part of their parents' 
family `they are absolutely in their parents' power, and have no more right to dispose 
of themselves than they have to dispose of the parents' fortune, or inheritance, or any 
of their goods'. However, he balances this firm assertion of parental rights by 
cautioning parents that they should not offer violence to children's inclinations by 
forcing them to marry against their will. (18) Fleetwood is not quite so absolute in the 
assertion of parental rights over the disposal of children. He points out that in respect 
of marriage, children are not tied to `such strict obedience' as were those of the Jews 
and Greeks and Romans, societies in which parents had absolute power to dispose of 
their children, but acknowledges that parents have a great power, which they must 
use tenderly and kindly. (19) Children may only resist such authority with reluctance, 
and only in specific circumstances: 
It must be in Cases of great and lasting Moment and Concern, 
and such, as, when represented to fair, and equal, wise and 
understanding People, they may find themselves both pitied for their 
Trial, and approv'd for their Resolution. (20) 
Neither Clarissa, nor anyone else in the novel, disputes the right of parents to 
exact obedience from their children, although Anna, even while acknowledging the 
sacredness of parental authority, questions whether that authority should not be based 
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upon reason. (p. 85) Clarissa herself, writing to Solmes a letter which urges him to 
abandon his pretensions to her hand on the grounds that in doing so, he will not only 
show generosity to her, but will also do justice to himself, acknowledges her parents' 
right to her obedience, but qualifies the exercise of such a right by recourse to reason, 
when she refers to her parents as being those `who had a right to all reasonable 
obedience from me ý. 
(p' 159) 
To exercise their prerogatives justly, the Harlowes must exercise them 
reasonably. Richardson appears to have recognised that the Harlowes' treatment of 
their daughter is not based upon that reason which gives due regard to justice. The 
Christian reader might infer that whatever is neither just nor reasonable cannot be in 
accordance with God's law; the Christian author seems somewhat uncomfortable in 
balancing the claims of natural justice due to his heroine, and the institutionalized 
rights of her parents. Writing in the persona of the Editor of the collection of letters 
which makes up the history of this young lady, he refers in the Preface to his aims in 
publishing the collection, among these being: 
To caution parents against the undue exertion of their natural 
authority over their children in the great article of marriage. (p. 36) 
Writing to Susanna Highmore, he asserts the necessity for children to be 
dutiful towards their parents, but balances that assertion with a recognition that 
parental behaviour may indeed be unreasonable, and uses the Harlowes as an 
example of such lack of reason: 
Is the girl to be the judge; and is she to dispense with the word 
and the thing called duty, should her parents be less indulgent (if not 
quite unreasonable; if not absolute Harlowes) than she would have 
them to be? (21 ) 
He adds that he has made the Harlowes cruel and implacable to inculcate the 
doctrine that lack of duty on the one side does not dispense with the performance of 
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duty on the other; such performance earns even greater merit if it is not reciprocated. 
The reader of Richardson's comments on his own fictional creations may perhaps 
regard him as being somewhat ambivalent in his opinions on their conduct. He 
seems to regard the Harlowes as unreasonable and as failing in their parental duty, 
but notwithstanding to expect that a child in such circumstances should obey those 
parents and earn merit by the sacrifice of personal inclinations. Yet his recognition 
of the essentially unreasonable nature of the Harlowes' exercise of their parental 
prerogatives carries the implication that a child need not comply with what is 
unreasonable. The modern reader must inevitably be less aware of the resonances of 
such statements, and less likely to perceive Richardson's remarks as comments on the 
changing state of parent-child relationships which was characteristic of his time and 
which was a matter of debate. It is necessary to remember that cases of parental 
coercion in matters of marriage were by no means unknown, whether coercion took 
the form of over-persuasion or of actual physical restraint to prevent a match 
considered unsuitable, even if the attitudes of the time were undergoing a change. 
(22) 
Clarissa's situation falls uncomfortably between the claims of natural and of 
legal justice, between unquestioning obedience to an authority doubtfully delegated 
to a brother, and the dictates of reason. She herself acknowledges in a letter to her 
brother that her father may, if he wishes, turn her `out of his doors' and may do so 
through the agency of James. (p. 226) However, in the same letter, she refers twice to 
the justice of her cause, and might claim with some validity that she is basing her 
resistance to the proposed marriage with Solmes on the dictates of reason, since she 
later writes to Anna, `God forbid that I should ever think myself freed 
from my 
father's reasonable control'. 
327) 
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The word `reasonable' in this context, where she is referring specifically to 
the financial independence which the assumption of her grandfather's legacy would 
give her, cannot but reflect on the unreasonable nature of her father's demands on 
her, that she should marry a man who has nothing to recommend him but money, and 
whose character is repulsive to her. The question must be asked whether any 
reasonable parent could justly expect a child to embrace such a match without 
repugnance, and if such repugnance were felt, to embrace it at all. It would be no test 
of his heroine's duty and of her parents' just exercise of their prerogatives were 
Clarissa threatened with an attractive suitor, and certainly no effective comment on a 
current debate. Richardson takes an extreme case in offering to the reader's 
consideration an exceptionally dutiful child, an unusually repulsive suitor, and 
parents whose motives in a worldly sense might be seen as rational, balanced against 
an unreasonable use of power. 
Justice involves an adjustment between the rights of individuals, and 
Christian theology claims a place for it as a virtue, because, according to Aquinas: 
It regulates human action according to a standard of right 
reason, and so renders it good. (23) 
Richardson appears to have wished the reader to understand that in the 
situation he proposes for his heroine, the delicate adjustment between the rights of 
individuals is not concluded. While he supports the validity of parental rights in 
general, he makes a case that there may be exceptional circumstances in which a 
child's compliance cannot be reasonably expected. In a letter to Sarah Chapone 
he 
discusses this difficult issue: 
I repeat, that I have not anywhere contended, that Parents have 
a Right to command Children to marry against the whole 
Stream of 
their Affections, when they run rapidly into another Channel. or 
against the Conviction of their Judgements - If I had, I should not 
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have made Clarissa persevere as she does; tho' she has not such rapid Inclinations; nor punished the Harlowes as I have done ! (24) 
That Richardson had deeply considered the matter before placing Clarissa in 
so painful a situation, virtually impossible to be satisfactorily resolved, poised as she 
is between a demand that cannot be just because it is not reasonable, and her own 
conviction, a conviction sanctioned by religion and institutionalized by society, that 
children owe obedience to their parents, is demonstrated by his quoting in support of 
the remarks in this letter, the judgement of Bishop Fleetwood on such cases: 
If the parents offer what the Child cannot possibly consent to, 
and what the Neighbourhood and wise and unconcerned Persons 
blame, condemn and reject, upon a competent and reasonable 
Information of the whole Proceedings, if such Refusal of the Offer be 
made with Decency and great Humility, upon the Children's Part, it 
will not fall under the Head of sinful Disobedience. They may stand 
off with Innocence and Safety; and yet may honour as they ought 
their Father and their Mother ... 
(25) 
Bishop Fleetwood's remarks could be seen to have a direct application to 
Clarissa's situation. By quoting them, it appears that Richardson believes that they 
do. Clarissa's rejection of Solmes is based not only on physical revulsion, but 
essentially on the same conviction which leads her to reject Lovelace. Her letter to 
the former points out that she `cannot consent to marry a man whom I cannot 
value'. (' 159) In different circumstances, she might have made the same remark to 
Lovelace. In both cases, such comments would confirm that she regards herself 
unable to do what is required of her, what she `cannot possibly consent to', by uniting 
herself to men whose characters she cannot respect. Indeed, in the additions to the 
third edition, many of which are designed to offer a more explicit exoneration of 
Clarissa's conduct, Richardson at once stresses that her prudence would have 
prevented her from uniting herself to a man `too immoral to be implicitly beloved', 
and throws heavier blame for her fate on to the Harlowes themselves. "'° 
pp. 532-533) If 
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the Bishop's statement be considered further, generations of readers, wise or not, 
might be considered to constitute a group of `unconcerned persons' to whom 
Richardson has given `competent and reasonable information' on which to base a 
judgement which will lead them to `blame, condemn and reject' both the offer made 
by Solmes and the Harlowes' insistence on its acceptability. It appears that 
Richardson intended that his original readers should do so. 
He is at pains in a later letter to Sarah Chapone to stress his opposition to 
forced marriage, and claims that Clarissa's letters to Solmes, as well as those she 
writes to her parents, uncles, brother and sister on the same subject, were intended as 
a `powerful plea' against it. However, Richardson is aware that girls in Clarissa's 
situation may be driven into marriages repugnant to them, and that few actually 
refuse to take the vow when they are led to the altar. In the same letter he considers 
the duty of Clarissa had she yielded to her parents' pressure and married Solmes: 
But had she been prevailed upon to go to the Altar with 
Solmes, there can be no doubt, but that she would have made him an 
excellent Wife. She would have endeavoured to love him; and if she 
could not, it would have been a very hard Sentence, to pronounce 
upon her, that she had incurred the guilt of Perjury, before God, for 
having been prevailed upon to give up her own Will to that of her 
Parents. Solmes was sure of her Principles. He and her barbarous 
Friends declare that. And he was willing to be satisfied with her Fear, 
altho' he should not have her Love. (26) 
Most Christian commentators might not regard, even if Solmes does, fear as a 
basis for marriage. William Fleetwood points out that the marriage relationship is `a 
State and Condition, upon which the Happiness or Misery of Life does very much 
depend', and that `without Love, the very best of all good Qualities will never make a 
constant Conversation easy and delightful'. (27) He does not discuss what marriage 
might be like if characterized by fear, but he does consider the situation which may 
arise if parents' commands run counter to the Law of God. 
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It is certain that all commands of God must be obeyed before 
those of Parents; if ever they interfere, our duty to God is most 
undoubtedly to be preferr'd. The Counsels or Commands of Parents 
must never sway so far with Children, as to cause them to do what 
God forbids, or to neglect what God commands; because the 
Authority of God is first and greatest; nothing is to stand in 
Competition with it; but then the Command of God must be plain and 
evident; it must not be a doubtful or disputed Thing; but full as 
certain, as that Obedience is due to the Commands of Parents. (28) 
How far the Harlowes' demand that their daughter should consent to a 
marriage with a man whom she fears and detests in equal measure has the sanction of 
legitimate authority is open to question. Clarissa bases her objection to marriage 
with Solmes on the contention that to make her vows to him would be a form of 
perjury; fear might constrain her to obey such a man in all that was not sin, but she 
could neither love nor honour him. She expresses her reverence for the state of 
marriage; it is an `altar-vowed duty', (p. 241) and one concern which she claims to feel 
in her attempts to avoid marriage with Solmes is the likelihood of rising each day to 
some new breach of that duty. The cruelty of the position to which Clarissa is 
exposed lies partly in the conflict of duties which it presents to her. 
The dilemma is resolved for Clarissa since her primary duty is to God, and 
there is no reason to doubt her sincerity in asserting that to obey her parents in this 
instance would expose her to the likelihood of violating a vow made before Him. 
The sincerity of her contention is in no way diminished by her suitor's general 
repulsiveness, but perhaps some original readers of the novel might not have been so 
entirely sure as is its heroine that the command of God is as `plain and evident' as 
Fleetwood claims it should be in cases of disobedience, while for most modern 
readers Clarissa's repugnance may be seen as sufficient justification in itself for 
rejection of Solmes. Richardson's treatment of Clarissa's situation has been seen by 
some modern commentators as a severe critique of the patriarchal system, but to a 
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certain extent, he endorses that system on religious grounds, condemning abuses of it 
rather than the system itself. He is careful to make his heroine acknowledge that this 
imperative has a Divine origin; she tells Anna that failure to observe it, will result in 
God's punishments. (p. 434) A letter to Frances Grainger suggests that Richardson 
regards obedience to parents as a religious imperative, rather than as a convention 
merely human in origin, and as such an indispensable duty: 
Be pleased, Madam, always to remember this Great Rule, 
inculcated thro'out the History of Clarissa, That in all reciprocal 
Duties the Non-Performance of the Duty on one Part is not an excuse 
for the Failure of the other. Why, think you, are future Rewards 
promised and future Punishments threatened? But the one to induce 
us to Persevere in our Duties here, and the other to Punish our 
Deviation from them. She was not bid to obey even unjust Powers not 
only for Wrath but for Conscience Sake. (29) 
The Harlowes demonstrably fail to behave with both justice and charity 
towards all their children, since James is allowed to compromise his soul by 
unchecked violence and materialism, and Arabella's eventual disastrous marriage is 
proof of the family's continuing elevation of worldly over spiritual values. The 
conduct books did not fail to warn against such failures. (30) The Harlowe parents' 
failure in relation to their children might well be expressed in the words of the 
Aquinas: 
Justice for individuals involves doing the specific good owed 
to one's fellowmen and avoiding specific evils harmful to them ... 
In 
this sense avoiding evil and doing good are component parts of 
justice, required for its wholeness in action. (31) 
By the light of this contention, the Harlowe household is characterized by its 
injustice. The specific good owed to those who are entrusted to their care and subject 
to their authority is what the Harlowes have failed to provide, while they have 
equally failed to avoid the specific evils harmful to this special category of their 
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fellowmen, their own children. Ironically it is the one point in which they may be 
seen to have succeeded which makes the conflict between themselves and their 
daughter impossible of resolution. The virtuous education for which the dying 
Clarissa will give thanks to her father is that which has taught her that the law of God 
must be given primacy over the unjust commands of legitimate authority, and it is on 
this contention that she bases her rejection of Solmes. Her last letter to her father 
addresses him as `dear, venerable Sir', and acknowledges to the last a duty which the 
reader may feel has in only one respect been unequivocally reciprocated, that of the 
provision of a virtuous education. This is a benefit which Richardson regarded as an 
essential foundation to moral excellence, as the Postscript to the third edition makes 
clear. (iv, 1'564) Moreover, it held out the hope of a happy death. (32) Conversely, as the 
extended histories of Polly and Sally in the Conclusion to the third edition 
demonstrate, the effects of a poor education in morality might very well lead to 
spiritual ruin. (Iv, pp. 
542-544) Clarissa writes: 
And now let me bless you, my honoured papa, and bless you 
as I write, upon my knees, for all the benefits I have received from 
your indulgence. 
(p. 1371) 
In this respect, Clarissa may be seen to be following the prescriptions of the 
Gospel, in returning good for evil, a blessing for a curse, but she is also following the 
prescriptions of the conduct books. The behaviour that Jeremy Taylor recommends 
should be exercised towards a faulty ruler or parent might have been written as a 
gloss upon the above response to the failure of this specific parent: 
Speak not evil of the Ruler of thy people, neither curse thy 
Father and Mother, nor revile thy spiritual Guides, nor discover and 
lay naked their infirmities: but treat them with reverence and religion, 
and preserve their Authority sacred by esteeming their persons 
venerable ! (33) 
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It is the author of Clarissa, rather than its heroine, who discovers and lays 
naked the infirmities of the Harlowes, because the integrity of his treatment demands 
it, in despite of his respect for an established order generally upheld both by his 
society and by his religious beliefs. However, those religious beliefs uphold the 
principle of authority, but not its violation or distortion. 
riting of the parental prerogative in the provision of spouses for 
their children, Jeremy Taylor reminds parents that they should have 
regard to their children's affections, a point also made by other commentators. He at 
once suggests, in the most striking language, the importance of this aspect of 
marriage and the pain of its absence. Concerning this parental prerogative, he points 
out that it is also a parental duty to use it wisely in the matter of their choice of 
spouse: 
In which they must secure piety and Religion, and the 
affection and love of the interested persons; and after these, let them 
make what provisions they can for other conveniences or advantages: 
ever remembering that they can do no injury more afflictive to the 
children than to joyn them with cords of a disagreeing affection: it is 
like tying a Wolf and a Lamb, or planting the Vine in a Garden of 
Coleworts. Let them be persuaded with reasonable inducements to 
make them willing and to choose according to the parents' wish, but 
at no hand let them be forced. Better to sit up all night, than to go to 
bed with a Dragon. (34) 
The Harlowes have not regarded `conveniences and advantages' as secondary 
considerations, but as their primary concern. They show little interest in securing for 
their daughter a spouse characterized by `piety and religion'; the continence which 
they claim for Solmes as a recommendation opposed to Lovelace's promiscuity, is 
less evidence of a positive virtue on his part than of the fact that his cold passion is 
avarice. On the other hand, the ill-concealed resentment with which he responds to 
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Clarissa's rejection suggests a man who will indeed be a wolf ready to devour this 
sacrificial lamb once marriage has placed her in his hands. 
Clarissa herself has good reason to be apprehensive of her position in 
marriage to Solmes, or to any man whose conduct may not be regulated either by 
Christian charity or by natural kindness. She fears the power which a husband may, 
sanctioned both by society and by religion, exercise over his wife. Her comments on 
the subject, expressed in a letter to her uncle, John Harlowe, deserve to be quoted at 
length, since they convey so fully and so clearly the restricted life of a married 
woman if her husband is less than even moderately considerate, and the sense of a 
lost identity which must in any case characterize a state in which a woman is by law 
an `absolute and dependent property': 
Marriage is a very solemn engagement, enough to make a 
young creature's heart ache, with the best prospects, when she thinks 
seriously of it! - To be given up to a strange man; to be engrafted into 
a strange family; to give up her very name, as the mark of becoming 
his absolute and dependent property: to be obliged to prefer this 
strange man to father, mother - to everybody: and his humours to all 
her own - or to contend, perhaps, in breach of a vowed duty for every 
innocent instance of free will: to go no-whither: to make 
acquaintance: to give up acquaintance - to renounce even the strictest 
friendships perhaps; all at his pleasure, whether she think it 
reasonable to do so or not. Surely, sir, a young creature ought not to 
be obliged to make all these sacrifices but for such a man as she can 
approve. If she is, how sad must be the case! - how miserable the 
life, if to be called life! (pp. 148-149) 
Such reflections must remind the reader, even if they strike no resonances 
with John Harlowe, that Clarissa has had before her the daily example of just such a 
union in which the wife has done her utmost to accommodate herself to the 
government of an autocratic husband for the sake of peace, if not in pursuit of a 
religious duty. Such compliance has not made Mrs. Harlowe a contented and happy 
woman, nor rendered the Harlowe family harmonious, as might have been the case 
had the master of the household been possessed of a kindlier and less exacting 
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temper. In the third edition, Clarissa offers some remarks to this effect herself, ('' 1L74) 
although her filial piety later constrains her to attempt to excuse both her mother's 
passivity and her father's autocracy. (i, pp. 
132-133) Since so much must depend upon the 
character of the husband, it is not surprising that Clarissa, as a prospective wife, has 
so far begged to be excused from the addresses of suitors far less repulsive than 
Solmes. 
However, Clarissa appears to accept that marriage must be her fate, or if 
entering into the married state is seen in terms of undertaking a duty, her vocation. 
She may often express a willingness to embrace the single life, but the reader may 
reasonably feel at this point that such remarks are not unnatural, given the difficulty 
of her situation. Pre-Reformation theology had generally elevated the state of 
consecrated virginity above that of marriage. Although one contemporary 
commentator of Richardson's, William Law, advocates virginity, along with 
voluntary poverty, both practised in retirement, as superior to life in the world, (31) the 
Protestant religious ethos generally regarded marriage as the state ordained by God in 
which the majority of His people should fulfil His will. Calvin argues that man was 
not made for a life of solitude, and that God has made provision for him in the 
institution of marriage. Celibacy is not to be despised, but it is not in every man's 
power to live as a celibate, although God may bestow a special grace; to attempt to 
live a life of celibacy without that special call, is to oppose God Himself, and `nature 
as constituted by Him' . 
Calvin concludes that marriage is the only mode of life in 
which most people may live chastely: 
Let no man rashly despise matrimony as a thing useless or 
superfluous to him; let no man long for celibacy unless he is able to 
dispense with the married state. Nor even here let him consult the 
tranquillity and convenience of the flesh, save only that, freed from 
this tie, he may be the readier and more prepared for all the offices of 
piety. (36) 
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Of all Richardson's heroines, only the Catholic Clementina aspires to the 
specialized vocation of consecrated celibacy, and only the irresistible, reasoned 
eloquence of Sir Charles can dissuade her from seeking it, when all the 
representations of her own family have failed to do so. Clarissa's own plea to be 
allowed to follow the single state does not suggest that she, or Richardson, holds any 
conviction that celibacy is in itself superior to the state of marriage; the evidence 
available suggests that Richardson adheres to the Protestant conception of marriage 
as the proper state for most people, and certainly for the vast majority of women. 
Clarissa may die unmarried, but her reason for rejecting the belated offers made by 
Lovelace (and the renewed offer of Mr. Wyerley) makes her one of the exceptions to 
the general rule of which Calvin speaks. That Richardson accepted that there were 
such exceptions may be inferred from a remark elsewhere: 
The single state may be said to be fitly marked out by 
Providence, to those women who never have it in their power fitly to 
change it. (37) 
Clarissa may be seen as both asserting to the end that sense of individual 
integrity which had preserved her sanity after the rape, and as a woman on whom 
God has bestowed a special grace, who has been called to this specialized vocation 
which Calvin claims is given to few. A modern reader might be able to offer sound 
reasons, which have less to do with a sense of religious vocation than with 
psychological trauma, for the choice which Richardson's heroine makes, and this 
question may be discussed at a later point, but Richardson's own avowed reasons for 
having her make that choice are those which relate to religion. 
On the whole, Richardson's presentation of the married state suggests that he 
does hold the Christian view of it as ordained by God for the purposes which 
theology usually distinguishes as being those of procreation and then of 
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companionship and solace to the partners. St. Augustine had defined the three goods 
of marriage as procreation, fidelity, and `sacramentum', a term which did not then 
suggest the sense in which the later pre-Reformation Church would use the word, but 
which was meant to be expressive of the indissolubility of Christian marriage, and `a 
symbol that in the future we shall all be united and subject to God in the one 
heavenly city ". (38) Both pre- and post-Reformation theology give primacy of purpose 
in marriage to procreation. Thomas Aquinas comments: 
Marriage consists essentially in the inseparable union of souls, 
husband and wife pledging unbreakable loyalty to one another for the 
purpose of bearing and bringing up children. (39) 
Likewise, Calvin stresses the dignity of this conjugal function: 
God intends the human race to be multiplied by generation 
indeed, not as in brute animals, by promiscuous intercourse. For he 
has joined the man to his wife, that they might produce a divine, that 
is, a legitimate seed ... 
Certainly he does not give the rein to human 
passions, but, beginning at holy and chaste marriage, he proceeds to 
speak of the production of offspring. (40 
Richardson does not disregard this important duty of the married state. If 
Clarissa is not to be fruitful, both Harriet and Pamela are shown to be so shortly after 
their marriages, and the union of Anna Howe with Mr. Hickman produces at least 
one child to bear the name of Clarissa. Of Richardson's male characters, it is 
impossible to doubt that Sir Charles would fulfil his duty to give a Christian 
education to his children, while Mr. B. becomes the father of a fine family. Even 
Lovelace, while he does not desire marriage, dwells with pleasure on the idea of 
paternity, imagining Clarissa nursing twins, or alternatively, both Anna and Clarissa 
bearing his children. Moreover, he makes a generous provision for his illegitimate 
off-spring and shows some concern for their mothers. Lovelace has no difficulty in 
imagining himself as a patriarchal figure, as the third edition shows, (iii, 
p. 474-475) but 
does not intend to undertake the position of head of a household until age has put an 
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end to his `rogueries', nor does he take a serious view of the position's duties. His 
conduct reflects, in a distorted way, the values of marriage which Richardson 
endorses; such pleasure in paternity and such concern for his children, if not in the 
matter of education as much as in material provision, would be admirable in its place. 
Calvin regards such activity as that of Lovelace, in begetting children outside of the 
bonds of marriage, as `a corruption of the Divine institute', and adds: 
Whereas God produces offspring from this muddy pool, as 
well as from the pure fountain of marriage, this will tend to their 
greater destruction. (41) 
Lovelace's fantasies of union with Clarissa suggest his failure to understand 
the duties of marriage in other respects. Firstly, he does not intend fidelity, even in a 
sanctified union as opposed to the `life of honour'. Nor do his fantasies extend to the 
education and upbringing of his children; so far from envisaging himself as a 
constant presence to offer guidance and paternal care, he imagines himself ranging 
freely to return to Clarissa at will. In the implied condemnation of the fantasies of 
Lovelace, Richardson appears to be endorsing the contentions of Christian theology 
that a stable union in which both parents contribute their care and guidance, each 
undertaking their appropriate duties, is required for the proper up-bringing of 
children. 
St. Paul advised fathers to bring up their children `in the nurture and 
admonition of the Lord', (Eph. 6.4) while Aquinas points out that generation itself 
would be in vain if no due nourishment followed. Moreover, he adds that the needs 
of human life require many things which one person alone cannot offer, especially 
instruction for the soul. He claims that a woman is insufficient for the 
accomplishment of such tasks, since the more perfect reason of the male better fits 
him to offer instruction. Therefore, the male should remain as long as his presence 
is 
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required to this end. (42) The Reformation did not change substantially this view of 
parental duty, since Calvin tells parents that they should `carefully bring up, guide 
and teach their children as a trust committed to them by God'. 
(43) It is clear that in 
the marriage which Lovelace fantasizes between himself and Clarissa, he would not 
have envisaged the performance of the duties of the married state, as a faithful 
husband, as a parent, or as the moral as well as legal head of the household. 
Such a failure to understand the duties of the married state is inseparable from 
his misunderstanding of its nature. Richardson offers a view of marriage which is 
essentially that of a Divine institution. To Clarissa, marriage is an `altar vowed 
duty' (". 241) and a `state of purity ). (p. 703) This latter remark Lovelace regards as 
`comical' when he reports the conversation on the subject between himself and 
Clarissa to Belford. Such a fundamental difference in the conception of the nature 
and value of the married state would hold out little prospect for any future harmony 
or fulfilment for the prospective spouses. Clarissa's view of marriage, however, 
accords well with the tradition of Christian teaching on the subject. If post- 
Reformation theology, unlike Roman Catholicism, did not regard marriage as 
sacramental, it yet regarded the state as Divinely ordained. Calvin points out that the 
sacred nature of this institution is guaranteed precisely because God is its Author, and 
is demonstrated by the fact that Adam did not take a wife to himself of his own will, 
but received her at the hands of God. (44) However, Calvin, together with most 
Christian commentators of whatever tradition, makes a distinction between the pre- 
lapsarian union of Adam and Eve, and unions between men and women in their post- 
lapsarian damaged state. If the Divine institution had remained as God appointed it. 
The sweetest harmony would reign in marriage; because the 
husband could look up with reverence to God; the woman in this 
would be a faithful assistant to him; and both, with one consent, 
would cultivate a holy, as well as friendly and peaceful intercourse. 
(45 
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If post-lapsarian marriage does not approach such perfection, Christian 
theology still regards it as a holy state. Lovelace's conception of marriage appears 
to regard it as little more than a social institution established for the sake of 
inheritance, and in this respect is closer to the views of the philosophers who see the 
origin of marriage in social utility, (46) or of the satirist who regards the formality of a 
ceremony as a means of enabling the prospective spouses to indulge their sexual 
appetites in a socially acceptable manner. (47) Likewise, while Christian theology, 
both pre- and post-Reformation, regards marriage as providing the legitimate and 
sanctified expression of sexuality, it would not regard the marriage-bed as a place of 
licence. St. Augustine had argued that intercourse for the sake of procreation is 
sanctified, while intercourse for the sake of relieving physical desire is permissible as 
a concession to human weakness, and quotes St. Paul to this effect. (1 Cor. 7.4) (48) 
A later formulation of Christian opinion on the subject of marital sexuality suggests a 
certain ambivalence towards the status of sexuality in marriage: 
Even married sex, adorned with all the honourableness of 
marriage, carries with it a certain shame, because the movements of 
the genitals, unlike those of the other external members don't obey 
reason. 
(49) 
Protestant theology is less censorious on the matter; Calvin argues that Satan 
has endeavoured to dishonour marriage, but that it deserves due reverence, and that 
the `children of God may embrace a conjugal life with a good and tranquil 
conscience, and husbands and wives may live together in chastity and honour'. 
(50 
However, one way in which he claims that Satan has attempted to dishonour 
marriage is by inducing married persons to believe that they might indulge in 
whatever licence they pleased. Such notions of a due moderation are disseminated 
by the religious conduct books. Jeremy Taylor asserts that married people are 
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expected to maintain modesty and decency, to behave temperately as to frequency, 
and to make no unlawful use of lawful liberties: 
In their permissions and license they must be sure to observe 
the order of nature, and the ends of God ... 
Concerning which our 
best rule is, that although in this, as in eating and drinking there is an 
appetite to be satisfied, which cannot be done without pleasuring that 
desire, yet since that desire and satisfaction was intended by nature for 
other ends, they should never be separate from those ends, but 
alwayes be joyned with all or one of these ends; with a desire of 
children, or to avoyd fornication, or to lighten and ease the cares and 
sadnesses of household affairs, or to endear each other; but never with 
a purpose either in act or desire to separate the sensuality from these 
ends which hallow it. (51 
Such moderation would be incomprehensible to Lovelace, who seeks to 
indulge in what he calls `innocent freedoms' before any proposed union with Clarissa 
could take place, and appears to believe that a marriage would sanction all and any 
usage, including his freedom to commit adultery, or would compensate fully for any 
sexual abuse before the ceremony, (iii, p. 412) a view that Richardson is at pains to 
condemn elsewhere. (52) Such views do not do justice to a wife or to society - the 
original bond of which, as Christian commentators have pointed out, is marriage. 
Nor do they tend to the fulfilment of the Divinely established ordering of human 
existence. They also confirm that between Clarissa and the man who seeks, 
belatedly, to marry her, there is a fundamental and irreconcilable difference in their 
respective conceptions of the meaning of marriage. 
Clarissa's reservations about marriage to Lovelace, not to mention the 
abhorrence aroused in her by the very notion of a union with Solmes, are all the more 
understandable if the marriage bond is perceived as being as much a spiritual union 
as a physical, since as such, the fulfilment - or not - of its duties must have 
its effect 
on the eternal welfare of the spouses. In relation to Lovelace, as to Solmes, Clarissa 
fears that such a union would not only deprive her of temporal happiness 
but also 
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would put at risk her happiness in the hereafter. (53) She asserts that even to think of a 
union with Lovelace is a `high degree of impurity', adding her fears: 
That he is young, unbroken, his passions unsubdued: that he is violent 
in his temper, yet artful: I am afraid vindictive too: that such a 
husband might unsettle me in all my principles, and hazard my future 
hopes. (p. 183) 
Clarissa expresses this fear early in the novel, before she becomes as fully 
aware as she ever becomes of Lovelace's character and intentions. After the rape, 
marriage with such a man becomes a moral impossibility, despite the fact that it 
would offer some restoration of her reputation, but by that time, Clarissa has lost all 
concern for temporal affairs, and the question that she poses to Anna demonstrates at 
once her conception of the spiritual as well as of the physical intimacy of marriage 
and the primacy which she gives to salvation above all other values. `Can I vow duty 
to one so wicked', she asks' `And hazard my salvation by joining myself to so great a 
profligate, now I know him to be so? '(p. 1116 She adds that she could not believe her 
penitence for her `rash step' to be anything but a `specious delusion' if she retained 
the least desire to marry Lovelace. She thus shows herself aware of the complexities 
which exist in the position of a wife, bound by vow to obey her husband, but as a 
Christian soul, enjoined to avoid any situation which could lead to sin and the loss of 
salvation. Clarissa is determined to preserve her soul intact from such a catastrophic 
loss, aware that the very intimacy of marriage exposes a woman to its peculiar 
dangers in this respect: 
And, after all, who knows but that my own sinful compliances 
with a man who would think himself entitled to my obedience might 
taint my own morals, and make me, instead of a reformer, an imitator 
of him? - for who can touch pitch and not be defiled(P-1'16) 
When Richardson commented in the Preface to Clarissa that he wished to 
caution children against accepting the notion that a reformed rake makes the 
best 
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husband, his warning was concerned with even more important penalties for reposing 
trust in the maxim than that of the misery in this life that a woman might expect with 
a husband only dubiously faithful. 
Clarissa is not over-scrupulous in fearing that a union with Lovelace could 
affect, unfavourably, her eternal welfare, given the primacy of a husband's authority 
and influence over his wife. Richardson presents the married state, on the whole, as 
that which is most desirable from the point of view of the individual and society, 
although he is too realistic not to suggest the pains and difficulties of the state in this 
post-lapsarian world. His treatment suggests that, at best, it may offer to the 
individual a comfort and intimate companionship not to be found elsewhere. He also 
offers the view that entering upon the married state should be regarded as a duty 
undertaken in response to the will of God, and for the good of man. A refusal to 
marry, based on selfish reasons, such as those embodied in Lovelace's refusal to 
accept any curb on his freedom, not only confirms Lovelace's libertine principles, but 
suggests his failure to undertake a duty to society and to understand the Divinely 
ordained nature of the married state. Richardson suggests such a view in a letter to 
Hester Mulso in which he writes of the possible fate of Clementina should she die 
unmarried: `Her duty on earth, unperformed, in the highest characters that a woman 
can shine in! ' (54) Those `highest characters' of which he speaks can only be those of 
wife and mother, and Richardson's remark therefore suggests the importance that he 
attached to the undertaking of the duties of the married state and to their faithful 
performance. However, it is equally clear that such an undertaking requires constant 
attention to the demands of justice in a concern for the general good of all interested 
parties, and of society, which cannot be related only to the fulfilment of any legal 
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codification, but must also take the requirements of right reason as its frame of 
reference. 
J ustice', asserts Aquinas, `is a virtue because it regulates human action 
according to a standard of right reason, and so renders it good'. (55) 
Justice, therefore, must apportion rights and duties, so that if such a prescription were 
followed in the conduct of family life, the spouses would undertake their respective 
duties in harmony and perfect accord, each in full awareness as to how such duties 
were best to be defined, and then performed. The resulting state might then be 
regarded as that sanctioned by both Divine and human laws. 
The Christian interpretation of those laws, over the centuries, beginning with 
the pronouncements of St. Paul (Col. 3.18; Tit. 2.5) and St. Peter (1 Pet. 3.1 and 5), 
apportioned to the woman obedience and subjection, and government to the man. 
Both pre- and post-Reformation theology thereafter endorse this distribution of duties 
as being in accordance with right reason and God's law. The natural inferiority of 
women does not seem anywhere to be questioned by Christian theologians. 
St. Augustine comments that `the male sex ... 
is surely the better', (56) while Aquinas 
remarks upon `the natural inequality and subordination of women to men, who are by 
nature more reasonable and discerning. (57) Calvin accepts that women, like men, are 
created in the image of God, but qualifies this remark by adding `although in the 
second degree'. (58) Such views find an echo in Richardson's remark in a letter to 
Stinstra: `Don't you think, Sir, that women are generally more susceptible of levity 
than men? )(59) However, as William and Malleville Haller have pointed out, some 
traditions of Protestant thought, at least, while maintaining the notion of female 
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inferiority, yet claimed that women were to be regarded as being only a little lower in 
status than men. (60 
It would be surprising if Richardson's heroines, given their piety, were to 
regard the woman's lot in marriage as anything other than subjection, and if instead 
they were to subscribe to the subversive views of such early feminists as Mary 
Aste11. (61) The woman fortunate enough to marry Sir Charles Grandison thanks God 
for having been bestowed upon `such a Friend, Protector, Director, Husband', and 
prays that her power of obliging him may be increased. (" p"457) She does not 
question his power over her. Clarissa, whose prospective spouses, Solmes and 
Lovelace, offer her far less for which to be grateful, finds her position rendered all 
the more painful in that marriage would make her subject to men who are morally, 
and in the case of Solmes, intellectually inferior to herself. However, she does not 
question the right - and duty - of the husband to direct and command. She writes to 
her uncle Antony to make this very point: 
Dear, dear, sir, if I am to be compelled, let it be in favour of a 
man that can read and write - that can teach me something: for what a 
husband must that man make, who can do nothing but command; and 
needs himself the instruction he should be qualified to give? ('-151) 
Elsewhere, she refers to the respect which a good wife should pay her 
husband, and wish everybody to pay him. »p" Clarissa's remarks demonstrate that 
she accepts the established position that a husband is entitled to the obedience of his 
wife, but imply that she perceives how problematic such a position is, when the 
husband is unworthy of the prerogative which both law and Christian tradition give 
him. 
opinions might vary among theologians as to whether female subordination 
pre-dated the fall or was part of Eve's punishment for her transgression, 
(62) but that 
subordination was according to nature and reason was generally accepted by 
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Christian commentators, and institutionalized by society. Even when John Locke 
denies that the words of Genesis 3.16 gave Adam any authority over Eve, or men 
over their wives, he admits that they did foretell what would be the woman's lot, how 
God would order human society to ensure female subjection: 
How by His Providence He would order it so that she should 
be subject to her husband, as we see that generally the laws of 
mankind and the custom of nations have ordered it so. (63) 
Richardson himself appears to accept without question the orthodox view of 
religion and society that female subordination is ordained by God, and makes this 
point in a letter to Sarah Chapone: 
It is certain that the Woman's Subordination was laid upon her 
as a Punishment. And why? - Because Adam was not deceived, says 
the Apostle; but the Woman being deceived, was in the Transgression. 
I allow, that but for this Transgression, all wou'd have been Peace, 
Love, Harmony, and when that is in the married State now, there is no 
Superiority, no Inferiority; nor could there have been then. (64) 
He adds that `Subordination ... 
is not a punishment but to perverse or 
arrogant Spirits', but he does not deny that subordination exists, or that it should 
exist. Nor does he define what might constitute perversity and arrogance of spirit. 
Most of the husbands, or prospective husbands drawn by Richardson, do not display 
the qualities of wisdom, charity and justice which could make subjection a light yoke 
for a wife to bear. Only Sir Charles is such that Harriet may rejoice to have such a 
'Director'. The reader might imagine that Anna would more suffer the pains of 
subjection, married to the mild Mr. Hickman, by her awareness that she is legally his 
dependent and his inferior in the eyes of religion and society, rather than by any 
imposition of authority on his part. It is not be be imagined that Clarissa, espoused 
either to Mr. Solmes or to Lovelace could have found her yoke so light, nor that 
either man would have wielded his authority in the manner prescribed by Jeremy 
Taylor: 
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The Husband must rule over the wife, as the soul does over the 
body, obnoxious to the same sufferings, and bound by the same 
affections, and doing or suffering by the permissions and interest of 
each other. (65 
If perhaps a husband took care to fulfil the duties of his superior status in the 
manner recommended by Taylor, the pains of subjection for his wife might, as 
Richardson claims in his letter to Sarah Chapone, be lessened, even if she were 
aware, as Anna Howe might be aware, of some natural superiority of mind or spirit of 
her own. Taylor does not fail to assert the right of the male to rule in marriage in his 
analogy between the relative position of husband and wife and those of the soul and 
the body; these are indissolubly wedded, just as husband and wife are so united, but 
the husband and the soul are seen as the rightfully superior partners in these 
respective unions. The position of a wife who could truthfully claim, as Clarissa 
does to Lovelace, `My soul is above thee, man! (p. 646) must then be painful in the 
extreme. In view of this manifest superiority, it is not surprising that Clarissa 
expresses her rejection of Lovelace in terms which might otherwise seem extreme. 
After the rape she scornfully tells him that `it would be criminal in me to wish to bind 
my soul in covenant to a man so nearly allied to perdition'. (p. 
902) 
Even if the reader were not meant, as Richardson means him or her to be, to 
see Clarissa's rejection of any earthly union in favour of a Divine consummation as 
the result of a special grace, her rejection of Lovelace would be justified in terms of 
merely human prudence. When a man shows himself so unaware of the sacred nature 
of marriage, and has no intention of maintaining that fidelity which St. 
Augustine 
defines as one of the three goods of the married state; when the writers of the conduct 
books recommend that a wife endure infidelity, rather than 
leave an unchaste 
husband to go to his ruin, (66) marriage with such as Lovelace holds out 
hardly even a 
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distant prospect of happiness in this life, and must carry the very real risk of 
compromising any happiness in the next. 
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6 
Temptation and Trial 
The difficulties and problems inseparable from such intimate human 
relationships as those discussed in the previous chapter furnish a sharp 
reminder of the imperfections of fallen human nature. Such difficulties, together 
with the natural accidents of disease or injury, befalling the innocent and guilty alike, 
may be attributed by the theologian or the moralist to the indirect effects of man's 
primary disobedience resonating throughout the whole realm of nature, a notion 
which has had a widespread currency. `Religion informs us', says Dr. Johnson, `That 
misery and sin were produced together. The depravation of human will was followed 
by a disorder of the harmony of nature'. (1) 
No Christian commentator who addresses the problem of human suffering 
seems to doubt that this earthly life is a time of trials, but it is generally agreed that if 
these are endured with courage, patience and faith, they may not only be overcome - 
with the grace of God - but may also be a means of achieving a heavenly reward. 
The notion that trial is inevitable in this life, and is ordained by God, who expects a 
positive response to it, is already well-established in the infancy of the Church. St. 
Augustine writes: 
Is not our life on earth a period of trial? For who would wish 
for hardship and difficulty? You command us to endure these 
troubles, not to love them. No-one loves what he endures, even 
though he may be glad to endure it. For though he may rejoice in his 
power of endurance, he would prefer that there should be nothing for 
him to endure. (2) 
The notion of trial as a condition of human experience pre-dates Christianity 
itself, since Genesis offers in the narrative of Adam and Eve the spectacle of 
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humanity faced with its first trial, that of obedience, which it miserably fails. If man 
in his pre-lapsarian state of innocence, possessed of an integrated nature which 
enabled him to subject at will his passions to his reason, could yet fail, there can be 
nothing to surprise the Christian believer in the fact that Adam's posterity, deprived 
by that failure of both innocence and integration, should be likely to follow his fatal 
example. For Adam and Eve, no less than for their descendants, theologians assert, 
trial was permitted by God as a test of faithfulness to His commandments, and 
conducted by means of the instrumentality of a being who had already failed his own 
trial of obedience, Satan. The poet with whom Richardson was so familiar, Milton, 
expresses this well-established belief, held by Christians of all persuasions: 
For what can scape the eye 
Of God all-seeing, or deceive his heart 
Omniscient? who in all things wise and just, 
Hindered not Satan to attempt the mind 
Of Man, with strength entire and free will armed 
Complete to have discovered and repulsed 
(3) Whatever wiles of foe or seeming friend. 
Nor, as Christian tradition accepts, have such evil spirits ceased their 
activities in subjecting - with Divine permission - humanity to similar trials 
in the 
long ages succeeding that first failure. Such trials are not permitted, we are told, with 
the intention on the part of the Deity that man should fail and earn punishment, still 
less the damnation that befell Satan and his followers, but so that he should triumph 
over them with the help of grace. Thomas a Kempis, makes this very point. Writing 
of temptation, he says: 
In all these trials, our progress is tested; in them great merit 
may be secured, and our virtue become evident. It is no great matter 
if we are devout and fervent when we have no troubles; 
but if we 
show patience in adversity, we can make great progress in virtue. 
(4) 
This is exactly Clarissa's experience, whether her trials are those of 
temptation to sin or of sufferings imposed upon her by the persecutions of others. 
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The notion of trial as an indispensable part of human and of Christian experience is 
something which Richardson accepted as a man, and to which he gave explicit 
expression as an author. His hero and heroines are seen to undergo their own trials, 
both those of undeserved afflictions peculiar to themselves, and those of the 
temptations which afflict all fallen mankind in general, and which may be seen as the 
results either of a direct assault by the powers of evil on their spiritual integrity, or of 
the promptings of that fallen nature. His view, expressed in a letter to Lady 
Bradshaigh, seems to have been that trial is inevitable in this life, and however 
painful, is not undesirable, since a heavenly reward may result: 
A writer who follows Nature and pretends to keep the 
Christian System in his Eye, cannot make a Heaven in this World for 
his Favourites; or represent this Life otherwise than as a State of 
Probation 
... 
What greater moral Proof can be given of a World after 
this, for the rewarding of suffering Virtue, and the punishing of 
oppressive Vice, than the Inequalities in the Distribution of Rewards 
and Punishments here below? (5) 
Richardson expressed this conviction again, in the Postscript to the third 
edition, when he answered the objections of those who claimed that his novel's 
resolution violated poetic justice. He pointed out that he was `well justified by the 
Christian system, in deferring to extricate suffering virtue to the time in which it will 
meet with the completion of its reward ). (iv, 
p"554) His remarks conclude with the 
assertion that `the notion of poetical justice ... 
has hardly ever been more strictly 
observed in works of this nature than in the present performance'. (iv, 
p. 557) He bases 
this claim on the grounds that his villains are punished and the virtuous are made 
happy. The reader of the novel may conclude that in Richardson's presentation, it is 
in some measure by means of the response to the inevitable trials of life that this 
distribution is effected. 
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The reward for enduring trials and for withstanding temptation is well worth 
the having, but it requires the assistance of God in the acquisition, since as Aquinas 
points out: 
Eternal life is a goal out of all proportion to human nature ... Man does however will and do things which earn him eternal life, but 
only because his will has been prepared for it by God through his 
grace. (6) 
Richardson's hero and heroines, particularly Clarissa, never cease to seek that 
goal of eternal life whatever their trials, but always assisted by grace. For Clarissa, at 
least, the reader may assume at the end of her history, that the reward is won by the 
patience with which she has endured persecution, abduction, imprisonment and 
sexual abuse. It may be assumed that while God permits such trials at the hands of 
others, He is not the cause of the sins of their perpetrators, since such sins take their 
origin from the misuse of reason and free will on the part of such sinners as Lovelace, 
the Harlowes, and Mrs. Sinclair and her girls. Calvin endorses St. Augustine's words 
on the subject, quoting the earlier theologian as his authority for his own opinion that 
God does not will sinners to sin: 
In a wonderful and ineffable way, what was done contrary to 
His will was yet not done without His will, because it would not have 
been done at all unless He allowed it. So He permitted it not 
unwillingly but willingly. (7 
He adds, speaking of both men and angels, that, `In sinning, they did what 
God did not will in order that God through their evil will might do what He willed'. 
In Clarissa, Lovelace, in particular, places himself voluntarily at `the service of sin', 
and precipitates himself to destruction '8 , 
but in doing so, he has become the 
instrument of Clarissa's trials, both because he imposes on her suffering which must 
be patiently endured, and because, in himself, he represents temptations of which she 
may not herself be fully aware. 
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In common with those of Richardson's other heroines and of his hero, Sir 
Charles, Clarissa's experiences serve to demonstrate the Christian believer's 
acknowledgement that even the virtuous are not exempt from trial, and are certainly 
not exempt from temptation; they share the same fallen nature and are subject to the 
same weaknesses as the common run of humanity. If their trials, of whatever kind, 
have a triumphant conclusion, it is because they seek and obtain the grace of God as 
their indispensable support. St. Augustine makes the point which Christian thinkers 
incorporated into the body of orthodoxy in various forms: 
It is to be observed that temptation does not always imply 
anything blameworthy, since the testing that brings approval is a 
matter for rejoicing. And as a general rule, there is no other way in 
which the human spirit can acquire self-knowledge except by trying 
its own strength in answering, not in word but in deed, what may be 
called the interrogation of temptation. And then, if God 
acknowledges the task performed, there is an example of a spirit truly 
devoted to God, with the solidity given by the strength of grace, 
instead of the inflation of the empty boast. (9) 
More than a thousand years later, Milton offers much the same consideration 
when he asserts that temptation is either good or evil. (10) God uses good temptations, 
he tells us, to prove the righteous, knowing what the result will be, but in order that 
He may demonstrate or exercise their faith or patience. However, He may also tempt 
such people in order to lessen their self-confidence and to reveal their weaknesses, so 
that they may become wiser thereby, and may serve to instruct others. God's justice 
in such procedures is never at fault, even when what Milton describes as evil 
temptation is seen to operate, those occasions on which God withdraws His grace, or 
throws opportunities in man's way, or hardens his heart, or blinds him. Such 
temptations are evil from the point of view of the man who is tempted, but just on 
God's part, since they may unmask such hidden sins as hypocrisy. Milton asserts 
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that God tempts no-one to sin, but may justly allow some men to be tempted by the 
devil. 
Milton's remarks demonstrate the consistency of Christian thought over the 
centuries on such questions, and Christian experience establishes that the soul which 
seeks God may indeed come to see temptation, this specific form of trial, as a means 
of sanctification, and resistance, assisted by grace, as a manner in which God may be 
glorified. In The Imitation of Christ, the disciple addresses Christ to this effect: 
I know that it is by Your will that temptation and trouble come 
upon me. I cannot escape it, but must needs come to You for help, 
that it may be turned to my good ... 
Yet it is for Your glory that I 
have been brought to this hour, and that I may learn that You alone 
can deliver me from the depths of my humiliation. (") 
Clarissa voices sentiments which closely echo these, at a point when her trials 
have as yet hardly begun, and when she does not yet know, despite her earnest self- 
searchings and applications to Anna for helpful insights into her faults, the nature of 
the weaknesses that she must overcome. It does not appear that she has so far ever 
been exposed to the test of any strong temptation to serious sin, but she writes as if 
she has a premonition of such trials to come: 
Who knows what the justice of Heaven may inflict in order to 
convince us that we are not out of the reach of misfortune; and to 
reduce us to a better reliance than we have hitherto presumptuously 
made? 
(p. 333) 
The trials of misfortune might be seen as those of imprisonment, rejection by 
her family, and a violent assault on her person, as well as the general contempt 
society reserves for any woman unfortunate enough to be in her position, but among 
her spiritual trials will be the temptations to rely too much on her own strength, and 
to attribute to herself, as she later acknowledges that she has done, credit for graces 
bestowed on her by God. Both external afflictions and trials of her soul's probity 
must be met with the humility which is demonstrated by the disciple in 
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St. Thomas ä Kempis's Dialogue quoted above, a humility which acknowledges a 
total dependence on God, for such is the way to delivery and exaltation. It is to this 
state of total dependence that Clarissa will finally come, but in doing so, she finds 
that such dependence is her triumph and fulfilment. 
It is difficult, both for the Christian commentator and for the reader of 
Clarissa, to define the exact origin of any given temptation but theologians have 
addressed the problem, and the reader of Clarissa needs to do so if he is to understand 
why Richardson declares his heroine a saint, and to ascertain what kind of saint she 
is. Aquinas offers this discussion of the problem: 
Indirectly the devil is the cause of all our sins, since it was he 
who led the first man into sin, and as a result of that sin, human nature 
is so weakened that we are all prone to sin. But he is not a direct 
cause, persuading to each and every sin, as Origen showed when he 
said that even if there were no devil, men would still desire. food and 
sex and the like, and whether those desires were controlled by reason 
or not would be up to our. free will. (12) 
To the direct assaults of the devil and the desires of the flesh must be added 
the attractions of the world, of wealth and status, as sources of temptation and sin. 
Richardson's characters meet with all three species of temptation. The very existence 
of Mrs. Sinclair and her daughters exemplifies the desires of the flesh in their most 
blatant form. The Harlowes have succumbed to the attractions of wealth and status at 
the expense of their spiritual probity. It may be concluded that both Clarissa and 
Lovelace face the most subtle onslaughts of the enemy in that their presiding faults 
are those of the intellect; in them, the seat of reason is itself under attack. Lovelace 
does not recognize that such temptations have been presented - or ignores the fact - 
and that he has succumbed, but Clarissa learns to acknowledge humbly that her trials 
have brought her to an understanding of the temptation to which she has unwittingly 
succumbed, and to seek the grace of repentance: 
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And now, being led to account for the cause of my temporary 
calamities, find I had a secret pride to be punished for, which I had 
not fathomed: and it was necessary perhaps that some sore and 
terrible misfortunes should befall me in order to mortify my pride and 
my vanity. 
Temptations were accordingly sent. I shrunk in the day of 
trial. My discretion, which had been so cried up, was found wanting 
when it came to be weighed in an equal balance. »p. 1375 
The insight which Clarissa offers here accords with the doctrines of Christian 
orthodoxy, whatever differences in tradition. She does not claim that God has led her 
into sin, but that by allowing her to be exposed to temptation, He has allowed her to 
fall, so that the secret vices which would have marred her soul and compromised her 
salvation, have been exposed. She can thus seek grace to amend them. Of such 
situations as Clarissa's, Aquinas had claimed that while one outcome of sin may be 
the damnation which it brings on itself, the other is a healing `attached to it in the 
plan of a merciful God who allows some to fall into sin in order that they may 
recognize it, be humbled and turn back to Him'. (13) 
Clarissa's sense that God has permitted temptation and failure in order to 
bring about a spiritual healing does not lead to any complacency on her part, but must 
suggest a certain ambiguity to the reader. Belford records that when she is dying, she 
rejoices that all her dangers may be said to be past, after having been `so much 
exposed to temptation, and to be so liable to fail in the trial'. 
( '375) She might be 
referring here to her mortified pride, since pride is the past sin to which she has 
confessed, and will confess again before she dies. But pride is an ever-present 
temptation as long as the intellect is clear, and Clarissa's intellect never fails her even 
when her frail body reaches the point of death. She cannot therefore claim that all 
danger is past if the temptation of pride is the only one to which she has 
been 
exposed. Her pride she can freely acknowledge, but it is not impossible that the 
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temptation she mentions here, from which she is now safe, could have been of a 
different kind. 
The trials which have exposed to her both the frailties of humankind, and her 
own vulnerability to them, have been those which have arisen from her relationship 
with Lovelace. Had she felt only revulsion towards him, as she did to Solmes, he 
could never have represented any temptation to her other than the temptation to 
express such revulsion with inordinate vehemence, so violating charity. Temptation, 
however, can only possess any force when some object or objective is desired. 
Clarissa declares here that she was `so liable to fail in the trial', but nothing in her 
circumspect conduct has given the reader any reason to suppose that she might have 
succumbed to his advances. However, it may well be that the attraction which she 
will only acknowledge, or even recognize, as `a conditional kind of liking', or by 
admitting that she could have loved him, has represented for her an error in itself, 
without needing to go any further by consciously responding to his courtship. From 
the moment she undertook her clandestine correspondence with Lovelace, Clarissa 
exposed herself to the possibilities of temptations which she did not allow herself to 
recognize as such. Whatever her unconscious motivation in doing so, her assertion 
that the temptations to which she has been so liable to succumb are past, and that this 
is a matter for rejoicing, even in the face of imminent death, suggests that she has 
come by means of her exposure to such temptations, of whatever nature, assisted by 
grace, to seek God, and to find in Him her own salvation, whether that salvation is to 
be regarded as access to eternal life, or as safety, both from Lovelace's persecutions 
and from any temptations which he might represent. 
If Clarissa can admit that she has been beset by temptations, of whatever 
nature, Lovelace, her adversary, is as ready as she is herself to admit to his pride. 
154 
The one essential difference is that he does not appear to perceive this intellectual sin 
as a sin, the result of a temptation that should have been resisted, or as a conquest 
over him by the powers of evil. Instead, he embraces that pride to the extent that he 
will readily identify himself with those evil powers. Such an identification may be 
perceived as one example of Lovelace's constant assumption of a variety of roles, but 
the identification is too frequently made, both by Lovelace himself and by others, not 
to signal to the reader that Richardson has a point to make both about the nature of 
temptation and about the result of succumbing to it. 
Lesley Berry has pointed out that Lovelace's temptation and deception 
of Clarissa echo that of Eve by Satan, as Milton describes it, in that 
both Satan and Lovelace falsely promise deliverance, and their victims are 
subsequently cursed, by God and by Mr. Harlowe, their respective fathers. 
Moreover, Clarissa describes her experience as a `fall', the term always employed to 
describe Eve's sin and her expulsion from the Garden. (14) Leaving aside the question 
as to whether the Harlowe household, with all its materialism, malice and cruelty, 
may be considered as an analogue to the paradise from which Eve is expelled, if this 
parallel is otherwise accepted it may be seen to be consistent with the ancient 
Christian belief that the wicked may be used as the instruments of Satan in 
temptation. St. Augustine points out that just as Satan was God's instrument in the 
testing of Job, so He may allow some people to be persecuted through the wickedness 
of others: 
It must be observed that when any man suffers any harm 
through the wickedness or the mistake of another, then that other 
human being commits a sin in doing some harm to another man either 
through ignorance or through ill-will; God commits no sin in allowing 
that wrong15ý to happen by his decision, which is just, albeit 
inscrutable. 
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If these remarks are applied to Clarissa's situation, and if Lovelace may be 
seen as such an instrument by which she is allowed to suffer both temptation and 
external trials, then her very acknowledgement of hidden sins, of the pride which led 
her to continue the clandestine correspondence with Lovelace, and perhaps of the 
unadmitted and largely unconscious impulses of an attraction which could have made 
that correspondence itself attractive, represent an admission that the justice of God 
has demanded an expiation. Clarissa's frequent assertions of her culpability, which 
may seem excessive to the reader, for which God has mercifully punished her, may 
then not be seen as the result of an over-scrupulous or morbidly sensitive nature. 
Christian theology, as Richardson is at pains to remind the reader implicitly, has a 
place both for temptation and trial as a means of testing the individual soul, and for 
revealing to that soul weaknesses to be repented and repaired for the sake of 
salvation. Clarissa had failed to recognize - or to resist - the temptations thrown her 
way by the instrumentality of Lovelace, but she has come to recognize and repent of 
that failure. Successive theologians reiterated St. Augustine's contention that certain 
individuals may assume the role of instruments in the testing of others. However, 
sometimes they are perceived as the instruments of Satan, but sometimes also of God. 
Of the former role, Aquinas comments: 
The devil tests in order to harm people and throw them into 
sin: indeed this sort of tempting is regarded as his special job, and 
when a man does it he is regarded as an agent of the devil. 
(16) 
Likewise, Calvin would see such a man as Lovelace as an instrument of God 
in the same way that the devil was His instrument when He tested Job: 
Scripture teaches that the reprobate are also instruments of 
God's wrath, for by some He instructs His faithful in patience, and on 
others He inflicts the punishments which as enemies they merit. 
(17 
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Whether Lovelace is to be regarded as the instrument of God or as the agent 
of the devil in relation to the trials which Clarissa undergoes, he is only too ready to 
claim the role of tempter. `What is it', he writes to Belford, `She ought not to expect 
from an unchained Beelzebub, and a plotting villain? '(P. 878 Like Milton's Satan, he 
seeks to despoil a virtue he has himself lost. `By my soul, I cannot forgive her for 
her virtues', (p. 853) he says, and shows himself as aware as any theologian - or devil - 
that in the matter of temptation, it is the yielding of the will that makes the sin, by his 
remark that `There 's no triumph over the will in force' . 
('. 879) 
Lovelace's self-identification with Milton's Satan is a matter of satisfaction to 
him, an instance of the role-playing which is part of his pleasure in plot and intrigue, 
but there is an irony which he fails to perceive in that either as God's instrument or 
the devil's, in exercising his own free will to tempt, he also fulfils the will of another. 
At Hampstead he tells Belford that like Satan, surprised out of his disguise by 
Ithuriel's spear, `I started up in my own form divine'. (p. 772) However, in his self- 
congratulation, Lovelace has forgotten that in this episode Milton's Satan is 
perceived by the two angels who have disturbed him in his temptation of Eve as `the 
grisly King (18) and that Satan is struck with regret, as Lovelace will come to be, for 
what he has lost by his own wilful choice: 
Abashed the Devil stood, 
And felt how awful goodness is, and saw 
Virtue in her shape how lovely - saw, and pined 
His loss. (19) 
As a result of assuming the role of tempter, Lovelace's loss will be twofold, 
and both will be losses of what is lovely, of an honest love in this world, and of his 
soul in the next. Meanwhile, his transformation as he removes his disguise and 
congratulates himself on the impact that his youth and beauty have on Mrs. Moore 
and her friends offers an ironic commentary on St. Augustine's warning of the 
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dangers of demons who present themselves disguised as angels of light. Lovelace 
thinks that he has removed one disguise, but its removal merely presents the 
onlookers with an appearance that disguises the evil in his heart. St. Augustine tells 
his readers of such demons: 
But their most effective hold upon the hearts of mortals (and it 
is in the possession of them that they especially glory) is gained when 
they transform themselves into angels of light. (20) 
Clarissa has been too clear-sighted to regard Lovelace as an angel of light, 
even before she becomes fully aware of his character and intentions, but she does 
come to identify him with Satan, recognizing the role he has assumed in testing her 
virtue. It is true that she never succumbs to sexual sin as the other objects of 
Lovelace's attentions have done, but she does become aware of the dangers that he 
represents, and that he is in some sense aligned with the powers of evil: 
Oh Lovelace, you are Satan himself, or he helps you out in 
everything; and that's as bad! 
But have you really and truly sold yourself to him? And for 
how long? What duration is your reign to have? Poor man! The 
contract will be out; and then what will be your fate! (p. 
894) 
If Satan's purpose on earth is to ruin souls, Clarissa's perception, focusing 
with compulsive force on the experiences which have befallen her, and illuminating 
harshly the relationship which has existed between herself and Lovelace, victim and 
tempter, expresses the situation in terms of the conflict which exists between 
mankind and this ancient enemy. However, her distraught state does not 
deprive her 
of the knowledge that the instruments of evil, entering into a Faustian pact, or 
Satan 
himself, must eventually suffer for what they do, even if at present she recognizes 
that the aim of such powers is to encompass the ruin of my soul, that my 
father's 
curse may be fulfilled ... to complete 
the triumphs of so vile a confederacy 7. 
(P. 900) 
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A further comment of hers suggests her understanding of the nature of 
temptation, but raises a question as to what her temptations have been. The Satan of 
Paradise Lost offers Eve the temptation which holds out the fulfilment of a desire for 
power and knowledge, a fulfilment which will remove from her the essential quality 
by which both God and Adam seem to define her role, that of her willing submission 
to both. The reader of Richardson's novel may question what hidden inclinations 
Clarissa has, or has had, when she tells Lovelace, `Thou art surely nearly allied to the 
grand deceiver in thy endeavour to suit temptations to inclinations! '. 
(P. 928) 
Ostensibly, she speaks of the immediate temptation offered by `Captain 
Tomlinson's' mediation in an apparent attempt to reconcile her to the Harlowes by 
means of marriage to Lovelace. The reader has no reason to dismiss Clarissa's claim 
to have abandoned any thoughts of such a marriage, but the question must be asked 
whether she has learned of Lovelace's satanic ability to offer temptations suited to 
inclinations by reflecting upon past experiences of such temptations which may have 
found a response in her own heart. Lovelace reports her in the moment of rejecting 
him yet again at this point, as praying `in a kind of frenzy', `Blessed, blessed God ... 
save me, Oh save me from myself, and from this man! 
(p, 929) It is obvious in what 
danger she stands from Lovelace, but the reader may ask what prompts Clarissa to 
seek to be saved from herself, and may conclude that Lovelace can indeed offer what 
is desirable, or may himself be so. 
Clarissa's sense of being subjected to the direct assaults of Satan in a personal 
encounter, is one which is not uncommon in Christian experience. Calvin says of 
Satan: 
Truth he assails with lies, light he obscures with darkness. 
The minds of men he involves in error; he stirs up hatred, inflames 
strife and war, and all in order that he may overthrow the Kingdom of 
God, and drown men in eternal perdition with himself 
(21) 
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He might be speaking of the activities of Lovelace. The Gospel reminds us 
that even Christ was subject to such an encounter, (Matt. 4.1-11), and Milton's Jesus 
in Paradise Regained undergoes in His own person such a conflict, repeating that of 
Adam, but where one man, despite the integration of his nature and the availability of 
grace, failed, Jesus is exposed in the wilderness to trial by a God who knows that His 
Son will triumph and redeem mankind from the condemnation merited by Adam's 
failure. Unlike Clarissa, Jesus recognizes Satan in the disguise he has assumed from 
the start: 
Why dost thou, then, suggest to me distrust, 
Knowing who I am, as I know who thou art? (22) 
Unlike Satan in his recognition of Jesus, Lovelace does not initially recognize 
the quality of the woman he proposes to try by the test of seduction. However, 
Milton's Satan does as Lovelace does, he disingenuously claims that he means 
mankind no harm. We might be reminded that Lovelace too professes to Clarissa 
that he means her no harm, but only offers protection: 
Men generally think me much a foe 
To all mankind: why should I? they to me 
Never did wrong or violence, by them 
I lost not what I lost. (23) 
The setting for Jesus's temptations, triumphantly overcome, the wilderness, serves to 
remind us that the soul meets the tempter in a wilderness of its own, where reason 
struggles with the chaos of deceptions and passions. Even before Clarissa leaves 
Harlowe Place she has begun the struggle with her own tempter, but at a remove 
through correspondence, and, as some commentators have pointed out, she now finds 
in the world outside, especially within the confines of Mrs. Sinclair's house, a place 
of moral chaos. (24) In this relationship with Lovelace and in this house, she is as 
much locked in battle with the representative of Satan as ever Milton's Jesus 
is 
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shown to be, in the wide spaces of the desert with Satan himself. Temptation does 
not, after all, depend upon location, but is essentially a struggle within the soul. 
However, Clarissa does not triumph so unequivocally; Lovelace's pride tempts her 
own, and his seductiveness calls forth an unrecognized or unacknowledged response 
in herself Clarissa may fairly claim to be innocent of having provoked her tempter's 
- and would-be seducer's - attentions, but such innocence does not exempt her from 
undergoing temptations of her own in trying to evade his attempts. 
he Christian is required to be as equally unmoved - with Divine 
assistance - by painful experiences and by persecution as much as by 
temptation. If the sufferer should ask why God allows such trials, or at least chooses 
not to prevent affliction, Christian theology has offered a variety of answers, 
including the assertion that goodness may only be tested by trial. Clarissa, like 
Richardson's earlier heroine, Pamela, may be said to be defined by her trial, and 
eventually to be the product of it. She does not provoke the trial by which she is 
tested, but her experiences remind the reader that for God's mysterious purposes, the 
good must suffer as much, and sometimes more, than the wicked, even as they are 
not exempt from the specialized trial of temptation. Even if the virtuous and the 
wicked are subjected to similar trials, however, the effects of that suffering, as St. 
Augustine points out, may be very different: 
When the good and the wicked suffer alike, the identity of 
their sufferings does not mean that there is no difference between 
them. Though the sufferings are the same, the sufferers remain 
different. Virtue and vice are not the same even if they undergo the 
same torment. The fire which makes gold shine makes chaff 
(25) smoke ... 
Although Lovelace must be seen as the instigator of Clarissa's trial, or the 
instrument by which she is tested, there is a point at which he himself undergoes a 
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trial which has some remarkable similarities to a part of Clarissa's own experience, 
and which opens up the question of the function of trial, as outlined by St. Augustine 
in the quotation above. As Carol Houlihan Flynn has noted, both Clarissa and 
Lovelace are driven to the borders of insanity, she by rape and he by her death and 
his recognition of his own part in causing it, and have similar memories of their 
respective experiences, which turn upon the loss of their sense of self (26) However, 
the outcomes of their respective trials are widely different. Clarissa has already 
begun to acknowledge the faults of which she has been guilty, and to repent of them, 
by the time of the rape. This further trial and the near madness which succeeds it 
point to the presence of grace already gained, which sustains her in her sufferings and 
enables her to undertake the rigorous self-examination by which she is able to 
exonerate herself of any complicity. Her trial, and her response to it, indicates the 
future saint; it both tests and helps to form her. Lovelace's response to a similar trial 
reveals the weakness of a soul which is devoid of grace, and because he does lack the 
grace which sustains Clarissa, he cannot respond in a manner which would re-form 
him; he cannot acknowledge with humility his sins and truly repent of them. Instead, 
his pride shrinks from a humiliation which Clarissa is prepared to accept if her soul 
may thereby be saved. Since Richardson intended Clarissa and Lovelace, the saint 
and the libertine, (27) to stand opposed, their respective responses to a similar trial have 
an important place in the scheme of his novel. 
That he must have intended to draw the reader's attention to their respective 
responses to similar trials, the outcome of which in both cases could have been the 
loss of a sense of self, of identity, is indicated by his making both Clarissa and 
Lovelace describe their experiences of this particular trial in terms which are notably 
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alike, terms which express a nightmarish sense of confusion and horror. Clarissa 
writes to Anna, describing her memories of the rape: 
I was so senseless that I dare not aver that the horrid creatures 
of the house were personally aiding and abetting: but some visionary 
remembrances I have of female figures flitting, as I may say, before 
my sight ... 
But as these confused ideas might be owing to the terror I 
had conceived ... 
(P-1011) 
For his part, Lovelace describes his descent into a similar condition of near- 
madness for Belford: 
I had no distinct ideas, but of dark and confused misery: it was 
all conscience and horror indeed! Thoughts of hanging, drowning, 
shooting; then rage, violence, mischief, and despair took their turns 
with me. My lucid intervals still worse, giving me to reflect upon 
what I was the hour before, and what I was likely to be the next, and 
perhaps for life ... 
(n. 1430 
Both accounts carry the sense of disorientation, of a divorce from reality 
which gives them their nightmare quality; both accounts also suggest the terrors of a 
loss of any sense of control and hint at a state bordering on the loss of a sense of self 
However, while Clarissa's account conveys fear as the predominant emotion during 
this experience, that of Lovelace suggests a crisis in which pride and violence are 
predominant. Kinkead-Weekes points out that they both come to a moment under the 
pressure of these respective situations in which the cherished, recognized self nearly 
disintegrates, in response to emotional experiences which they each find virtually 
unendurable, and he rightly concludes that Lovelace's self-image is `the mainspring 
of his life'. (28) Since Richardson elsewhere expresses, through the mouths of other of 
his characters, the opinion that God asks us to bear only what is in our power to 
endure, (29) it must be concluded that he would expect the reader to understand that 
both Clarissa and Lovelace are required to bear trials which take them to this 
extreme, the sense that they both have of the loss of self, here the familiar image that 
has sustained that sense of self trembles for both of them on the edge of extinction. 
163 
As St. Augustine points out above, the wicked and the virtuous are not alike, 
and Clarissa and Lovelace respond differently in these similar crises. Her first letter 
to Anna after the rape expresses her sense of loss and dispossession: 
Once more I have escaped - but alas! I, my best self, have not 
escaped! - Oh! Your poor Clarissa Harlowe! You also will hate me, I 
fear! 
... 
But no more of myself! my lost self! ... 
Oh! my best, my 
dearest, my only friend! What a tale have Ito unfold! - But still upon 
se l this vile, this hated se JP ... 
Self then, be banished from se f one 
moment - (for I doubt it will for no longer) to enquire after a dearer 
object, my beloved Anna Howe ! (p. 974) 
While Clarissa struggles with her sense of dispossession, and seeks to rise 
above it in a concern for her friend, she yet faces the interrogation of her own heart, 
the necessity to address the unbearable question as to whether she might be in some 
measure guilty of complicity in Lovelace's act. The fact that she finds that her will 
was unviolated, that she was not a participant but a victim merely, and can therefore 
exonerate herself, does not render any less painful the experience she must undergo 
in order to arrive at this conclusion by putting her conscience to the test. It may be 
said therefore that this, her climactic trial and her response to it, ensures that she does 
not in reality lose her `best self, but is enabled to find it; her experience thus opens 
the way to her sanctification. It would not be too much to claim that this trial and 
response, of all others, enables her to overcome those elements of self that stand 
between her soul and its heavenly reward, since it is by this trial more than by any 
other that she comes to acknowledge and repent her sins, not of complicity, but of 
pride and wilfulness. 
Lovelace too faces a trial which is essentially that of the possible loss of a 
known and cherished image of the self, a self which he is required to interrogate in 
order to determine its sins and failings. A self that could be an heir to the Kingdom 
of Heaven may only be found by such a process and by the acknowledgement and 
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repentance of sin. Unlike Clarissa, who accepts the disintegration of a cherished self- 
image, the humbling of her pride, and the presence of hidden sins, Lovelace cannot - 
or will not - stand his trial. Terrified by the possibility of the disintegration of the 
self he has constructed, he refuses to acknowledge both the full extent of his 
culpability and the hollowness of the self he fears to lose. He asks Belford: 
Who can bear such reflections as these? To be made to fear 
only, and to fear such wretches too! What a thing was this but 
remotely to apprehend ! (p. 1430 
Lovelace's perception of his self is founded on his pride, and he cannot face 
the possibility of the loss of the self he presents to the world as the arch-manipulator, 
the centre of all admiring attention, the controller of the lives of others who is himself 
subject to no control but the compulsions of his false self. This trial offers him the 
opportunity to question and to discard that self-image which will eventually carry 
him beyond the reach of grace. Whether the reader sees Lovelace at this moment as 
displaying the evidence of reprobation, or as simply choosing to exercise his free will 
in favour of his pride instead of the acknowledgement of sin and the repentance 
which would be his salvation, he and Clarissa present opposing responses, one 
negative and one positive, both to similar trials and to Christ's paradoxical 
pronouncement, `He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this 
world shall keep it unto life eternal'. (John 12.25). 
owever painful the experience, trial should not be seen as evidence 
that the sufferer is forgotten by the God who allows the affliction. 
Even if that affliction represents punishment for sin, it is ultimately for the benefit of 
the sufferer. St. Augustine makes this point when he reflects on his own experiences, 
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on the way in which God weaned him from unlawful pleasures by means of 
suffering, so that he would seek instead the joys which are `unallied with pain'- 
You meant me to find them nowhere but in yourself, 0 Lord, 
for you teach us by inflicting pain, you smite so that you may heal, 
and you kill us so that we may not die away from you. (30 
He concludes that trial may be evidence that God has lessons which we are 
required to learn for our own good. Christian theologians of differing traditions have 
frequently been agreed in contending that trial and suffering are not only a necessary 
component of human experience, but also offer specific benefits. The first of these, 
as St. Augustine indicates, is the testing of worth, (31) with the prospect of a heavenly 
reward for those who triumphantly sustain the trial. This is a contention which the 
respective responses of Clarissa and Lovelace to a similar trial, discussed above, 
would seem to bear out. On the evidence of Lovelace's remarks on the question of 
the Divine purpose in allowing suffering, it may be seen that he is as much aware of 
this Christian belief as is Clarissa. He asks Belford, `Is not calamity the test of 
virtue? ' 
»' 519) Richardson himself, in a letter to Frances Grainger, expresses his own 
opinion on the matter in terms very close to those he gives to Lovelace. `Calamity is 
the test of virtue', he says, `And often the parent of it, in minds that prosperity would 
ruin' 
(32) 
This notion of suffering as a test of virtue finds its pre-Christian expression in 
the Book of Job, the part of the Scriptures to which Richardson makes most explicit 
references in Clarissa, and which had a general significance for writers and readers of 
the period who concerned themselves with the problem of unmerited suffering. 
(33) 
The testing of Job may be considered in Christian thought as a positive experience, 
an example which prefigures the testing of Christ, and after Him, of all who aspire to 
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follow Him. When Milton's Satan addresses Jesus in the wilderness, it is this 
positive aspect of trial that he alludes to: 
I came, among the sons of God, when he 
Gave up into my hands Uzzean Job, 
To prove him, and illustrate his high worth. (34) 
Satan's subsequent testing of Jesus proves not only His worth but His 
readiness to begin the task of Redemption, and leads on to His triumph. (35) If the Son 
of God Himself should humbly submit to such a test, no Christian could complain if 
his own worth were tested. Thomas a Kempis makes the point that suffering is not 
only necessary as the test of a soul's virtue, but also of its ability to progress in the 
spiritual life. To this end, in a dialogue between Christ and a disciple, he has the 
former tell the latter, `You must still be proved in this life, and many trials await 
you" (36) but a little later the disciple of the dialogue, instructed that Providence 
oversees all trials, addresses God in terms which Clarissa might have spoken: 
0 Father, ever to be honoured, the hour has come which has 
lain in Your foreknowledge from all eternity, when for a while Your 
servant will seem utterly defeated; yet let him inwardly feel Your 
presence. He will be maligned and humiliated, a failure in the eyes of 
men, broken by suffering and sickness, that with You he may rise 
again in the light of a new dawn, and receive glory in Heaven. (37) 
Clarissa has no doubt that a merciful God oversees her trials. Like the 
disciple, she learns to trust in the Providence which has allowed her, for His own 
purposes, to be subjected to such sufferings. She comes to express the view that 
human suffering may be a Divinely chosen method of rendering the soul fit for 
heaven, and finds in her own case that God has been especially gracious to her in 
accelerating the progress of her testing: 
Having finished ... 
her probatory course, at so early a time of 
life, when many are not ripened by the sunshine of Divine grace for a 
better [world] till they are 50,60, or 70 years of age. ». 1406 
167 
Clarissa's confidence in the Providence that oversees her ordeal enables her to 
seek assistance and comfort from that source rather than from any human agency. 
Successive Christian thinkers have concluded that in times of suffering, God alone 
can be the only sure resource. St. Augustine, reflecting on the contrast between the 
unchanged and unchangeable nature of God and the turbulence and vicissitudes of 
human existence addresses God: 
You are steadfast, constant in yourself, but we are tossed on a 
tide that puts us to the proof, and if we could not sob out our troubles 
in your ear, what should we have left to us? (38) 
It takes all of Clarissa's painful experiences to teach her that to be comfortless 
in human terms is to enjoy the highest comfort of all; she has learned that there can 
be no comfort which will afford the soul security but that of God Himself Clarissa's 
cry, `But God Almighty would not allow me to depend for comfort upon any but 
Himself! '(p. 1356) comes very close to that of the disciple in The Imitation of Christ 
who also recognizes that God's is the only comfort to afford rest to the soul in 
anguish: 
No mortal man can comfort me, and if only I could renounce 
all human comfort ... then 
I could rightly trust entirely to Your grace, 
and rejoice in the gift of Your renewed comfort. (39) 
Christian theology recommends that suffering should be met with patience 
and endurance, and that the exercise of these qualities in times of trial will bring both 
merit and the development of a deeper spiritual maturity. It is for God to propose the 
trial; it is for the Christian soul to endure it in trust. The experiences of the great 
Biblical exemplar, Job, demonstrate that however hopeless and arbitrary the trial may 
seem to be, the Christian soul must cling to its trust that it answers God's purposes. 
Clarissa shows herself aware of a need for patient endurance, and of the 
fact that this 
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cannot be achieved without Divine assistance: `I hope I shall have more grace given 
me than to despond, in the religious sense of the word', she writes to Anna, and adds: 
I must have more conflicts. At times I find myself not 
subdued enough to my condition. I will welcome these conflicts as 
they come, as probationary ones. ('. 1022) 
Such exemplary patience as that with which Richardson endows her, is in 
accordance with the prescriptions of numerous Christian commentators. The words 
of Christ in The Imitation of Christ may be taken as an example of such 
recommendations, and might have been spoken directly to Clarissa, since they 
summon the disciple to sufferings which are remarkably similar to those which she is 
required to endure: 
Dispose not yourself to rest, but to patient endurance. Seek 
true peace not on earth, but in Heaven; not in man nor in any other 
creature, but in God alone. For love of God, cheerfully endure every 
thing - labour, sorrow, temptation, provocation, anxiety, necessity, 
weakness, injury and insult; censure, humiliation, disgrace, 
contradiction and contempt. All these things foster your growth in 
virtue, for they test the approved servant of Christ, and form the 
jewels of his heavenly crown. I will grant an eternal reward for your 
brief toil, and boundless glory for your passing trouble. (40 
It is the patience with which Clarissa submits to her trials that has a profound 
effect on those around her. Belford's admiration for such exemplary conduct 
completes his conversion, and in turn, through him, influences the lives of his fellow- 
rakes for the better, so that they, too, have a chance of achieving salvation. Untold 
good is shown to be thus performed by the power of God working through this dying 
girl, who has demonstrated the right to claim that she acts in `humble imitation of the 
sublimest exemplar'(p*"8 in accepting suffering as God's will. Such a claim relates 
to the notion that suffering may be seen as the privilege of sharing in the Passion of 
Christ, and thereby earning the right to share in His glory. Clarissa's address to her 
Redeemer at the conclusion of her Will, demonstrates an awareness of the 
169 
meritorious aspect of her suffering in that it links the redemptive Passion of Christ 
with her own trials. By the one, mankind is redeemed; by the other, Clarissa believes 
that she has atoned for her sins, and may confidently hope to share her Saviour's 
glory: 
And now, oh my blessed REDEEMER, do I, with a lively 
faith, humbly lay hold of Thy meritorious death and sufferings; 
hoping to be washed clean in Thy precious blood from all my sins: in 
the bare hope of the happy consequences of which, how light do those 
sufferings seem (grievous as they were at the time) which I 
confidently trust will be a means, by Thy grace, to work out for me a 
more exceeding and eternal weight of glory! (p. 142° 
Her perception of suffering as a means of redemption marks her out as one 
who follows directly, as she has claimed, in the footsteps of the `sublimest exemplar'. 
The doctrine of the redemptive nature of Christ's sufferings has a long history and is 
an integral part of Christian belief Aquinas says: 
But since Christ's suffering was enough and much more than 
enough to make amends for both the sin and the liability to 
punishment of mankind, his sufferings were a kind of ransom by 
which we are delivered from both slaveries. Christ made amends not 
with money, but by the greatest gift of all, himself, given up for us. (41) 
The link between the redemptive suffering of Christ and the suffering of His 
followers, which may, if endured in patience and submission, lead to glory, can be 
seen as well-established likewise in Protestant theology. Jeremy Taylor tells us that 
those who suffer must take Christ on the Cross as a model, reminding his readers that 
Christ endured more for us that we can endure for Him or for ourselves. Sufferers 
who grasp this find `the high way of the Crosse ... 
is the way to ease, to a kingdom, 
and to felicity'. (42) Clarissa is brought to follow the `high way of the Crosse' by 
accepting that her ordeal is the means by which her relationship with God is to be 
defined, and that her sufferings have been permitted for her eternal wellbeing. 
Because of this, she may cry out to God, but she does not cry out against Him. Her 
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response is that of the disciple in The Imitation of Christ who responds to his own 
suffering with the words, `I have accepted the Cross from your own hands: as You 
laid it upon me, I have accepted it, and will bear it to death' "(43) 
On 
the way to that death, Clarissa learns to know herself, as the sufferer 
who embraces his suffering in the spirit of acceptance and trust is 
promised that he will do. In the Collection, Richardson acknowledges this claim, 
`How little do we know of ourselves till the hour of trial comes! 1. 
(44) If the reader 
feels that Clarissa's insight falls short of a full understanding of her own motives, it 
can still be granted that her experiences have opened up for her the self-knowledge 
that has enabled her to repent of her hidden sins. Rosemary Bechler has drawn 
attention to the manner in which the ideas of the German Lutheran Mystic, Jacob 
Boehme, may be applied to the opposition of Lovelace and Clarissa. Boehme 
comments on the revelatory force of opposition in the development of the spiritual 
life, `No thing may be revealed to itself without contrariety' "(45) 
It is largely through 
the opposition of Lovelace that Clarissa's trials have been defined, and that her 
development from a young girl of conventional piety to a woman of heroic virtue is 
achieved. She finds her `contrariety' in him; her capacity to endure has met his 
capacity to test her endurance; her virtue has been tested against the touchstone of his 
vice. In her, the grace of God has been demonstrated and has triumphed over the 
negativity of pride and egotism. Lovelace himself recognizes that Clarissa's 
suffering has both defined and developed her character, that it has given her greater 
knowledge of herself - her `self - and has taught her adversary 
in his turn to 
perceive its quality. With characteristic acuity, and a failure to mention his own part 
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in creating the `uncommon occasions' which have had so great an influence on 
Clarissa's development, Lovelace writes to Belford on the subject: 
How the dear creature's character rises in every line of thy 
letters! - But it is owing to the uncommon occasions she has met with 
that she blazes out upon us with such a meridian lustre! - How, but for these occasions, could her noble sentiments, her prudent 
consideration, her forgiving spirit, her exalted benevolence, and her 
equanimity in view of the most shocking prospects ... 
have been 
manifested? (P-1309) 
Equally, Clarissa herself early perceives that in trial there might lie the means 
of self-knowledge, of an understanding of what is vital in the struggle for salvation, 
not the good opinion of others, but `self acquittal'. The words she writes to Anna - 
`To be self-acquitted is a blessing to be preferred to the opinion of all the world 
(p. 360) 
- express the Protestant view of the supremacy of the individual conscience, and in 
view of the fact that when she writes them, she has no knowledge of what trials, 
calling for both endurance and rigorous self-examination, await her, must be seen as 
prophetic. No-one can be self-acquitted without knowing that self, and to seek to 
know the self in Christian terms, is to risk knowing the faults and failings of that self 
as well as its virtues. Clarissa's progress to that self-knowledge, incomplete as it 
must be in a post-lapsarian world, seems to reflect Jeremy Taylor's opinion that to be 
tried is a proof of God's love, since otherwise we cannot know if we are good or 
bad. (46) If this is the case, that love may manifest itself by teaching a knowledge of 
the self that humbles the soul by trial. The revelation of hitherto unrecognized 
weaknesses might lead to despair, but it can also lead, with the help of grace, to a 
desire and purpose to amend and the suffering by which this knowledge has been 
gained may also serve as an opportunity to atone for sin and weakness. 
Such lessons may involve humiliation, but this is not to be seen as a 
punishment inflicted for sin by an offended God, but a means by which He tests 
in 
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order to draw the soul to Himself, in order, ultimately, to exalt it. Clarissa early 
recognizes that humiliation may be an essential part of the nature of trial, but her 
expression of this notion has a certain poignancy, in retrospect, for the reader, since 
when she speaks of being humbled at this early point in the novel, she can have no 
conception of the depths of humiliation to come: 
My calamities have humbled me enough to make me turn my 
gaudy eye inward; to make me look into myself! - And what have I 
discovered there? Why, my dear friend, more secret pride and vanity 
than I could have thought had lain in my unexamined heart. ». 333 
Clarissa is unaware that she has not yet been humbled enough, and that the 
mere apprehension of pride and vanity is not sufficient for the purification which will 
eventually exalt her. She reaches that point when she can only express the totality of 
her humiliation by writing, not to her friend, but to herself in an attempt to give some 
form or shape to emotions which must be borne, but which are virtually unendurable. 
Clarissa's intellectual apprehension of the necessity of humiliation to achieve God's 
purposes has here been fused with the emotional experience of what humiliation is, 
and feels like; not only her mind but her heart understands: 
How art thou now humbled in the dust, thou proud Clarissa 
Harlowe! Thou that never steppedst out of thy father's house but to 
be admired! ... to plume 
thyself upon the expected applauses of all 
that beheld thee! ... 
Thou that usedst to go to rest satisfied with the 
adulations paid thee in the past day, and couldst put off everything but 
thy vanity !- (p. 891) 
If she is `humbled in the dust' in her own eyes, she is no less humbled in the 
eyes of others, and knows it. In another of her `papers', she addresses Arabella 
(whom the reader might judge to be in need of some salutary experience of 
humiliation herself), and writes, expressing her conviction that her fall has been 
permitted to teach her true, as opposed to false, humility: 
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Rejoice not now, my Bella, my sister, my friend; but pity the 
humbled creature, whose foolish heart you used to say you beheld 
through the thin veil of humility, which covered it. 
(p. 891) 
It must have been so! My fall had not else been permitted - 
To greet Arabella as a friend is to recognize that she has been an unwitting 
instrument to warn Clarissa, vindictive and envious as the motives of her conduct 
were, of the pride that has undergone the correction of humiliation, since whatever 
offers to make the soul aware of its own fault does it a service. Moreover, Clarissa's 
humiliation, whether in her own eyes or in those of others, has the effect of bringing 
her closer to her `sublimest Exemplar' in spirit. Jeremy Taylor tells us that one of the 
signs of humility is to behave as Christ behaved. The humble man, he says: 
Is ready to do good offices to the murderers of his fame, to his 
slanderers, backbiters and detractors, as Christ washed the feet of 
Judas. '47) 
Clarissa lives up to this definition, being ready to do all in her power to 
prevent her family's vengeance on Lovelace, or his on James. She prays for the 
soul's welfare of the man who has been the murderer of her fame, and is likewise, as 
Jeremy Taylor further remarks of the humble man `contented to be suspected of 
Indiscretion, so, before God he may be really innocent'. (48) Her reputation lost, 
rejected by her family, and unjustly condemned by a society which has no place for a 
woman thus injured, calumniated by such as the hypocritical Mr. Brand - whose self- 
righteous comments illustrate painfully what a woman in her position could expect 
from respectable society at large - Clarissa's acknowledgement of her own innocence 
and her self-acquittal is as much a demonstration of her humility as the acceptance of 
the state to which her unmerited sufferings have brought her. Humility is not self- 
abasement, but a clear-sighted self-evaluation. If her state in this life is that of an 
outcast in the eyes of society, she knows that it is otherwise in the eyes of God, and 
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that it is by her trials that He intends her exaltation. That Richardson, as well as God, 
had this intention may be inferred from a letter to Hester Mulso: 
I laid indeed an heavy hand on the good Clarissa. But I had 
begun with her, with a view to the future saint in her character: and 
could she, but by sufferings, shine as she does? (49) 
Christian theology frequently presents the view that it is not the time of 
suffering which represents the greatest spiritual danger to the soul, but the time of 
prosperity. St. John of the Cross asserts that we can acquire neither humility nor self- 
knowledge in times of prosperity and are therefore more liable to sin. Spiritual 
humility is drawn from the aridity of the night of the soul. `Through this humility, 
which is acquired by the said knowledge of self, the soul is purged from all those 
imperfections whereinto it fell with respect to that sin of pride, in the time of its 
prosperity. (50) Likewise, the peril to which the soul is exposed during periods of 
prosperity, when it may be drawn away from the things of God, and the opposing 
benefits of suffering are succinctly expressed in William Law's enquiry, `How many 
saints has adversity sent to Heaven? And how many poor sinners has prosperity 
plunged into everlasting misery? ' . 
(sl) 
At the end of her life, the forcing-house of suffering has made Clarissa 
conscious of the dangers of prosperity. Born with all the advantages that wealth, 
status and personal attractions could offer, she might have been expected to cry out 
against the loss of every worldly gratification and at the prospect of an early death. 
Yet she writes to her father as she lies dying, rejoicing in the loss of these 
advantages: 
Since, had I escaped the snares by which I was entangled, I 
might have wanted those exercises which I now look upon as so many 
mercies dispensed to wean me betimes from a world that presented 
itself to me with prospects too alluring: and, in that case (too easily 
satisfied with worldly felicity) I might not have attained to that 
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blessedness which now ... 
I humbly presume (through the Divine 
goodness) I am rejoicing in. (p. 1372) 
Both in Richardson's own circle and in Christian thought in general, the belief 
that in adversity lies the supreme opportunity for the testing of the soul, so that it may 
gain merit and prove itself worthy of exaltation, appears to be well-established. 
Likewise the belief that there are no comparable opportunities in prosperity and ease 
accompanies this conviction in both spheres. Stinstra makes this point in his Preface 
to the Seventh and Eighth Volumes of Clarissa: 
The less one thinks that temporal happiness and prosperity are 
the definite fate and part of virtue, the less one is disappointed to learn 
that, on the contrary, one must often struggle with cruel disasters and 
long-lasting adversities. One observes that this life is not immediately 
rewarding, but is, instead, a trial and preparation for another life in 
which the pious will receive the real reward for their good works. (52) 
Since this is the case, adversity and suffering are to be welcomed. To 
reinforce this point, Richardson ensures that Clarissa is not the only person in her 
own circle who comes to recognize the benefits of trial over those of prosperity. 
Anna too reflects on the rewards that Clarissa may expect in undergoing her trials in 
patience. Her remarks - which voice similar sentiments to those of a number of 
Christian thinkers - suggest the notion that by adversity's offering such especial 
opportunities to the sufferer, it acts as the forge in which the soul is refined and 
purified, as gold is by the fire: 
Adversity is your shining time. I see evidently that it must call 
forth graces and beauties that could not have been seen in a run of that 
prosperous fortune which attended you from your cradle till now. 
(p. 5795 
Had Anna written these remarks having just laid down a volume of 
Edward 
Young's Night Thoughts, she could hardly have expressed herself in terms closer to 
those of Richardson's contemporary and friend: 
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A noble fortitude in ills; delights 
Heaven, earth, ourselves; 'tis duty, glory, peace. 
Affliction is the good man's shining scene; 
Prosperity conceals his brightest ray. (53) 
If it cannot be claimed that Richardson necessarily drew this thought from the 
writings of his friend, it can be claimed that he shared the sentiment, and that both 
authors had tapped into a common mode of expression for Christian writers who 
wished to point out both the benefits of trial in calling forth and testing virtue, and the 
dangers of prosperity. (54) 
ichardson's treatment of the complex issue of trial embraces one 
further important aspect, that of purification by affliction, which is 
closely linked to the Christian metaphor of refinement by fire. In a letter to Lady 
Bradshaigh, he refers to his heroine as `a Creature perfected by Sufferings and 
already ripened for Glory'. (55) In Clarissa he has Mrs. Norton refer directly to 
Clarissa's own purification in this manner as designed to achieve her exaltation. (p. 980 
These two aspects of suffering, purification and exaltation, are closely linked in the 
novel, and elsewhere in Christian thought; one is hardly possible without the other. 
Clarissa is exposed to a specific form of trial, that which echoes the primal opposition 
in Judaeo-Christian theology of man to Satan, of human free-will, assisted by grace, 
opposed to seductive and devious evil, of the positive values of charity in the love of 
God and true self-love, opposed to the negativity of false egoism and pride, of what is 
essentially reasonable according to God's order, opposed to moral chaos. One 
Christian thinker, Milton, expresses the values of such opposition succinctly in his 
remark `That which purifies us is triall, and triall by what is contrary '. 
(56) 
Christian theology holds that in some form all men must re-enact that ancient 
conflict. Yet some souls are invited to more exacting and arduous trials than the 
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common run of humanity. St. John of the Cross speaks of the trials of the spirit 
which are reserved for those souls whom God intends to admit to closer union with 
Himself. `Those who have the disposition and greater strength to suffer, He purges 
with greater intensity and more quickly. ' (57) 
We are reminded that Clarissa's trials against so skilful and powerful an 
adversary do not outlast a year's duration. However, the intensity of her suffering 
more than outweighs its comparative brevity. The process of purification demands a 
recognition of sinfulness, followed by repentance and expiation before the sufferer is 
rewarded by a union in love with God. St. John of the Cross compares the effect of 
this spiritual purgation to the effects of a fire-consuming fuel. During the course of 
purgation, the soul which is being consumed in the purifying fire becomes aware of 
what it never has perceived in itself before, its own impurities, and it comes to look 
upon itself as loathsome, although it is not worse in itself, nor worse in the eyes of 
God, than before it was granted this insight. This appears to be Clarissa's experience 
of purification under trial, since it is only then that she can, in the anguish of her self- 
interrogations after the rape, fully experience the sense that she has hidden sins to 
expiate; she has become aware of the true and deadening effects on the soul of sin. 
It is useless for the reader to respond that Clarissa's self-accusations are too 
severe, since St. John of the Cross asserts that a revulsion from one's own sins is a 
necessary part of the purgation which the soul must undergo before it may achieve 
the desired union with God: 
For this Divine purgation is removing all the evil and vicious 
humours which the soul has never perceived because they have been 
so deeply rooted and grounded in it; it has never realized, in fact, that 
it had so much evil within itself But now that they are to be driven 
forth and annihilated, these humours reveal themselves, and become 
visible to the soul ... and, as 
it sees in itself that which it saw not 
before, it is clear to it that it is not only unfit for God to see it, but that 
it deserves His abhorrence and that He does indeed abhor it. (58) 
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Clarissa's afflictions follow the classic Christian patterns of testing, self- 
revelation, expiation and purification. After this final stage of trial is completed, she 
may confidently expect the promised reward of those who triumphantly stand their 
testing with patience and humility. Her confidence in this expectation is expressed in 
two of the letters written while she is dying. One to Anna, refers to herself as 
`purified by her sufferings, and ... made as she assuredly trusts, by God's goodness, 
eternally happy'. 1377 In the other, she writes to Arabella, her sometime critic and 
persecutor, that she is 'NOW made perfect ... through sufferings. 
(p. 1375) Clarissa's 
perception of the value and result of her sufferings is reflected in the general 
conviction of her friends that her conduct under trials so extreme has manifested the 
purposes of God in permitting such suffering, which offers to the faithful soul the 
opportunity of a glorious reward. Mrs. Norton writes in her penultimate letter to her 
charge of the glory that Christian hope holds out for those who endure such trials: 
You are as near perfection, by all that I have heard, as any 
creature in this world can be. for here is your glory; gYou are 
brightened and purified, as I may say, by your sufferings ! (P. 132 
If the prayer with which Mrs. Norton ends the letter, that Clarissa may be 
spared if it is God's will, is not to be answered to her own satisfaction, there can be 
no doubt that for Clarissa herself the outcome of her trials is that which is most to be 
desired. She can reflect on sufferings now past and on glory to come, and find 
herself both afflicted and blest: 
Most happy has been my punishment here! - happy indeed! ... 
It is 
good for me that I was affl' icted! (PP* 1361-1362 
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7 
That False Fruit' 
JF 
Richardson's novel reflects the eighteenth-century interest in the 
problem of evil, (') and in the further problem as to how to reconcile 
unmerited or apparently arbitrary suffering with the providential designs of a just 
God, it also addresses the existence of evil in its specific form of sin and vice. 
Richardson's treatment of specific sins, and his examination of their effects, reflects 
the orthodox Christian view that all sin is essentially unreasonable in that it opposes 
the eternal law. Leaving aside the materialism of the Harlowes, the effects of which 
he demonstrates with such clarity and perception through his analysis of its effects 
both on the Harlowes' own moral characters and on the fate of Clarissa, he chooses 
to explore most fully the sins of lust, pride and violence, which in the case of 
Lovelace, although he is not the only sinner in these respects, are closely linked. 
Richardson himself characterizes Lovelace in a letter to Aaron Hill as a `vile 
libertine', (2) but his anti-hero's complex character shows that he is very far removed 
from being a mere sensualist. However, it is clear that his sexuality is damaged in a 
specific way, and that the nature of the damage reflects, in its own manner, the 
wound which Christian theology, of every persuasion, believes to have been inflicted 
on human sexuality in general as a direct result of the fall of man. From the moment 
when man severed his relationship with God by a deliberate choice of sin, 
he lost the 
perfect control of his passions with which a previously integrated nature 
had 
endowed him. The point is made by St. Augustine, by Aquinas, and 
by Calvin, in 
turn, in their several discussions of the matter, 
(3) but for Richardson more directly 
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illuminating on this point might well have been the words of John Milton. Milton 
asserts that before the fall, that cataclysmic event, Adam and Eve, naked and 
innocent, were not only without shame but were without even the knowledge of what 
shame is. Immediately following the fall, the effects of the disintegration of human 
nature are seen in the disorder of the sexuality of that first pair; desire is now no 
longer subject to reason: 
But that false fruit 
For other operations first displayed, 
Carnal desire inflaming; he on Eve 
Began to cast lascivious eyes; she him 
As wantonly repaid; in lust they burn, 
Till Adam thus 'gan Eve to dalliance move. '4ý 
Such disordered desire is opposed to the purity characteristic of that 
integrated state which they have now forever lost. The Angel Raphael, who had once 
instructed Adam on the use of his judgement, had urged him to love Eve rationally, 
and the description he gave of such rational love offers a contrast to the spectacle of 
disordered desire Adam and Eve present after the fall: 
In loving thou dost well; in passion not, 
Wherein true love consists not. Love refines 
The thoughts, and heart enlarges - hath his seat 
In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale 
By which to heavenly love thou may'st ascend, 
Not sunk in carnal pleasure; for which cause 
Among the beasts no mate for thee was found. (5) 
Raphael's words give the physical expression of love its due, but not a pre- 
eminent place; love which is subject to reason is seen to approach most closely to the 
love shared by God and the angels. As such its practice elevates man, while mere 
carnal intercourse sinks him to the level of the unreasoning beasts. It is to this level 
that Milton shows Adam and Eve descending after the fall, when they have lost 
forever, both for themselves and for their descendants, the perfect innocence of a 
state in which reason rules the passions. Then, Adam speaks of Eve's 
beauty as 
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inflaming his sense, (6) an indication that his integrated nature, as created by God, has 
undergone a transformation; desire has degenerated from the reasoned response 
which God intended to exist between man and woman. 
Milton's view of the origin of lust - lust as opposed to the pure, controlled 
desire characteristic of an integrated nature now irreparably lost - is not peculiar to 
himself among Christian thinkers. When St. Augustine discusses the Platonist 
assertion that anger and lust are `perverted elements in a man's character and soul'. 
he adds: 
But in paradise before man's sin these elements did not exist in 
their perverted state. For then they were not set in motion, in defiance 
of a right will, to pursue any course which made it necessary to hold 
them back with the guiding reins, so to speak, of reason. (7) 
He points out that the other members of the body are set in motion by the will, 
but the genital organs alone are completely under the sway of the passions, hence the 
shame attending their operation, and the necessity for acts of generation, even 
lawfully performed in marriage, to be modestly concealed. If he does not go as far as 
Milton does in asserting that Adam and Eve had physically consummated their love 
according to God's original dispensation before the fall, he does claim that if they 
had not been cast out of paradise before they could do so, that sexual union would 
have been a consummation without shame, `the peaceful obedience of the members 
in intercourse, not the shameful concupiscence of the flesh'. (8 He argues that 
subjection to lust is part of man's punishment for his disobedience, and that therefore, 
human nature is rightfully ashamed of lust itself: 
For in its disobedience, which subjected the sexual organs 
solely to its own impulses and snatched them from the will's 
authority, we see a proof of the retribution imposed on man for that 
first disobedience. And it was entirely fitting that retribution should 
show itself in that part which effects the procreation of the very nature 
that was changed for the worse through that first great sin. 
(9) 
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A distinction is thus made between pre- and post-lapsarian sexuality which 
subsequent theologians endorse. Pre-Reformation theologians hold that even within 
the bonds of marriage the exercise of the sexual function might still involve sin. 
Aquinas admits that the `use of sex properly ordered for its purpose of human 
reproduction is no sin', (1° but adds: 
Sexual sin consists rather in a breakdown in proper reasonable 
order in exercising the sex-act, and that can happen in several 
ways. (11) 
One such way is promiscuity, which Aquinas finds contrary to human nature 
in that it denies the primary purpose for which human sexuality had been created, the 
procreation and care of children, a denial which constitutes a fatal sin. 
Richardson's treatment of sexuality reflects the tradition of Christian thinking 
on the matter in that he shows the damage done to this function by the fall of man. 
The conduct of the rakes, the irregular unions contracted by some of his characters, 
the very existence of Mrs. Sinclair and her `daughters', the lustful pursuit of the 
innocent, and above all, Lovelace's distortion of sexuality by making it a function of 
his egoism, all give expression to the wound in post-lapsarian sexuality. Richardson 
does not subscribe in general to the severity of those pre-Reformation theologians 
with regard to the dangers of disordered sexuality within marriage, but, through the 
apprehensions of his heroine, he does suggest that such unions as those proposed to 
her, with Solmes and Lovelace respectively, would have had their own spiritual 
dangers; the reader may infer that Solmes might have used the marriage-bed as an 
exercise in fear, and Lovelace as an exercise in power. 
In contrast, the chaste Sir Charles Grandison enjoys with Harriet a 
happy 
union which, in its mutual expression of affection, friendship and respect, suggests an 
ideal of pure marital harmony without any sign of the guilt which pre-Reformation 
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theology attaches to sexuality, even within the bonds of marriage, beyond the 
purposes of procreation. Such a union might have been one which Clarissa would 
characterize as `a state of purity'. However, happy marital relationships are always 
shown as existing within the context of charity, and as fruitful, so pointing to the 
Christian conviction of procreation as the primary purpose of marriage. It must be 
assumed therefore, that Richardson expects the sexual function in marriage to find its 
place within that wider context, and that its expression is legitimated and sanctified 
because it is exercised in accordance with reason. It follows that he regards those 
unions which are irregular and lack the formal commitment of marriage, or which 
would be characterized by a distorted form of sexuality, such as Clarissa's proposed 
matches with Solmes and Lovelace, as intrinsically wrong because they oppose 
reason. 
If Richardson does no more than hint at the manner in which sexuality may be 
distorted within marriage, he gives greater attention to the spiritual dangers of 
irregular unions, both in Clarissa and in his other novels. The portrayal of irregular 
relationships in his work demonstrates the temporal misery and disgrace of such 
unions, and reminds the reader that they compromise the eternal welfare of those who 
enter into them. In Clarissa the squalor and wretchedness of Belton's irregular union 
with Thomasine is underlined by his nearness to death; his consciousness of sin is 
exacerbated by the callous treatment he receives from his mistress, and even from the 
children he has hitherto believed to be his own. Richardson is at pains to present the 
orthodox Christian view of such unions, by demonstrating their insecurities both for 
the partners and for their offspring The comment of Aquinas is one which 
Richardson surely would have endorsed Discussing the dangers represented by 
promiscuity, Aquinas goes on: 
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The exercise of the sex act outside marriage is promiscuous 
and disadvantageous to the care of children, and for this reason a fatal 
sin. It doesn't matter that sometimes people who act this way do 
provide sufficiently for the consequent offspring of their actions: laws 
are laid down to cover the general sum of things, not particular cases. 
One act of intercourse can beget a child, so any disorder in that act 
which disadvantages a child that could be born of it is a fatal disorder 
as such, quite apart from any disordered desire. (12) 
Belton does not have the security of knowing that his children by Thomasine 
are, in fact, his own, and is no longer well enough to assert any dubious authority that 
he might have had over his mistress and her children. On the other hand, a woman in 
Thomasine's position may be left, on the death of her protector, to fend for herself 
and for her children in a world in which she is regarded with contempt as an outcast, 
and in which her children can claim no legitimate right to their father's name and 
estate. Belford's description of his friend's last days conveys the horror of such a 
situation and concludes with the words `The fruits of blessed keeping these! 
'() 1089) 
Belton does not have the authority of a husband; Thomasine does not have the 
security of a wife. That she claims to be `Mrs. Belton' may suggest her awareness 
that once her lover is dead, she has no legal claim to whatever may be left of his 
estate. Predatory though she is, and unfaithful to her protector, her own position is 
no more enviable than that of Belton himself. Richardson is even-handed in his 
presentation of the mutual wounds the partners in such situations inflict on each 
other. It may be inferred that Belford speaks for him: 
Hardly ever, I dare say, was there a keeper that did not make a 
keeperess; who lavished away on her kept-fellow what she obtained 
from the extravagant folly of him who kept her. 
(P-1089) 
St. Augustine, discussing his own experience of living in a state of 
concubinage, and reflecting on `the difference between the restraint of the marriage 
alliance, contracted for the purpose of having children', and `a 
bargain struck for 
lust', (13) records his grief and sense of loss when he sends 
his mistress away. This, 
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together with his fidelity, may suggest that his liaison was not solely `a bargain struck 
for lust'. In this, it would differ from the irregular liaisons which Richardson 
portrays, which appear to be, for the most part, based on commercialism, whether 
children are born of these unions or not. Likewise, Lovelace's fantasy of a Clarissa, 
subdued and devoted, nursing twin boys, may be less a projection of a happy family 
life than a dream of the completion of his triumph, and his children of such a union 
loved not necessarily for themselves, as St. Augustine had admitted that children of 
irregular unions may be, so much as primarily the visible expression of the 
completeness of his victory over Clarissa's will and heart. (p. 706) 
Lovelace does not appear to have contemplated entering into a state of 
concubinage with any other woman, but leads a band of men, who, apart from 
Belton's liaison with Thomasine, engage in endless promiscuity. The ethos of the 
rakes and their familiarity with the world of the brothel is the background and 
counterpoise to the commercialism of the patriarchal marriage system. In both the 
brothel and in respectable society, women's bodies are exchanged for money. 
Richardson's Preface to Clarissa warns his readers about `that dangerous but too 
commonly received notion, that a reformed rake makes the best husband', but 
equally his novel implicitly criticizes the notion of property-marriage. 
The reader may certainly expect that at least one of his rakes, Belford, having 
reformed, will make a good and faithful husband. Lovelace, however, lives and dies 
as rake. He and his followers exhibit the same free-living conduct, but are widely 
diverse in character and motive. Richardson's presentation of Mowbray, for 
example, suggests a man who is so lacking in intelligence and sensitivity that 
he 
would seek nothing more from a partner but the satisfaction of mere animal 
lust 
divorced from any other consideration, and who might regard a woman as nothing 
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more than the means of his own physical gratification. He represents one extreme of 
sexual irregularity. At the other extreme, for Lovelace consummation is almost 
incidental to the intellectual pleasures of intrigue and deceit. Both display in their 
respective ways a disordered sense of the uses of sexuality, and at the same time, 
carry patriarchal convictions of the inferiority of women to the point of parody; to 
both of them women count so little that they may be used and abused at their 
pleasure. To Mowbray indeed, there is hardly any distinction between one woman 
and another. No other character in Clarissa expresses quite so complete a divorce of 
sex from any hint of sensibility as does Mowbray, but that is not to say that the 
behaviour of his fellow-rakes is to be perceived as being in any way less 
reprehensible. 
Richardson takes for granted the reader's inference that such men take their 
pleasure where persuasion, money, or a degree of force will procure it for them, but 
such activities are never explicitly described in the novel. However, the world of the 
rakes, where sexual freedom, unfettered by any eternal considerations, is the norm, is 
suggested by the familiarity of Lovelace and his followers with Mrs. Sinclair and her 
`daughters', and with women of a higher class in their profession, who may pass as 
genteel enough to deceive Clarissa into believing them to be Lovelace's aunt and 
cousin. Lovelace and Belford, in his unregenerate days, received in polite society, 
are also habitues of this other world, a fact that the reformed Belford reflects upon 
when he considers the sordid viciousness of the rake's existence: 
What woman, nice in her person and of purity in her mind and 
manners, did she know what miry wallowers the generality of men of 
our class are in themselves and constantly trough and sty with, but 
would detest the thoughts of associating with such filthy sensualists 
whose favourite taste carries them to mingle with the dregs of stews, 
brothels, and common-sewers? (P, 1393) 
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Such lives as those led by the rakes, Richardson is at pains to suggest, 
perpetuate themselves and their evils by means of a gradual hardening of the spirit, 
which makes repentance difficult, if not impossible, and moreover, involves others in 
their own general ruin. Those men who live a rake's life not only risk their eternal 
welfare, but may be constrained to risk their temporal existence in duels, or to kill 
others who seek to avenge the lost honour of their female relatives. Clarissa comes 
to regard herself, as a result of her bitter experiences, as a warning to those women 
who hope to reform libertines by marriage, and to know what evils such associations 
bring: 
May my story be a warning to all, how they prefer a libertine 
to a man of true honour; and how they permit themselves to be misled 
(where they mean the best) by the specious yet foolish hope of 
subduing riveted habits, and as I may say of altering natures! - The 
more foolish, as experience might convince us, that there is hardly 
one in ten of even tolerably happy marriages, in which the wife keeps 
a hold in the husband's affections which she had in the lover's. What 
influence then can she hope to have over the morals of an avowed 
libertine, who marries perhaps for conveniency, who despises the tie, 
and whom, it is too probable, nothing but old age, or sickness, or 
disease (the consequence of ruinous riot) can reclaim? '319 
The conduct of such men does not escape the notice of the religious 
commentators of Richardson's day. The remarks of William Law have a particular 
relevance to the condition of Lovelace himself, since the latter is not a philosophical 
atheist whose free-living is a proclamation of his rejection of Christian doctrine. Law 
reminds such men as Lovelace that if they accept the existence of God, and of a 
hereafter, reason dictates that they should therefore reform their behaviour: 
Let them but grant that there is a God and providence, and then 
they have granted enough to justify the wisdom and support the honor 
of devotion ... 
A devout man makes a true use of his reason; he sees 
through the vanity of the world, discovers the corruption of his nature 
and the blindness of his passions. (14) 
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Lovelace however, and - if the conclusions which are reached above by 
Clarissa are to be accepted as valid - the generality of rakes, never reach that state of 
reason. Only Belford grasps the essential irrationality of the rake's existence. 
Shaken by the spectacle of the dying Belton's condition, he offers to Lovelace the 
reflection that libertinism can bring only suffering, and concludes that he intends `to 
live a life of reason, rather than a life of a brute, for the time to come'. (15) He has 
realized that the life of a rake is ultimately unsatisfying in this world, and 
compromises his salvation in the next. Christian theology would conclude that such 
dissatisfaction arises because such a life is opposed to man's essentially reasonable 
nature: 
It is, after all, a devilish life we have lived. And to consider 
how it all ends in a very few years: to see what a state of health this 
poor fellow is so soon reduced to: and then to observe how every one 
of ye run away from the unhappy being, as rats from a falling house, 
is fine comfort to help a man look back upon companions ill-chosen, 
and a life misspent. (P-090) 
It appears that Richardson supports the view that, on the whole, men are the 
predators in sexual irregularity and initiate woman by seduction, then despise them 
for having been seduced. Even Belford, in the course of reformation, is shown to be 
repelled by the women of Mrs. Sinclair's house, as they gather to surround her 
deathbed. His description of the scene shows both the spurious nature of their 
charms and in the sordid spectacle of the grotesque Mrs. Sinclair herself, to what fate 
such women must come, once age, disease and the ravages of their profession have 
marked them. Belford equates the sluttishness of their persons with the degradation 
and impurity of their spiritual condition, but it is not clear whether Richardson 
intends the reader to make the same identification; elsewhere, through Anna, he 
seems to offer a comment which stands as a partial corrective, at least, to the age-old 
view, expressed in the Old Testament, (16) that such women exert their wiles to ruin 
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men. Anna's letter to Belford, commenting on Lovelace' execration of Mrs. Sinclair, 
is balanced between revulsion from the prostitutes' trade, and a clear-sighted 
appreciation of the part played by such men as Lovelace and the rakes in introducing 
them to such a life by their own free-living ways: 
By the letter of the wicked man it is apparent that there are still 
wickeder women. But see what a guilty commerce with the devils of 
your own sex will bring those to, whose morals ye have ruined! - for 
these women were once innocent: it was man that made them 
otherwise. The first bad man, perhaps, threw them upon worse men: 
those upon still worse: till they commenced devils incarnate - 
(p. 1454) 
Anna blames the men who take advantage of female innocence, but she finds 
the sinners of both sexes equally reprehensible; they are both `devils'. Moreover, in 
the third edition, she acknowledges the attractions that such men as Lovelace can 
have. `These are the very fellows that we women do not naturally hate'. "° 
j)318) 
Richardson does not privilege the women sinners above the men; he concurs with 
Jeremy Taylor's view that both partners to the sin of fornication are guilty of 
offending God, and that the sin is damnable, (17) but equally, he is as clear-sighted as 
Anna is shown to be, in his analysis of how such women come to such a state of 
degradation. 
The language he gives to Belford to describe the women of Mrs. Sinclair's 
house, with its references to Swift's Yahoos, and to Virgil's `obscene Harpies 
squirting their ordure upon the Trojan trenchers', together with Belford's judgement 
that their persons are `as filthy as their minds', as he urges Lovelace to `hate them as 
much as I do', certainly echoes, as Jocelyn Harris has pointed out, a kind of 
misogynistic strain similar to that of Swift's The Lady's Dressing Table, or of A 
Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed. (18) However, the reader of Belford's 
description is surely meant to contrast this hellish scene, with its grotesque 
dying 
sinner surrounded by her corrupted retinue, with the pure serenity of another 
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deathbed, Clarissa's. A point is being made about the contrast between sexual 
viciousness and sexual purity. Moreover, Belford for the first time sees the women 
unprepared for those who frequent them, at the moment when his eyes are being 
opened in another sense; his revelation of the spurious nature of their charms comes 
in the midst of his own conversion from being one such frequenter. His revulsion 
therefore is psychologically valid, even in failing to mention - or to perceive - the 
part played by men in the moral condition of these women: 
But these were the veterans, the chosen band; for now and then 
flitted in, to the number of half a dozen or more, by turns, subordinate 
sinners, undergraduates, younger than some of the chosen phalanx, 
but not less obscene in their appearance, though indeed not so much 
beholden to the plastering fucus; yet unpropped by stays, squalid, 
loose in attire, sluggish-haired, under-petticoated only as the former, 
eyes half opened, winking and pinking, mispatched, yawning, 
stretching, as if from the unworn-off effects of the midnight 
revel. (P* 1388) 
There could be no greater contrast with the shining cleanliness and seemliness 
of Clarissa herself, whose purity lights up her own squalid prison. Belford appears 
conveniently to forget, while the reader may remember, when he expresses his 
revulsion and disgust, that such women are professionals, providing a service for 
which innumerable members of his own sex are only too ready to pay, and that he is 
only present at this deathbed because he is himself familiar with the world which 
they represent and embody. 
Richardson may present Mrs. Sinclair's `daughters' as degraded and 
repulsive, but elsewhere, in Anna's remarks quoted above, he suggests that such 
women, once ruined, are constrained to their profession by necessity, not lust, while 
the men who use them can be motivated by nothing else. The histories of Polly and 
Sally, Mrs. Sinclair's able lieutenants, as former trophies of Lovelace's own lust for 
conquest, then discarded, might suggest why some such women come to serve in 
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such establishments, as the expanded Conclusion to the third edition makes painfully 
clear in the detailed history of their decline. ('" 
pp. 536-547) Yielding to persuasion, 
importunity, or even initially to the desires of the flesh, in response to the attractions 
of Lovelace or of some similar seducer, may legitimately be considered sinful in 
itself, but so are the activities of those who initiate and partner them. Belford's 
revulsion does not here extend to their original initiators, nor to their present 
customers, but at least one religious commentator, Milton, would argue that the sin of 
the male is greater, given his closer approximation to the image of God. (19) 
The history of contempt for such women is well-established. The New 
Testament makes it clear that they are generally to be despised. (20) However, St. Paul 
points out that the man who uses a prostitute becomes as one with her, so 
acknowledging that the frequenter is as much a sinner as the frequented (1 Cor. 5.16). 
Christianity enjoins chastity on both sexes, but historically men have been accorded 
greater latitude, and, in practice, the society of Richardson's day reserves the severity 
of its censure for women who put themselves outside social and moral codes rather 
than for the men who drive them to do so. At least one divine of Richardson's own 
time acknowledged the inequality of this situation. Dr. Dodd's sermon, preached 
before the officers of the Magdalen Hospital in 1759 has this to say: 
For though the great author of our being hath, for wise and 
good ends, implanted the same passions in either sex, and therefore 
transgression is as possible, and of consequence as excusable on the 
weaker side, as it is in the stronger; yet fact abundantly demonstrates 
to us, that men, for the most part, are the seducers; and the generality 
of those, who now claim our aid have been introduced to their misery 
by the complicated arts of seduction, and by every unjustifiable 
method, which cruel and brutish lust suggest to the crafty seducer. 
(21) 
Dr. Dodd goes on to point out that `one false step forever ruins their 
fair 
fame', while their seducers are not even subject to reproach. Since Richardson 
is 
known to have been sympathetic to women in such a situation, and in 1760 actually 
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became one of the annual Governors of the Magdalen House, it is not too much to 
infer that he would concur with Dr. Dodd' s remarks. (22) However, he accepts the 
existence of the double standard as a fact, if a deplorable one. Lovelace may be 
notorious, but he is not excluded from popular assemblies. His presence at Colonel 
Ambrose's ball, after his conduct towards Clarissa has become known, and the worst 
of it at least suspected, if not confirmed, excites comment, but not condemnation, still 
less eviction. Shameless as he is, he carries off the situation with unblushing 
confidence. Anna comments that `he had something in his specious manner to say to 
everybody: and this soon too quieted the disgust each person had at his 
entrance'. (p. 1134) It is clear that Clarissa - or any other woman in her situation - could 
not have contemplated entering such an assembly, and society would never have 
contemplated allowing her to do so. (23) 
Of Richardson's male characters, the reader may be sure that only Sir 
Charles, and probably Mr. Hickman, of whom Clarissa approves, place the same 
value on chastity in men as society places on that of women. It is well known that 
Colley Cibber found the proposition that the hero of Richardson's last book should be 
a male virgin a matter of hilarity, (24) much to the author's discomfort, and likewise, 
Lovelace's contempt for Hickman is partially based on the latter's sexual 
purity. (p. 1°96) The responses of both Cibber and Lovelace offer a comment on the 
double standard of behaviour which contemporary society tacitly accepted. 
Philosophers of the time might locate the insistence on female chastity alone in social 
utility, or in the need to ensure a legitimate descent of property; modern 
commentators might conclude that it expressed the male right in women as property, 
a right which patriarchy had annexed to itself 
(25) Richardson however, explores the 
situation of inequality as it existed, and argues, at least implicitly, for 
its injustice. 
19) 
Equally present, and equally implicit, is his Christian perspective. In a number of 
ways, he points out the essential illogicality of the double standard. Morden, for 
example, admits that he would have `thought myself warranted to cut the throat of 
any young fellow' who served his female relatives as he served the sisters or 
daughters of others. ''. 1280) Clarissa herself echoes his remarks to censure sentiments 
almost exactly similar, (p. 1319) and the reformed Belford, if further reinforcement of 
Richardson's rejection of the double standard were needed, offers it when he remarks 
on the contrast between the rakes' behaviour and their claims to be men of honour: 
Man acting thus by man, we should not be at a loss to give 
such actions a name: but is it not doubly and trebly aggravated when 
such advantage is taken of an inexperienced and innocent young 
creature whom we pretend to love above all the women in the world, 
and when we seal our pretences with the most solemn vows and 
protestations of inviolable honour that we can invent? (P, 1295 
In the third edition, Belford censures himself for the false notions of honour 
in keeping Lovelace's confidence, and so failing to do all in his power to save 
Clarissa from his friend's designs. (iv, p"458) The tacit acceptance of the double 
standard, as Richardson suggests by such remarks, disfigures relationships between 
the sexes with dishonesty and cynicism; it certainly does not suggest the original 
paradisal harmony established when God declared that it was not good for man to be 
alone. Such men as Belford describes above, with their implicit contempt for the 
women they seduce, find their counterpart in the advice offered by Lord Chesterfield 
to his son, a lesson in dealing with women: 
He who flatters them most, pleases them best; and they are 
most in love with him, whom they think most in love with them. No 
adulation is too strong for them; no assiduity too great; no simulation 
of passion too gross. (26) 
It might be remembered that his Lordship was instructing his son in the ways 
in which a gentleman might make his way in society. In both instances, the 
fictional 
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and the factual, the behaviour of the men involved is at once a comment on a false 
conception of honour, and revelatory of a total lack of understanding of the meaning 
of charity. Richardson's response to such attitudes which privilege men and 
condemn women in so unjust a manner, is to advance an alternative mode of conduct, 
based on Christian principles. He does not explicitly do so in Clarissa, but in the 
presentation of Sir Charles, who has all the address of the most polished of 
gentlemen, but who recognizes that the Christian injunction to chastity applies to 
both sexes. (V 643 In Clarissa, no male figure is seen to engage the reader's interest by 
his struggle to maintain sexual purity. Richardson's heroine stands opposed to a 
male world in which seduction is the norm. 
ichardson's presentation of female sexuality is conditioned both by his 
vowed intention to base his novels upon the Christian system, and by 
the social expectations of the day as to female behaviour. It has frequently been 
remarked that the age expected women of `respectable' character to conduct 
themselves not only with a total subscription to the view that female honour is 
located solely in chastity, but also as if they were totally devoid of any sexual 
feelings at all. (27) None of Richardson's main female characters, except perhaps 
Olivia, exhibit a frank interest in the satisfactions of the flesh. Yet he is too realistic 
to ignore the fact that women are seduced, and do respond to fine words, or to a fine 
person, or both. 
The cases of Richardson's virtuous heroines are, however, problematic. 
Pamela resists the attentions of Mr. B. by calling on the help of grace, but the reader 
must be aware of the attraction, even if Pamela herself is not, which would provide 
the only answer to her ingenuous question as to why she cannot hate her would-be 
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seducer. Clarissa too, never acknowledges - and never seems to recognize - that 
within herself there is any desire for the satisfactions of the flesh. This is a denial 
which Anna recognises as self-deception, a denial of a response, which, while it must 
be controlled by reason, is implanted, as Dr. Dodd points out above, in humanity for 
God's own purpose. 
Clarissa's apparent inability to recognize that such a response to Lovelace 
exists within her, and her claim that it could only exist were he a moral man, 
meanwhile admitting to only `a conditional kind of liking' for him, (P-135) reveals a 
refusal to examine her own heart in this important respect. Anna echoes her friend's 
words, `Indeed, I would not be in love with him, as it is called, for all the world', (p. 72) 
with gentle and affectionate raillery. She acknowledges, as Clarissa declines to do, 
that attraction is not a matter of choice and does not depend upon the moral 
worthiness of the object. That Clarissa is attracted to Lovelace's person, even while 
she censures his moral character, is indicated in a number of subtle ways, and not 
least demonstrated by her response to another suitor. Mr. Solmes is as morally 
repulsive to her as Lovelace is, although his moral deficiencies take another form 
than that of sexual promiscuity, but no reader can doubt, reading Clarissa's 
comments about him, that she is not without a susceptibility to male beauty, in that 
her descriptions of Solmes make clear the opposite effect that physical repulsiveness 
has upon her. 
Clarissa might consider what it is about Lovelace that she would prefer, but 
for his moral character, and why she so innocently remarks that no disguise could 
hide `the gracefulness of his figure. 
(p. 352) By the time that Anna writes her account 
of her dead friend's virtues and accomplishments for Belford, she appears to have 
forgotten her scepticism as to the nature of Clarissa's response to Lovelace. Anna 
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praises her friend for her frankness in relation to her feelings about him, but the 
reader may have reservations about Anna's own frankness at this point, given her 
earlier opinion as to the degree of Clarissa's self-deception in the past. She tells 
Belford: 
You must everywhere insist upon it, that had it not been for 
the stupid persecutions of her relations, she would never have been in 
the power of this horrid profligate: and yet she was frank enough to 
acknowledge that were person, and address, and alliance, to be 
allowably the principal attractives, it would not have been difficult for 
her eye to mislead her heart. (p. 1467 
The reader may feel that if Clarissa had been allowed, both by her society and 
by her education, to be frank with herself, she might have been better equipped to 
avoid Lovelace's guile as well as his attractions. Such frankness would not have 
compromised purity nor constituted such a danger as self-deception. Anna discreetly 
slides over any suggestion that if person and address were not allowable as `principal 
attractives', they were still attractives in themselves. It is an open question how far 
Clarissa's eye does, initially, mislead her heart. Certainly the well-experienced 
Lovelace can conclude complacently after his feigned illness, `I see the dear soul 
loves me', (i. 677 and Clarissa can write of this episode that it has taught her `more than 
I knew of myself, and fear that `I have, I doubt, exposed myself to him'. 
(p. 679) 
The natural attraction between the sexes is not a matter in which the will has a 
choice, but Clarissa behaves as if it is. The will can only operate to exercise choice 
as to whether to confine the expression of that attraction within legitimate bonds, or 
to indulge it freely. What Clarissa cannot admit to herself, when she declares that she 
could have loved Lovelace, is that she did love him, and that physical attraction was a 
powerful element of that love. In the third edition, Richardson has Clarissa express 
her conviction that love should be determined by the worthiness of the object, 
ýu' p225) 
although some further remarks of hers to the same effect do add the proviso 
`as much 
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as human frailty and partiality will permit'. (", p. 438) In doing so, his intention might be 
to elevate his heroine but the reader is more likely to see such remarks as a reflection 
of some confusion on her part. Anna Howe appears to recognize in Clarissa's claim 
to feel only `a conditional kind of liking' for Lovelace that the imposition of 
conditions is the province of reason, while the impulse towards liking - or attraction 
- finds its origin in the passions. Clarissa, too, is subject to the imperfections of 
humanity engendered by the fall, and cannot subdue this particular passion so 
perfectly to her reason as could pre-lapsarian man. It would be difficult however for 
a young woman, chaste by conviction and conscious of the prohibitions placed on 
any overt expression of attraction by both religion and society, to admit, even to 
herself, that her eye might have misled her heart rather more than her reason might 
wish to acknowledge, and that, despite her suitor's moral deficiencies, his person 
might persist in retaining its attractions. 
To say this is not to accuse Clarissa of lust, but to recognize how problematic 
for character, author and reader are the ambiguities of human passions. Richardson 
himself was concerned to defend the nature of his heroine's feelings for Lovelace, 
and in the Postscript to the third edition answered those readers who accused her of 
being too cold in her love. He denied any intention that Clarissa should ever be in 
love with Lovelace, `but in liking only', and claimed that she would never, if left to 
herself, have married Lovelace. He adds that what is called `love' could properly be 
called by the harsher name of 'cupidity'. 
" pp. 558-559) However, despite this 
disclaimer, the reader must still feel, that without accusing Clarissa of `cupidity' to 
any degree, Richardson's presentation of her, as opposed to what he says about her, 
suggests a young woman who is far from being devoid of natural passions, and is the 
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more psychologically valid for being so. According to Christian orthodoxy, even the 
purest of human beings is subject to imperfections in the control of such passions: 
Concupiscence insinuates itself where it is not needed, and by 
its troublesome and ever wicked desires it agitates even the hearts of 
the faithful and the saints. Even if we resist it and refuse to yield to 
its disturbing impulses with any conscious assent, we would still 
prefer by a holier desire that these impulses not be present in us at all, 
if it were possible; indeed some day this will happen ! (28) 
This is exactly Clarissa's experience, but by the end of the novel, she will 
have endeavoured to enter that state, impossible to achieve in this life, but 
characteristic of the next, as St. Augustine asserts, of being devoid of such troubling 
desires. Clarissa's virtue in this life must therefore consist, not in the denial that such 
passions exist, or that she can, and does, feel an attraction to Lovelace, but in her 
steadfast adherence to the dictates of the eternal law by the exercise of her will, 
assisted by grace. Richardson's presentation of his heroine implicitly demonstrates 
that the impulses of the passions may be opposed to the determinations of reason, 
even in the purest of women, since the struggle between the two opposing forces is 
rooted in the duality of human nature. 
There is evidence enough, even before the catastrophic effects of the rape lead 
Clarissa to a gradual rejection of the body, that she has desired the absence of those 
`disturbing impulses' of which St. Augustine writes. The expected fate of a young 
woman of her class must be marriage, and Clarissa apparently accepts that this is 
inevitable. Yet given the painful example of her mother's position in the family, it 
would be surprising if Clarissa could approach the married state with unreserved 
enthusiasm. She has already rejected a number of suitors, and while her revulsion 
from Solmes is entirely understandable, it seems that her preference, were she 
allowed it, would be for celibacy. At the end of her life, when one such rejected 
suitor, Mr. Wyerley, renews his offer of marriage, Clarissa makes it clear that her 
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preference was always for the single life. 1268ß She adds that since such a choice was 
not permitted to her, she had (dutifully) considered the various suitors proposed to 
her. Yet she always found something to which to object in their principles or morals. 
The reader may infer that for a woman who wishes to remain single, it is not too 
difficult to find legitimate reasons to reject any proposed suitor. Clarissa's attitude in 
this respect is consistent, since she tells Anna that a happy solution would be hers if 
the Harlowes were Roman Catholic, and she could enter a nunnery. (p. 83) The reader 
must be uncertain whether this remark is an intimation at an early point of a 
preference for a Divine bridegroom, or an indication of a repugnance to marriage 
itself However, to Clarissa, celibacy appears to represent both freedom and safety, 
since she refers to that state as `the desired port, the single state, which I would fain 
steer into '. 
(p. 281) 
If it were only the prospect of Solmes as a husband which evoked such 
sentiments, it would hardly be surprising, but Clarissa seems to view relationships 
with the male sex as problematic in themselves. Desiring to be free of both Solmes 
and Lovelace, she writes of men in general that she would `defy the sex': 
For I see nothing but trouble and vexation that they bring upon 
ours: and when once entered, one is obliged to go on with them, 
treading with tender feet upon thorns and sharper thorns, to the end of 
a painful journey. »p. 358 
Lovelace presents a threat of another kind to that represented by the repulsive 
Solmes. Clarissa's soul is in no danger from the latter, but Lovelace's very 
attractions create a response which she cannot accept in herself Her rational nature 
disapproves of his morals; her emotions divide between the natural response to so 
attractive a suitor and her own fear of that response. It is too much to claim that 
Clarissa might prefer death to the recognition of that attraction, but she might prefer 
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it to any suspicion in herself that a response in her has opened the way for `liberties' 
- and worse - taken by Lovelace. 
Her rigorous self-examination after the rape may exonerate her of any 
complicity in what has befallen her, and because she believes that `to be self- 
acquitted is a blessing to be preferred to the opinion of all the world'. (p. 360) she may 
be assured that she may face the God of Judgement with a conscience clear of any 
doubts on the matter, or any conviction of sin. However, her emotional response 
does not seem to square with this rational conviction. Clarissa should regard any 
pollution of sin as belonging to Lovelace, but while she refers to him as `vile', she 
also annexes the idea of pollution to her own flesh, and seems as much repelled by 
herself as by him. `Now you have made me - what is it of vile that you have not 
made me? '(', 892) she asks in one of her papers written after the rape. Recovered 
enough to confront Lovelace, and very clearly in her rational mind, even if shocked, 
she tells him: 
I hate thee not, base and low-souled as thou art! half as much 
as I hate myself, that I saw thee not sooner in thy proper colours! (p. 901) 
Clarissa's lament after the rape that she has lost her 'self, may be related to 
her fable of the lady and the young lion, as at least one commentator has noted, the 
lady is punished because `what she did, was out of nature, out of character at 
least'. (89l) She has drawn her fate upon herself by behaving unlike herself, and so is 
to blame for what has happened. (29) The reader might enquire what Clarissa 
believes 
that she has done which is so much out of her character. For a young woman whose 
Christian piety makes sexual purity a virtue to be practised in so absolute a form as to 
render her unable even to admit the existence of a natural attraction, which she 
has no 
intention to indulge in any irregular way, such an attraction may in itself be perceived 
as a breach of the integrity of that absolute purity. In her response to 
Lovelace, 
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unconscious as it has been, Clarissa has allowed herself to go one step along the way 
to its expression. 
The result has been catastrophic. Clarissa has touched the outermost edges of 
desire, and this is the result. If she castigates herself for her correspondence with 
Lovelace, it may well be because of her unconscious recognition that her motives in 
pursuing it were those of attraction. Had she not corresponded with him, she would 
not have found herself under his protection, and the rape could not have occurred. 
Clarissa's rational mind exonerates her, and rightly, of any complicity in the rape; her 
unconscious interpretation of events does not appear to do so. It is possible to infer 
from her sense of herself as `vile' that Clarissa has found herself guilty, and responds 
with a self-condemnation which calls for unending penance, and which is marked by 
a revulsion from the flesh that has responded against her conscious will. Such 
revulsion would not in any case be psychologically implausible in a young woman of 
such exquisite moral refinement and sensitivity of character in her position, but 
Christianity would regard it as mistaken. 
St. Augustine comforted women in Clarissa's situation, those who had 
suffered violation, with the assurance that despite the shame they might feel, they 
were not guilty of any sin, nor had they surrendered their chastity. 
(30) This is as 
rational a response to violation as Clarissa's in finding herself free of any complicity 
in the rape, but it also recognizes the likely emotional response that the innocent 
victim may experience shame. Clarissa's own emotional response to her experience 
leads her to a kind of self-hatred, but this is not entirely an attitude which 
is new in 
her. After the fire scene, she writes to Lovelace, `I hate myself . 
(p. 732) Anger and 
indignation the reader might expect in her, but self-hatred is not an appropriate 
response, unless Clarissa feels that in her terror she has allowed 
Lovelace to come 
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closer than the boundaries set by her absolute standards of purity permit, and so 
exposed herself to the risk of violation, and perhaps to the dangers of her own 
unrecognized desires. 
After the rape, she refers to `this vile, this hated sel(p 974) and later, dying, 
writes to Anna, `Yet how this body clings'. (p. 1265) Even more disturbing for the 
reader is the way in which Clarissa's mind dwells on the fact of the physical decay 
which follows death. Belford records her satisfaction as she regards her coffin and 
comments of its white satin lining that it is `soon ... to 
be tarnished by viler earth 
than any it could be covered by'. 
(p"1306) Clarissa's dream of being stabbed to death by 
Lovelace, thrown into a pit with two or three other half-dissolved carcasses, dirt 
being cast upon her by him, clearly has a link with this comment. The reader might 
consider that to become viler earth than that which is cast upon the dead is, then, the 
fate of Lovelace's women, as is spiritual death itself That Clarissa appears to feel a 
kinship, however unjustified, to such women, is suggested by her reference to herself 
as a `harlot-niece', )909) Clarissa's remark indicates a sensibility, which, despite her 
rational conviction of innocence, finds the satisfaction of a terrible justice in the 
dissolution of the body which has been betrayed, and which she may also perceive as 
having itself betrayed that `best self. 
A 
recent commentator has remarked that Lovelace and Clarissa have a 
unity in that they both `hate the body'. 
(31) The matter is perhaps not 
quite so clear-cut. Both are opposed to what the body may represent. For Clarissa, 
the patriarchal system makes women's bodies a commodity or a currency to be 
exchanged for other goods such as status, wealth and land. Eventually her 
body 
becomes the site, and is possibly perceived as the source of sin, but of whose sin, 
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Clarissa may not be able to ascertain. For Lovelace, the body has its own tyranny; 
after the intellectual pleasures of intrigue, the impetus of the chase carries the body 
onwards, demanding a fulfilment of its own which Lovelace finds almost empty of 
pleasure. His situation in this respect illustrates the Christian contention that one 
effect of the fall has been the inability of the will to control the genitals as it controls 
the other bodily members. Lovelace, who is so desirous to control others, finds that 
his campaigns of seduction have their own momentum, which in this respect, 
removes a degree of control from him. 
Lovelace presents a paradox in his sexual behaviour. He is familiar with 
brothels and the world of the rakes; he is the seducer of innumerable women, but he 
is essentially a cold man, motivated not by simple lust, a desire to enjoy female flesh, 
so much as by an insatiable desire for conquest. Unlike Milton's Adam, he does not 
burn in lust, but considers the act itself, once the woman's consent is gained, as an 
anti-climax. To him, the campaign is all-in-all, and the victory a mere 
disillusionment. Moreover, he is quite frank in his analysis of his own motivation. 
He writes to Belford: 
What 
... 
is the enjoyment of the finest woman in the world, to 
the contrivance, the bustle, the surprises and at last the happy 
conclusion of a well-laid plot? - The charming roundabouts, to come 
the nearest way home - the doubts; the apprehensions; the 
heart 
achings, the meditated triumph - These are the joys that make the 
blessing dear - For all the rest, what is it? - What 
but to find an angel 
in imagination dwindled down to a woman in fact? (P*920 
Such remarks give an insight into the nature of Lovelace's sexuality; it exists 
in the imagination rather than in the body itself, and his dominant vice is not lust 
but 
pride. When Lovelace exercises his imagination in his fantasies, as when in the third 
edition he imagines an infatuated Clarissa succumbing to him, 
("' p p. 251-252) the fantasy 
is the expression of desire for the gratification of conquest rather than of 
lust. 
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Pursuit, not consummation affords the pleasure, even in the imagination. However, 
the preference for pursuit over consummation reflects the comment of Jeremy Taylor 
on the ultimate emptiness of pursuing pleasure itself, and reminds the reader that, in 
Christian terms, the expression of sexuality cannot be a game, but has a serious 
purpose: 
The nature of sensual pleasure is vain, empty, and 




Mark Kinkead-Weekes has argued that Lovelace's egotism not only precludes 
his forming any satisfactory sexual relationship but also relieves him of any sense of 
the reality of others' existence; he may then despise them. (33) This contention cannot 
be disputed, but Christianity would claim that this is a pitiful as well as a spiritually 
dangerous state. While Lovelace inhabits it, he places himself outside the charity 
which unites the individual to both God and to his fellows. Because he has no sense 
that the exercise of sexuality has a primary purpose founded on God's eternal law, 
the exercise of his own sexuality shares the unreasoning nature of the beasts. 
Because he is without charity in the wider sense, it is not surprising - although it may 
be shocking to the reader - that even the act of rape may carry no resonances 
for him. 
Writing to Belford of the rape of Clarissa, to which he refers as `a trifling incident', 
he continues: 
And yet I allow thee this; that she really makes too much of it: 
takes it too much to heart. To be sure she ought to have forgot it by 
this time, except the charming, charming consequence happen, that 
still I am in hopes will happen, were Ito proceed no further. 
(p. 916) 
Even to contemplate proceeding further is to contemplate a possible repetition 
of the offence. The reader might consider such callous remarks merely as an 
expression of bravado on the part of a man who seeks to conceal 
from himself any 
compunction he might be expected to have for having committed such an act. 
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However, an earlier letter has already suggested instead a settled inability in Lovelace 
- the result of a hardening of sensibility as a result of habitual vice - to perceive the 
effects on others of a distorted sexuality compounded with pride. Clarissa is not the 
only woman whose innocence has been assaulted by the demands of Lovelace's 
egoism. He utters much the same sentiments in relation to Sally Martin, an earlier 
conquest. `What a rout', he says, `do these women make about nothing at all! '(p. 34) 
Lovelace takes it upon himself to despise Sally for the life into which he has initiated 
her. The only woman whom he cannot despise is the woman who does not sacrifice 
to his pride, but this man who claims that his only fault is `love of the sex' 
demonstrates by such remarks that he is incapable of love at all, but only capable of 
contempt: 
How do these creatures endeavour to stimulate me! A fallen 
woman, Jack, is a worse devil than even a profligate man. The former 
is above all remorse 
»535) 
Yet being `above all remorse' is exactly Lovelace's conduct in relation to 
others. His attitude to the expression of sexuality is, in terms of Christian thought, a 
perversion in itself. While Christian theology recognizes that human sexuality is 
flawed, it still asserts that sexuality may be creative when it is expressed for the 
appropriate purpose, within the bonds of marriage, since `marriage seeks the body's 
good - the bodily multiplication of the human race. 
(34) 
For Lovelace, however, marriage is `a life of shackles', rather than the liberty 
of living in accordance with the eternal law. He does not perceive the Church's rite, 
which he despises, as anything more than a civil contract; at one point he playfully 
proposes a form of annual marriage for the sake of novelty. 
(p. 873) Yet the playfulness 
of the suggestion indicates a refusal - or an inability - to see marriage as 
the 
appropriate expression of sexuality, a life-long commitment which 
Christianity has 
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always regarded as essential to the primary purpose of procreation and nurture of 
children. 
Christianity can only perceive the sexual freedom habitually exercised by 
such men as Lovelace, whatever tolerance may be extended to him by society as both 
a man and a gentleman by birth, as a sin which compromises his salvation twice over; 
it is an abuse both of his own body and of those of his partners. Moreover, the idea 
of sexual sin as a form of self-abuse has a long history. St. Augustine also remarks 
upon it in a manner which reinforces the remarks of St. Paul )(35) `It 
is the lusts which 
misuse the body ... the 
habits and inclinations of a soul to enjoy what is inferior'. In 
the light of such a comment, Lovelace's treatment of Clarissa in testing her, takes on 
an aspect which suggests Lovelace's own inadequacies. 
Unlike St. Augustine, whose confession that he had taken a mistress is 
accompanied by the claim that he had been faithful to her, Lovelace insists on what 
St. Augustine calls `an utterly shameless exercise of their slavish kind of freedom'. (36) 
He is unable to comprehend that his `right' to take his pleasure at his pleasure, 
enthrals him to the servitude of vice and denies him any hope of the fulfilment that 
fidelity and love, as opposed to his own particular form of lust, could bring. His 
desire is that Clarissa will acquiesce in his plan to live the `life of honour' with him, 
but the fantasies he entertains of such a life do not include any intention of fidelity 
even in an irregular union: 
He resolves never to marry any other woman: takes a pride to 
have her called by his name: church-rite all the difference between 
them ... 
Now and then, however, perhaps, indulging with a new 
object, in order to bring him back with a greater delight to his 
charming Clarissa - His only fault love of the sex - which 
nevertheless the women say will cure itself - Defensible thus far, that 
he breaks no contracts by his rovings - And what is there so very 720 
greatly amiss, as the world goes, in all this? 
(P 
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Richardson is at pains to convey to his readers that this plan is not defensible 
in Christian terms, and that to act as this world goes is to risk the loss of salvation in 
the next. What is so very greatly amiss here is that Lovelace would not only be 
damaging Clarissa, whom he claims to love, emotionally and spiritually, and 
rendering insecure the future of the `charming boys' whom he expects to result from 
the union, but he would also be damaging himself, by acting against his own best 
interests. Even when he imagines himself as Clarissa's husband, he sees that 
situation as advantageous to his access to Anna; (37) in this fantasy too, his motive for 
such an attempt is revenge rather than desire. For such sins, we are assured by 
Christian commentators, retribution may be slow in coming, but it will come: 
If any such women have suffered the violence of barbarian 
lust, they will not blame God for allowing it, nor will they believe that 
God makes light of such crimes. He allows them, but no-one can 
commit them with impunity. The truth is that in the mysterious 
justice of God the wickedness of desire is given rope, as it were, for 
the present, while its punishment is plainly being reserved for the final 
judgement. (38) 
St. Augustine's remarks above apply no less to such men as to those the world 
of Rome would have termed `barbarian' in his own day; few acts are more barbaric 
than rape. 
Some of the additions to the third edition are designed to blacken Lovelace's 
character in this respect. The reader may regard Lovelace's fantasy of the triple rape 
of Mrs Howe, Anna, and their maid, as merely a fantasy, and one which, despite its 
unpleasant nature, is recounted with a verve which suggests the excess of Lovelace's 
inventive vivacity rather than a serious intention. (" 
PP'418-421) However, the 
Conclusion to the third edition makes it clear that Lovelace has already been party to 
the near rape of another mother and daughter, in Mrs Horton and Polly, when an 
excess of wine was used to procure the show of consent. 
(IV, p. 546) The reader may see 
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little difference in effect between the use of drugs and the use of wine to achieve a 
conquest, whatever the folly, in this case, of the mother and daughter concerned. 
Moreover, Joseph Leman's letter to Lovelace, and the latter's response, 
(ll' pp. 143-144 and 
pp. 147-149) about the Miss Betterton affair, must leave the reader with questions - and is 
meant to do so - about the degree of Lovelace's culpability in the lady's loss of 
honour. Lovelace says it would have been cruel to ask a modest woman for consent, 
but without explicit consent, the reader may conclude that the case was one of rape. 
Lovelace may tell Joseph that there was no rape in the case and add, `rapes 
are unnatural things; and more rare than are imagined', ('I, p148) but the third edition is 
even more likely than the first edition to persuade the reader that Lovelace might not 
only imagine rape, but resort to it for the sake of conquest if no other means suffice. 
The wit and humour with which he fantasises that he would escape justice, should 
Anna and Mrs Howe bring him to court, since all women present would exonerate 
him, ('i° pp. 422-426) shows exactly why many of Richardson's first readers were brought 
to plead for him. Their response to Lovelace `outside' the novel, is the response 
Lovelace expects from all women `inside' the novel, and for the most part, may 
confidently expect. Lovelace's energy, wit and beauty prove irresistible to the 
unwary or unheeding. It is the response that induced Richardson to deepen the 
shades of his villain's character. 
Lovelace's sexual behaviour and his pronouncements on his `love of the sex' 
demonstrate a terrifying deficiency in him; he is incapable of distinguishing between 
love and lust, and between lust and a perverted self-love, which is nearer to self- 
hatred. Lovelace's debate with love in the third edition, 
(iii, PP'155-157) with its 
recognition that he and Clarissa define love in radically different ways, concludes 
ominously for Clarissa. The reader is left to question whether Lovelace has any 
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understanding of what love is, and to fear that if he should have a momentary insight 
into its nature, his pride would eradicate it. His advances to women, the attentions he 
offers them, the words of adoration he utters, are not the words and actions of a man 
who is capable of either sincerity or of respect and tenderness towards youth and 
innocence, nor are they those of a man so confused by the impulses of the flesh as to 
assume, temporarily, that it is love he feels rather than desire. Lovelace feels neither 
love nor true desire, only a compulsive urge to conquer, the origin of which must be 
located in deficiency, in a perversion of his soul. This deficiency reminds us that 
Christian theology defines sin in terms of negativity and absence. (39) 
When St. Augustine distinguishes between the Christian interpretation of the 
word `love' and the opposite meaning which should be attached to the term `lust', his 
remarks have an application to that deficiency in Lovelace in which his inability to 
love must lie: 
By love I mean the impulses of one's mind to enjoy God on 
his own account and to enjoy oneself and one's neighbour on account 
of God; and by lust I mean the impulse of one's mind to enjoy oneself 
and one's neighbour and any corporal thing not on account of God. 
What unbridled lust does to corrupt the mind and body is called 
wickedness; what it does to harm another person is called 
wrongdoing. All sins can be divided into these two kinds, but 
wickedness comes first. Once it has depleted the mind and as it were, 
bankrupted it, it rushes on to commit wrongdoing in order to remove 
the obstacles to wickedness or to find assistance for it. Similarly, 
what love does to benefit a neighbour is known as kindness. And here 
self-interest comes first, because nobody can do good to another out 
of resources which he does not possess. The more the realm of lust is (4o) destroyed, the more the realm of love is increased. 
Lovelace's tragedy is that he does not understand how best to love himself, 
his egoism and self-indulgence are finally the opposite of self-interest in the sense of 
which St. Augustine writes above, since they deny him his eventual salvation, and 
preclude in this life any hope of the love which would allow him `to enjoy God on 
his 
own account, oneself and one's neighbour on account of God'. Loving 
God does not 
210 
seem to be a consideration with him, since religion is a matter of intellectual and 
theoretical interest at best, if of any interest at all. His inability to love his neighbour 
is amply demonstrated by his readiness to use and abuse women, and to kill any man 
who objects to his doing so. 
The reason which should characterize sexual relations between men and 
women, in Christian terms, is lacking in this man of pre-eminent rationality. For 
Lovelace, sex is shown to be essentially destructive, rather than creative in 
accordance with the eternal law. It is the means by which the negativity of his 
egoism - the `wickedness' to which St. Augustine refers - finds its satisfaction, a 
satisfaction requiring continual renewal, or it is a weapon by which slights to his 
pride are revenged. 
Lovelace's wickedness proceeds, as in St. Augustine's analysis, to 
wrongdoing. For him, the very language which expresses the relationship between 
the sexes is the language of warfare, of violence; he speaks of it in terms of 
campaigns and conquest. Lovelace's vision of the relationship between the sexes is 
given further explicit expression in the third edition. His remarks on the cruelty of 
women to the lower creation are complemented with his account of his own cruelty 
exercised on them as revenge. (" 
pp. 247-248) There is no notion in his account of mutual 
harmony, respect or affection; his whole vision is one of destruction without remorse. 
He may claim to love Clarissa, to love the sex, but his behaviour demonstrates the 
hard-heartedness which he acknowledges to be essential to the character of a 
libertine. ("" p. 315) In the case of his relationship with Clarissa, Lovelace finally makes 
a weapon of his body itself, and so carries his perversion of sexuality to a logical 
conclusion in which pride, a distorted self-love and hatred are fused. Had Clarissa 
allowed herself to be seduced, Lovelace would have believed himself to have 
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asserted his superiority over the whole female sex in her person, a kind of parody of 
the Christian contention that God has chosen to subordinate female to male; Divine 
providence, Christianity might claim, did not intend that subordination should be 
established in this manner. 
The act of rape to which Lovelace resorts when seduction will not serve, is 
the final perversion of the Divinely-ordained order of sexuality between male and 
female, because it is an act in which a mere physical mechanism operates, and as 
such, is divorced from all that might be defined as human; both reason and any sense 
of charity must be in abeyance. When Lovelace declares that he is not a machine, he 
fails to perceive that in this respect, at least, he has reduced himself to the status of a 
mechanical function. Richardson, however, has made his own comment on the 
mechanistic theories of human psychology which, according to Christian ideology, 
deny the dignity of man's freedom of choice and his access to grace. What the author 
could not have perceived was that his examination of the perversity of the human 
heart in this respect would be received, not as a powerful analysis of the effects of 
pride and egoism on this Divinely ordained function, but as inflammatory. Perhaps 
the irony of this misapprehension makes in itself an unanswerable comment on the 




'A Perverse Kind of Exaltation' 
Both 
his author and the reader may suspect that Lovelace earns 
damnation, but it will not be his seductions of women nor his violent 
encounters with men which will damn him, so much as his indulgence of the 
predominant vice of which both seductions and murderous encounters are the 
expression. Lovelace's predominant sin is not violence, still less lust, since his 
seductions do not seem to be the result of a man's yielding to a sensual nature, but 
pride, which has found its expression in the construction of a self-image as an 
irresistible seducer and as a man of honour who meets any affront by resorting to the 
sword. Pride determines that Lovelace must claim pre-eminence over women and 
amongst men, and that any challenge to that assumption by female resistance or male 
affront must be met by the encompassment of the opposer's ruin. 
Ecclesiasticus asserts that `Pride is the beginning of sin, and he that hath it 
shall pour out abomination'. (10.13) Christian theologians of all persuasions have 
stressed the peculiarly dangerous nature of this particular sin. St. Augustine links the 
sin of pride with the exaltation of the self, and his description of the proud man could 
easily be appended to a portrait of Lovelace: 
And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of 
exaltation? For it is a perverse kind of exaltation to abandon the basis 
on which the mind should be firmly fixed, and to become, as it were, 
based on oneself, and so remain. This happens when a man is too 
pleased with himself: and a man is self-complacent when he deserts 
the changeless Good in which, rather than in himself, he ought to have 
found his satisfaction. (') 
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No-one who gives Clarissa even the most cursory reading could fail to 
perceive that if any character in the novel is `too pleased with himself - or rather 
with the image he creates, for his `self is always in doubt - it is Lovelace. His very 
first letter sounds the note which resonates throughout the whole novel in that his 
repeated use of the word `pride' and the impression given of a soul in which this sin 
has an habitual dominion must impose themselves upon the reader. The self-analysis 
the letter contains confesses that his pursuit of Clarissa is motivated more by pride 
than by love, and that his present object is triumph over the whole female sex in the 
person of his intended victim, as well as to force the Harlowes, especially James, 
whom he describes as `sordidly-imperious' to acknowledge his pre-eminence. (p. 145) 
Lovelace appears unaware of the irony of his describing James in such terms. 
Richardson himself hoped that his readers would perceive the note of pride in this 
initial letter, since he writes to Lady Bradshaigh on this very point: 
And did you not perceive, that in the very first Letter of 
Lovelace all those Seeds of Wickedness were thick sown, which 
sprouted up into Action afterwards in his Character? - Pride, 
Revenge, a Love of Intrigue, Plot, Contrivance! - And who is it that 
asks, Do Men gather Grapes of Thorns, or Figs of Thistles? (2) 
In asserting his superiority, and in claiming the right to pre-eminence, and in 
the manipulations of others which bring them to accede to his designs and to do his 
will, Lovelace sets himself up as a parody of Divine providence. As St. Augustine 
points out: 
Thus pride is a perverted imitation of God. For pride hates a 
fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to impose its own 
dominion on fellow men, in place of God's rule. This means that it 
hates the just peace of God, and loves its own peace of injustice. 
(3) 
We are reminded that Lucifer too, hated equality under God, and sought to 
displace Divine dominion by his own. Theologians of very different traditions all 
find in Lucifer the prototype and exponent of this particular sin, but pride is the same 
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in its nature, and has the same origin, in both man and fallen angel. St. Augustine 
makes the point that both man and devil have fallen because of this same sin, and that 
in seeking to be more than their essential natures were intended to be, make 
themselves less. In this way, the proud man approaches the condition of Lucifer, the 
adversary of Christ, in whom `exaltation ... exercises supreme dominion' : 
We can see then that the Devil would not have entrapped man 
by the obvious and open sin of doing what God had forbidden, had 
not man already started to please himself That is why he was 
delighted with the statement, `You will be like gods'. In fact they 
would have been better able to be like gods if they had in obedience 
adhered to the supreme and real ground of their being, if they had not 
in pride made themselves their own ground. For created gods are 
gods not in their true nature but by participation in the true God. By 
aiming at more, a man is diminished, when he elects to be self- 
(4) sufficient and defects from the one who is really sufficient for him. 
As the supreme example in Richardson's novels of the disordered self-love 
which is pride, it is clear that Lovelace very much resembles in this respect the Satan 
with whom he sometimes, with satisfaction, compares himself Pride exercises 
supreme dominion in him, and like Lucifer, in giving it expression, he sets himself up 
in opposition to God, by taking it upon himself to dispose of the lives of others. In 
particular, he claims supremacy over his fellows on the grounds of his intellectual 
superiority. Such claims are similar to those of the demons, so named because of 
their knowledge, as St. Augustine tells us. He goes on to explain that the misuse of 
knowledge is a dangerous matter, quoting St. Paul when he says, `knowledge inflates: 
but love edifies'. (5) He then enlarges on the Apostle's words: 
Without charity, knowledge inflates; that is, it exalts men to an 
arrogance that is nothing but a kind of windy emptiness. There is in 
the demons knowledge without charity, and so they are inflated; that 
is to say they are so arrogant that they have done their best to obtain 
for themselves the divine honours and the devout service which they 
know to be due to the true God. ... 
Against this arrogance of the 
demons, to which mankind was enslaved as a deserved punishment, is 
set the humility of God, revealed in Christ. But the power of humility 
is unknown to men whose souls are inflated with the impurity of 
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inflated pride. They resemble the demons in arrogance, but not in 
knowledge. (6) 
Lovelace's intellect, then, avails him nothing as far as the vital question of his 
salvation is concerned. And his arrogance echoes that of the demons. He has not 
even glimpsed, because of that arrogance, the knowledge he needs to save his soul. 
However, he asserts his control over a group of followers who, but for Belford, are a 
sorry crew, and boasts of being their captain in a manner which resembles the pride 
of Milton's Satan in his own pre-eminence over the devils in hell in working harm: 
To me shall be the glory sole among 
The Infernal Powers, in one day to have marred 
What he, Almighty styled, six nights and days 
Continued making ... 
(7) 
Like Satan, Lovelace seeks to ruin what God has created, the souls of the 
innocent, and in doing so, degrades his own humanity as Satan degrades his angelic 
nature by his own pride; to exalt himself, he will, paradoxically, stoop to assume any 
degrading form: 
O foul descent! that I, who erst contended 
With Gods to sit the highest, am now constrained 
Into a beast, and mixed with bestial slime, 
This essence to incarnate and imbrute, 
That to the height of deity aspired; 
But what will not ambition and revenge 
Descend to? (8 
Just as Satan is degraded not so much by his disguise itself as by his purpose 
in assuming it, the destruction of man and the exaltation of self which leads him to 
attempt it, so Lovelace is not degraded by the disguises he assumes in his attempts on 
Clarissa, but by his purposes in assuming them, seduction and the desire for revenge 
on the Harlowes, which is, in reality, another manifestation of his pride. However, 
like Satan, he is offended by his disguise: 
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My lodging 
... at a wretched alehouse, disguised like an inmate of it: accommodations equally vile as those I met with in my Westphalian journey. (i . 146 
In both cases, pride makes such dispositions in order to assert its supremacy 
and to take its revenge for the denial of aspirations which are not, in reality, its right 
to have. In this respect, Lovelace's dominant disorder of the soul could be seen as 
being characterized by Aquinas's definition of pride, `a special sin with a special 
object: a disordered desire for one's own excellence'. (9) 
The word `disordered' is especially relevant since Richardson explores the 
nature and effects of such disorder not only in his villain, but also in his heroine. 
However, there is a vitally important distinction between their respective 
manifestations of pride, since Clarissa comes to recognize the existence of the 
disorder within her own soul, repents of it, overcomes it, and substitutes for it a 
desire for excellence which is not disordered, since it relates to virtue, and demands 
the rejection of the pride which is a sin. In the letter which Anna writes to Belford 
after Clarissa's death, describing the various excellencies of her friend's character, 
she quotes Clarissa's own words on the subject. `There is but one pride pardonable; 
that of being above doing a base or a dishonourable action '. (p. 1466) 
This is a lesson which Clarissa must have learned in a theoretical manner 
before the revelation to herself of her own sinful pride, since we may infer that any 
such conversations on the matter with Anna would have taken place in the days 
before her trial began; by the end of her life, she has learned the truth of her own 
words by experience. Her comment indicates that a certain type of pride is not only 
permissible, but laudable, and leaves the reader to draw the inference that the type of 
pride which does not accord with this definition is far from being above base and 
dishonourable actions. 
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The portrait of her friend which Anna offers to Belford characterizes the state 
which Clarissa finally achieves, rather than the faulty state which she is forced to 
recognize in herself during the course of her experiences - or rather as a result of her 
experiences - in which she herself comes to acknowledge that she has harboured 
secret pride. In the third edition, Richardson expanded on his heroine's self- 
examination in this respect, so that both her repentance and an implicit contrast to 
Lovelace's own pride were thrown into sharper relief m )1) 378.379) However, her 
remark about pardonable pride is supplemented by her comments on the 
complementary virtue of an appropriate humility. Such a virtue recognizes our own 
value, but gratefully acknowledges the endowments with which God has graced the 
individual person: 
The darkest and most contemptible ignorance is that of not 
knowing one's self; and that all we have, and all we excel in, is the 
gift of God. ... 
The excellence that makes every other excellence 
amiable is HU ILITY. (P*1466) 
Clarissa rejects the pride which exalts the self into undue importance, but 
insists that a grateful recognition of one's own endowments is to give them their 
appropriate value as the gifts of God. In doing so, she expresses a view consistent 
with that of Christian orthodoxy, which is that man has value because he is made in 
the Divine image, and has been so placed above all other creatures, bar the angels. 
However, to recognize and exalt one's own endowments without an appropriate 
gratitude is not only the expression of a disordered pride, but is also an act of 
folly; it 
is, in the fullest sense of the word, unreasonable. Aquinas comments on the matter: 
Pride is wanting to get above oneself. Right reason sets one's 
will on what is appropriate to oneself, so pride goes against reason 
and that is sinful: to act unreasonably is an evil of soul. 
(10 
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On the other hand, he points out that humility is fully in accord with reason, 
and so dignifies the person who practises it. It is concerned with giving an 
appropriate value to the self as well as to others, and above all, to God's dispositions: 
Humility reverences God and esteems what we have from 
ourselves less than what our fellowmen have from God. It does not 
require us to esteem what we have from God less than what others 
have from him, or what we have from ourselves less than what they 
have from themselves. (") 
Clearly, judged in the light of such considerations, both Lovelace and 
Clarissa, the former throughout the whole course of the novel, and the latter in the 
earlier stages of her experiences, stand in a state of sin. However, by means of those 
experiences, she painfully learns the lessons of humility and achieves the balance of 
value for self, and value for others, which both her own remarks on the opposing 
characteristics of pride and humility, and those of Aquinas quoted above, describe. 
Lovelace never learns, and remains in a perilous state of sin because of the undue 
value which he places upon his own gifts, upon his pre-eminence among his 
associates, and over those whom he corrupts and manipulates, at once exalting 
himself and denying others their value. He compounds his sin in that he achieves his 
pre-eminence by turning his considerable gifts of mind and person to evil purposes 
more skilfully than his fellow-rakes could ever do, since they lack the excellence of 
his endowments. 
In this way, Lovelace's sinful pride is rendered more dangerous in its effects 
by the abuse of God's gifts, and this constitutes a perversion, since those gifts were 
bestowed to help him towards man's ultimate goal, and for the service of others. His 
behaviour, therefore, could be seen as more reprehensible than in a man less gifted 
than himself His pride is not only an evil in itself, since it gives him `an unbalanced 
love of [his] own importance', (12) but it is also misplaced, since the personal 
219 
endowments which create in him so much disordered pride he regards as attributes of 
his own, rather than as the gifts of God. (13) His improper self-love is indulged at the 
expense of others, and to his own ultimate ruin. On the other hand, Clarissa's 
remarks on the species of pride which is not disordered, coupled with her comments 
on the value of humility, serve to assert the worth of the human person, since they 
acknowledge that every individual has value, however he might stand in the 
estimation of the world: 
All human excellence is but comparative - there are persons 
who excel us, as much as we fancy we excel the meanest. In the 
general scale of beings, the lowest is as useful, and as much a link of 
the great chain, as the highest. (p. 1466 
Lovelace is never seen to accept that anyone might excel him, until he 
encounters Clarissa, when the virtues which are her particular excellence, and which 
reveal to him his own defects, become an additional motive for him to determine to 
establish his supremacy. Clarissa's own recognition that the antidote to pride is the 
just estimation of our own value and of the value of others, stands in marked contrast 
to Lovelace's self-exaltation. It is also in accordance with the consistent view of 
Christianity on the matter. Two comments from theologians of differing traditions 
will serve to illustrate this contention. Aquinas comments on the matter: 
By humility a man restrains himself from getting above 
himself, and for this, he needs to know the limit of his abilities. 
(14) 
About five hundred years later, William Law offers a similar thought, 
although differently expressed: 
Humility does not consist in having a worse opinion of 
ourselves than we deserve, or in abasing ourselves lower than we 
really are. But as all virtue is founded in truth, so humility is founded 
in a true and just sense of our weakness, misery and sin. 
('5 
It follows that the proud lack that sense of our `weakness, misery and sin', 
while being firmly entrenched within this very state. No-one can claim, as Lovelace 
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does, the supremacy of his own value, or the right to the predominance of his own 
will, since in this world there will always be, as Clarissa's comments point out, some 
other person whose excellence, in any given field, exceeds our own, and further, in 
relation to God, no human being may claim any absolute virtue or excellence. Her 
remarks in this respect relate to long-established Christian thinking on the matter. In 
describing Divine perfection, Aquinas for example points out that the perfections of 
creatures can only really exist in God, and as reflections of His own excellence: 
Indeed, as the origin of all activity God is supremely actual, 
and thus supremely perfect, since perfect means achieved, realized, 
lacking nothing one's particular mode of perfection requires. 
Moreover, his perfection is all-embracing: the diverse (and sometimes 
opposed) perfections of creatures all pre-exist united in God, without 
detriment to his simpleness. (16) 
In the light of this notion, if Clarissa's thoughts about relative excellences are 
carried to their just conclusion, her supplementary comments concerning the 
generally unpardonable nature of pride - except for that species of pride which is in 
reality a due regard for virtue - convey to the reader the folly and futility of this sin, 
and remind him, by implication, of the danger in which Lovelace stands. He does not 
see his very considerable `excellences' as relative, but in his arrogance seems to 
regard them, like those of God, as absolute. An intelligent man should know better; 
the recognition of man's dependence on God and of the gifts with which God has 
endowed him have long been acknowledged by Christian thinkers, but Lovelace 
displays no such moderation which Aquinas claims above as the attribute of humility. 
Moreover, the humility which would have led him to just estimation of his own true 
value as a Divine creation in God's image, and to a just estimation of the value of 
others for the same reason, is the virtue which would have set him above 
`doing a 
base or dishonourable action', for such humility is very close to the pride which 
is 
permissible. His own disordered pride has no such effect, but rather 
leads him to a 
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way of life in which his inappropriate self-regard has both imperilled his soul and 
encompassed the corruption or the death of others. The egocentricity of pride is 
opposed to the charity which gives due value to one's neighbour. 
In contrast, the pride which Clarissa comes to profess, and which she declares 
is pardonable, is a species of virtue, paradoxically closely allied to humility, since it 
declines to devalue the dignity of the human person, and seeks to avoid any act which 
will compromise the soul of its professor or damage a fellow-man by corruption. 
Likewise, her use of the word `dishonourable' gives the term a diametrically opposed 
value to that which Lovelace might give it, since `dishonourable' to him would refer 
to whatever could damage his sense of self in his own eyes, or in the eyes of those 
who conform to worldly values. Conversely, the word `honourable' to him refers to 
whatever will confirm his disordered sense of his own importance, while to Clarissa, 
it means whatever will reverence God in so behaving that His eternal law is observed, 
both in relation to one's own soul and in charity to others. The same shift of meaning 
might be observed in their respective uses of the word `pride' itself, since the 
pardonable pride she professes must have a diametrically opposed meaning to the 
value which Lovelace gives the term. 
Clarissa herself becomes aware of the distorted values by which he lives and 
describes them to Anna in terms that perceptively analyze their intrinsic negativity 
and shamefulness: 
But his pride has eaten up his prudence. It is indeed a 
dirty, 
low pride that has swallowed up the true pride which should 
have set 
him above the vanity that has overrun him. 
(p. s60 
Just how far Lovelace is from any understanding of the nature of that true 
pride, and how far his values are hopelessly distorted, is shown 
by a remark of his 
own which employs the same terms as Clarissa 's comment above, 
but which makes 
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clear the opposing meaning he attaches to them. Lovelace may be striking one of his 
accustomed attitudes when he tells `Captain Tomlinson' in Clarissa's presence that 
his carelessness and levity towards his family is the result of `a pride that has set me 
above meanness (,, 841) but he fails to perceive that true pride would set him above the 
lack of charity thus revealed. `Pride' in the definition of the word which Clarissa 
learns painfully to give it, would have set him above lies, seduction, rape and 
violence. However, his notion of pride, like his notion of honour, can lead only to 
death, the physical death of his opponents or himself in duels, and the spiritual death 
of himself, his followers, and his corrupted victims. His pride is shown to be the 
negation of all that virtue is, and so his honour is void. Lovelace's species of pride is 
nowhere characterized better than by the words of William Law: 
Pride is only the disorder of the fallen world, it has no place 
amongst other beings; it can only subsist where ignorance and 
sensuality, lies and falsehood, lusts and impurity, reign. (17 
That such pride is essentially unreasonable would appear to be a concept 
which Lovelace is incapable of comprehending, but it is something which Christian 
commentators have steadily asserted. St. Augustine reflects on this contrast between 
self-exaltation and the humility which opposes it, in terms which define the 
relationship between God and man, to the honour of the former and the profit of the 
latter. Reflecting on the Tower of Babel as a symbol of `arrogant impiety', he asks: 
When all is said, what harm could be done to God by any 
spiritual self-exaltation or material elevation however high it soared? 
The safe and genuine highway to heaven is constructed by humility, 
which lifts up its heart to the Lord, not against the Lord ... 
X18) 
A commentator closer to Richardson's own time, Richard Steele, is equally 
convinced that pride of the kind which Lovelace exhibits, can only be based on a 
false estimation of one's own value, and an unjust self-exaltation. Lovelace may 
assert that his pride places him above a mean action, but Steele's remarks 
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characterize Lovelace's species of pride as mean in its very nature, and an opposing 
humility as both just and apposite: 
For as certainly as Pride proceeds from a mean and narrow 
view of the little Advantages about a Man's self, so Meekness is 
founded on the extended contemplation of the Place we bear in the 
Universe, and a just Observation how little, how empty, how 
wavering are our deepest Resolves and Councils. (19) 
Lovelace is not alone among Richardson's characters in exhibiting this 
disordered sense of his own importance. Pamela, Clarissa and Sir Charles all display 
the symptoms of pride in varying degrees, but they all consciously strive to live 
virtuously, and if they do not always recognize pride within their own hearts, they do 
acknowledge the heinousness of the sin itself, and the opposing value of humility. 
Lovelace appears to be almost another species of moral being in this respect. Like 
Satan, he is characterized by pride in all his actions. When the stricken Clarissa, after 
the rape, cries out to Lovelace, `I knew not that you were vice itself (p. 892) the reader 
may be in little doubt that the vice which Lovelace embodies is not lust, but pride. 
Such 
a vice is not practised in isolation, although its primary effects are 
to be seen in the soul of the sinner himself The most serious of these 
must be, since he loses a just estimation of himself in relation to God, the separation 
from Him that attends any serious sin. St. Augustine refers to this effect when he 
discusses the grace of God, `from which the proud are estranged so that they fall, 
with which the humble are filled so that they rise up'. (20) It is the nature of pride that 
the very self-will which characterizes it puts a barrier between the proud man and 
God's grace, which makes a reconciliation in this estrangement all the more 
difficult. 
The proud, as Milton notes in his descriptions of Moloch and Mammon, exemplify 
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the wilful blindness and arrogance which refuses to seek reconciliation by seeking 
grace. Thus Moloch: 
His trust was with th'Eternal to be deemed 
Equal in strength, and rather than be less 
Cared not to be at all; with that care lost 
Went all his fear. (21) 
The proud will not give up their own sense of superiority, even to gain heaven, or to 
sustain life itself. Like the fallen angels who cannot endure to abandon the image of 
themselves as rivals to God, and cannot accept the futility of their opposition to the 
Almighty, Lovelace cannot endure, even for the sake of his soul's salvation, to 
abandon the futile self-image which he has created, that of the invincible seducer and 
manipulator. He must exalt himself above all whom he encounters, failing to see that 
the exercise of the superiority he claims, because it is illegitimate and ultimately 
leads to his ruin, renders him inferior to those whom he despises for their virtue. 
Finally, presented with impregnable virtue in Clarissa, he cannot endure its existence 
any more than Milton's devils can bear the supremacy of God. Lovelace writes to 
Belford: 
If I give up my contrivances, my joy in stratagem, and plot, 
and invention, I shall be but a common man: such another dull, heavy 
creature as thyself (P. 907 
However, he writes to a man who has begun to understand the dangerous 
folly of such pride, both in its effects on its professor, and on those whom the plots 
and stratagems are intended to deceive. Eventually Lovelace is forced to 
acknowledge that such pride as this is grounded in the fear of being compelled to 
recognize his own inferiority, but he appears to grasp the essential meanness of 
his 
pride only briefly, under the pressure of emotions which overwhelm 
him after the 
death of Clarissa. The reader may perceive the emptiness that underlies 
his self- 
exaltation, and for once, Lovelace himself comes close to a perception of it. 
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To bring her down from among the stars which her beamy 
head was surrounded by, that my wife, so greatly above me, might not 
too much despise me - this was part of my reptile envy, owing to my 
more reptile apprehension of inferiority. (P. 1344) 
The truly humble do not have such `apprehension of inferiority', and the truly 
repentant would abandon the pride which has precluded any honest relationship with 
Clarissa - or with anyone else - and with God. However, any impulse in the 
direction of sincerity and repentance is lost when Lovelace's pride in the self-image 
he has constructed reasserts itself, and he rejects with horror the trial of self- 
examination, which, met with an attempt at honesty and an acknowledgement of his 
own sinfulness, might have saved his soul. His pride would rather expose him to the 
risk of that loss than to the risk of losing the idol he has constructed, which has, in a 
sense, become Lovelace's substitute deity. 
Nor can he endure that others should perceive him as less than superior to the 
rest of mankind, and he insists on maintaining this image of superiority even when he 
compounds his sins by doing so, and does so with full knowledge. In the proposed 
engagement between himself and Morden, he is fully aware that he is in the wrong - 
if there can be anything that is right about such a situation - rather than his opponent, 
but he will not acknowledge his fault, repent, and withdraw. He prefers to compound 
his sins in relation to Clarissa by the likelihood of being responsible for the death of 
her cousin, because his false notion of `honour' demands that he cannot be suspected 
of fearing any man. So Lovelace's pride not only separates him from God because it 
precludes repentance, but also prevents him from achieving any understanding of 
what would, in truth, constitute honour. He writes to Belford about the proposed 
meeting with Morden: 
I can't bear to be threatened, Jack. Nor shall any man, 
unquestioned, give himself airs in my absence, if I know it, that shall 
make me look mean in anybody's eyes: that shall give my friends pain 
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for me: that shall put them upon wishing me to change my intentions, 
or my plan, to avoid him. Upon such despicable terms as these, 
thinkest thou that I could bear to live? 
However, he adds a little later in the same letter: 
In short, I am as much convinced that I have done wrong as he 
can be; and regret it as much. But I will not bear to be threatened by 
any man in the world, however conscious of having deserved blame. (p. 1476) 
Lovelace's insight into the meanness of his pride has quickly passed, and the 
habitual reversal of values which pride creates has soon reasserted itself. His 
behaviour is determined by the threat to the image of himself that he has created, and 
thus, he has become a slave to it. 
If Lovelace locates the security of his identity in this self-created image and 
cannot endure - through pride or fear, which in this case are closely allied, if not 
identical - to risk the loss of it, even at the expense of his soul, then he deceives 
himself as to what is of value in this world and in the next. He could only create a 
secure identity through that interrogation of his own heart which he declines to 
undertake, through an admission of his culpability, and through sustained repentance. 
However, as Thomas a Kempis tells us, `the security of the wicked springs from 
pride and presumption, and ends in self-deception ". (22) Lovelace convinces himself 
of his superiority and invincibility, but the self-deception which refuses to 
acknowledge where life and true honour are located, also deprives him of any 
understanding of the value and dignity of himself and of others as the image of God, 
in which he could find a real identity. 
Lovelace lives and dies in this state of self-deception, and the reader can only 
fear the results, as Richardson appears to have intended that he should, for a man who 
arrives at the point of death in such a state. Lovelace, however, has long ago locked 
himself into a kind of bondage imposed by pride. The man who cannot bear to be 
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threatened by another, subjects himself to a tyranny imposed by his self-exaltation, 
by the image of himself that he cherishes and desires, or needs, others to worship, at 
whatever cost. He describes himself as a man: 
Who never did anything I was ashamed to own, and who have 
more [ingenuousness] than ever man had; who can call a villainy by 
its right name, though practised by myself, and (by my readiness to 
reproach myself) anticipate all reproach from others; who am not such 
a hypocrite as to wish the world to think me other or better than I 
am ! . 1237) 
A man who says that he does not wish others to think him better than he is, 
deceives himself, if, like Lovelace, he makes every endeavour to present himself to 
the admiration of all. Even when he invades the Smiths' shop in search of Clarissa, 
he afterwards records with satisfaction the impression of gaiety and good-humour he 
perceived himself to make on everyone present, including the bystanders, although 
all these people were nothing more than momentary acquaintances. Lovelace is 
concerned, above all, to have people think of him as he wishes to appear, and so is far 
from being the free agent he professes to be when he thinks of others as his puppets, 
since the necessity he feels to maintain his false and futile self-image deprives him of 
any true autonomy. He is a slave to this self image in that each conquest must be 
succeeded by another, and since he cannot bear to be thwarted, his life must be in 
thrall to his own need for continual `triumphs' if that self-image of potency and 
dominion is not to be replaced by knowledge of the spiritual poverty which underlies 
it. 
In this respect Lovelace both embodies and exemplifies the folly of pride, 
which in seeking to dominate and control, renders itself a slave. The comments of St. 
Augustine when he discusses this point are appropriate to Lovelace's condition: 
Now, as our Lord above says, `Everyone who commits sin is 
sin's slave', and that is why, though many devout men are slaves to 
unrighteous masters, yet the masters they serve are not themselves 
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free men; `for when a man is conquered by another he is also bound 
as a slave to his conqueror'. And obviously it is a happier lot to be 
slave to a human being than to a lust; and, in fact, the most pitiless 
domination that devastates the hearts of men, is that exercised by this 
very lust for domination, to mention no others. (23) 
Those whom Lovelace despises, the Mr. Hickmans of this world, exercise a 
greater autonomy than the man who despises them because of their adherence to the 
laws of God. Once again like Milton's Satan, Lovelace makes a fundamental error 
about the respective natures of freedom and servitude, and fails to see that the service 
of God offers man the greatest freedom, and the service of self locks him into a hell 
of his own making. When Abdiel addresses Satan as `Fool' he does so because he 
recognises that the pride which aspires to equality with God is futile. Satan, 
however, asserts his freedom, and the servility of those who serve God. Abdiel's 
reply to this scornful comment reveals the true nature of servitude, locating it in 
Satan's pride, which, like that of Lovelace, rests on his self-exaltation, and which is 
therefore insecurely based. All he has gained by indulging it, is Hell: 
Apostate! Still thou err'st, nor end wilt find 
Of erring, from the path of truth remote. 
Unjustly, thou deprav'st it with the name 
Of servitude, to serve whom God ordains, 
Or Nature: God and Nature bid the same, 
When he who rules is worthiest, and excels 
Them whom he governs. This is servitude - 
To serve th'unwise, or him who hath rebelled 
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee, 
Thyself not free, but to thyself enthralled; 
Yet lewdly dar'st our minist'ring upbraid. (24) 
In the same way, Lovelace is at once `enthralled' to himself, to his pride and 
to the image he has created, and upbraids those who seek to serve God in virtue and 
humility. Belford as much as Hickman is the subject of Lovelace's mockery when 
he 
begins to reform, while Lovelace, who sees his own sinfulness as the evidence of 
his 
autonomy, cannot see the totality of his servitude. The stratagems on which 
he so 
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much prides himself, and which, in the case of his attempt on Clarissa alone, require 
the pretence of love and reverence so that he may win her, recall the hypocritical 
behaviour of Satan, whose respectful approach to Eve conceals his plan of betrayal. 
Lovelace promises Clarissa freedom from the tyranny of her family, but intends to 
exercise a tyranny himself; the pride of Milton's Satan leads him to the same 
hypocritical behaviour. Neither Lovelace nor Satan can ever afford to be honest in 
their responses to God and to their peers, or their whole notion of themselves would 
collapse in ruin, and they would be left to face their own essential negativity. 
The 
effects of his pride are equally destructive to his fellow-men. 
Richardson's anti-hero might well say with Milton's Satan: 
For only in destroying I find ease 
To my relentless thoughts. (25) 
Satan's pride leads others into Hell, and the revenge inspired by his thwarted 
ambition results in the corruption of man, setting in train the long course of human 
suffering. Lovelace's pride has the same destructive force; in attempting to satisfy its 
endless demands for tribute, he corrupts and destroys in one way or another. He 
enquires of Belford, `What signifies power, if we do not exert it? '(i. 610 and speaking 
of Anna remarks, `What pleasure should I have in breaking such a spirit! 
'. (p 637) Such 
remarks are indicative of a soul which seeks to find fulfilment in destruction. He 
might as well say with Satan, `Evil, be thou my Good'. (26) 
While this vice holds dominion in him, he is incapable of the exercise of any 
virtue, while what appears to be virtue in him often is, as Clarissa recognises, merely 
a further expression of his vanity: 
Mr. Lovelace is a proud man ... and 
I am truly afraid that his 
very generosity is more owing to his pride and his vanity, than to that 
philanthropy which distinguishes a beneficent mind. 
(p. 69 
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From such pride arise the envy, ambition and desire for revenge which 
characterize Lovelace's relationships with his fellow-men. Clarissa's virtue is an 
incentive to despoil her, to destroy in her the qualities which he himself does not 
possess. Revenge for affronts, both fancied and actual, from the Harlowes, 
compounds his envy, and the ambition to be `the greatest conqueror in the world' 
finds its outlet in a series of seductions and a number of duels, some of them fatal to 
his opponents. Christian commentators have not failed to point out that such pride 
gives rise to other sins. Thomas a Kempis declares `From this vice of inordinate self- 
love springs nearly all those other failings that have to be completely overcome'. (27) 
On this very same point, Calvin is equally uncompromising in linking pride with 
every other vice and sin: `Sin in man is made by perfidy, cruelty, pride, 
intemperance, envy, blind love of self, any kind of depraved lust'. (28) 
Such a comment emphasizes that pride must have its destructive effects, if it 
goes unchecked, on the lives and souls of others. Milton's Satan, seeking to revenge 
himself for his own losses on God's new creation, does so by spreading the contagion 
of pride to man. Crouching `like a toad' by Eve's ear, he raises in her: 
Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires, 
Blown up with high conceits engendering pride. 
(29) 
Lovelace long ago succumbed to such temptations himself, being full of `vain 
aims', and `inordinate desires', and so contaminated, spreads his own contagion. 
The 
vicious envy of Polly and Sally, made more explicit in the third edition, 
("i° p275-276) 
shows the results of it in those who have become tributes to his unrestrained passion 
for dominion. It is no less destructive in every other relationship; the rakes are 
spurred to emulation by his example; his family are treated with contempt and 
manipulated to his advantage; his friend Belford is valued only 
insofar as he 
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emulates, but does not aspire to exceed; his servants are treated with arrogant 
brutality which reduces them to objects to be abused at a whim. The correspondence 
between Lovelace and Joseph Leman in the third edition, intended to deepen the 
shades of Lovelace's character, demonstrates both Lovelace's skill in manipulating 
the already weak and venal, and the corruption that results from it. (" Pp. 
143-153) 
Lovelace's self-regard leaves no room for the charity which alone can offer any true 
satisfaction and fulfilment. 
William Law points out the penalties which await those who show contempt 
for their fellow-men by so far rejecting the graces of charity. He distinguishes 
between the man who may let fall a hasty or an injudicious word, and he who 
displays towards others a settled and deliberate contempt. Law's words offer a gloss 
on those of Christ: 
Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of 
the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of 
hell fire. (Matt. 5.22) 
Law comments: 
But he that says `Raca' or `Thou fool' must chiefly mean him 
that allows himself in deliberate, designed acts of scorn and contempt 
towards his brother, and in that temper speaks to him and of him in 
reproachful language.... For to despise one for whom Christ died is 
to be as contrary to Christ as he that despises anything that Christ has 
said or done. (30 
No-one could despise his brother more than the man whose egocentricity can 
only perceive his fellow-men as puppets to be manipulated at his whim, or as 
obstacles to be overcome. William Law holds such behaviour as a species of 
blasphemy, since if it were profane, he tells us, to trample on the altar of 
God, it 
would be no less profane `to scorn and trample upon a brother who so 
belongs to God 
that his very body is to be considered as the Temple of the Holy 
Ghost' . 
(31) Any such 
considerations appear to have escaped Lovelace. The women whom 
he seduces, the 
232 
men whom he kills, those whom he corrupts, are less the Temples of the Holy Ghost 
than sacrificial victims to his pride. In a sense, he has set himself up, as Satan wished 
to do, as an alternative deity, and the offerings of virtue that might have been given to 
God within the precincts of these holy temples are transmuted into the desecrated 
victims of an idol. The insult to God and the injuries done to God's creation 
constitute thereby the very antithesis of the charity which should unite God and man 
in love. 
Similarly, it might be inferred that the advice offered by Jeremy Taylor that 
inordinate self-love requires restraint would appear nonsensical to such as Lovelace: 
Never compare thy self with others, unlesse it be to advance 
them and to depresse thy self. To which purpose we must be sure in 
some sence or other to think our selves the worst in every company 
where we come: one is more learned than I am; another is more 
prudent; a third, honourable; a fourth more chast; or he is more 
charitable, or lesse proud. (32) 
When Lovelace claims a superiority which expresses itself in regarding others 
as mere objects to be manipulated, controlled and discarded, prescriptions which 
suggest that salvation attends the humble and that a man should make a just 
assessment of his own deficiencies in relation to others, could only threaten the self- 
image which appears to offer a desirable identity. Lovelace resists any such threat 
with a tenacity which suggests, at least when he is threatened with madness, an 
underlying insecurity about that very identity. If he needs others at all, 
it is to 
confirm the validity of that self-image, and any threat to it in the 
form of assertion of 
autonomy by another is met with an outraged response, and a renewed resolution 
to 
achieve dominion. His very determination to overcome Clarissa's own resistance 
to 
him is fuelled by fear of the threat which the firmness of that resistance represents. 
The reader may suspect that such determination on 
his part finds its origin in 
the insecurity of the validity of the self which Lovelace claims to 
be and wishes to 
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appear to be. He enquires of Belford, `Why, why will the dear creature take such 
pains to appear all ice to me? Why will she, by her pride, awaken mine? '. 
(p. 413) Or he 
comments elsewhere: `I can put her to trials as mortifying to her niceness, as 
glorifying to my pride' . 
(p, 387) And again: `How it swells my pride to have been able 
to outwit such a vigilant charmer! '. (p. 402) 
An attitude expressive of all the competitiveness of pride, which finds 
domination a necessity to existence itself, finally isolates the man who professes it, 
and damages those who are its victims. Such damage, as probably in the case of 
Polly and Sally, may extend to eventual damnation. The Conclusion to the third 
edition explicitly declares that if Sally had not met with Lovelace, she would have 
avoided a connection with Mrs Sinclair, ('°. ) 552) and that her hardened conscience 
resulted in doing all she could to promote Lovelace's pleasures by drawing in others 
to follow her example. (iv, 
pp. 541-542) The effects of Lovelace's pride are thus 
perpetuated almost without limit. True, Polly and Sally could have sought grace to 
repent of their fall, or could have resisted the temptation which Lovelace represented, 
but without his own sinful pride, they would not have been exposed to this particular 
sin at all. The pride which does such damage, according to one Christian theologian 
at least, relates a man more nearly to Satan than to God; Richard Baxter remarks that 




One aspect of the tragedy of Lovelace is that pride deprives him of the 
insight 
which would enable him to know himself well enough to recognize his own 
defects 
before he puts himself beyond the reach of grace. Thomas A Kempis reflects on the 




Empty conceit is like an evil disease, and the most monstrous 
of vanities, for it leads a man away from true glory, and robs him of heavenly grace. (34) 
Saint Augustine likewise points out that the abandonment of God through the 
elevation of self brings the danger of annihilation: 
And so, to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is to 
please oneself, is not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come 
nearer to nothingness. (35 
Lovelace's penultimate letter to Belford expresses the sense of futility to 
which all his contrivances and machinations have finally brought him, and contains 
the admission that those same plots, undertaken for the sake of ensnaring Clarissa, 
were totally ineffectual. The letter conveys a mood of emotional and spiritual 
exhaustion, as if the only result of all that activity to secure his own dominion and 
self-exaltation has been to bring him closer to the negativity at the heart of one who 
has substituted worship of self for the worship of God. Moreover, his letter carries an 
implicit acknowledgement that Clarissa's construction of pride, the pride which is 
`above doing a base or a dishonourable action', has triumphed over Lovelace's own 
sinful pride, which would perform any base action to achieve its end of self- 
exaltation: 
Now and then, indeed, am I capable of a gleam of comfort, 
arising (not ungenerously) from the moral certainty which I have of 
her everlasting happiness, in spite of all the machinations and devices 
which I set on foot to ensnare her virtue, and to bring down so pure a 
mind to my own level. 
(p. 1483) 
However, self-deceived to the end, and still clinging to that self-image which 
has lost all value, Lovelace must still add `not ungenerously'. All his effort and 
contrivances, his boasted joy in mischief, his pride in the manipulation of others, 
have brought him to nothing but failure and futility in this life, and hardly 
hold out 
any prospect of the everlasting happiness, which he is convinced Clarissa enjoys, 
in 
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the next. Such an outcome, according to Thomas A Kempis, is only what he should 
expect. He has Christ say: 
But whoever desires to glory in anything outside Me, or to 
delight in some personal good thing, will not be established in true 
joy, nor uplifted in heart, but will be hindered and frustrated in 
countless ways. (36) 
Lovelace has made `a perverse kind of exaltation' his `good thing', and has 
gloried in the flattering but false self-image of himself as the greatest conqueror in 
the world' at the expense of the lives and souls of others. It can only be an instance 
of God's justice if in so doing, he has brought himself to the prospect of Hell. 
Certainly in this life, he has already encountered the frustration and loss of joy of 
which ä Kempis speaks. 
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9 
The Four Last Things - The Sinner 
ichardson's treatment of death accepts orthodox Christian eschatology 
nd presents formal examples of both holy and unholy departures. 
The latter are as important to his scheme as the former, and the significance of 
Clarissa's own death cannot be fully appreciated unless it is considered in relation to 
the less edifying departures also described in the novel. Richardson himself 
remarked that he had intended that his readers should be struck by the Christian 
triumph of her passing in contrast to the pitiful exit which he had given to 
Lovelace. (') 
Of the four deaths which feature so prominently in the latter half of the novel, 
only that of Clarissa offers to the reader a description of a passing in which death is 
certain to be followed by salvation and eternal happiness, while he may conclude that 
salvation is denied to Mrs. Sinclair and doubtful, if still possible, for Belton. The 
death of Lovelace is the most painful and the most enigmatic of exits among those of 
the sinners, since it seems that Richardson intended almost certain damnation for his 
anti-hero, yet presents him as possibly being favoured with a vision of Clarissa as 
he 
dies. It may be that since this vision is reminiscent of the dream which 
Lovelace 
once had of Clarissa's apotheosis and his own descent into a pit, the reader may 
perhaps infer that part of Lovelace's punishment may be eternal separation 
from the 
woman he has loved and injured. 
Even more problematic than the death of Lovelace is that of 
Clarissa herself. 
Whatever Richardson's intention, which seems to have been, on the evidence of the 
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letter cited above, to offer to his readers the edifying spectacle of a saint on the point 
of gaining the heavenly reward promised to the faithful servants of God, no reader 
can fail to be aware of the complexities in the treatment of the death of this saint. 
These complexities complicate and puzzle the reader's response, but offer him a far 
richer experience in his reading of the novel. 
It is clear that these four deaths form a pattern which, taken as a whole, 
demonstrates Richardson's eschatological design. The reader is present at four 
deathbeds, three of them described vividly by Belford. The two women are 
diametrically opposed, both in character and in attitude to death and ultimate 
destination; the obvious saint stands in formal opposition to the near fiend. Of the 
two men, both profligates with a similar tally of sins to their account, the less 
intelligent, attractive and successful dies in fear and horror. However, for this sinner 
there is a faint hope of salvation in a doubtful and tardy repentance which may 
commend him to the mercy of God, a mercy which Richardson appears to be telling 
his readers is yet accessible to all those who will turn, imperfectly but finally, in 
search of it. 
The reader is thus prepared for the death of Lovelace, who, with every 
personal and material advantage in life, is superior in every other way to his fellow- 
rake but this one, that he does not at the end seek that Divine mercy. The 
comparative quietness of his death only serves to suggest to the reader that here is an 
experience far more terrifying than the harrowing deaths of the other two sinners; the 
man whose intellect far surpasses theirs, does not seem able to grasp - or to care to 
grasp - what they finally do in their terror realize, that 
judgement is not merely a 
theoretical possibility, but an imminent event. It may be that his 
despair is so 
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profound that he does not care. Either way, he is further from salvation than the man 
only doubtfully saved, and the woman assuredly damned. 
From the earliest times, Christian theology has asserted that death is the 
penalty and result of the fall. St. Augustine tells us: 
For God did not create men in the same condition as the 
angels, completely incapable of death, even if they sinned. The 
condition of human beings was such that if they continued in perfect 
obedience they would be granted the immortality of the angels and an 
eternity of bliss, without the interposition of death whereas if 
disobedient they would be justly condemned to the punishment of 
death. (2) 
No theologian questioned such an account of the origin of death; the problem 
posed for the Christian, a problem which Richardson addresses in his work, is how 
best to prepare for death, and how to meet it when it comes so as to enter once again 
into that union with God of which man's fall had deprived him. Since the fall had 
left man spiritually weakened and so pitiably liable to sin and sin again, the prospect 
of attaining that union demanded unremitting struggle and endless repentances for 
endless sins, themselves the inevitable result of an impaired nature. Because of this, 
Christian commentators from the earliest times urged those who aspired to salvation 
to prepare for death by living in the constant recognition, not only of its inevitability, 
but also of the inevitability of judgement to follow. Thomas ä Kempis reminds us: 
If you are not ready to die today, will tomorrow find you better 
prepared? 
Happy and wise is he who endeavours to be during his life as 
he wishes to be found at his death. (3) 
Richardson's sinners do not exhibit this kind of wisdom, and are shown, 
finally, to be very unhappy indeed. If he presents in the death of Clarissa an example 
of the perfect Christian passage from life to death, and from death to triumph, 
he 
reinforces his lesson as to the necessity of gaining such wisdom as she exhibits, 
by a 
239 
vivid presentation of what death can be when the dying are deprived of that 
confidence and hope which is the reward of penitence, faith and virtue. The 
Christian must so far overcome the failings of his fallen nature as to be able to cry out 
with Bunyan: 
Though I was before afraid to think of a dying hour, yet now I 
cried, Let me die; now death was lovely and beautiful in my sight, for 
I saw we shall never live indeed till we be gone to the other world; 0 
methought this life is but a slumber in comparison of that above:... 
God himself is the portion of the saints. (4) 
This is the experience of the dying Clarissa, but what if the consciousness of 
sin, and a hardness of heart that makes repentance difficult, renders the very idea of 
dissolution hideous? The process of dying then takes on the quality of a nightmare, 
which the sinner knows can only conclude in a further and unending nightmare 
unimaginably horrible. This is the experience of two of Richardson's sinners, and he 
spares no pains to demonstrate that hell is the portion of such unfortunates, and that 
for such as these, hell begins here on earth. 
It might be considered excessive to oppose to the account of Clarissa's perfect 
Christian death not one but three descriptions of the harrowing deaths of such 
sinners, but each of these three latter exits comments on her death in their several and 
differing ways. The squalor and disorder of Mrs. Sinclair's death-bed contrasts with 
the calm serenity of Clarissa's passing, while Lovelace's death, almost as quiet as 
hers, suggests that a sinner who has barely come to comprehend what true repentance 
is, may die hardly even aware of the joys of the Kingdom; he keenly feels the loss of 
Clarissa, but not of the God on whom her heart and mind are fixed. 
If Lovelace's death represents that of those who become insensitive to the 
state of their souls - and it is never the state of his soul which troubles 
Lovelace - 
Belton's death comments on that of Clarissa because it is that of a man who, unlike 
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her, does not understand the vital importance of repentance until it is too late to have 
any reasonable assurance of salvation. Such men must pass their last moments in 
ignorance as to whether a late and imperfect repentance has been accepted. It is not 
an easy way to die; the natural fear that any man may experience in the face of death 
is heightened in Belton to a pitiful state of terror, and the reader is as unable as 
Belton is himself to feel any firm conviction that his salvation is assured. To die in 
such uncertainty is almost as terrible as to die convinced of damnation. As for Mrs. 
Sinclair, the reader may only conclude that this is the way in which the self-damned 
die, (p. 1389) and Richardson's presentation of the event is designed to make any reader 
determine to do otherwise when his own time comes. 
Richardson's sinners have all signally failed to make appropriate preparation 
for death by the manner of their lives. Belton has wasted his life in the gratification 
of his senses and in acts of violence, and only on his deathbed does he wish that he 
could be spared to live a little longer so that he might repair this situation. He is 
conscious that it is judgement rather than death itself he needs to fear, and that he can 
recall no good deeds to support him when he comes to his account. (P'1221) His state 
indicates the misery that a sinner may experience in awakening, too late, to the 
recognition that he must account for his life. Habitual vice has weakened him, both 
physically and spiritually, to such an extent that repentance is all the more difficult . 
(5) 
Moreover, since his anguish arises more from the fear of hell than sorrow at 
offending God and from love of Him, he is unlikely to arrive at an effective 
repentance. (6) 
The consciousness of his desperate situation leads him to fall into a state of 
despair, a state which is recognized as sinful in itself in Christian theology. 
(7) Belton 
thus compounds his sins, and renders his condition yet more dangerous. 
His state 
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amply illustrates the dangers of a delayed repentance, for as Christian commentators 
have frequently pointed out, repentance can never be safely delayed, but should be a 
constant state of mind. (8) Belton's despair leads to a fear of accepting the 
ministrations of the clergy, and to a wish that death might lead only to annihilation, 
both ways of expressing a futile denial of the approaching event, and a wish often 
expressed, in both fiction and in devotional literature, by the dying sinner. (9) 
However, Belford reflects that since God is merciful, and Belton wished to repent, he 
may yet be saved, despite the terrors of a deathbed in which the consciousness of 
hitherto unrepented sins has made effective repentance difficult. (p*1243) Belford's 
presence at such a painful deathbed leads him to reflect upon his own situation, and 
brings him to a determination to reform, a resolution he recommends to 
Lovelace. ('. 1243) The reader of Richardson's novel is surely intended to take the 
warning; the recipient of Belford's letter in which the advice is conveyed, Lovelace, 
never does. 
Belford's resolution is confirmed by his attendance on Mrs. Sinclair's 
deathbed, although he is not present at the moment of her passing. If Belton's death 
is a warning to young men to undertake a timely repentance in their youth, that of 
Mrs. Sinclair offers a similar warning to women not to allow themselves to be 
corrupted, if when they come to die, they wish to do so in the confidence of salvation. 
In every respect, her deathbed contrasts with that of Clarissa, just as her adherence to 
vice is opposed to Clarissa's steadfast virtue. Like Belton, Mrs. Sinclair claims that 
she has no time to repent, but unlike him, she makes no motion at all towards 
repentance itself. Her condition demonstrates that a life of consistent vice leads to 
such a graceless state that repentance is virtually impossible to achieve. 
(p. l389) 
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She cannot accept that she must die, and attempts to bribe God with hollow 
promises of reform. (P*1392) However, her defiant and blasphemous attitude suggests 
that such promises do not mean that she is repentant, only that she is afraid. Fear of 
death, as both Jeremy Taylor and Richardson suggest, (10) does not equate with 
effective repentance. Mrs. Sinclair's refusal to die is shown to be futile and a sin 
against the dispositions of Divine Providence. She fails to show the patience which 
Christian commentators recommend as indispensable to a Christian submission to the 
will of God. In this respect, as in many others, her behaviour contrasts with the 
patience and submission to the Divine will exhibited by Clarissa. Resentment makes 
her passing hideous, and her complaints against her doctors and household stand in 
contrast to the exquisite courtesy with which Clarissa behaves towards those who 
attend her deathbed. (") Like Belton, Mrs. Sinclair fears to accept the ministrations of 
the church, which Jeremy Taylor in particular, recommends as indispensable to assist 
the dying to repentance, and never receives a visit from a clergyman. Nor does she 
undertake the one duty which the sick can perform, which is to pray. (12) She thus 
deprives herself of all spiritual comfort and of any chance of salvation. 
Her situation leads Belford once more to reflect on the need for grace in order 
for a sinner to effect reformation. The `editor' of Clarissa adds in a perfunctory note 
that Mrs. Sinclair's deathbed was extended for eleven days, but we are not told that in 
all that time she showed the least sign of repentance, nor does Belford's account 
record any such gesture on her part. It seems as if Richardson's reader 
is meant to 
conclude that her heart has been so hardened by sin that she has put herself 
beyond 
the reach of grace, or that during the eleven days of dying, she has resisted the 
final 
promptings, extended to her through the agency of Belford who urges repentance, 
to 
seek mercy. She claimed to have no time to repent; her extended agonies allowed 
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time of which she did not avail herself (P- 1394) Lovelace, too, will be given time and 
fail to use it. 
Mrs. Sinclair's deathbed presents the bleak and terrifying mirror-image to that 
of Clarissa, and Belford, passing from one to the other, witnesses and conveys to his 
reader and to Richardson's, the diametrically opposed experiences and attitudes of 
saint and sinner, which reflect, as at least one commentator has not failed to point 
out, the devotional literature widely read at the time. (13) However, underlying the 
prescriptions of such devotional works, as to how the individual should face death, 
were the contentions, established over centuries of Christian belief, as to how he 
should live, in accordance both with God and with his own nature. For Belford's 
reader, Lovelace, the descriptions of these contrasting deathbeds should take on a 
particular meaning; these are the respective ultimate fates of those women who resist, 
and of those who yield, to such as he. Belford writes of his own reflective mood: 
When I see in Miss Harlowe how all human excellence, and in 
poor Belton how all inhuman libertinism, and am near seeing in this 
abandoned woman how all diabolical profligateness, end. 
(Pp"1393-1394) 
His remark suggests that his author, Richardson, sees virtue to be in 
accordance with the essential nature of man when man is in accordance with the 
divine law, that is, when man acts reasonably, and that conversely, vice and sin are 
essentially unreasonable since they are opposed to that same law. Belford's wish that 
Lovelace might also have seen the same sights, so as to benefit from their instruction, 
is quite ineffective. Of all the deaths in the novel, that of Lovelace, quiet though it is, 
offers the most painful spectacle and provides the conclusion to Richardson's most 
searching analysis of the way in which a man may choose to be damned. It 
is also as 
problematic in its way as that of Clarissa herself 
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Christian 
theology has always asserted that preparation for death should 
be life-long by means of the practice of virtue and the awareness of 
judgement. Lovelace has not prepared himself for death, but he has most assiduously 
prepared himself for damnation. That Richardson intended his readers to recognize 
that Lovelace dies in danger of damnation is clear on the evidence of his letters, and 
of his remarks on the subject in the Postscript to Clarissa. In a letter to Edward 
Moore, he comments on Lovelace's death: 
Yet how deplorably impious, hardly thinks of invoking the 
highest assistance and mercy! - ... 
Have I not then given a dreadful 
rather than a hopeful Exit, with respect to Futurity, to the unhappy 
Lovelace ! (14) 
He points out that Lovelace's death was intended as a contrast to the 
triumphant departure of Clarissa, while in his conclusion to the novel, he makes it 
clear that Lovelace had been unprepared for death, leaving his family `apprehensive 
with regard to his future happiness'. In the Postscript, he asks his readers: 
Is not Mr. Lovelace, who could persevere in his villainous 
views, against the strongest and most frequent convictions and 
remorses that ever were sent to awaken and reclaim a wicked man - is 
not this great, this wilful transgressor, condignly punished. ('- 1498 
The difficulty for those readers is that Richardson's remarks in both instances 
do not categorically consign Lovelace to damnation, and his condign punishment 
might be interpreted as the loss of Clarissa and the final futility of his life. 
Richardson's scheme would seem to demand Lovelace's damnation as an appropriate 
fate in opposition to the triumph of his heroine, but to insist on too schematic a 
treatment might well shock the susceptibilities of readers who have found themselves 
engaged with Lovelace on an imaginative level. In theological terms, to 
leave no 
room for doubt might likewise comment too presumptuously on the unsearchable 
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mercy of God. It may be said that Lovelace's damnation seems probable, but not 
inevitable. 
Lovelace admits himself a believer and accepts the doctrine of rewards and 
punishments, but he eventually goes to his death with no apparent concern as to the 
destination of his soul. The reader may be appalled at such lack of concern, or may 
salute his courage in such circumstances, but must recognize, as Richardson intended 
that he should, that the courage is here misapplied. However, the fact that Lovelace 
is courageous points to a problem for the reader, which created a problem for an 
author who sought to control his reader's response. Lovelace is not drawn as being 
entirely abandoned in the way that Mrs. Sinclair is presented as such. He has 
qualities, as Richardson himself pointed out, (15) which are admirable, but these are 
often vitiated by pride or by his inability to maintain a fixed determination on virtue. 
Richardson has given Lovelace a capacity for goodness and has made it his 
tragedy that he chooses to destroy it in himself Just as Clarissa does not become a 
saint because she is, as she is frequently called, `an angel', but because she is a 
human being who must struggle with the failings of fallen human nature, so Lovelace 
is not, as he is so often called, `a devil', but a human being who fails in that struggle 
and makes himself a `worse man'. (16) Elsewhere, Richardson declares that 
reformation requires a good heart `properly touched by the divine Finger'. 
ý"ý 
Lovelace is offered - and rejects - time after time, grace and the opportunity to 
repent. As Richardson himself points out, Lovelace chooses his path `against the 
strongest and most frequent convictions and remorses'. 
This process is painfully illustrated in Lovelace's progress towards death and 
judgement. He can turn with fervour to Clarissa and ask her to `mould me as you 
please', and abase himself, telling her that she is born to save his soul. 
("' P. 80) Both the 
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reader and Clarissa must be disturbed by this sudden intensity, but while it lasts, 
Lovelace is in earnest. He can be surprised by the sudden softening of his heart 
towards Clarissa and tell Belford with all apparent sincerity: 
I had not, at the instant, any thoughts but what reverence inspired. And till she had actually withdrawn ... all the motions of my heart were as pure as her own. (p. 646) 
However, the motions of his heart cannot retain their purity, since within a 
few minutes, he is speculating on his chances of surprising Clarissa by night, as his 
attempts by day have met with so little success. He seems, however, in a half- 
conscious manner, to recognize that to yield to such impulses of pity and tenderness 
would be his salvation. Moved by the pathos of Clarissa's tears at her `fatherless' 
state, he questions: 
What's the matter with me! - Whence this dew-drop! -a tear! 
- as I hope to be saved, it is a tear, Jack ! (p. 709) 
It is never easy to ascertain whether Lovelace is sincere or not, or whether he 
is merely trying out yet another of his personae, (18) but the use of the conventional 
phrase here, `as I hope to be saved', at such a moment, even uttered carelessly, does 
indicate a way in which he could be saved. The tears do not, however, lead him to 
repentance but only to a literary reference which he uses to distract his own attention 
from the present reality of being in danger of finding a self in which pity might lead 
to reformation. Instead he withdraws to continue plotting to deceive Clarissa with 
the false possibility of a reconciliation with her family. Even after the rape, when 
Lovelace has seen the effects of her suffering on the woman he claims to love, he 
continues in this pattern of rejecting the impulse towards an acknowledgement of his 
sins and towards repentance. 
Well, but, after all (how many after-alls have I? ), I could be 
very grave, were I to give way to it --the devil take me 
for a fool! 
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What's the matter with me, I wonder! -I must breathe fresher air for 
a few days. (p. 887) 
Lovelace may feel that it would be foolish to give way to such an impulse 
towards seriousness, but Richardson appears to be indicating to the reader the notion 
that the devil will indeed take Lovelace for a fool who did not allow himself to 
recognize his own best interests, but acted with a fatal perversity. 
The question must be asked why a man of such intelligence, who is capable of 
tears of pity and of reverence for virtue, and who has moments when he appears to be 
visited by Divine promptings towards repentance, should be unable to sustain such 
impulses. It is not through ignorance of Christian doctrine that he fails. Richardson 
shows that Lovelace, even at his moments of failure, is aware of what the work of 
grace is, and that religion is the expression of reason. He admits, when he 
accompanies Clarissa to church, that he has been impressed by the service, and that 
the act of worship is `an exercise worthy of a sentient being', adding that if he 
regularly attended church, he could not pursue his designs on Clarissa. (p. 540 
Lovelace may be seen here recognizing the vital support of religion in 
assisting man towards a virtuous life, but also simultaneously rejecting such 
assistance in favour of carnal interests, since he concludes his account of his visit to 
church by adding that his attention there was fixed on Clarissa. Time and again, 
Lovelace rejects such proffered grace; even when he is forced to recognize that grace 
has operated, momentarily, in his heart, he does not, or cannot sustain the desire for 
virtue which it inspires in him. 
He shows himself equally aware that for such sins as he commits, a 
judgement awaits. Faced with a Clarissa, who so far from being cowed and 
broken 
by his assault upon her, is majestic in the scorn and dignity of her innocence, 
he finds 
in the encounter a premonition of another occasion to come: 
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By my soul, Belford, my whole frame was shaken: for not 
only her looks, and her action, but her voice, so solemn, was inexpressibly affecting: and then my cursed guilt, and her innocence 
and merit, and rank, and superiority of talents, all stared me at that 
instant in the face so formidably, that my present account, to which 
she unexpectedly called me, seemed, as I then thought, to resemble 
that general one to which we are told we shall be summoned, when 
our conscience shall be our accuser. (pp 899.900 
These are not the words of a man who is ignorant of the doctrine of rewards 
and punishments, nor of one who disbelieves that doctrine. If Lovelace is so 
disturbed by his consciousness of guilt before Clarissa, why does he not consider 
what it will be like, with that same consciousness, to face the infinite power and 
awesome majesty of an offended God? It seems to be a consideration from which he 
withdraws his mind. The warnings implicit in Belton's hideous death, and explicit in 
Belford's reflections on the unhappy man's terror of judgement have no effect. `But 
thy heavy sermon shall not affect me too much neither', he tells Belford, who is 
urging him to repentance for fear of judgement. (p. 1239) Only when he must 
contemplate the imminent death of Clarissa does he begin to think of damnation in 
relation to himself. `Is not damnation likely to be the purchase to me, though a happy 
eternity will be hers? ' he asks. (p. 1358 But this is a question which is not answered by 
any attempt to avoid such a fate. 
Lovelace then, aware of the doctrine of rewards and punishments, aware that 
judgement awaits the sinner, yet goes to his death without any formal 
acknowledgement of repentance. If both Belford and the reader might hope for some 
expression of repentance even at the last, they must be disappointed. They must also 
be disturbed by what appears to be a misunderstanding on Lovelace's part of the 
redemptive power of suffering: 
I never was such a fool as to disbelieve a Providence: yet am 
I 
not for resolving into judgements everything that temporarily chances 
to bear an avenging face. Yet if we must be punished either 
here or 
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hereafter for our misdeeds, better here say I, than hereafter. Have I 
not then an interest to think my punishment not only begun, but 
completed; since what I have suffered, and do suffer, passes all description? 
... 
When, oh when, shall I know a joyful hour? (p-1428) 
Such words cannot be read without exciting compassion, but they must also 
provoke disquiet. Lovelace's suffering cannot be doubted, and suffering can indeed 
atone for sin, but it must be humbly accepted for that purpose, and the sufferer must 
not question Divine dispositions, nor decide for himself when atonement has been 
made. Moreover, suffering is not a reparation in itself, it may be sanctified if 
accompanied by penitence and consciously offered to God in atonement. A man who 
suffers in this way, taking the opportunity offered by God to make atonement in this 
life rather than in the next, would hardly be looking for joyful hours, but would be 
resolved to bear his affliction patiently. Nor would he be about, as Lovelace is here, 
to engage in an encounter which must almost certainly result either in the death of his 
opponent, or send his own unprepared soul on its way, divorced from his body in a 
manner which precludes the possibility of repentance. 
When St. Augustine addresses the question of redemptive suffering, he points 
out that God does not always inflict suffering as punishment in this life, but reserves 
some for the last judgement. He adds: 
The violence which assails good men to test them, to cleanse 
and purify them, effects in the wicked their condemnation, ruin and 
annihilation. Thus the wicked, under pressure of affliction, execrate 
God and blaspheme; the good, in the same affliction, offer up prayers 
and praises. (' 
Lovelace does not blaspheme, but he does not undertake the reformation and 
restitution, where possible, which would be required for any repentance to be 
considered effective. Although his words, quoted above, show an understanding of 
the redemptive power of suffering as an instrument of repentance, they also reveal 
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that he has again failed to grasp an opportunity which has been offered to him. What 
is lacking is patient submission to God's dispositions and a change of heart. 
How Lovelace has arrived at this point, when he can write of the redemptive 
power of suffering to mitigate punishment hereafter, and yet intend knowingly to 
commit further sin by means of a duel, is suggested by a gradual process of 
hardening and insensitivity to conscience. Time and again, Richardson shows him, 
despite his awareness of the doctrines of grace and judgement, stifling his 
conscience, and has left the reader in no doubt but that Lovelace undertakes this 
process in the full knowledge of what he does. Torn between `contemplating her 
perfections', and his wounded pride that such perfections make Clarissa superior to 
himself, he rejects his better impulses of awe and reverence which he feels for her by 
arraigning his conscience as a `lurking varletess', and a `troublesome bosom- 
visitor'. (P*658) Such terms hardly square with the conviction of Christian theology that 
conscience is a God-given faculty which guides and counsels man to his eternal 
benefit. Conscience, says Aquinas, is: 
The activity of consciously applying our knowledge to what 
we do: witnessing to what we do and don't do, legislating about what 
we should and shouldn't do, and defending and accusing us when we 
(20) have or haven't done well . 
Lovelace is aware that he has done badly in relation to Clarissa. He knows 
that his way of life opposes the tenets of Christianity, but he actively seeks to kill the 
inconvenient conscience whose promptings could save him from judgement. His 
description of the `murder' of this God-given faculty is expressed in a colourful, even 
a theatrical manner, but the humour he intends for the amusement of Belford, 
hides 
the grim and sordid reality of his intentions towards Clarissa - to deceive 
her further 
and to resort to rape - and the mortal effects of this 
`murder' on his own soul. There 
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is a certain hysterical edge to his account, as if the reader might here perceive a man 
desperately impelling himself to an act he knows to be wrong: 
Had I not given thee thy death's wound, thou wouldst have 
robbed me of all my joys. Thou couldst not have mended me, 'tis 
plain. Thou couldst only have thrown me into despair. Didst thou not 
see that I had gone too far to recede? - Welter on, once more I bid 
thee! - Gasp on! - That thy last gasp surely! - How hard diest thou! - ADIEU! - 'tis kind in thee, however, to bid me Adieu! Adieu, Adieu, 
Adieu, to thee, Oh thou inflexible, and till now, unconquerable bosom-intruder 
- 
Adieu to thee forever! (p-848) 
It is a mistake on Lovelace's part to claim that he has gone too far to recede, 
or to assert that his conscience could not amend him; it could if he would allow it to 
do so. But as his manipulative letter to Joseph Leman in the third edition makes 
clear, Lovelace regards any positive response to conscience as a weakness. ("- p. 15°) 
However, his conscience is not so easily killed, despite his vehemence here, since 
after the rape, he is to be found coolly preparing to ignore its promptings in favour of 
allowing Mrs. Sinclair's `daughters' to `break' Clarissa: 
I am still resolved upon matrimony, if my fair perverse one 
will accept of me. But if she will not - why then I must give an 
uninterrupted hearing, not to my conscience, but to these women 
below. (p. 942 
This considered comment is far more horrifying, both for what it indicates as 
to the poor prospects of Clarissa's safety at Lovelace's hands, and as an indication of 
the increasing depravity of his soul, than the earlier, theatrical account of the murder 
of his conscience. Lovelace appears to be increasingly hardened, and if he is to face 
death and judgement with any hope of salvation, only a settled repentance confirmed 
by mortification will avail him. However, as an examination of his inability to 
sustain his better impulses, and his misunderstanding of the manner in which 
suffering must be accepted, have demonstrated, he becomes increasingly unlikely 
to 
secure this hope. `No-one is worthy of heavenly comfort', says Thomas 
a Kempis, 
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`Unless they have diligently exercised themselves in holy contrition '. (21) Lovelace 
does not appear to understand what holy contrition is, nor the part played by 
conscience in achieving it. Repentance, for Lovelace, is to be undertaken in age: `It 
is time enough when I am old and joyless to enlarge upon this topici. (P 865) But he 
will never reach such a point, and Richardson offers a stark comment, in his bringing 
Lovelace to an early death, on the folly of such expectations. (22) 
Lovelace 
is never quite prepared to face the full responsibility for the 
sinfulness of his acts. He can never accept that repentance makes 
demands on the sinner. In this respect, his attitude is consistent both before and after 
Clarissa's death. Instead of allowing the suffering he experiences to remain with him 
as a healing power and an expiation to be offered to God, he attempts to evade it. 
After the rape, spying on the sleeping Clarissa, he reflects on his own guilty 
sleeplessness: 
As every vice generally brings on its own punishment, even in 
this life, if anything were to tempt me to doubt of future punishment, 
it would be that there can hardly be a greater than that which I at this 
instant experience in my own remorse. 
I hope it will go off ... 
(p. 904) 
That Lovelace is not prepared to accept the suffering that his sins have 
brought upon him is demonstrated in his wish that his misery will recede. Likewise, 
shaken by his brush with madness after Clarissa's death, he drives from his mind the 
full acknowledgement of sin which would initiate the process of repentance and 
reform: 
I must, I will, I have already overcome these 
fruitless 
gloominesses. Every hour my constitution rises stronger and stronger 
to befriend me; and, except a tributary sigh now and then to the 
memory of my heart's beloved, it gives me hope that I shall quickly 
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be what I was - life, spirit, gaiety, and once more the plague of a sex 
that has been my plague ... 
(r. 1432) 
It is impossible not to feel compassion for this man who strives to avoid the 
reflections that he fears will make him mad, but these same reflections would lead to 
repentance, and he rejects them. Jeremy Taylor asserted that there was `but one 
repentance in a man's whole life, if repentance be taken in the proper and strict 
Evangelical Covenant-sense' . 
That repentance would `change our whole state of 
life', and the sinner would move from the state of sin to the state of grace. (23) So far 
from recognizing with Jeremy Taylor that a man needs to be changed by repentance 
if he is to achieve his salvation, Lovelace seeks to remain what he once was, and 
hopes for nothing other than to resume his old, rakish persona of the irresistible 
seducer of numberless women. So far from being life and spirit, he is therefore set 
on the course of the spiritually dead. If he cannot begin to acknowledge that this 
persona needs to be discarded, and maintains it in despite of the better impulses of a 
heart not entirely impermeable to the stings of conscience, he is in a fair way to deny 
himself mercy. 
Part of his difficulty in acknowledging his sins and repenting of them arises 
from his habit of seeking to shift to others, even to his victim, the responsibility for 
what he does. He always finds someone else to blame, either the `accursed Circes' of 
Mrs. Sinclair's house, who urge him on, (pp. 971-972) or the Harlowes as the chief cause 
of Clarissa's fate, ignoring his own part in manipulating them, 
(p. 1384) 
or Clarissa 
herself. `This dear creature will not let me be good! ' he complains to Belford when 
Clarissa seeks to elude him by making an ally of Dorcas. 
(p. 917) He argues that death is 
not a natural consequence of rape, and that the `sweet miser would 
break her heart, 
and die; and how could I help it'? (P*1439) Even when confronted with the 
dignified and 
resolute resentment of Clarissa in their interview after the rape, and 
disconcerted by 
254 
the composure of the woman whom he knows he has wronged, Lovelace cannot quite 
admit responsibility for what he has done, and can only stammer: 
What - what a- what - has been done - I, - I, -I- cannot but 
say - must own - must confess - hem - hem - is not right - is not 
what should have been - But -a- but - but -I am truly - truly - sorry for it - . 
(P. 901 
Lovelace's use of the passive voice indicates at once his shame and his 
reluctance to acknowledge fully, even as the woman he has raped stands before him, 
the sin he has committed. Richardson's presentation of his confusion and shame here 
is convincing - Lovelace is not represented as being unmoved by his own act - but it 
also conveys that weakness in him which always fails, finally, to follow any 
recognition of sin with appropriate behaviour. Clarissa, it is true, will not allow 
Lovelace to make her amends in the eyes of the world, and Richardson himself 
elsewhere declares that such reparation could never be adequate. (24) However, 
Lovelace's duty is also to make amends to God, and that is something he never 
attempts to do, and something he cannot do, while he disclaims the full responsibility 
for his sins. Thomas ä Kempis puts the matter simply and clearly when he questions 
God: 
Why do You demand of a guilty and wretched sinner that he 
repent and humble himself for his offences? It is because in true 
penitence and humbleness of heart is born the hope of pardon; the 
troubled conscience is reconciled; lost grace restored; man is spared 
the anger of God; while God and the penitent soul greet each other in 
a holy embrace. (25) 
But humbling himself is what Lovelace does not do. His troubled conscience 
can never be reconciled because he refuses to allow its promptings to have any effect 
on him. That Richardson recognized the difficulties of repentance for a character 
such as he creates in Lovelace and intended that he should stand accountable at 
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Judgement for the choices he makes, may be inferred from a letter to Lady 
Bradshaigh: 
Indeed, indeed, Madam, Reformation is not, can not, be an 
easy, a sudden thing in a Man long immersed in Vice - the Temptations to it, as from Sex to Sex, so natural; constitution, as in 
such a Character as Lovelace, so promotive, a Love of Intrigue so 
predominant - So great a self-admirer - so supposedly admired by 
others - 
(26) 
He adds later that Lovelace is `wicked upon Principle'. Grace is not easily 
accessible to such a man; Lovelace himself agrees with Belford that `we cannot 
repent when we will', and continues: 
For, in my lucid intervals I made good resolutions. But, as 
health turned its blithe side towards me, and opened my prospects of 
recovery, all my old inclinations and appetites returned; and this 
letter, perhaps, will be a thorough conviction to thee that I am as wild 
a fellow as ever, or in the way to be so. (p. 1 40) 
The hint of self-congratulation at the conclusion of these remarks suggests a 
second reason for Lovelace's failure to repent, a reason which is in keeping with 
Richardson's own remark about Lovelace being `so great a self-admirer - so 
supposedly admired by others' .A careful reading of 
Lovelace's frequent self- 
analyses, when he describes to Belford the recurring impulses towards virtue that he 
experiences and rejects, demonstrates the reason why, despite his knowledge of 
Christian doctrine, his admiration and at times, his reverence for Clarissa's virtue, 
and those very impulses themselves, he always slides back to sin in the form of 
further lies and deceptions, and why he rapes a woman whom he does love as far as 
in him lies. 
`By my soul ... this sweet creature will at 
last undo me! ', he comments to 
Belford when Clarissa's misery at her father's curse nearly reduces him to tears. 
(P, 
What Lovelace fears is that he will always be `undone' by such responses; 
he will 
lose sight of the persona he himself loves, and which he presents to be admired 
by the 
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world he claims as his own. In that world, he is a conqueror, fit to be a prince, an 
emperor. Time and again, Lovelace expresses a response to his better impulses in 
such terms: 
Faith, Jack, thou hadst half-undone me with thy nonsense, 
though I would not own it in my yesterday's letter; my conscience of 
thy party before. But I think I am my own man again. (p. 721) 
Belford had urged Lovelace to abandon his designs on Clarissa. To be his 
`own man' Lovelace must suppress both his conscience and the promptings of his 
better impulses in favour of maintaining his self-image. However, he does not do so 
without conflict; the man he could be, if he yielded to those better impulses, is always 
opposed by the man he desires to be in the eyes of the world and in his own. He 
makes such strenuous efforts to be the latter that he seems to make as hard a task of 
his own damnation as others might do of securing salvation. Lovelace experiences 
his better impulses as a threat to his 'self. `If I now recede, I am gone forever', he 
reflects as Clarissa begs to be spared what he intends for her (which, at this point, is 
rape). (- 881) Lovelace's choice of his constructed self in every instance ensures that he 
will finally be undone, his salvation probably lost rather than that self 
He sees in Clarissa what he fears and envies, `The God within her' , 
(p. 853 
which exalts her and reveals to him the essential shoddiness of the persona he has 
chosen, and the consciousness of the attraction which such virtue has for him 
threatens the security of his `self. In relation to Clarissa, the threat expresses itself 
as a fear of a capitulation which will annihilate that self-image, `For shall I not 
be 
hers, and not my own? '. ('. 734) Mark Kinkead-Weekes's analysis of Lovelace notes 
his 
fear of losing the Lovelace he wishes to be, the self-image he has created, 
by such a 
capitulation, and makes the interesting point that he destroys Clarissa rather than 
lose 
`his imperial idea of himself. However, in Christian terms, his refusal to abandon 
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that self-image has even more painful effects on himself, since it destroys him, body 
and soul. In those terms, Lovelace's tragedy is not merely, as this most perceptive 
commentator claims, that of human waste brought on by himself, but the compromise 
of an immortal soul, and the likely loss of the goal for which man was created. (27) 
Clarissa is brought to recognize the pride which has exposed her to the power 
of Lovelace. He is not prepared to acknowledge the pride on which his favoured 
self-image is based, and the sins which result from maintaining it at all costs. When 
his crisis comes, he chooses as he has always chosen, the survival of his 'self. What 
he does, therefore, in his crisis is to begin a painful reconstruction of his 'self, while 
admitting that the reflections on his own culpability that he finds so disturbing and 
has decided to drive away, might have been his salvation: Lovelace cannot afford to 
take the risk of giving them room. Fearing that his mind is affected, he concludes: 
Once touched, therefore, I must endeavour to abandon these 
gloomy reflections, which might otherwise have brought on the right 
turn of mind. 
(p. i431) 
There could be no clearer statement of the rejection of a painful 
acknowledgement of sin, a rejection which precludes both repentance and 
amendment. Had Lovelace been able to achieve these states by means of the 
`gloomy reflections' which he rejected so fiercely, and which might have brought 
about the `right turn of mind', he would not have embarked on his final, futile 
journey of amusement which would bring him neither satisfaction nor relief, and 
which would be a prelude to his early death. Lovelace cannot journey away 
from his 
own heart, and its better impulses, which he has rejected, have marked the moments 
when grace was offered. `It is not to be expected', says Richardson in the 
Collection, 
`that offended grace should repeatedly offer itself to a wilful transgressor. 
(28) 
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Lovelace's reflection that `we cannot repent when we will', may well suggest 
his underlying conviction that he has not only lost his happiness in this life, but 
probably forfeited his chance of happiness in the next. As far as this life is 
concerned, nothing gives him pleasure or satisfaction. Among all the diversions of 
foreign courts, he can think `of nothing, nor of anybody with delight, but of my 
CLARISSA': 
What greater punishment, than to have these astonishing 
perfections, which she was mistress of, strike my remembrance with 
such force, when I have nothing left but the remorse of having 
deprived myself and the world of such a blessing? (P-1483) 
Since he gains comfort only from his conviction that Clarissa enjoys 
everlasting happiness, he cannot fail to be aware of the everlasting misery which 
awaits an unrepentant sinner. Richardson shows his anti-hero offered, even at this 
point, one last chance to avoid such a fate for himself Lovelace writes that he is so 
miserable abroad, that he will return to England and follow Belford's example, `and 
see what a constant course of penitence and mortification will do for me'. He adds, 
`There is no living at this rate - d-n me if there be! 
' 
" 
1483) Lovelace has again 
unconsciously predicted his fate, and the use of the conventional curse may well be 
seen as a half-conscious recognition that such a life as he has lived, and continues to 
lead, without repentance, does actually lead to damnation. 
R ichardson's concern is with an examination of how one soul triumphs 
while another may sustain the tragedy of loss. Such moments 
in the 
novel demonstrate the inexorable logic of the tragedy he presents and shapes. He has 
shown Lovelace rejecting every impulse towards virtue, and his anti-hero's 
final 
rejection or failure to respond to the ultimate offer of grace is consistent 
both with 
psychological verisimilitude and with the Christian contention that 
habitual vice 
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hardens the heart and may finally - probably will - put the sinner beyond the reach of 
grace. Thus Richardson presents Lovelace's inexorable process towards unrepentant 
death. Immediately following his remarks about a possible repentance, his next 
words indicate his determination to pursue his quarrel with Morden. Moreover, he 
resumes his accustomed persona. He cannot allow even Belford, or himself, to 
entertain a moment's doubt of its validity, but remarks: 
Most cheerfully do I go to meet the colonel; and I would tear 
my heart out of my breast with my own hands, were it capable of fear 
or concern on that account. 
(p. 1484) 
Belford is unlikely to doubt Lovelace's physical courage, and does not need 
to do so. Lovelace has not recognized that acknowledging sin and undertaking 
repentance does not render a man less brave physically, but only proves him 
courageous morally. Yet Lovelace, knowing as he does the state of his soul, aware 
that repentance is required for forgiveness to operate, continues on his course, 
prepared to commit what is in truth a murder or to expose himself to an unprepared 
death. He admits his reluctance to kill Morden, but does not decline meeting him, 
and his plea that he will think of repenting hereafter, carries an irony in that for him 
there will be no hereafter in this world in which to repent. No-one can knowingly 
commit a sin, Christian doctrine assures us, pleading that he will repent for it 
afterwards; choice is here and now. (29) Christian doctrine also makes clear the value 
of the human person, whether that of the self or of another: 
Man is both the image of God and our flesh. Wherefore, if we 
would not violate the image of God, we must hold the person of man 
sacred - if we would not divest ourselves of 
humanity, we must 
cherish our own flesh. (30 
Lovelace has never held the persons of others sacred, and does not 
do so now. 
He has not cherished his own flesh, but abused it by sin, and put it at risk 
for a false 
notion of honour. Richardson shows him to be consistent in continuing to 
do so. The 
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letter he receives from Clarissa after her death, urges a repentance which would 
preclude any such undertaking as a duel, and has warned him of his `hardened 
insensibility'. It is this insensibility which now allows him to pursue his present 
course with apparent tranquillity. In the face of these warnings, and of his own 
acknowledgement that Morden's death would be an act for which repentance would 
be required, showing that he is aware of the sin that he is about to commit, it is 
difficult to conclude otherwise than that Lovelace faces damnation. However, 
because of the consistency of his conduct, the reader sees the approach of his death 
and probable eventual destination take on the character of tragic inevitability. 
His assertion that he cannot avoid the duel is open to question. He does not 
need to fight Morden, unless he subscribes to the view that the rakes' code of honour 
alone has any validity as a standard of conduct, and he knows that this is not the case. 
He also knows that there is a higher law to which he stands accountable, and that by 
the terms of that law, the rakes' code is sinful in itself Elsewhere, Richardson points 
out that duelling is opposed to Christianity, and in his novel he has drawn Lovelace 
as aware of Christianity's tenets. (31) So far from being unable to avoid the duel, he 
actively seeks to bring it about; he has himself initiated the exchange of letters which 
leads to the duel. Belford has told him: 
If you seek not Colonel Morden, it is my opinion that he will 
not seek you: for he is a man of principle. But if you seek him, I 
believe he will not shun you. 
Let me re-urge (it is the effect of my love for you! ) that you 
know your own guilt in this affair, and should not be again an 
aggressor. It would be a pity that so brave a man as the Colonel 
should drop, were you and he to meet: and on the other hand, it would 
be dreadful, that you should be sent to your account unprepared for 
it; 
and pursuing a fresh violence. (p. 1478) 
Belford urges Lovelace to take the deaths of Mrs. Sinclair and 
`Tomlinson' as 
warnings. It must be regarded as if Heaven spoke through Belford, 
but it seems that 
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Lovelace, no less than Clarissa, can act with both conscious and unconscious 
motives. On the surface, it is his pride and his adherence to the rakes' code of honour 
which urge him to this undertaking. However, his last letters, under their forced 
gaiety of tone, again and again strike a note of weariness and a barely suppressed 
grief and remorse. This is not a man who takes any pleasure in life, or who finds 
anything to make it worth the living. It is at least possible to contend that such a man 
might seek his own death as much as that of Morden. 
Certainly when the choice of life is offered, when he is wounded, but not 
seriously, and Morden declares, `Sir, I believe you have enough 5, (p. 1486) Lovelace, 
weakened though he is, insists on resuming the duel. It is impossible to say 
definitively whether his motive is the pride that will not allow him to acknowledge 
defeat or a despair that seeks his own death. Social commentators of Richardson's 
own day remarked on the increasing incidence of suicide, and a lively debate on the 
topic was current. Modern commentators have analyzed such tendencies in terms of 
considering the factors which might have brought such an increase about; it is 
generally agreed that one factor predisposing to suicide is isolation. Such a factor has 
been recognized as a possible - probable - contribution to Clarissa's death, 
but 
Lovelace, too, has been seen as isolated from his familiar companions, eternally 
separated from Clarissa, and accompanied only by the newly hired valet who will 
report his death- (32) In such circumstances, a choice of death, whether consciously or 
unconsciously elected, would not be unlikely. Likewise, for such a man as 
Richardson presents, death in a duel would represent at once the most 
likely 
conclusion to such a life as he has lived, and would be seen to re-affirm 
his 
established persona as a man of honour. The manner of death Richardson gives 
to 
Lovelace also makes a far more telling comment on the evils of 
duelling, likewise a 
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subject of current debate, (33) than all the reasoned homilies on the subject with which 
Sir Charles Grandison will favour his would-be opponents. 
`Had you a good conscience', writes Thomas A Kempis, `Death would hold 
no terrors for you' . 
(34) Lovelace cannot have a good conscience, but he dies without 
apparent fear. It may be that like Bunyan's Mr. Badman, he cannot repent because 
he has no sense of sin. As Mr. Wiseman points out, a mere confession of sin is not 
enough; repentance would require the sinner to turn to God by means of Jesus Christ 
as well as by sorrow for sins committed. (35) Lovelace is not unaware of his sins, but 
the name of Christ is conspicuously absent from his dying utterances, and the relative 
quietness of his death, combined with serious sin, is a dangerous combination to the 
soul, as Bunyan points out. Just how much so, may only be apparent when God's 
judgement is pronounced. (36) 
Richardson's treatment of Lovelace's death is strangely muted in contrast to 
the vivid descriptions of the deathbeds of his other sinners. In the Postscript to the 
third edition, Richardson remarks that he has `thought fit to paint the death of the 
wicked as terrible as he could paint it'. (iv, 
p. 554) This is clear in the conventional sense 
of the words in the deaths of Belton and Sinclair. However, in describing their 
deaths, he has already intimated the horrors of anticipating judgement and 
hell. 
Lovelace's death is a more complex and troubling event, and the simplicity of the 
account given by a narrator, a man far less sophisticated a writer than 
Belford, who 
describes the three other death-beds in the novel, leaves the reader to 
draw inferences 
and to make conjectures which are not required by the descriptions of 
those other 
deaths. The death of Lovelace is reported from the outside 
by a man who knows 
nothing of Lovelace's history and of the state of his soul. 
The reader sees and hears 
only what De la Tour sees and hears, and is aware that De 
la Tour's account must be 
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supplemented by his own knowledge of the dying man's history, drawn from being 
privy to Lovelace's character and letters, to conjecture what might be his frame of 
mind. However, in the absence of Lovelace's own accustomed self-analyses, those 
conjectures can be nothing more, and must lead to a further reflection that Lovelace's 
protean nature has always, anyway, made it difficult to establish at any given moment 
the truth of his motives and intentions. Clarissa herself, in the third edition, remarks 
upon the perplexity such changeability creates in her. It is no less perplexing to the 
reader. ("' p. 82) 
Lovelace's dying words, that he has provoked his destiny, (p-1487 may be seen 
as the conventional gesture of `a man of honour' in exonerating his opponent. Yet 
his words could also mean that he has brought his fate upon himself by his treatment 
of Clarissa, by his mode of life, or by seeking the duel. His remark defies exact 
interpretation. All that is clear is that he does not act upon Morden's repeated 
recommendations that he should seek Divine mercy in the `few fleeting moments' 
that the Colonel believes are left to him. (p. 1487) Those few moments extend to nearly 
twenty-four hours, but De la Tour records no words which might be interpreted as 
expressing repentance. Richardson does not control so closely, as he does with those 
earlier deaths, the reader's interpretation, and it is as easy to conclude that Lovelace's 
despair precludes his making any gesture of repentance as that, even at this point, 
imminent judgement remains only a theoretical proposition. 
De la Tour's comforting assumption that Lovelace addresses Heaven as he 
dies is undercut by an irony of which the loyal valet is unaware, although the reader 
is not. It seems that in his last hours, Lovelace lives the dream he once 
had of 
Clarissa's apotheosis and his own damnation, and which he cannot now 
interpret with 
specious ingenuity. He may call upon Clarissa, and she is indeed a saint, 
but only 
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God can give pardon, and he does not, apparently, address himself to God. Since 
Richardson himself in his letter to Edward Moore (37) had remarked upon this 
omission, his very creator seems to doubt Lovelace's salvation without categorically 
condemning him to Hell. 
The reader cannot reflect, any more than Belford can, on Lovelace's probable 
eternal destination with any satisfaction. Rather he must feel a sense of pity at so 
profound a loss. Richardson's use of De la Tour's simple narrative, expressive of the 
valet's sympathy and grief, must evoke similar emotions in the reader, but the 
reader's awareness of circumstances, denied to the servant, must also complicate his 
response to the event. Richardson has a point to make, which he regards as vitally 
important to the proper conduct of life, about sin and judgement. His presentation of 
Lovelace's character, the lengthy unfolding of the man's history and the thorough 
analysis of his inner life which the form of the epistolary novel has presented as no 
other medium could, have all given the reader a kind of negative spiritual biography, 
a record of graces offered and rejected, and of opportunities of repentance held out 
until the very last hours of life, and, apparently, rejected. Lovelace has lived and 
appears to die in a state of sin. The reader is reminded that the wages of sin is indeed 
death. The reader is warned. 
Lovelace's conduct, with his frequent expressions of remorse which are never 
sustained, might seem to be an example of reprobation. However, in this novel, 
repentance is held out as a possibility to the dying and urged on them, until the 
last 
hours of life, if the sinner will only acknowledge his sin and seek pardon. Belford 
and Morden, who urge repentance on Mrs. Sinclair, Belton and Lovelace, may not 
be 
more theologically sophisticated than the average man, but Clarissa, too, urges 
Lovelace to repentance. It appears that Richardson demonstrates both a 
less rigorous 
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attitude to the availability of salvation than Calvinism allows, and a faith in the strong 
possibility of the Divine mercy on the condition of even late repentance. 
If the reader must believe Lovelace is damned, and that Richardson intends 
both damnation and conviction of damnation, such a fate can only be, in the final 
analysis, the result of Lovelace's inability to abandon the false self he has created. In 
effect, if he is damned,, his pride damns him. The reader who follows Lovelace's 
progress with close attention to the very point of death must be struck by the 
consistency of his conduct in being inconsistent. Only his egocentricity remains 
constant, and he maintains the self-deception which it engenders to his death. 'Self, 
as Richardson says elsewhere, `is a grand misleader. '(38) 
Lovelace's last clearly articulated words LET THIS EXPIATE! (P* 1488) are 
enigmatic, but if he may be taken to mean that his death expiates his sins, it does 
nothing of the sort and the theatrical gesture is futile. His death cannot now affect 
Clarissa's situation for better or worse, since she is beyond any such considerations, 
nor does it atone for his sins, since atonement must rest on admission of guilt and 
repentance. Unless the reader takes these words in themselves as an oblique 
admission of guilt and an implied repentance, he may conclude that as Lovelace has 
done so often in life, in death he is making a gesture conceived in pride and in the 
desire to present himself as a hero, to sustain his chosen image, as Mark Kinkead- 
Weekes has asserted . 
(39) However, he is not now presenting the hero of some 
comedy of manners, but the hero of a tragedy. The irony is that this tragedy is no 
dramatic representation, but represents the reality of the probable loss of a soul. 
Lovelace only deceives himself if he believes that his gesture has any worth or 
validity. 
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The reader, however, needs to bear in mind that Lovelace's tragedy, like 
Clarissa's triumph, is a representation by an author who shapes the fates of both, and 
that Richardson had intended to direct his response. His letter to Edward Moore on 
the subject of Lovelace's death at once signals how he had intended his readers 
should respond, and yet at the same time suggests a certain ambivalence in his own 
response to the death of Lovelace, as if the creator who had, perhaps, Intended an 
inevitable damnation for his creature found himself maintaining against all the 
evidence he had presented at least a remote possibility of the Creator's mercy. His 
remarks may suggest a half-recognized belief that if the fictional creature's fate may 
yet be not entirely fixed, the Divine mercy may operate in unsearchable ways. At the 
very least, Richardson himself appears to feel a compassion for Lovelace similar to 
that experienced by the reader, although both creator and reader have been fully privy 
to the man' sins. 
And at last with his wonted haughtiness of spirit - LET THIS 
EXPIATE all his apparent Invocation and address given to the 
SUPREME. Have I not given rather a dreadful than a hopeful Exit, 
with respect to Futurity, to the unhappy Lovelace! -I protest I have 
been unable to reperuse the acct- of his Death with this great 
circumstance in my Head, and to think of the triumphant one of my 
divine Clarissa, without pity - and I did hope that the contrast 
if 
attentively considered would be very striking. 
(40) 
Richardson himself remarks here on Lovelace's consistency in maintaining 
his pride, but he also refers to Lovelace's apparent failure to invoke God, and claims 
that he has given 'rather a dreadful than a hopeful exit' to Lovelace, whom 
he 
characterizes as 'unhappy' rather than wicked. It is as if Lovelace, who so 
frequently 
eludes the reader's grasp, and often does not seem ever to be able to maintain a 
fixed 
identity, in his death has momentarily eluded even his creator's control. 
Or it may be 
that Richardson, admittedly enamoured of his 'divine Clarissa' 
is no less enthralled 
by his villain, only less likely to recognize or to admit the 
fact. If this is the case, 
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there is a parallel of which Richardson himself may have been aware. 'The Lord', 
says the Psalmist, is 'full of compassion', and 'his tender mercies are over all his 
works'. (Psalm 145). It seems that Richardson too, despIte himself, has compass'On 
for his creation, and cannot quite bring himself to deny Lovelace all mercy, whatever 
dreadful exit Lovelace's sins may deserve, and his author's intentions demand. 
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10 
The ]Four Last Things - The Saint 
Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saints() 
o the psalmist celebrates the servants of God who crown a life of virtue 
with a triumphant death. There is no doubt that Richardson intended 
his readers to perceive Clarissa as a saint, and her death as the apotheosis of Christian 
virtue. To those who objected that her excellence was improbable, he replied, in the 
Postscript to the third edition, that her education had encouraged virtue, and that 
many women, given occasion, have exerted like virtues and reached her perfection. ('v' 
p. 565) Moreover, schematically, he appears to have intended her, in this respect, to 
stand opposed to Lovelace. In a letter to Lady Bradshaigh, he writes- 
But have I really made Clarissa what the Woman of Virtue, of 
Christian Virtue, cannot be? - Surely, I have not. Have you not seen 
from Infancy in her, by the help of her worthy Norton, and the good 
Dr. Lewen (as in Lovelace the early Libertine) in her the early Saint? 
The one in a manner calling out for Punishment - The other for a 
heavenly Crown? (2) 
It is by overcoming the failings of a fallen humanity that Clarissa is to 
become a saint, since in another letter, to Aaron Hill, Richardson writes that, 'I would 
that she should have some little things to be blamed for, tho' nothing in her 
will, . 
His assertion to Lady Bradshaigh that it is possible for Christians to achieve 
Clarissa's virtue is not made, therefore, without a recognition that his heroine shares 
those human failings. Carol Flynn's illuminating remark that Clarissa's sanctity 
reflects her ambivalence as well as her integrlty(4) may therefore be regarded as a 
starting point to any discussion of that sanctity. However, it is a remark that requires 
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qualification. Such ambivalence in Christian terms , is characteristic of sinners, as 
well as of saints, since it must take its origin in the primal impairment of human 
nature. The sinner, as Richardson indicates when he refers to Lovelace as 'wicked 
upon principle' (5) elects to follow the faultY impulses of fallen nature which are 
opposed to the will of God. The saint seeks to overcome them. Sanctity is not, and is 
not to be presented as being, the result of effortless virtue, but of subduing the 
impulses of that impaired nature in a constant and conscious struggle to bring the will 
into accordance with the will of God. Clarissa's triumphant death, in the expectation 
of that heavenly crown, is achieved at the expense of such a struggle with nature, and 
not because she is exempt from its penalties. 
However, if the reader responds to the death of Clarissa as her creator appears 
to have intended,, and as he represents those who surround her deathbed as 
responding, with awe, that reader must also feel a sense of disquiet. The reason for 
this is because in creating his saint, Richardson has also created a complex figure 
whose motives, although pure in intention, are often emotionally ambiguous. How, if 
he is to create a credible human being, placed in an extreme situation, could they be 
otherwise? The reader is moved and troubled precisely because in Clarissa's faulty 
humanity he must recognize his own. 
Moreover, Richardson's saint, like all the saints - with their ability to remind 
us what human nature may achieve by a positive response to grace - is disturbing to 
the Christian. By considering the saints, the Christian is expected to measure the 
distance between their achievement and his own state. Richardson's remarks to 
Lady 
Bradshaigh above suggest that he shares this expectation on behalf of 
his readers. In 
Clarissa herself, he offers them an example to emulate in the same way that 
the 
writers of the religious conduct books urged on their readers a manner of 
living and 
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dying that would be in accordance with both reason and conscience , in short, with 
their perception of the demands of the Divine will. In Clarissa's death, he describes 
the death that the Christian should strive to achieve. 
The letter to Lady Bradshaigh reminds us of the Christian conviction, so often 
expressed in popular religious works, that such a death is not to be achieved without 
due preparation, and that it is too late to begin such a preparation on the deathbed 
itself, since the very condition of sickness disables the sufferer from making any such 
attempt truly effective. (6) In terms of such a preparation, Clarissa's living and dying 
are both exemplary, (7) if preparing for death may be seen as a life-long vocation, and 
in a sense the purpose of Christian life itself, since it is only through death that the 
goal of human existence, the enjoyment of God, may be achieved. Calvin makes this 
very point: 
We ought to hold that we are baptised for the mortification of 
our flesh, which is begun in baptism, is prosecuted every day, and will 
be finished when we depart this life to go to the Lord. (8) 
Richardson clearly intended his heroine, unlike his sinners, to exemplify such 
Christian preparedness for death. From the opening of the novel, she is shown to live 
her life in accordance with the virtues of faith, charity and a prudence beyond her 
years. Moreover, she interrogates her heart rigorously for faults, so that she may 
repent of them and eradicate them. As the novel progresses, she is shown to come, 
by means of the trials laid upon her, to a recognition of, and repentance for, the sins 
which she perceives to stand between herself and Heaven, so that the preparation 
for 
death which she undertakes in her last illness is but an extension of the preparation 
that has been her life. Whether Richardson intended that the meticulous preparation 
that he gives to Clarissa at this point should be understood to atone for what she 
has 
not consciously recognized in herself is open to question. However, Clarissa's own 
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remarks upon the subject are in accordance with orthodox Christian thought on such 
matters, and since Richardson means her to be an example, the reader may infer that 
they express his own views: 
For believe me, sir, that now in this last stage very few things 
will bear the test, or be passed as laudable, if pardonable, at our own 
bar, much less at a more tremendous one, in all we have done or 
delighted in, even in a life not very offensive neither, as we may 
think! Ought we not then to study in ourfull day, before the dark 
hours approach, so to live as may afford reflections that will soften 
the agony of the last moments when they come, and let in upon the 
departing soul a ray of Divine Mercy to illuminate its passage into an 
awful etemity? (P' 1337) 
To a modem reader, the notion of fife-long awareness of death verges on the 
morbid, but the religious literature popular in Richardson's own age does not regard 
such sentiments in the same light. So important does it hold the goal of eternal life, 
so vital the necessity to be aware of the spiritual dangers consequent on sin in 
compromising the hope of attaining that goal, that living life in the expectation of 
death appears the only sane way to live at all. William Law advises his readers to 
pray that death may be ever in their thoughts, and to remember it as the last thought 
of every day: 
Represent to your imagination that your bed is your grave, that 
all things are ready for your interment, that you are to have no more to 
do with this world and that it will be owing to God's great mercy if 
you ever see the light of the sun again or have another day to add to 
your works of piety. (9) 
The reader of Richardson's novel is driven to reflect that Clarissa comes to 
follow this advice almost literally; if she does not actually consider her bed as 
her 
grave, she makes her coffin the most significant item of furniture in 
her room and 
dwells - with great satisfaction, even with eagerness - on 
how soon she will occupy 
The purchase of that coffin shocks the reader as much as it 
does Belford, but 
Clarissa can point out, very reasonably, that she has no-one to undertake such 
duties 
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on her behalf Richardson appears to present his heroine as admirably detached from 
the fear and rejection of death which disfigure the dying moments of his sinners; she 
behaves , in 
fact, rationally. However, it is easy to suspect In her rationality at this 
point the rationalization of an unrecognized impulse towards death. 
As the conduct books recommend,, Clarissa has avoided the danger of relying 
upon a deathbed repentance to secure her salvation. Richardson's treatment of his 
sinners emphasizes the results of neglecting what should be a life-long habit of 
penitence(lo); his treatment of Clarissa's life and death is designed to show the 
positive results of embracing that same penitence as part of the Christian vocation. 
Some Christian theologians popular in Richardson's time, doubting the efficacy of 
deathbed repentance, presumably on the grounds that metanoia, usually translated as 
repentance, means a change of heart or direction, urge that repentance, like virtue, 
should be a life-long condition, practised with the long-term view in mind of 
preparing for death. (" 
Richardson seems prepared to allow his sinners the opportunity, if they will 
only seize it, to repent on their deathbeds, but renders their struggles to arrive at a 
ar more penitent state so painful that the reader is encouraged thereby to see how f. 
effective for the comfort of the dying must be the consistent practice of penitence as 
of virtue. It is clear that his saint repents her errors as soon as they present 
themselves to her mind as such. Clarissa repents her departure with Lovelace ftom 
the moment that she can think clearly about the matter, and the pride that led her to 
correspond with him when her anguished self-examination after the rape makes it 
apparent to her. 
If she is not shown to go as tar as William Law recommends, in setting aside 
each evening time in which to review the day past and repent of its sins, she is shown 
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to be in agreement with the reason for which he makes this recommendation, the 
absolute necessity of repentance, and the need to seek God's assisting grace to avoid 
further sin. "Nor can you repent', says Law, 'But so far as you know what it is you 
are repenting of, adding that true repentance should touch the heart and leave 'a 
horror and detestation of sin upon the mind ". 
(12) The reader may suspect that while 
Clarissa feels all the detestation of heir sins that any theologian could desire, she is 
consciously unaware of at least some things of which she repents, but repent she 
does, and imposes a terrible penance. If, as Jeremy Taylor asserts, we can prevent 
God's anger on the Day of Judgement by being angry at ourselves, (13) it is arguable 
that Clarissa exercises on herself such preventative anger. 
To those who surround her deathbed, Clarissa seems well-prepared for death, 
assured that her repentance has been accepted, and impressing the beholders with 
' such a sweetness of temper, so much patience and resignation, as she seems to be 
mistress of . 
(p. 1178) She herself remarks on the gradual detachment from the 
satisfactions of this life in the death with which God blesses her. Such sentiments 
belong to a well-established tradition of Christian thought. St. Augustine sees death 
as the gateway to life, and expresses this paradox in terms with which Clarissa would 
concur: 
God has granted to faith so great a gift of grace that death, 
which all agree to be the contrary of life, has become the means by 
which men pass into life. (14) 
Why is it then, that the death of Clarissa, moving and even awe-inspiring as it 
is, convincing the reader as much as Belford and the other onlookers that this is 
indeed the passing of a saint, so disturbing? And why, in retrospect does 
it make her 
life also disturbing? 
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he whole presentation of her death, so closely reminiscent of 
exemplary Christian deathbeds described by Law and Taylor, 
corresponding in every several detail to such portrayals of the attitudes of patience, 
charity and resignation appropriate to the passing of a Christian soul, is undercut by 
ambiguities, and it is impossible to ascertain whether Richardson intended that his 
readers' response should recognize these, or whether he himself recognized them. 
Richardson's desire to control his readers' response is well known, but this may well 
be an instance in which not only the reader escapes that control, but also the 
character. The psychological verisimilitude of his presentation has its own demands, 
the fulfilment of which makes Clarissa the living figure that she is for the reader, and 
which distinguishes her from the exemplary figures of the conduct books, figures 
which are never intended to be other than one-dimensional. 
The death of Clarissa is both complicated and enriched by such complexities, 
because the life of Clarissa,, as Richardson presents it to us, also leaves so many 
questions imPossible to answer definitively. Richardson's avowed intention was to 
offer an example of Christian living and dying, but the character he creates would be 
far less effective did his presentation not trouble the reader. Clarissa's progress 
towards Heaven is not shown to be merely the linear journey of a young girl of 
conventional piety towards a deeper relationship with God, but the struggle of a soul 
to transcend her nature in the face of that nature's inherited damage, and so 
liable to 
the very end to misinterpretations and failings. This is, after all, the 
Christian 
conception of what it is to be human, and of what the Christian vocation 
in this world 
is, to struggle towards God in despite of a nature flawed by sin and weakness. 
No 
less an authority than St. Paul finds himself bewildered 
by the complexities of his 
275 
own nature, and attributes his difficulties to the presence of the damage attendant on 
the fall: 
For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold 
under sin. 
For that which I do I allow not- for what I would, that do I not-, 
but what I hate, that do 1. (Romans 7.14-15) 
His words suggest a tension between the conscious will, assisted by grace 
towards what is good, and the impulses, not always recognized as such, of a fallen 
nature, which drive the individual towards what reason may tell him is opposed to the 
law of God. They also suggest that both conscious and unconscious motives may co- 
exist, to perplex and trouble the soul. 
If Richardson's heroine is to provide the example he wishes to offer, she 
cannot be exempt from such complexities. The question remains as to how far he 
himself intended that she should reflect them. From the beginning of the novel, it is 
made clear that Clarissa's formidable will, in every act and intention, is exercised to 
shape her life and conduct according to the prescriptions of Christianity. Seeking 
grace, she appears to the reader to have had it bestowed upon her to assist her 
disposition to virtue. However, Samuel Johnson's comment upon Clarissa that 'there 
is always something she prefers to truth, (") must be admitted to have some justice. 
The reader may or may not agree that Clarissa always expresses preferences other 
than those of truth, but from an early stage in the novel, it is apparent that she 
certainly does so in some important respects. It is as clear to the reader, as it is 
to 
Anna, for example, that Clarissa is attracted to Lovelace, and either remains unaware 
of it, or is unable to admit it to herself 
The reader is left to wonder in what other respects 
Clarissa may fail to knoxv 
her own heart, and in her failure to do so, may precipitate what 
is in human terms her 
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tragedy, if in Divine terms her triumph The theologian might say that her flawed 
nature makes her liable to such failures of reason or to self-deception, but that by the 
grace of God, her sanctification is brought out of this evil. A secular reader of the 
novel might see Clarissa's belief that Providence has brought about her salvation 
through suffering, as further evidence of self-deception, Whichever view Is 
embraced, no reader, of whatever persuasion, can deny that Clarissa's progress 
towards Heaven, or simply towards death, remains problematic. 
Long before Clarissa reaches the point when she is about to enjoy the fullness 
of Truth in the Christian sense, the reader becomes aware that 'truth' in the sense of 
which Johnson appears to be speaking , 
is not always to be clearly defined. Dying, 
Clarissa remarks that eighteen of her nineteen years have been happy, and expresses 
her gratitude for this blessing. At first sight this remark may appear to reflect a truth. 
Clarissa claims to have enjoyed the indulgence of her parents and the affection of all 
who have surrounded her. Yet it is clear to the reader that the Harlowe family, with 
its ambitious and soulless materialism, can hardly have been a happy household. The 
autocracy of Mr. Harlowe, the uneasy passivity of his wife, the sharp envy of her 
siblings have surrounded Clarissa, not love. Moreover, one remark to Anna, early in 
the novel, not only comes strangely from a young, healthy woman, but also suggests 
a sense that her apparently favoured position in this household, full of tensions, may 
be conditional: love may be withdrawn. Commenting on the family upset after the 
duet which opens the novel, Clarissa writes, I have sometimes wished 
that it had 
pleased God to have taken me in my last fever, when I had everybody's 
love and 
good opinion'. (p. 41) 
To wish for death as a response to family 
disturbance may seem a little 
e and must argue for a helghtened tenslon in the writer. 
It is not the response extrem 
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of a young woman who enjoys a happy life and faces the future with the optimism of 
youth. Clarissa's thoughts turn much upon death, even before she faces the prospect 
of dying young. Some time later, still in heir father's house, and increasingly 
perplexed by Lovelace's machinations, she expresses her fears that he might come to 
Harlowe Place in the following terms- 
If he come hither (and very desirous he is of my leave to 
come), I am afraid there will be murder. To avoid that, if there were 
no other way, I would most willingly be buried alive. 
(p. 142) 
Such a hypothetical condition as being buried alive is a very curious 
conclusion to an expression of fear about a possible meeting between James and 
Lovelace, although Clarissa no doubt consciously uses the phrase in a conventional 
way to suggest the strength of her apprehensions. Her fear of the possible dangers of 
such a meeting is reasonable enough, but the reader may recall this remark later when 
Clarissa describes a dream in which Lovelace does indeed bury her, after stabbing 
her. The sexual overtones of the dream are frequently noted, but Clarissa's words 
here, with their apparent dislocation of meaning between a possible danger to James 
of being pierced by Lovelace's sword, and an alternative of herself being buried 
alive, suggest a confused connection in her mind between Lovelace's skill as a 
swordsman (perhaps lover), herself, and death. If Clarissa permits Lovelace's 
presence, she, as well as James, may be in danger, but of yielding to his attractions. 
Clarissa fears spiritual death perhaps, as a result of such an encounter, and would 
prefer her own physical death to the loss of her soul. 
A number of commentators have already pointed out that for 
Clarissa, death 
of -f . 
(16) if she were presented with presents itself as an altemative to the distresses 11 e 
a secret desire of the heart which conflicted with conscious principle, 
the only 
resolution to such a conflict which did not embrace dishonour, 
disgrace or sin, might 
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well be death. It certainly seems desirable as an alternative to marriage with Solmes, 
and to conflict with her family. Finding that familial love is indeed conditional, she 
adds: 
I don't know what to do, not V- God forgive me., but I am 
very impatient! -I wish - But I don't know what to wish, without a 
sin! - Yet I wish it would please God to take me to his mercy! -I can 
meet with none here! - What a world is this! What is there in it 
desirable? The good we hope for, so strangely mixed, that one knows 
not what to wish for- and one half of mankind tormenting the other, 
and being tormented themselves in tormenting! (p. 224) 
In all this confusion,, Clarissa clings to one value: her fixed point is that she 
must not sin, yet to avoid sin seems impossible. God could resolve her pain if He 
would only take her, but God declines to do so. Clarissa's reflections are not unlikely 
in the circumstances, but the frequency with which her thoughts tum to death as an 
alternative to the pains of life, prepares the reader for what may in retrospect, appear 
an inevitable conclusion to that life. 
By the time that Clarissa's physical decline begins, her relationship with 
Lovelace, culminating in the rape, has led her to abandon all hope of happiness on 
earth. It is one thing to long for unlon with God, but it is quite another to seek to be 
divested of a body which its possessor characterizes as 'viler earth' than that which is 
thrown on the dead. The reader cannot be sure that the remarks which Clarissa 
addresses to Anna on the joys of Heaven reflect the Christian desire for union with 
God rather than a disgust of her own violated flesh- 
But we shall one day, I hope (and that must comfort us 
both), 
meet never to pal-t again! Then, divested of the shades of 
body, shall 
we be all light and all mind - Then how unalloyed, 
how perfect, will 
be our friendship! Our love then will have one and the same adorable 
object, and we shall enjoy it and each other to all etemity! 
(p. 13 48) 
Clarissa's anticipation of the enjoyment of the Beatific 
Vision in perfect 
charity with a beloved friend is impeccably orthodox 
in sentiment, but Christian 
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theology has always recognized that man, unlike the angels, is a composite being, so 
much so that body and soul are inextricably linked. The Christian faith rests, as St. 
Paul tells us, on the Resurrection of Christ, and Christians must therefore look to the 
resurrection of the body. (17) Clarissa apparently does not. Her vision of Heaven Is of 
a state in which the body is forever absent. St. Augustine has some remarks on the 
relationship between body and soul which have an application to the state of mind 
indicated by Clarissa's remarks above- 
Some say that they would prefer not to have a body at all, but 
they are mistaken. For what they hate is not their body, but its 
imperfections, its dead weight. What they want is not to have no body 
at all, but to have one free from corruption and totally responsive. (18) 
Clarissa does not want a body which has been subjected to another's 
corruption, nor one which may respond to another's attractions. Certainly, in 
complaining that her body 'encumbers', she hates the weight that Lovelace's 
imperfections, and - possibly - her own, have imposed on it. St. Augustine 
continues that men must be told how to love their bodies so as to care for them 
sensibly, and adds, 'For it is equally obvious that one loves one's own body and 
wants it to be healthy and sound'. (19) However, this is not at all obvious in Clarissa's 
case. She finds existence in the body virtually unendurable, records its decline with a 
degree of detachment which amounts to satisfaction, 
(20) 
and eagerly awaits its 
dissolution. (pp. 1336-1337) Such satisfaction suggests less a Christlan readiness to accept 
the will of God,, than the hidden fulfilment of a will of her own. Heaven is only open 
to those, in her view., who are 'all light and all mind'. 
The body, claims Aquinas, is not intrinsically evil, and is to 
be loved as a 
Divine creation, but not the sins which we may commit through W 
Our bodies were created by God, not as the Manicheans 
pretend by some evil principle. So we can serve God with our 
bodies, 
and should love them with the charity with which we 
love God. What 
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we should not love is the taint of sin and the damage that its (21) 
punishment has wreaked in our bodies. 
Clarissa, it seems, has confused the sin committed on her body for sin 
committed by her body, and makes the error of hating that body itself As for her 
conception of eternity as a state in which she will be forever disembodied spirlt, and 
happy because of that very disembodiment, both Aquinas and St. Augustine appear to 
be agreed upon the matter, since the former's discussion of the question uses the 
latter as an authority. Man as a composite being cannot fully enjoy God as a 
disembodied spirit, but is distracted by a natural yearning for his lost body, into 
which his spiritual joy will overflow. (22) Aquinas disputes with those who cialm that 
'the soul needs to be entirely separated from its body', and asserts that since it is 
natural for body and soul to be united, the fulfiiment of the soul cannot exclude this 
natural fulfilment, and that for human happiness to be complete in every way, 'it 
presupposes and results in complete well-being of our bodies'. (23) 
Clarissa's experiences have deprived her of the joyful anticipation of this 
complete human fulfilment in Heaven, as they have deprived her of the hope of any 
fulfilment) if she desired it, through the body on earth. What then, if Clarissa rejects 
her life along with her body, would she make of St. Augustine's triumphant 
declaration? 
At the resurrection the saints will inhabit the actual bodies 
in 
which they suffered the hardships of this life on earth, yet these 
bodies will be such that no trace of corruption or frustration will affect 
their flesh, nor will any sorrow or mischance interfere with their 
felicity. (24) 
Clarissa's response to the hardships that she has expenenced In th, s 
fife is to 
reject the body which has suffered them. Such a conclusion can only 
be the result of 
the imperfections of a fallen nature, which does not see that the renewal of shattered 
completeness is not only possible in the next life, but is to 
be expected. However, 
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Clarissa's conduct, in literary terms, may also be seen to reflect the temper of her 
times. As Jean Hagstrurn points out- 
The notion of woman as too fi7agile for masculine handling 
was never totally absent from eighteenth-century sensibility. This 
tendency to make the angel in woman not only transcend but 
sometimes even deny her body was, as often in Western culture, 
associated with religious feeling and the hesitations in love induced 
by Christian asceticism. (25) 
Clarissa has denied her body's response to Lovelace. She now carries her 
reservations a step further and attempts to deny that body's worth and the prospect 
that it will share the glory of resurrection. In this respect, the theologian might regard 
Richardson's heroine as a heretic. When St. Augustine describes the beatified state, 
he clearly means that man will enter into it in the fullness of his composite nature. 
My God, my mercy, I shall not turn aside until you gather all 
that I am into that holy place of peace, rescuing me from this world 
where I am dismembered and deformed, and giving me new form and 
new strength for eternity. (26) 
C larissa may be mistaken about the state in which she will pass eternity, 
but not about that union with God which, according to Christian 
theology, follows death. It is a union which Clarissa expresses in terms of a mystic 
marriage. She is not alone in using the imagery of courtship, marriage and 
consummation to express such a union, since these images are consistently employed 
by mystics. Moreover the Church itself has always used the Song of 
Solomon as an 
image which celebrates its mystical union with Christ. However, in 
Clarissa's case) 
the use of such language must be considered in relation to the 
blasting of her earthly 
hopes of fulfilment, and her use of such imagery in relation to the 
Divine bridegroom 
is counterpointed by reference to those occasions when she is 
being prepared, 
unwillingly, to be the bride of Solmes, and when, perhaps 
less unwillingly, but with 
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fearful modesty, the bride of Lovelace One commentator has remarked that 
Clarissa's two earthly courtships lead to a third marriage with death, (27) but this 
comment does not quite convey the ambivalence of Clarissa Is final choice of 
bridegroom. In effect, Christ and death are equally desirable) but only one is 
consciously elected. 
For Clarissa death and wedding clothes appear to be associated, but she 
comes to transform an association of such garments with distress into an association 
with blessedness. Before setting out for London with Lovelace, she expresses a 
premonition of approaching disaster in the following terms- 
If I could flatter myself that my indifference to all the joys of 
this life proceeded from proper motives, and not rather from the 
disappointments and mortifications my pride has met with, how much 
rather, I think, should I choose to be wedded to my shroud than to any 
man on earth ! (pp. 513-514) 
The question must remain, whether Clarissa's unconscious motives, after the 
rape, do persuade her that her choice of a shroud as a wedding garment may be the 
object of legitimate desire. After her second escape from Lovelace, Clarissa wears 
only the shining white that both asserts and symbolizes purity, but shrouds too, are 
white, and one of her papers, written in the aftermath of the rape, suggests that a 
moment of determination has taken place in her in favour of the shroud as a wedding 
garment. Lovelace has indeed been the 'fretting moth that corrupteth the fairest 
garment' : 
Who now shall assist in the solemn preparations? Who now 
shall provide the nuptial ornaments, which soften and divert the 
apprehensions of the fearful virgin? (P* 892) 
Despite the conviction of her rational self, when that is restored, that she is 
essentially unchanged and that her will has not been corrupted, Clarissa seems to 
have another self which may hold its own conviction of a virgin state lost, and of a 
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purity which will not be applauded in this world. That self will provide the nuptial 
ortiaments, the coffin and the shroud. Christ is a bridegroom of whom she may have 
no apprehensions. 
Having been threatened with Solmes as a bridegroom, and betrayed by 
Lovelace, whom her natural , if unacknowledged, response might have led her to 
accept, Clarissa's choice of a heavenly spouse is not an unlikely one, given the piety C 
which has always characterized her, and which, deepening under the pressure of 
adversity, offers an alternative fulfilment to the earthly. 'I am upon a better 
preparation than for an earthly husband', she tells Mrs. Norton, (P" 121 ) but it is difficult 
for the reader to ascertain, initially, whether Clarissa is in reality more prepared to 
embrace death than the Divine spouse. Her mind dwells much upon this mystical 
marriage. It is the reader who may have doubts as to the identity of the bridegroom; 
Clarissa appears to have none. 
As for me, never bride was so ready as I am. My wedding 
garments are bought - and though not fine or gaudy to the sight ... 
(for I have no beholders' eyes to wish to glitter in), yet will they be 
the easiest, the happiest suit, that ever bridal maiden wore - for they 
are such as carry with them a security against all those anxieties, 
pains, and perturbations, which sometimes succeed to the most 
promising outsettings. 
And now, my dear Mrs. Norton, do I wish for no other. Oh 
hasten, good God, if it be thy blessed will, the happy moment that I 
am to be decked out in this all-quIetIng garb ! 
(p. 1331) 
Saints have used such imagery to convey their moments of union with 
God. 
ft is not, therefore, surprising that Clarissa, who claims that her frame of mind might 
have had its origin in disappointment, but has now developed into a 
desire for union 
with the Absolute, 
(P* 1121) 
should employ it to convey her desire for that union. 
(28) 
However, her remarks, for all their context of mysticism, are still 
disturbing. As 
Evelyn Underhill points out, the mystics have used the imagery of the wedding 
as 
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exactly that, an image to express the notion of the desired union with God, and the 
mention of bridal clothes for them is the means to convey their spiritual preparedness 
for such a union. 
(29) In Clarissa's case, here, the term 'wedding garments' refers to 
an actual, concrete reality, to physical objects, her shroud and her coffin, and these 
garments she declares will be 'the easiest, the happiest suit that ever bridal maiden 
wore . 
It seems that it is less the mystical union which Clarissa seeks than the relief 
of pain and distress which will come with the assumption of those wedding garments. 
Perhaps the most disturbing word of all is Cmaiden'. As in her papers after the rape, 
Clarissa remarks on the virginity of the bride, a virginity which, technically, has been 
wrested from her. She writes as if maidenhood may be restored by the assumption of 
these garments. Her mind seems to turn, unconsciously but not unnaturally, upon the 
violation of her person, as it will again in the symbolism of the emblems she chooses 
for her coffin 
(pp. 1305-1306) 
and on the need, although she is innocent, for atonement. 
What she casts off in order to assume her wedding garments are 'these rags of 
mortality 1, , 
(P' 1341) a term that can only refer to her body, and which conveys a 
revulsion disquieting to the reader. 
It must appear that despite Clarissa's rational and correct conviction of 
innocence of any complicity in the rape, her underlying response to violation has 
left 
her with a sense of defilement, even of guilt, which determines a choice of 
death. 
The self-examination she undertook to ascertain her innocence was necessarily and 
properly the concern of the intellect, as conscience according to Christian 
belief is a 
function of reason, but her just conclusion has not, could not, take into account 
the 
emotional response to so traumatic an event. The reader will 
have noticed in Clarissa 
before a divergence between intellect and emotion, her intellect could 
lay down 
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conditions for a response to Lovelace, while her emotions responded in despite of 
reason, and without conditions. This effect has been attributed to her confusion 
between moral and emotional analysis, but in Christian terms, such a divergence 
reflects the disintegrated state of fallen nature, and therefore such confusion is a state 
to which any human being, not only Clarissa, may be liable. (30) Clarissa herself could 
not perceive this divergence, and she does not now, when she compares her 
approaching death to the nuptials of the virgin bride, recognize the expression of an 
unconscious conviction of a defilement which her reason knows is not her own, and a 
conviction that death may appear the only expiation. Such a conclusion may be the 
resolution to her sense of the vileness of her 'self. The bridal garments she has 
purchased do indeed offer a security against all perturbation, but Clarissa's words 
read as if she is seeking a conclusion to an unbearable situation here on earth rather 
than positively anticipating the mystic union. The reader has no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of her contention that she wishes for no other garb, but must have some 
doubt as to why she so wishes. 
As Lovelace asks with callous detachment, or perhaps with a guilt 
which cannot bear its own reflections, Js death the nahiral 
g as the remark may be, Lovelace has consequence of a rape? " 
(p. 1439) Shockin 
touched upon a question which must trouble the reader who looks in vain 
for a 
description of any recognizable symptom of a disease which could bring, within a 
few months, a girl in blooming health to skeletal death. As Clarissa's decline 
begins, 
he must be uncomfortably aware of those earlier remarks of hers, while still enjoying 
that health which indicated an underlying attraction to death, and 
her frequently 
31 C") 
*11 not live long expressed conviction, in the aftermath of the rape, that she wi 
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Richardson's scheme demanded the death of his heroine, she could not 
otherwise enjoy the reward promised to the faithful soul who serves God through all 
vicissitudes, and who perceives in suffering the hand of Providence. "I could not 
think of leaving my Heroine short of Heaven'. he wrote to Lady Bradshaigh. 
However, it is not only Richardson's formal scheme which requires such an outcome 
for his heroine, but the inexorable logic of the psychology of the character he has 
created. Clarissa's initial, disturbed response to rape is to think of death, her papers 
make that clear when she scribbles these lines- 
When honour's lost, 'tis a relief to die- 
Death's but a sure retreat from infamy. 
(p. 893) 
However, Clarissa is in her right mind when she tells Mrs. Norton that she 
may only receive a pardon from her parents when she is in extremis, as a viaticum, 
and adds that she does not expect to live long. 
(p. 992) A little later she is writing to 
Anna: 
Let me slide quietly into my grave, and let it not be 
remembered, except by one friendly tear, and no more, dropped from 
your gentle eye ... on the 
happy day that shall shut up all my sorrows 
(p. 1013) 
These are clearly the words of a young woman who not only expects an early 
death, but who feels painfully wounded by betrayal and rejection: Clarissa's 
rationality has been restored by means of the ordeal of self-examination to which she 
subjected herself after the rape, but emotions are not amenable to reason in man's 
fallen state (at least, in the Christian view). Such remarks as Clarissa's reflect a 
disturbance which would be a natural consequence of what she 
has undergone. 
Richardson's presentatIon of her state is true to psychological probability. 
Death Is 
not a natural consequence of rape, but disturbance i. s, and no matter 
how much 
rationality may strive to find the means of accommodation with such an experience, 
287 
itself compounding the earlier psychological pressures of conflict and rejection by the 
Harlowes, the emotional response to such traumas may well be to seek to withdraw 
from a life which has proved so Painful, even if withdrawal is not consciously 
recognized as such. 
Just as Clarissa's thoughts have turned upon death, even before leaving her 
father's house, so they have turned upon suicide. It appears to be a notion that both 
attracts and repels her as a solution to her difficulties. If it does not attract her, there 
is no reason why it should be in her thoughts at all. When Aunt Hervey desires 
Clarissa to assure her that she would offer no violence to herself, the latter replies 
with an impeccably Christian response- 
God, I said,, had given me more grace I hoped than to be guilty 
of so horrid a rashness. I was His creature, - and not my own. 
(p. 341) 
Yet even so, a little later Clarissa records for Anna her remark to Lovelace 
that if she could die when she wished, without unpardonable sin, she would prefer to 
do so rather than leave her father's house under his protection. 
(p. 350) Having accepted 
that protection she twice threatens suicide, as a response to Lovelace's 
encroachments in the fire scene, and again in the pen-knife scene, a situation which 
recalls the response of Lucretia, that classical pattern of outraged chastity, which as 
Ian Donaldson's study The Rapes of Lucretia (32) has demonstrated, caught the 
imagination of succeeding ages, and underwent various transformations in doing so. 
Clarissa, however, is a Christian heroine, and is in no doubt of the sin of self- 
destruction- 
I dare die. It is in defence of my honour. God will be merciful 
to my poor soul! -I expect no mercy from thee! ... 
My heart from 
principle abhors the act which thou makest necessary! 
(PP-950-951) 
However Clarissa's remarks here suggest that she may not regard self- 
destruction as absolutely prohibited in extreme circumstances, even given that 
these 
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circumstances are sufficient to cause her to talk somewhat wildly. In this respect, her 
remarks may be seen to reflect to some degree the controversy concerning the 
culpability of suicide which characterized the latter part of the seventeenth century 
and the eighteenth century. Countless commentators contemporary with Richardson, 
or earlier, had expressed a variety of conclusions on the subject, ranging from those 
churchmen who expressed anew the traditional Christian view of suicide as a sin 
which involved an inevitable damnation, to Hume,, whose advocacy of suicide he 
prudently declined to have published except posthumously. 
(33) Clarissa might have I. - 
found some support for her assertion here that God would be merciful to a woman 
who dies in defence of her honour in John Donne's treatise Biathanatos, which 
declared that in certain circumstances, suicide may be lawftil if the glory of God is 
thereby advanced and if the party is disinterested. He argues that Protestantism has 
no established human judge of sins, and that the individual may then choose to 
condemn himself if his conscience regards it as lawful to do so. 
(34) 
No modem commentator appears to dispute the fact that the death of Clarissa 
is, in fact, if not in conscious intention, a case of suicide, the result Of grief Or 
guilt. (") Clarissa herself asserts her abhorrence of the act upon principle, and 
Lovelace remarks of the possibility of self-destruction on her part that 'there is no 
(p. 728) iberate fear of that from her deliberate mind' . 
However, it is not Clarissa's del 
mind that always determines her actions. Moreover, Richardson himself, elsewhere 
offers a comment which may reflect on Lovelace's remark. 'The mind 
has great 
I is power over the body, he writes, but he does not speci y whether that mind 
deliberate or not . 
(36) Belford expresses fears that Clarissa's resentment may cause 
her 
'like another Lucretia' to kill herself, but adds that if her piety should preserve 
her 
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(p. 710) from violence 'wasting grief will soon put a period to heir days. His words are 
prophetic, but more than grief may be involved in this outcome. 
St. Augustine tells us that Lucretia committed an act of injustice on herself in 
killing an innocent woman. He argues that only she could know if she condemned 
herself because- 
She was so enticed by her own desire that she consented to the 
act and that when she came to punish herself she was so grieved that 
she thought death her only expiation. (37) 
Even if Lucretia were guilty, he says, penance, not self-murder was required. 
He concludes that to Christian women, suicide is forbidden in all circumstances, even 
following an act of violation; they do not 'take vengeance on themselves for 
another's crime'. (38) He adds that nowhere in the Sacred Books can be found any 
injunction or permission to commit suicide, 'either to ensure immortality or to avoid 
(39) 
or escape any evil'. In the light of these pronouncements, it would appear that 
Clarissa's threat to conunit suicide to defend her honour rests on very shaky 
theological ground. 
Lovelace's remark that there is no fear of suicide arising from her 'deliberate 
mind' opens up the question of what unconscious motives may exist in that mind, 
whether Clarissa has either condemned herself to death in preference to the misery of 
a ruined life in this world, or is driven by an unjustified and unrecognized sense of 
guilt for her very attraction to Lovelace, presenting itself to her as complicity 
in an 
act of which her conscious mind exonerates her. If so, she may indeed be a suicide, 




represented by Christian orthodoxy as a function of reason. Clarissa has not willed 
complicity in the rape; she does not consciously will her death, 
but the hidden 
determinations of her heart may mistakenly assign guilt for the one, and express a 
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preference for the other. Certainly a number of modern commentators have pointed 
out that in her situation are many of the factors which would predispose an individual 
towards such a choice. 
(40) 
Clarissa frequently expresses, during her long decline, a desire for death, but 
does not appear to exhibit any positive resolution to end her life by any act of 
omission or commission. She is scrupulous in obeying the instructions of her 
medical attendants, and in seeking their advice as to how she should preserve her life 
until it should please God to relieve her of it. She writes to Anna that she has 
rejected any notion of suicide and 'like a poor coward desert my post, when I can 
maintain it, and when it is my duty to maintain it'. She adds that she would think it 
sinful to neglect herself wilfully, and so purposely bring about her death. (P-' 
117) 
The important word she uses is 'wilfully', since the reader is reminded that 
the will, too, is regarded as a function of reason. Unless the reader considers Clarissa 
a liar or a hypocrite, he must take what she says as sincere and as expressive of her 
conscious intentions, but Clarissa has demonstrated before that she sometimes cannot 
easily distinguish between the impulses of her emotions and the conclusions of her 
reason. Meanwhile, Clarissa's medical attendants are by no means convinced that 
she is not responsible for her decline, and believe she could still recover with 
adequate rest and nourishment. 
(p. 1129) Moreover, Lovelace, an acute observer, 
expresses in his usual mocking and theatrical manner to Mr- Hickman, his own 
conviction that Clarissa has chosen a new suitor, 'His name, in short is DEATH! - 
DEATK sijr . ..,. 
(p. 1097) 
It must be accepted that Clarissa chooses to die, not 'wilfully', but at a 
deeper 
level than her conscious reason may deternune. Abstention from 
food as she 
abstains , is not without precedent in a religious context. 
Caroline Walker Bynum 
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points out that for religious women of the Middle Ages, fasting was a way of 
cstripping the self of pleasure and support', and refers to St. Catherine of Siena, who 
was (like Clarissa) accused of committing a form of suicide by abstention from food. 
Like Clarissa, she responded by referring to herself as suff 11 (41) ering from an infirmity. 
Bynum also notes that for one strain of Mediaeval moral teaching, fasting was 
associated with the rejection of the body, 
(42) 
and that for some mystics, hungering for 
God was associated with rejection of earthly food. 
(43) 
In all these respects, Clarissa might be seen to fit a pattern of female 
asceticism. However,, there are other aspects to the rejection of food which are more 
disturbing and might equally apply in Clarissa's case- John Donne asserts that 
'indiscreet fasting' is a means of 'deserting' ourselves, and quotes St. Jerome on the 
subject to support a view that such fasting is a covert form of suicide. (44) Clarissa's 
medical attendants certainly regard her fasting as 'indiscreet', but what may be open 
to question is whether Clarissa herself believes, at a deeper level than she is 
consciously aware of, that she undertakes a course of action which at once punishes 
and subdues the flesh. Fasting has always had a penitential aspect in Judaeo- 
Christian traditions, and yet, the interpreters of those traditions add a warning that 
fasting must be used in moderation: 
For right reason leads us to abstain only when and as we 
ought, with a cheerful heart, and for God's glory, not our own. 
Fasting as such is a sort of punishment, not something one would 
choose to do unless it had a useful purpose. 
(45) 
The question in Clarissa's case turns on the purpose of the 
fast which she 
claims, and believes, to be the result of physical infirmity. Calvin offers a number of 
reasons for fasting, which appear to have some relevance to her situation: 
We use it either to mortify and subdue the 
flesh, that it may 
not wanton,, or to prepare the better for prayer and 
holy meditation, or 
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to give evidence of humbling ourselves before God, when we would 
confess our guilt before him. 
(46) 
All these motives may find expression in Clarissa's fasting. Her heart has 
responded, even if in a blameless fashion, to Lovelace, and now fasting subdues, the 
flesh that could have given physical expression to that impulse of the heart as if it had 
indeed done so- fasting punishes Clarissa for having been human enough to feel so 
natural a response. Once the flesh is subdued, the soul may concentrate on the things 
of spirit, and seek to embrace a Divine bridegroom. Finally, Clarissa's repentance, 
whether for the pride she acknowledges or the desire she does not, finds a satisfactory 
mode of expression, 
In De Doctrina Christiana, Milton asserts that fasting may avert God's wrath 
for a while,, and adds, with the authority of Scripture, that if accompanied by prayer it 
can work miracles; it can cast out evil spirits. (47) Clarissa may well wish to avert 
God's wrath, since her penitence for the acknowledged sins of pride and 
disobedience is so great. If her own secret heart finds her guilty of more, although 
her reason does not, then Milton's comment that fasting can cast out devils has some 
application here; Clarissa's fast may cast out any devil in her own flesh. Fasting at 
once punishes desire, and precludes its further existence, Events after the rape might 
have seemed to confirm an unconscious conviction that punishment was due. 
She 
was imprisoned; imprisonment is the habitual punishment for guilt. A man offered to 
pay to free her; what kind of woman did this man conceive her to 
be? She was 
unaware that the man was Belford and that his motives were pure. 
It seems that 
Clarissa, innocent though she is, might regard Lovelace's dying cry of 
'Let this 
expiate! ' as appropriate to herself, since the process of 
her dying must seem very 
much like an expiation and an act of reconciliation. 
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hat Clarissa does as she dies is to attempt to reverse a sense of a 
violation which lies deeper than the knowledge she has of the loss 
of physical integrity. By seeking a union with the Divine bridegroom, she can 
obliterate the sense that she had, after the rape, as Kinkead-Weekes points out, (48) that 
Lovelace had invaded not only her body but her very 'self, that he would always be 
with her. In giving up her life, Clarissa can preserve her 'self and reverse the effects 
of an unhallowed and undesired union- 
But when all my doors are fast, and nothing but the keyhole 
open, and the key of late put into that, to be where you are, in a 
manner without opening any of them ... 
(p. 894) 
For this horror, she seeks to substitute the experience of another union, which 
will cancel the sense of Lovelace's presence. For Lovelace's uninvited possession of 
her body, she substitutes the Divine bridegroom's possession of her soul. In many 
ways, Clarissa's self-abnegation as she dies resembles the journey undertaken by the 
mystics, to abandon the world, to detach herself from all earthly loves, even those of 
family and fiiends, and finally to abandon self in order to seek union with God. 
What she seeks appears to be the state of which St. Teresa of Avila writes, in terms 
which strikingly recall those used by Clarissa above to refer to the sense of 
Lovelace's presence ever with her, but St. Teresa's words refer to the abiding 
presence of God - 
Between the Spiritual Marriage and the body there is even less 
connection, for this secret union takes place in the deepest centre of 
the soul, which must be where God Ffimself dwells, and I do not think 
there is any need of a door by which to enter it ... 
The Lord appears in 
(49) the centre of the soul ... 
The mystic may regard the body, or life itself as a prison, as 
Clarissa does. 
4- However, as Evelyn Underhill's study of mysticism points out, such 
figures as 
St. Teresa, for all the moments when they enjoy a foretaste of Heaven in a sense of 
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union with God, are firmly grounded in the duties and demands of this life. (5) 
Moreover, St. Teresa herself comments that while such favoured souls 'are no more 
afraid of death than they would be of a gentle rapture'; 
(52) 
they learn not to desire to 
die, but to live so that they may benefit others and thereby praise God. Longing for Z-) 
God means, then, that the mystIc must so far give up self as to be prepared to await 
that final union in order to do God's will in the world. 
The reader of Richardson's novel can never be sure whether his heroine is 
prepared for such utter self-abnegation or whether in dying, she exerts her own 
unconscious, formidable will rather than waiting on the will of God. 'Nothing hath 
separated us from God but our own will, or rather our own will is our separation from 
God", says William Law. (53) Clarissa recognizes that 'Life was not so easily 
extinguished ... as some 
imagine', and adds, 'But God's will must be done! Her only 
(p. 1341) 
prayer now was for submission to What she does not recognize is that she 
may not so easily be able to make a distinction between her own will and God's. 
A Christian apologist might argue that Clarissa would not die, whatever her 
motives in longing for death might be, unless in doing so she fulfilled the designs of 
Providence. (54) Clarissa has no doubt herself that Providence has overseen both her 
trials and her early death, and has designed her sanctification by means of them. In 
her experience, God has chosen her for Himself She writes to Mrs. Norton 'God 
will have no rivals in the hearts of those he sanctifies'. 
(p. 1338) The saints have said as 
much. (5) The reader may have reservations about Clarissa's Interpretation of 
her 
own experiences and her knowledge of her own heart, but she makes sense of 
the 
suffering she has endured at the hands of Lovelace as the expression of a 
Dvine 
dispensation to bnng her to Himself 
29Z, 
Those who are witnesses to Clarissa's death have no doubt of her sanctity, 
just as Richardson intends his readers should have none. 'I cannot but look upon her 
as one just entering into a companionship with saints and angels', Belford wntes to 
Lovelace, 
(p. 1275) 
and records her last words- 'Come - Oh come - blessed Lord 
JESUS! . 
(p. 1362ý Nor do any others doubt that she is a saint. Colonel Morden "rites 
(p. 1369) to James, 'Her beatification commenced yesterday afternoon' , while Anna, 
viewing her ffiend's body, refers to her having 'commenced angel' . 
(p. 1403) Lovelace 
demands her heart, to be kept enclosed in a golden casket as if it were a relic in a 
reliquary, and speaks of the 'sacred person of my beloved' . 
(pp. 1383-1384) Clarissa's 
person, like those of many a saint, appears to be untouched by death; incorruption has 
traditionally been considered evidence of sanctity, and in particular, of the greatest 
purity. (56) Belford writes to Lovelace of the effect on the beholders of the sight of 
Clarissa's mortal remains- 
We could not help taking a view of the lovely corpse, and 
admiring the charming serenity of her noble aspect. The women 
declared they never saw death so lovely before; and that she looked as 
if in an easy slumber, the colour having not quite having left her 
cheeks and lips. (p. 1367) 
Clarissa's corpse is received with all the honour due to the 'virgin saint' 
which Lovelace once called her. 
(p. 722) Only women are allowed to prepare the 
s 'fied body f it is carried to its resting place In the hall of 
Harlowe 
ancti or burial; 
Place., to receive the awe and honour of the beholders, 
by six maidens, and attended 
to its burial by a great concourse of people. The church 
itself is crowded as if for 
some great and solemn event, 'Such a profound, such a silent respect 
did I never see 
paid at the funeral of princes', says Morden. 
(p. 1407) 
If not Clarissa's miracles, her acts of virtue and charity 
are the talk of all the 
congregation, who join in a chorus of praise to their 
departed saint, and amidst that 
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praise and the tears of all, Clanssa descends into the vault. The whole description of 
the funeral, the assemblage of potent images - the corpse untouched by corruption, 
Lovelace's demands for her relics, the public acclamation of sanctity - make 
Richardson's presentation of the event as near a formal canonization as Protestant 
sensibilities will allow, but a canonization it is, even so, with public acclamation 
taking the place of Papal decree. However, many early saints were canonized by 
such loving recognition, and Clarissa is presented as a saint in this ancient tradition. 
And yet, for the reader perplexed by the complexities of Clarissa's life and 
death, the comments of two minor figures, present at the funeral, perhaps offer the 
nearest approach to what Richardson may have perceived as the truth. Mr. Mullins, 
one of the suitors she rejected while still in her father's house, casts his eyes upon her 
coffin and remarks that, 'In that little space ... 
is included all human 
excellence'. 
(p. 1408) Mr. Melvill, the clegyman who conducts the service, declares 
when he touches on the 'unhappy step that was the cause of her untimely fate', that 
he 'attributed it to the state of things below, in which there could not be absolute 
i, (p. 1408) perfection . 
These men, whose appearance in the novel is limited to this single occasion, 
have the right of the matter. Clarissa's virtue is heroic, but it is the virtue of a human 
being. Richardson's own comment on his heroine in the Preface to the third edition 
celebrates her perfection, but he qualifies his remarks by adding that she is perfect 'as 
far as is consistent with human frailty'. (" "') The reader must conclude that 
C arissa 
does not always understand herself, and responds, at times, to motives which she 
or all her conscious cannot consciously allow herself to recognize; her passions, f 
rI to the Christ' efforts to control them, can never be perfectly subdued for, acco ding i ian 
system which Richardson advocates, the frailty of fallen nature precludes such 
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perfection. Because of this, both her relationship with Lovelace and the 
circumstances of her own death are undercut with ambiguities, both for herself and 
for the reader, and must remain so. 
It is impossible to say how far the circumstances of Clarissa's death held 
ambiguities for her creator, Richardson. There is enough in the text to imply at least 
that the demands of psychological validity drew him, whatever he had intended, to 
suggest that his saint is poised between the rock-like certainties of her conscious will, 
and the shifting impulses of her hidden and unconscious desires. Christian doctrine 
would declare that this is what it is to be human, and that such complexities are the 
inevitable outcome of a flawed nature which has lost its original state of integration. 
If Richardson's response to the demands of psychological complexities had 
been less exact; if he had not allowed his heroine to reflect what is, after all, that 
human state of imperfection - whether the reader believes or not in the Christian 
system, as Richardson did, which attributes such imperfections to a fallen state in 
which reason does not and cannot, perfectly control the passions - the death of 
Clarissa would be less problematic, but it would also be less compulsive and moving 
as an experience for the reader. The very complexities at once make her a saint, 
since she must struggle towards Heaven in the face of that fallen nature, and offer to 
the reader his own struggle of interpretation in witnessing hers. In the final analysis, 




A Ithough Richardson's novels enjoyed great success on publication, it 
iswell known that the author was disconcerted to find that in some 
quarters, they met with a reception that indicated some misunderstanding of his 
intentions. (') On the publication of Clarissa, Richardson was distressed to find that a 
fair number of readers had so far managed to misunderstand those intentions as to 
admire Lovelace and openly express regret at his fate. Moreover, most of these 
readers fell into the category to which Richardson had wished to offer a particular 
warning 'against preferring a man of pleasure to a man of probity' as a marriage 
partner. 
(p. 36) Consequently, he felt obliged in subsequent editions to make those 
changes in order to render Lovelace even more clearly a villain which have been 
explored in their effects by a number of commentators. (2) In the third edition, such 
material as the correspondence between Lovelace and Joseph Leman, 
(ii, pp. 143-153) and 
Lovelace's fantasy of the rape of Mrs Howe and Anna 
(ii, pp. 418425) is supplemented by 
Richardson's frequent 'editorial' footnotes, which direct the reader's attention to 
Lovelace' s villainy in his duplicity and manipulation of persons and events. (For 
example, i, p. 254 and ii, p. 90). Richardson's attempt to control his readers' 
responses, once his work had been released into the public domain, could only 
be, 
and has remained futile. Commentators ever since his novel's publication 
have 
interpreted and reinterpreted it in the light of their own preferred ideologies and of 
the social and intellectual temper of their times. 
However, whatever changes Richardson may have made, Lovelace retains 
the 
fascination which may well induce the modem reader, as well as the orig, nal, 
to 
respond to him in a manner of which Richardson might not have approved. 
He 
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likewise attempted to control his readers' response to his heroine by means of 
additions to the text. In the third edition, he defends her against the charge of having 
loved so faulty a man as Lovelace, both in the text,, ("'- P"") and by his own comments 
in the Postscript. 
(iv, p. 55 8) In the Conclusion, he casts a more favourable light on 
Clarissa's conduct,, by providing a prudent reason for her correspondence with 
Lovelace 
(iv, p. 532) 
. Footnotes are used to exonerate Clarissa of blame, as they are used 
to blacken Lovelace. (For example, ii, p. 33 and ii, p. 156). Most notably, in response 
to those who accused her of 'over-niceness', he writes lengthy footnotes to point out 
that in her circumstances the utmost circumspection was necessary-(I- p. 
501 and ii. p. 313) 
On the other hand, the heroine whom he intended should serve as an example has had 
her own critics, (3) while her capacity for self-deception has frequently been noted, 
both within the novel by Anna, and by a variety of commentators. That there is a 
certain ambivalence about Richardson's own treatment of her is picked up by another 
of the original criticisms of the novel, expressed in terms modestly indirect, that the 
fire-scene exhibited too much indelicacy, a contention to which Richardson replied 
with an earnest denial. 
I was in hopes, that the Necessity there was of drawing such a 
Scene as should exalt the Lady, and baffle the intended Violator, even 
Rakes and Libertines being Judges, was sufficiently apparent. 
(4) 
The modem reader is perhaps more disturbed by the questions aroused, which 
can never be fully resolved, concerning the nature of Clarissa's long-drawn out death. 
However, it is no diminution of Richardson's achievement that the reader 
may be both attracted to his sinner, and at the same time repelled by his acts, or that 
he may both celebrate with Clarissa her hard-won triumph and yet be shocked at the 
determination for death which she herself does not recognise as such. 
These 
complexities of conduct on the part of the characters, and such ambivalence of 
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response on the part of the reader open up the novel to the variety of interpretations it 
has evoked, and mark both the psychological insight apparent in the presentation of 
character and Clarissa's power to engage the reader on a number of levels. 
Richardson may have intended to control his readers' responses, but it is a 
confirmation of his novel's success that he has not been able to do so. 
Whatever Richardson had intended at the novel's conception, his heroine and 
his anti-hero cannot be seen as characters neatly polarized. Hs concern to inculcate 
'the great lessons of Christianity -)(P- 1495) carries the implicit recognition that Lovelace, 
as well as Clarissa, must be presented as having a soul to be lost or saved, and that 
Clarissa, no more than Lovelace, can be seen as faultless. Nothing could be 
achieved, as far as inculcating those 'great lessons' is concerned if his saint were so 
inhumanly perfect as to defy credibility and to discourage emulation, and his sinner 
so evil as to preclude any sympathy or identification on the part of the reader. 
Richardson was well aware of such dangers, and appears to have modified his 
conception of Clarissa's character a little in order to bring her closer to fallible 
humanity. In a letter Aaron Hill in 1746, he writes- 
I had further intended to make her so faultless, that a Reader 
should find no way to account for the Calamities she met with, and to 
justify Moral Equity but by looking up to a future Reward; another of 
my principal Doctrines; and one of my principal Views to inculcate in 
this Piece. (5) 
However, eighteen months later he writes again to Aaron 911 that 
Clarissa 
'should have some little things to be blamed for, tho' for nothing in 
her Will'. (6) It is 
a slight difference between faultlessness and 'some little things', but it is a 
distinction 
that ensures the credibility of his heroine as a being in whom his readers may 
believe, 
and whom they may attempt to emulate. It also establishes her credibility as a saint. 
Richardson understands that sanctity, in the Christian system, 
is not beyond the 
Sol 
individual's grasp; it is only beyond the point to which he may care to reach . 
(7) His 
original didactic intention to make Clarissa 'faultless' gave way to the demands of a 
sure creative instinct in making her both complex and flawed. She, like Lovelace, is 
to be seen as the product of fallen nature, as even the saints must be. 
One modern commentator has referred to Clarissa as 'a Saint Teresa of her 
time', (8) and it is interesting to note that Saint Teresa, like her fictional sister, 
acknowledges the human frailty which characterizes even those who aspire to union 
with God. Writing for her nuns, she tells them- 
Do not,, of course, for one moment imagine that, because these 
souls have such vehement desires and are so determined not to 
commit a single imperfection for anything in the world, they do not in 
fact commit many imperfections and even sins. Not intentionally, it is 
true, for the Lord will give such persons very special aid as to this: I 
am referring to venial sins, for from mortal sins, as far as they know, 
they are free, though they are not completely proof against them; and 
the thought that they may commit some without knowing it will cause 
them no small agony'. (9) 
The reader of Saint Teresa's words must be reminded of Richardson's 
intentions that Clarissa should have some 'little things to be blamed for'. Her 
eventual sanctity is located in the conscious efforts she makes to overcome that 
frailty which the Christian system regards as integral to human nature, even in the 
most ardent of souls. It is clear that Saint Teresa and Richardson share a conception 
of human nature that is rooted in the long-establi shed doctrines of Christian 
orthodoxy, and upon which the great Spanish mystic bases the above analysis of 
human frailty, and Richardson his presentation of his heroine and of 
Lovelace. 
Perfection is not to be achieved this side of Heaven. Instead, Clarissa 
is fully realized 
in all her human complexity and passions, engaged in a struggle with 
herself as much 
as with Lovelace. That she does not always act in accordance with the 
Christian 
conception of reason is a measure of the success of Richardson's presentation. 
Such 
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shortcomings are at once consistent with the Christian account of human nature that 
he wishes to offer and with psychological verisimilitude. Moreover, it is apparent 
that for Richardson, his conviction of the truth of Scripture itself was strengthened b), 
the honesty with which the sins of its own heroes and saints are acknowledged- 
Is it not a strong proof of the sacred authority of the Scriptures, 
that the histories of David,, Solomon, and its other heroes, are handed 
down to us with their mixture of vices and virtues? (10ý 
In Clarissa, he applies this lesson from the Scriptures in the creatlon of h's 
heroine; writing to Frances Grainger, he makes this very point with application to his 
own work - 
'Human nature will sometimes give the lye to virtue'; and so it 
will, but it ought not nor will in a good girl; in a girl who is good upon 
principle. Such a one may err by sudden impulse, thro' passion, or 
from persecution or provocation-, but not with deliberation if she have 
principle. (11) 
If the reader's conviction of Clarissa's sanctity depends, paradoxically, on the 
recognition of her human liability to error, his acknowledgement of Lovelace's 
villainy must be accompanied by a sense of compassion for the very same reason. 
Richardson may have intended to render Lovelace odious, but he remains obstinately 
attractive, despite the commission of acts which, by any standards the reader cares to 
apply, are intrinsically evil. The reader can excuse no more than does Richardson, r 
Lovelace's sins; deception, abduction, seduction and rape are not the minor faults of 
which both Richardson and Saint Teresa write, nor are they acts likely to endear the 
perpetrator, in life or in fiction, to others. Part of the horror which the reader 
is 
intended to experience at Lovelace's probable eternal fate, arises from the fact that 
his creator has endowed him with many traits that are not only attractive but which 
are recognisable, as virtues. Richardson himself asserted that his villain 
is not all 
villain. 
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How Sir! ... Have you read Lovelace's Bad, and not his Good? ... Is 
he not generous! Is he not, with respect to Meiim and Tuum Matters, just? Is he not ingenuous? Does he not on all Occasions exalt the Lady at his own Expense? Has he not therefore 
many Sparks of Goodness in his Heart ... 
(") 
Lovelace is not a relentlessly driven, mechanistic libertine like Shadwell's 
Don John, for whom the spectator cannot care and with whom he cannot identify, but 
a man in whose soul, according to the Christian account, the light of reason is shown 
to flame intermittently into a desire of virtue, only to be quenched again and again by 
the passions of pride and revenge. The reader's emotional response to Lovelace 
reflects the fact that Richardson has created a character whose vitality and wit he can 
enjoy, and of whom he may, at times, approve. 
Because of such sympathies, it is impossible not to be appalled by Lovelace's 
fate, and to hope that Richardson's scheme, like the Christian system, allows for the 
unsearchable mercy of God to operate in Lovelace's case, as Richardson hints that it 
may do in that of Belton. Perhaps Richardson's original readers might not have been 
so far amiss in their protests at Lovelace's fate, but may have mistaken the basis on 
which they protested. It is not because Lovelace is so attractive a figure that we are 
meant to be appalled at his probable damnation, but because Richardson presents in 
him a common humanity; as with Clarissa, Lovelace is so fully realized a figure that 
Richardson succeeds in making any reader who accepts the Christian system reflect 
that Lovelace's fate is one which he could share. if Richardson intends his readers to 
understand that Heaven lies as open to them as it does to Clarissa, he also intends 
them to realize that Hell too, lies open. 
Not the least of Richardson's triumphs in Clariss is that the reader is as 
convinced of the respective destinations of Clarissa and of the sinners as the author 
must have wished him to be, and so far enters into this fictional world as 
to give 
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complete credence to the inevitability of both tragedy and triumph on the author's 
terms. It is clear that those terms include the consideration that Clarissa and 
Lovelace may be seen to represent, in some respects, opposing principles. Hers are 
the principles, as Richardson remarks above, of the Gospel, but of Lovelace one 
modern commentator has asserted that he is 'the man who worships reason above all 
else'. (13) It is a fair judgement on a character in whom pride of intellect 
predominates, but Lovelace's conception of reason does not appear to be identified, 
in Richardson's presentation, with the Christian conception; his reason is not used to 
determine his conduct in relation to the law of God. 
While in some respects Lovelace exemplifies some of the effects of adopting 
the principles of the new philosophical systems, notably that of Hobbes, his use of 
reason is at once an ironic comment on the account given of that faculty by empiric 
philosophy, and a perversion of its exercise in terms of the Christian conception. 
Hume asserts that 'reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood' . 
(14) Lovelace's use 
of his reason reverses this severely reductive definition, since he employs it to create 
falsehood and obscure truth. In Christian terms he misapplies his reason, the faculty 
which is meant to lead him to Man's ultimate goal, to the purposes of sin and places 
it at the disposal of his libertine principles. For Richardson, some of the contentions 
of the new philosophical systems might well appear to be old sins in new gulses. Or 
the modem reader might conclude that Richardson's claim that his characters present 
'human nature as it is'(") merely opposes an ideology congenial to 
himself to those 
which challenge the orthodoxy which he upholds and seeks to vindicate. 
Be that as it 
may, his presentation of 'human nature as it is), is consistent with 
the long- 
established Christian view of its ImPerfect state. 
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In a letter to Young, Richardson demonstrates that he has considered some of 
the intellectual currents of his day which challenged the views of Christian orthodom, 
and that he is disturbed by them: 
But here, my friend, let me digress into a caution against the 
automathers, the self-taught philosophers, of the age, who set up 
genius above, not human learning, but divine truth. I have called 
genius wisdom, but let it be remembered, that in the most refined age 
of heathen genius, when the world by wisdom knew not God, it 
pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save those that 
believed. (16) 
Richardson's assertion of orthodoxy might be seen to run counter to the 
intellectual tide, and yet to represent a transitional period of thought. One of the 
purposes of this study has been to place Richardson within the context of successive 
codifications of theological thought, and to examine which of the doctrines given 
form by those codifications his work most frequently reflects. The results of such an 
examination might, at certain points, seem surprising, since, although his 
Protestantism could never be in doubt, in some of its aspects, the religious thought 
which underpins his work has a provenance that reaches back beyond the 
Reformation. In many respects he is heir to an older tradition, some of whose 
theological concepts had been assimilated, or at least had not been rejected, by that 
Reformation. The influence of that older tradition has rarely, if ever been considered 
in relation to Richardson, but it has its own importance, since, as the remarks 
by 
Jonsen and Toulmin quoted on page 14 of this study point out, many of the concepts 
belonging to that older tradition held their place until the Enlightenment. 
Richardson was writing at a time when ideas about man's nature and eternal 
destiny were undergoing an unprecedented re-examination. 
I-Es disquiet about the 
irreligiousness Of his age reflects such changing times, and 
his reassertion of 
Christian doctrine and values is in some respects a reassertion of some 
of those 
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concepts born of an ancient tradition. If Richardson is to be examined as a Christian 
author, that examination cannot be adequate without considerable reference both to 
the challenges of his times and to exactly what was being challenged. 
In one respect, his work reflects changing times. His presentation of 
character appears to take the middle ground between a profession of the strict 
Calvinist position that man is essentially corrupt and the more sanguine opinion of 
human nature held by Shaftesbury and thinkers who held similar views. ( 17ý Bv the 
end of the eighteenth century, as R. F. Brissenden has pointed out, the developments 
in philosophy had created an intellectual climate in which moral judgements came to 
be seen as influenced by subjective emotional experience. In Richardson's own time, 
Hume argued that such judgements were the province of a moral sentiment(18) and 
this appears to be a view which gained acceptance as the century wore on. 
Brissenden remarks- 
The role of feelings, especially in the formation of moral 
judgements, was particularly emphasized ... 
Disproportionate weight 
eventually came to be placed on the feelings - on sensibility at the 
expense of sense. (19) 
Such views are opposed to the long-establi shed opinions of Christian 
orthodoxy in regarding moral judgements as the province of reason, and in claiming 
that such judgements should be made with reference to the enduring and 
unchangeable standards of the eternal law. it is with these 
latter views that 
Richardson's own must be identified. His characters look to reason to 
determine 
their judgements and conduct, and know that their eternal welfare 
depends on an 
appropriate determination. 
Since the intellectual climate underwent a change 
by the end of the century, 
and many of the concepts to which Christian orthodoxy 
had gven their accepted 
formulation were, at least in some intellectual circles" reconsidered, 
could It be said 
that Richardson's moral basis, predicated on those earlier formulations, had been 
superseded? By no means. In his own time, despite the misunderstanding of some of 
his readers, he had enjoyed the appreciation of a multitude of others, knowledgeable 
and discriminating, who both related to his characters on what may be called an 
emotional level and who recognized the completeness and coherence with which he 
had made those important concepts integral to his novel. 
(20) As fair as the modem 
reader is concerned, Clarissa is open to endless interpretation and re-interpretation, 
and whether the system of Christianity which informs the novel is accepted or 
rejected by any given reader, it retains a richness and vitality which characterizes a 
great work. 
It is clear that the relationship between Clarissa and Lovelace has resonances 
which transcend the merely personal, and while no reader can fail to be engaged by 
the fluctuations of feelings between them and by the contradictions inherent in their 
responses to each other, equally no reader can fail to be aware of those resonances. 
He himself characterized Clarissa as a 'religious novel', and the Christian message 
which Richardson believes to oppose the presumptuous 'genius' of which he speaks 
above, is conveyed with a coherence and conviction which must impress the reader, 
whatever his own beliefs, or lack of them. However, in presenting Clarissa and 
Lovelace, he is not offering representations of opposing ideologies, but characters 
with whom the reader may engage, and in this encounter, watching their tortured and 
tortuous relationship unfold, find that his intellectual and emotional responses are 
demanded and then satisfied, since Richardson brings both into a perfect adjustment. 
Richardson might claim that his heroine and his villain are 
both 
representatives of fallen man, in a world in which trial must 
be an inevitable 
condition. It is a painful state, but one in which salvation, although 
demanding of 
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achievement, is yet possible, while 
failure to meet such demands brings an eternity of 
pain and loss. The reader may or may not share Richardson's own convictions on the 
matter, but it cannot be denied that in his fictional world he demonstrates with an 
urgency that gives the novel much of 
its force, the strength of those convictions, and 
I is never to be persuades his reader both that the 
Christian triumph of salvation i 
achieved without cost and that the Christian tragedy of loss can never be 
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